This module has no single desk. Its subject is the map on which every other module of the course is a point. A student who joins a corporate and investment bank (CIB) in January sits on one desk, and within a week discovers that the client he or she works for is served by six other desks, each with its own product, its own profit-and-loss account and its own vocabulary. Sustainability enters the bank through all of them, in a different form each time: a margin ratchet in lending, a use-of-proceeds framework in debt capital markets, an allowance forward on the carbon desk, a line in a disclosure template in Finance. The purpose of this module is to make that map readable before the course visits each point.
Where the CIB sits. A European universal bank has three large blocks: retail and commercial banking (households, small businesses), asset gathering (asset management, insurance, private banking) and the CIB, which serves large corporates, financial institutions and public issuers. Meridian Bank, the fictional bank of this course, is organised that way. Its CIB has four business lines, which give the course its blocks B, C and D:
| Business line | What it sells | Main revenue | Course block |
|---|---|---|---|
| Corporate banking | Loans, structured finance, trade finance, cash management | Net interest margin, fees | B |
| Investment banking | Bond and equity issuance, M&A advice | Fees | C (C01 to C06) |
| Global markets | Rates, FX, credit, equity, commodity and carbon trading | Client margin, bid-offer, carry | C (C07 to C15) |
| Securities services | Custody, fund administration, issuer services | Fees on assets, deposits margin | D |
Around them sit the functions that do not face clients but decide what the business lines may do and at what price: Risk, Finance, Treasury (ALM), Compliance, Legal, Operations and IT. They are block E.
Orders of magnitude. One published example fixes the scale. BNP Paribas, the largest CIB of the euro area, reported group revenues of EUR 51.2bn for 2025, of which EUR 19.0bn in CIB, with CIB operating expenses of EUR 11.1bn, a cost-income ratio of about 58% (computed from the full-year press release). In the fourth quarter of 2025 the split of CIB revenues was EUR 1.66bn for Global Banking, EUR 2.08bn for Global Markets and EUR 0.83bn for Securities Services, roughly 36%, 45% and 18%. Meridian is a smaller bank with the same shape. The teaching point is in the proportions: financing and advising corporates is about one third of a CIB’s revenue, markets nearly half, post-trade services the rest.
Who the clients are. Three families: corporates (a few thousand groups, from mid-caps to multinationals), financial institutions (asset managers, insurers, pension funds, other banks, hedge funds, private equity) and the public sector (sovereigns, agencies, supranationals, local authorities). Corporates are mostly borrowers and hedgers; institutions are mostly investors and trading counterparties. A CIB earns its living by standing between the two: it originates assets from the first family and distributes them to the second.
The team that carries sustainability. There is rarely a “green desk” with its own P&L. Meridian, like most banks, has a small central team inside the CIB, here called the Sustainable Finance Group (SFG), of about forty people. Its members are product specialists embedded in other teams: sustainable bond structurers inside DCM, sustainability coordinators inside loan structuring, ESG advisory bankers alongside Coverage. The transaction belongs to the product desk; the SFG brings the framework, the standards and the credibility check. In the second line of defence, an ESG risk team inside Risk gives an independent opinion on sensitive sectors and on climate in the rating. In Finance, a sustainability reporting team produces the bank’s own disclosures. Three populations, three reporting lines, one client.
A realistic week. Monday: the senior banker for the industrials sector chairs the account-planning session for a building-materials client; the SFG presents the client’s transition plan and proposes two ideas. Tuesday: credit committee for the renewal of the client’s revolving credit facility; the ESG risk officer comments on the carbon-cost sensitivity in the credit memo. Wednesday: DCM pitches a green bond to the client’s treasurer; the structurer checks that eligible capital expenditure is large enough. Thursday: the new product committee reviews the carbon desk’s request to trade a new type of contract; Compliance asks how it will be marketed. Friday: Finance closes the quarter and asks every desk to confirm the sustainability flags on its deals, because a wrong flag in the loan system becomes a wrong figure in a public report.
WHO DOES WHAT — The senior banker (Coverage) owns the client and the account plan. Product desks own their transactions and their P&L. The Sustainable Finance Group owns the label: it decides whether a deal can be called green or sustainability-linked. Risk owns the rating and the limits. Finance owns the numbers that go outside. When these five do not agree, the deal goes to a committee, and this course will name it each time.
IN ONE SENTENCE — A bank earns money either by putting an asset on its balance sheet and being paid for the risk, the funding and the capital, or by providing a service and being paid a fee; everything else is a mix of the two.
INTUITION — A property company can own flats and collect rent, or act as an estate agent and collect commissions. The landlord needs equity and loses money when a tenant stops paying. The agent needs a telephone and a reputation. A universal bank is both, and its skill is in using the landlord’s flats to feed the agent’s business.
In a balance-sheet business the bank lends, funds the loan through its Treasury, sets aside provisions for expected loss and holds regulatory capital against unexpected loss. Revenue is the margin over the internal cost of funds (the funds transfer price, FTP), earned every year for as long as the asset stays on the books. In a fee business the bank arranges, advises, places or safekeeps; revenue is a commission, often paid once; little or no asset remains on the balance sheet; the capital consumed is mostly for operational risk.
The course uses one profitability measure for both.
FORMULA
is revenue (net margin over FTP plus fees); operating costs (40% of lending revenue, 60% of fee and markets revenue at Meridian); expected loss; the one-year probability of default; the loss given default (40% for a senior unsecured corporate loan under the foundation IRB approach); the exposure at default; the tax rate (25%); allocated capital; risk-weighted assets. The hurdle is 12% after tax.
Take the plainest product in the building: a EUR 100m five-year term loan to a BBB corporate at a margin of 110 bp over EURIBOR. The desk pays Treasury a liquidity premium of 30 bp for five-year funding, so the net margin is 80 bp, or EUR 800,000 a year. Costs take EUR 320,000. Expected loss is 0.20% x 40% x EUR 100m, EUR 80,000. The F-IRB risk weight for this borrower is 39.02%, so RWA are EUR 39.0m and capital EUR 5.07m. RAROC is 5.91%, half the hurdle. To reach 12% on its own the loan would need a gross margin of 178.6 bp, which the market does not pay to a BBB name.
Now take EUR 400,000 of fee revenue, for instance a bookrunner fee on a bond. Costs are higher, 60%, because bankers are expensive. There is no expected loss. The course convention attaches EUR 2.5 of RWA to each euro of such revenue, to stand for operational and residual market risk, so capital is EUR 130,000. RAROC is 92.3%.
INTERACTIVE LAB — A loan and a fee: two ways to earn, two returns on capital
Rebuild the RAROC of a plain term loan line by line, find the margin it would need to reach the hurdle alone, and compare it with a fee business.
| Parameter you can move | Range | Default |
|---|---|---|
| Loan amount, fully drawn | 10 to 500 EUR m | 100 EUR m |
| Gross margin over EURIBOR | 30 to 400 bp | 110 bp |
| FTP liquidity premium | 0 to 80 bp | 30 bp |
| One-year PD of the borrower | 0.05 to 4 % | 0.2 % |
| Fee revenue to compare | 50 to 2000 EUR k | 400 EUR k |
| Result at default settings | Value |
|---|---|
| Loan revenue (net margin) | 800.0 EUR k |
| Operating costs (40%) | 320.0 EUR k |
| Expected loss | 80.0 EUR k |
| F-IRB risk weight | 39.02 % |
| Allocated capital (13% of RWA) | 5,072.3 EUR k |
| RAROC of the loan | 5.91 % |
| Gross margin needed for 12% | 178.6 bp |
| Capital behind the fee revenue | 130.0 EUR k |
| RAROC of the fee business | 92.31 % |
Try it. Move the PD to 1% (a BB borrower): the risk weight doubles, and even 250 bp does not reach the hurdle. Then raise the fee revenue: its RAROC does not move, because capital is proportional to revenue.
PITFALL — Concluding that banks should stop lending. The fee would not exist without the loan: issuers give bond mandates, hedges and cash management to the banks that commit their balance sheet to them. The loan is the entry ticket. Its return has to be read at the level of the relationship, which is what section 5 does.
Corporate banking is the balance-sheet heart. Its products are the revolving credit facility (RCF), a committed line the client may draw and repay (B03); term loans; structured and asset-backed lending such as project finance (B06), real estate (B08) and asset finance (B09); trade finance and guarantees (B10, B11); supply chain finance (B12); and transaction banking, meaning payments, cash pooling and deposits (B14). Revenue is net interest margin plus commitment, upfront and arrangement fees. The scarce resources are capital and liquidity. Deposits collected from corporates are themselves a product: the bank pays the client less than Treasury credits the desk, and the difference is a margin earned with almost no credit risk.
Investment banking is the fee heart. Debt capital markets (DCM) brings bond issuers to investors and earns a gross fee, shared between the bookrunners, of roughly 20 to 40 bp of the amount for investment-grade corporates and far more for high yield (C01). Equity capital markets earns a few per cent of the amount raised (C05). M&A advisory earns a success fee, typically around 1% of the value for mid-sized transactions, less in percentage terms for very large ones (C06). Revenue is lumpy; a senior banker may wait three years for a mandate.
Global markets makes prices. A sales person takes the client order; a trader quotes a price, takes the position and hedges it. Revenue comes from the client margin embedded in the price, from the bid-offer spread on flow products and from the carry and revaluation of inventory. The resources consumed are market-risk capital (FRTB, whose start date in the EU has been postponed more than once; see E09), counterparty-risk capital and funding for inventory. Rates and FX (C07), credit trading (C08), equity derivatives (C09), commodities and carbon (C10) and repo (C11) all live there, as does the bank’s own Treasury (C15), which issues the bank’s debt and manages its liquidity buffer.
Securities services keeps and administers assets for institutional investors and issuers: custody, settlement, fund administration, depositary, paying agency (block D). It is paid in basis points, or fractions of a basis point, on very large asset amounts, plus the margin on the cash balances clients leave. It is a volume business with heavy IT costs and low capital consumption.
No transaction is decided by a banker alone. Banks organise control in three lines of defence. The first line is the business, which owns the risk it takes. The second line, Risk and Compliance, sets the rules and gives an independent opinion: the credit risk department rates borrowers and sits in the credit committee; Compliance controls conduct, marketing and financial-crime risk. The third line is internal audit. Beside them, Finance produces the accounts, the regulatory ratios and the public disclosures; Treasury sets the FTP and manages liquidity; Legal negotiates documentation; Operations books, settles and services transactions.
Four committees appear throughout the course. The credit committee approves exposures on the basis of a credit memo. The underwriting or commitments committee approves the risk of buying securities or loans in order to distribute them. The new product committee approves any product or feature that systems, risk models or control functions have not handled before. The reputational risk committee decides on transactions that are legal and creditworthy but may damage the bank’s name.
WHY IT MATTERS ON THE DESK — Sustainability did not create new committees so much as add a paragraph to every existing paper: a climate section in the credit memo, an ESG screening in the onboarding file, a labelling check before a deal is called green, a flag in the booking system. Knowing the ordinary machinery tells you where the new paragraph is written, who signs it and who can refuse it.
A bank does not emit much carbon; its offices and data centres are a rounding error beside its clients’ activities. Its importance comes from its position. Monetary policy is transmitted to the economy through bank lending rates. Savings are transmitted to investment through banks’ balance sheets and through the securities they place. In the same way, climate policy and climate damage reach the financial system through banks’ clients, and capital reaches the transition through the loans banks grant and the bonds they underwrite. The belt runs in both directions: from the world to the bank’s risk, and from the bank’s financing decisions to the world. Section 3 gives each direction its proper name.
IN ONE SENTENCE — Double materiality means that a sustainability matter can count for two different reasons: because it affects the company’s finances, or because the company affects people and the environment.
INTUITION — A factory on a river has two questions to answer. Can the river flood the factory? Does the factory pollute the river? The insurer asks the first, the neighbours ask the second, and a sensible owner knows that today’s second question is often tomorrow’s first, once the neighbours have gone to court.
The first direction, outside-in, is financial materiality: sustainability matters as a source of risk and opportunity for the firm. The second, inside-out, is impact materiality. European reporting rules (the ESRS, under the CSRD) require companies to assess both; the international ISSB standards (IFRS S1 and S2) ask for the financial direction only. For a bank the distinction has an organisational translation. Outside-in is the business of Risk: does climate change the probability that this borrower repays? Inside-out is the business of strategy and reporting: what does the bank’s financing contribute to, and what does it disclose about it? Prudential supervisors care first about outside-in, because their mandate is the safety of the bank; they have made clear that they supervise risk and do not steer credit.
Supervisors do not treat climate as a new risk category. The Basel Committee’s 2021 analysis describes climate-related risk drivers that act through the existing categories. Three families are usual, following the distinction Mark Carney made in 2015.
Transition risk arises from the adjustment to a low-carbon economy: policy (carbon pricing, standards, bans), technology (a cheaper clean substitute), market preferences and reputation. Physical risk arises from the climate itself: acute events such as floods, storms and wildfires, and chronic changes such as heat, drought and sea-level rise. Liability risk arises when those who suffer loss seek compensation from those they hold responsible, or when a firm is sued for what it disclosed or promised; many frameworks fold it into transition risk. The same grid extends to nature loss and to social issues (A05).
The driver first hits the client’s economics, then the bank through the instrument that links them.
| Driver | Effect on the client | Bank risk type | Where in the bank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Carbon price rises | Costs up, EBITDA down, leverage up | Credit (PD) | Lending, credit risk (E01) |
| Asset stranded by regulation | Collateral value down | Credit (LGD) | Real estate, shipping (B08, B09) |
| Flood closes a plant | Lost production, repair capex | Credit; operational for the bank’s own sites | Project finance (B06) |
| Repricing of carbon-intensive issuers | Bond spreads widen | Market, counterparty | Credit trading, XVA (C08, E09) |
| Deposit outflows or drawn credit lines after a disaster | Client draws liquidity | Liquidity | Treasury (E04) |
| Mis-labelled product, contested client | Litigation, fines, lost mandates | Operational, legal, reputational | Compliance (E10) |
PITFALL — Reading the table as a forecast of losses. Climate drivers act with long and uncertain delays, while a corporate loan matures in five years and a rating looks one year ahead. The transmission is real but partial: it depends on pass-through to customers, on the client’s ability to invest, on insurance. Section 5.2 quantifies one channel and shows how much depends on two assumptions.
Every labelled product in this course belongs to one of four families. They differ by what is promised.
| Family | What is promised | Standards | Examples |
|---|---|---|---|
| Use-of-proceeds | The money goes to eligible projects | ICMA Green and Social Bond Principles; LMA Green Loan Principles; EU Green Bond Standard | Green bond, green loan (B02, C01) |
| KPI-linked | The issuer improves; the price moves if it does not | ICMA Sustainability-Linked Bond Principles; LMA Sustainability-Linked Loan Principles | SLL, SLB, sustainability-linked derivative (B03, C02, C07) |
| Transition | A high emitter finances credible decarbonisation that is not yet “green” | ICMA Climate Transition Finance Handbook and Climate Transition Bond Guidelines; LMA Transition Loan Principles | Transition bond or loan (A04, B07) |
| Pure-play | Nothing is promised in the contract; the borrower’s whole business is the eligible activity | Taxonomy alignment of the counterparty | Loan to a wind developer |
A use-of-proceeds instrument is ordinary debt of the issuer, ranking equally with its other debt, with a commitment to allocate an equivalent amount to eligible projects and to report on it. The credit risk is the issuer’s; only the destination of the money is special. Under the voluntary ICMA principles, eligibility is defined in the issuer’s own framework and checked by an external reviewer. Under the EU Green Bond Standard, which has applied since 21 December 2024, proceeds must be allocated to activities aligned with the EU Taxonomy, with a limited flexibility pocket, and the external reviewer is supervised by ESMA.
A KPI-linked instrument finances general corporate purposes. Its interest rate depends on whether the borrower meets sustainability performance targets on a few key performance indicators. It suits companies with no large pool of green capital expenditure. Its weakness is calibration: if targets are easy and the step is a few basis points, the product measures more than it changes.
Transition finance addresses the gap between the two: a cement or steel producer has few projects that qualify as green today, but its decarbonisation capital expenditure is where emissions are actually cut. ICMA introduced a stand-alone Climate Transition Bond label in November 2025, and the loan associations published final Transition Loan Principles on 3 November 2026. The market is young and the credibility test rests on the issuer’s transition plan.
Pure-play financing carries no label but counts in the bank’s metrics: a general-purpose loan to a company whose revenue is fully Taxonomy-aligned is a green asset for the bank’s Green Asset Ratio.
IN ONE SENTENCE — Financed emissions are the share of a client’s emissions attributed to the bank because its money is in the client’s balance sheet; facilitated emissions are the share attributed because the bank helped the client raise money from others.
The Partnership for Carbon Accounting Financials (PCAF) gives the rule used by most banks. For a loan or a bond held, the bank is attributed a fraction of the client’s annual emissions equal to its outstanding amount divided by the client’s enterprise value including cash (EVIC) for listed companies, or by total equity plus debt for others (A03). For capital-markets transactions, PCAF’s Part B standard, published in December 2023, attributes the bank’s share of the deal over the same denominator, in the year of the transaction only, multiplied by a weighting factor of 33%, on the reasoning that an arranger’s responsibility is smaller than a holder’s. The two are reported separately. This mirrors the split of section 2: balance-sheet businesses produce financed emissions, a stock; fee businesses produce facilitated emissions, a flow.
Five reasons, in decreasing order of candour. Client demand: large corporates want to finance their transition plans and their treasurers ask their banks for formats; a bank that cannot structure a green bond loses the conventional one too. Regulation and supervision: banks must identify, manage and disclose ESG risks, and must explain to supervisors how their portfolios will fare during the transition. Funding: the bank issues its own green bonds (C15) and needs eligible assets to back them. Risk: a lender with a five-to-ten-year horizon on carbon-intensive sectors has an ordinary credit reason to know which clients can adapt. Franchise: staff, shareholders and some clients prefer a bank with a credible position.
The costs are real. People: the SFG, ESG risk analysts, reporting teams. Data: emissions, Taxonomy alignment and physical-risk data bought from vendors or collected client by client. Systems: flags and fields in loan and trading systems that were not designed for them (E11). Foregone revenue: basis points given up in margin ratchets, and business declined under sector policies. Liability: the risk of being accused of greenwashing rises with every label. Section 5 puts a number on several of these for one client.
PITFALL — Assuming that a labelled deal is cheaper for the bank to hold. As of November 2026 EU prudential rules contain no “green supporting factor”: a green loan to a BBB borrower carries the same risk weight as a brown loan to the same borrower (E02). The benefit, where it exists, comes through the borrower’s credit quality, the bank’s funding or its franchise.
Module A02 owns the regulatory stack; here are the five points every desk meets.
First, prudential rules. CRR3 (Regulation (EU) 2024/1623), applicable since 1 January 2025, defines ESG, physical and transition risks and extends ESG disclosure to all institutions. CRD6 requires banks to hold plans addressing the financial risks arising from ESG factors, including those of the transition; the EBA Guidelines on the management of ESG risks, published on 9 January 2025, have applied to large institutions since 11 January 2026 and apply to small and non-complex ones from 11 January 2027.
Second, supervision has teeth. On 13 February 2026 the ECB announced periodic penalty payments of EUR 7.55m on Crédit Agricole for failing to meet, by the deadline set in a binding decision, the requirement to assess the materiality of its climate-related and environmental risks. The ECB’s priorities for 2026-28 nevertheless describe its climate programme as nearing completion and moving into ordinary supervision.
Third, the bank’s own disclosures have been simplified, and are still moving. The Omnibus directive published on 26 February 2026 limits CSRD reporting to undertakings with more than 1,000 employees and more than EUR 450m of turnover. Delegated Regulation (EU) 2026/73 removed exposures to undertakings outside the CSRD scope from the denominator of Taxonomy ratios. On 29 October 2026 the EBA advised the Commission to drop the trading-book and fees-and-commissions indicators and to simplify the Green Asset Ratio templates; the Commission has not yet acted.
Fourth, voluntary alliances have faded while supervisory requirements stayed. The Net-Zero Banking Alliance ceased operations in early October 2025 after the departure of many large members; its target-setting guidance remains public. European banks kept their sectoral targets, now anchored in the prudential plans rather than in a club.
Fifth, conduct. Calling a product sustainable is a claim made to investors and clients, and financial regulators treat misleading claims as mis-selling. The asset manager DWS paid USD 19m to the US SEC in 2023 and EUR 25m to German prosecutors in 2025 over the way it had described its ESG capabilities. Banks have drawn the lesson that the label is a liability to be controlled.
A01 has no single deal, so the lifecycle followed here is that of a client relationship over one year. It is the skeleton on which the other modules hang their own, more detailed, flows.
INTERACTIVE LAB — One client, one year: the path through the bank
Follow a corporate client from the account plan to the bank’s public disclosures and see where the sustainability paragraph is written at each step.
| # | Who | Does what | Deliverable |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Senior banker (Coverage) | Runs the annual account-planning session with product desks and the Sustainable Finance Group | Account plan with wallet estimate and ESG client profile |
| 2 | Client onboarding (KYC) and ESG risk officer | Screens the client against sector policies and exclusion lists; scores the transition plan | KYC file, ESG screening memo, transition score |
| 3 | Credit analyst | Writes the credit application with a climate section and proposes the internal rating | Credit memo, rating proposal |
| 4 | Credit committee (Risk) | Approves limits for loans, derivatives and guarantees; sets conditions | Credit decision and limit structure |
| 5 | Loan structuring and sustainability coordinator | Negotiates the facility, the KPIs, the targets and the margin ratchet | Term sheet, facility agreement |
| 6 | DCM origination and sustainable bond structurer | Builds the green financing framework with the issuer; obtains the second-party opinion | Framework, external review, mandate letter |
| 7 | Syndicate desk | Runs the bookbuilding, prices and allocates the bond | Pricing term sheet, allocations |
| 8 | Rates and FX sales with the trader | Executes the interest-rate swap and currency hedges under the ISDA agreement | Trade confirmations |
| 9 | Carbon desk | Sells EU allowance forwards covering part of the client’s shortfall | Trade confirmations, position within limits |
| 10 | Transaction banking | Operates accounts, cash pooling and guarantees | Service agreements, guarantee texts |
| 11 | Middle office and loan agency | Books every transaction with its sustainability flags; collects the annual KPI certificate | Tagged records in loan and trading systems |
| 12 | Finance, sustainability reporting | Aggregates exposures, flags and emissions data into the bank’s disclosures | Taxonomy ratios, Pillar 3 ESG tables, financed and facilitated emissions |
| 13 | Senior banker and credit analyst | Hold the annual review: rating, KPI test results, profitability of the relationship | Annual review memo, updated account plan |
Steps 1 and 2: planning and screening. The account plan is a short internal document: the client’s strategy, its financing needs for the next two years, the fees the bank earned last year and the share of the client’s total banking spend, the wallet, it hopes to win. Since about 2021 it has contained an ESG profile: emissions, targets, controversies, and the transition score that Meridian’s ESG risk team assigns on a five-step scale. Screening is a control with consequences: a client in breach of a sector policy (for example a coal developer) cannot be onboarded whatever its credit quality, and a sensitive case is escalated to the reputational risk committee. B01 treats this dialogue in depth.
Steps 3 and 4: credit. The credit memo is the central document of corporate banking. The analyst describes the business, projects cash flows, proposes a rating that maps to a probability of default, and requests limits by product. The climate section asks what the carbon price, regulation or physical hazards do to the projections over the life of the exposure. The committee, chaired by Risk, decides; its conditions (a shorter tenor, a covenant, a lower hold) are binding on the business. E01 explains how climate enters the rating itself.
Steps 5 to 9: transactions. Each product desk executes under the limits granted. The sustainability work is front-loaded: KPIs and targets are negotiated before the facility agreement is signed; the green framework and its external review are published before the bond is announced. On the markets side the controls are those of any trade (suitability, best execution, limits), plus a marketing check whenever a sustainability claim is attached to the product.
Steps 10 to 12: servicing and reporting. These are the least visible steps and the ones on which the bank’s public figures depend. A loan booked without its “sustainability-linked” flag does not appear in the bank’s sustainable finance volumes; a loan flagged “green” without evidence of the use of proceeds is a misstatement waiting to be found by the auditor. Operations and Finance reconcile flags to documents every quarter (E06, E11).
Step 13: the annual review closes the loop. The banker faces two questions from management: is the rating stable, and does the relationship earn its cost of capital? Section 5 answers both for one client.
The client is Halvard Industries SE, a fictional listed European building-materials group: cement, aggregates, ready-mix concrete and insulation products. It is a deliberately difficult client for a course on sustainable finance, because cement is both indispensable and carbon-intensive: roughly 60% of a cement plant’s emissions come from the chemistry of turning limestone into clinker, and cannot be removed by switching fuel. All company figures below are case assumptions; rules and market parameters are real.
Question. Who is Halvard, financially and in carbon terms, in November 2026?
Data.
| Item | Value |
|---|---|
| Revenue, EBITDA (2026 estimate) | EUR 6,000m, EUR 1,080m |
| Gross debt, cash, net debt | EUR 3,700m, EUR 1,000m, EUR 2,700m |
| Market capitalisation | EUR 6,300m |
| Scope 1, scope 2 emissions | 8.4 Mt, 0.6 Mt CO2e |
| Annual capital expenditure | EUR 600m |
| Rating (external and internal) | BBB, one-year PD 0.20% |
Halvard’s cement plants fall under the EU Emissions Trading System. For each tonne of scope 1 emissions it must surrender one allowance (EUA). In 2026 it receives free allowances covering 75% of its emissions (case assumption) and buys the rest. We take an EUA price of EUR 75 per tonne as the base; allowances traded between about EUR 70 and EUR 90 in the first quarter of 2026. Free allocation to sectors covered by the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism, cement among them, is being phased out between 2026 and 2034, which is the heart of the transition risk.
Calculation. Leverage is net debt over EBITDA. Carbon intensity is scope 1 and 2 emissions over revenue. The annual allowance bill is the shortfall, emissions not covered by free allocation, times the price:
is scope 1 emissions, the share covered by free allowances, the allowance price.
Result. Leverage is 2.50x and the EBITDA margin 18.0%. Carbon intensity is 1,500 tCO2e per EUR million of revenue, an order of magnitude above most manufacturing companies. The shortfall is 2.1 Mt and the carbon cost EUR 157.5m a year, already 14.6% of EBITDA.
INTERACTIVE LAB — Halvard’s financial and carbon profile on one page
Derive the ratios a banker reads first: leverage, margin, carbon intensity, allowance shortfall and the carbon bill as a share of EBITDA.
| Parameter you can move | Range | Default |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue | 2000 to 12000 EUR m | 6000 EUR m |
| EBITDA | 300 to 2500 EUR m | 1080 EUR m |
| Net debt | 0 to 6000 EUR m | 2700 EUR m |
| Scope 1 emissions | 0 to 20 Mt CO2e | 8.4 Mt CO2e |
| Scope 2 emissions | 0 to 5 Mt CO2e | 0.6 Mt CO2e |
| Share of scope 1 covered by free allowances | 0 to 100 % | 75 % |
| EUA price | 20 to 200 EUR/t | 75 EUR/t |
| Result at default settings | Value |
|---|---|
| Net debt / EBITDA | 2.50 x |
| EBITDA margin | 18.0 % |
| Carbon intensity (scope 1+2) | 1,500 tCO2e per EUR m revenue |
| Allowances to buy | 2.10 Mt |
| Annual carbon cost | 157.5 EUR m |
| Carbon cost as share of EBITDA | 14.6 % |
Try it. Set free allocation to 0%, the situation scheduled for 2034: at an unchanged price the bill is EUR 630m, more than half of today’s EBITDA.
Where the data come from. Nothing here requires a specialist database. Revenue, EBITDA and debt are in the annual report. Scope 1 and 2 emissions are in the sustainability statement, which for a group of this size is subject to limited assurance under the CSRD. Verified emissions and free allocation of each installation are public in the EU registry of the trading system, so the analyst can rebuild the shortfall plant by plant and check the company’s own figure. What the analyst will not find easily is the future: the free-allocation path depends on product benchmarks and on the border-adjustment schedule, and the company’s hedging policy on allowances is rarely disclosed in detail. These are questions for the client meeting, and the senior banker should ask them with the treasurer in the room (B01, A03).
Reading. The financial profile is a comfortable BBB. The carbon profile says that a regulatory schedule already in law will multiply one cost line by four at constant prices. Whether this is a credit problem depends on what Halvard’s competitors and customers do, which is the next stage.
Question. How does a carbon-cost shock travel to Meridian’s rating of Halvard and to the capital the bank holds?
IN ONE SENTENCE — Transition risk becomes credit risk when a policy cost that the client cannot pass on to its customers reduces the cash flow available to service debt.
INTUITION — A baker whose flour price doubles is ruined if he is the only one affected, and unharmed if every baker in town faces the same price and bread goes up. The danger lies in the share of the extra cost that sticks to him.
Data. Stress scenario for the horizon of the facility, around 2030: free allocation falls to 50% of emissions and the allowance price rises to EUR 120. Halvard passes 60% of the additional cost on to its customers, since competitors inside the EU bear the same cost and imports pay the border adjustment. Net debt is unchanged. Meridian’s rating grid for the sector maps leverage to PD: 1.5x to 0.07% (A), 2.5x to 0.20% (BBB), 3.5x to 1.00% (BB), 5.0x to 4.00% (B), with log-linear interpolation between these points. The grid is a case assumption, a deliberate simplification of a rating model that weighs many factors.
Calculation.
and are the stressed free share and price; is the pass-through rate. The stressed gross bill is 8.4 x 50% x 120 = EUR 504m, an increase of EUR 346.5m, of which 40% stays with Halvard.
Result. EBITDA falls by EUR 138.6m to EUR 941.4m. Leverage rises from 2.50x to 2.87x. The PD read on the grid moves from 0.20% to 0.36%, still investment grade but one notch weaker. The F-IRB risk weight rises from 39.02% to 53.08%.
INTERACTIVE LAB — From the carbon price to the PD: one transmission channel, step by step
Shock the allowance price and the free allocation, choose how much of the extra cost the client passes on, and follow the effect on EBITDA, leverage, PD and risk weight.
| Parameter you can move | Range | Default |
|---|---|---|
| Stressed EUA price | 60 to 200 EUR/t | 120 EUR/t |
| Stressed free allocation (share of scope 1) | 0 to 75 % | 50 % |
| Pass-through of the extra cost to customers | 0 to 100 % | 60 % |
| Cut in scope 1 emissions delivered by the transition plan | 0 to 50 % | 0 % |
| Result at default settings | Value |
|---|---|
| Stressed carbon bill | 504.0 EUR m |
| EBITDA lost (after pass-through) | 138.6 EUR m |
| Stressed EBITDA | 941.4 EUR m |
| Stressed net debt / EBITDA | 2.87 x |
| PD read on the rating grid | 0.362 % |
| F-IRB risk weight | 53.08 % |
Try it. Set the pass-through to 0%: the same shock sends leverage to 3.68x and the PD to 1.18%, a sub-investment-grade borrower. The analyst’s whole judgement is in that one parameter.
What management does. The stress so far assumes that Halvard emits in 2030 what it emits today. Its transition plan targets a 20% cut in scope 1 emissions by then, through alternative fuels, a lower clinker content and the first capture unit. With that cut delivered and free allowances still covering half of the remaining emissions, the EBITDA loss is EUR 98.3m instead of EUR 138.6m, leverage 2.75x and the PD 0.30%. The plan is worth about six basis points of default probability in this scenario. It also costs money: the capital expenditure is financed with debt, which the simple grid ignores, and a capture unit that works on paper may be late. A credit analyst therefore reads a transition plan as any other investment programme: amount, timetable, technology risk, and what happens to leverage if it slips.
CASE — Halvard in three states of the world, same price and free allocation: no plan and 60% pass-through, PD 0.36%; plan delivered, PD 0.30%; no plan and no pass-through, PD 1.18%. The spread between the best and the worst case is a factor of four, and the two variables that produce it, competitive position and execution of the plan, are what the banker discusses with the client every year.
Reading. Three lessons. First, the chain is ordinary credit analysis: a cost, a margin, a leverage ratio, a rating. Nothing in it requires a climate model, only a scenario. Second, the result is dominated by pass-through, a competitive question that the credit analyst is better placed to judge than a climate scientist. Third, the stress ignores what management does: Halvard’s transition plan (alternative fuels, less clinker per tonne of cement, a carbon-capture unit) is precisely an attempt to shrink before reaches zero. A banker who finances that capital expenditure is acting on the bank’s own credit risk.
PITFALL — Applying a carbon price to all emissions as if nothing were priced today. Halvard already pays EUR 157.5m. The shock is the increase, and only the part that is not passed on. Naive stress tests that multiply total emissions by a headline price overstate the loss several times.
Question. Is physical risk a rating driver for Halvard?
Data. Halvard’s largest cement plant stands on a river and produces 9% of group EBITDA. A flood that closes it has an annual probability of 2% today (a one-in-fifty-year event); a climate scenario for 2050 doubles that to 4%. An outage lasts 60 days. Insurance covers half of the lost margin and repair costs after deductibles and limits; the other half is borne by Halvard.
Calculation. Event loss = plant EBITDA x (days / 365) x uninsured share. Expected annual loss = annual probability x event loss.
Result. The plant earns EUR 97.2m a year. One flood costs Halvard EUR 8.0m of EBITDA; group leverage in that year would move from 2.50x to 2.52x. The expected annual loss is EUR 0.16m today and EUR 0.32m in the 2050 scenario.
INTERACTIVE LAB — A flood at one plant: event loss and expected annual loss
Size an acute physical risk for a diversified industrial group and compare it with the transition shock.
| Parameter you can move | Range | Default |
|---|---|---|
| Plant share of group EBITDA | 1 to 50 % | 9 % |
| Annual probability of the flood | 0.5 to 10 % | 2 % |
| Outage | 10 to 365 days | 60 days |
| Share of the loss not insured | 0 to 100 % | 50 % |
| Result at default settings | Value |
|---|---|
| Plant EBITDA | 97.2 EUR m |
| EBITDA lost if the flood occurs | 7.99 EUR m |
| Expected annual loss | 0.160 EUR m |
| Group leverage in the flood year | 2.519 x |
Try it. Set the plant share to 100%, the outage to 180 days and the uninsured share to 100%: this is a single-asset borrower with no cover, and the event loss is half of EBITDA.
Reading. For a diversified group with insurance, an acute event at one site is a bad quarter. The transition shock of 5.2 costs EUR 138.6m every year; the flood costs EUR 8.0m once in fifty years. The proportion reverses when the borrower is a single asset: a project-finance company, a building, a ship. There the asset is the only source of repayment and its location is the credit (B06, B08). The honest statement for corporate lending in 2026 is that transition risk is analysable and physical risk is mostly a data problem: the bank often does not know where its clients’ plants are.
Two cautions keep this conclusion from becoming complacent. Insurance is renewed every year, and insurers reprice or withdraw after losses, so the uninsured share of 50% is itself exposed to the climate. And acute events are only half of physical risk: chronic water stress or heat that cuts kiln output by a few per cent every summer never makes the news, has no insurance, and enters EBITDA quietly. Neither changes Halvard’s rating today; both belong in the questions of the annual review.
Question. What does Meridian earn from Halvard in a year, and from which desks?
Data (case assumptions).
Result. Lending earns EUR 451,800; DCM EUR 375,000; markets EUR 238,700; the carbon desk EUR 42,000; transaction banking EUR 920,000; M&A EUR 540,000 in expectation; securities services EUR 150,000. The wallet is EUR 2.72m a year. Lending, which carries almost all the capital, is 16.6% of it.
INTERACTIVE LAB — What one industrial client pays one bank in a year, desk by desk
Build the revenue of each of the seven desks from its own pricing logic and see the weight of lending in the total.
| Parameter you can move | Range | Default |
|---|---|---|
| Meridian hold in the RCF | 0 to 300 EUR m | 150 EUR m |
| Average utilisation | 0 to 100 % | 20 % |
| Annual bond issue | 0 to 1500 EUR m | 500 EUR m |
| Number of bookrunners sharing the fee | 1 to 8 | 4 |
| Swap notional (7 years) | 0 to 1000 EUR m | 250 EUR m |
| Average deposits | 0 to 500 EUR m | 150 EUR m |
| Annual probability of an M&A mandate | 0 to 100 % | 15 % |
| Annual cost of the sustainability work on this client | 0 to 300 EUR k | 60 EUR k |
| Result at default settings | Value |
|---|---|
| 1. Corporate lending | 451.8 EUR k |
| 2. DCM | 375.0 EUR k |
| 3. Rates and FX | 238.7 EUR k |
| 4. Carbon desk | 42.0 EUR k |
| 5. Transaction banking | 920.0 EUR k |
| 6. M&A (expected) | 540.0 EUR k |
| 7. Securities services | 150.0 EUR k |
| Total wallet | 2,717.5 EUR k |
| Of which non-lending | 2,265.7 EUR k |
| Lending as share of the wallet | 16.6 % |
| Sustainability work as share of the wallet | 2.2 % |
Try it. Set the M&A probability and the bond issue to zero, a year without capital-markets activity: the wallet falls by a third and lending becomes a quarter of it.
How the banker knows. The lending and transaction-banking lines come from the bank’s own management accounts, client by client. The markets lines come from the sales credits that trading desks allocate to each client trade. The capital-markets and M&A lines are the hardest: the banker estimates the fees the client will pay to all its banks from league-table data and from the client’s maturity profile, then applies the share Meridian can reasonably win. The result, client revenue against capital consumed, is the single page that management reads before deciding how much balance sheet a client deserves.
Reading. Three features are typical. Transaction banking, the least glamorous line, is the largest and the most regular. Investment-banking revenue is large but uncertain: the EUR 540,000 is a 15% chance of EUR 3.6m. And the carbon desk, the only business in the list that exists because of climate policy, earns EUR 42,000: flow hedging for one corporate is a thin business, which lives on volume across hundreds of clients (C10).
Question. Where, on each desk, does sustainability enter the relationship with Halvard, and in which product family?
| Desk | Touchpoint | Family | Module |
|---|---|---|---|
| Lending | RCF is sustainability-linked: three KPIs, ratchet of plus or minus 3 bp | KPI-linked | B03 |
| DCM | EUR 500m green bond under a green financing framework | Use-of-proceeds | C01 |
| Rates and FX | Plain swap; a sustainability-linked version was considered | KPI-linked (declined) | C07 |
| Carbon desk | Allowance forwards hedge the transition cost itself | Risk transfer | C10 |
| Transaction banking | Guarantees for the carbon-capture project; request for a “green deposit” | Use-of-proceeds | B11, B14 |
| M&A | Carbon cost in the valuation of the business for sale | Advisory | C06 |
| Securities services | Paying agency on the green bond; ESG reporting for the pension fund | Service | D05, D06 |
Lending. The KPIs are scope 1 emissions per tonne of cementitious product, the share of alternative fuels in the kilns, and the lost-time injury rate. Meridian acts as sustainability coordinator. At full discount the bank gives up 3 bp on the drawn amount and 35% of that on the undrawn amount, EUR 21,600 a year on its hold (tested in section 6).
DCM. A green bond requires eligible expenditure. Halvard’s framework lists alternative-fuel installations, clinker substitution, waste-heat recovery and the capture unit; 35% of the EUR 600m annual capital expenditure qualifies. The framework allows a two-year look-back and one year of forward allocation, so the eligible pool is three years of eligible spend.
Result. Eligible capital expenditure is EUR 210m a year and the pool EUR 630m, 1.26 times the EUR 500m bond. The bond fits; a EUR 750m issue would not, and Halvard cannot issue a green bond every year.
INTERACTIVE LAB — Is there enough green capex for a green bond? And what counts for the bank?
Check that the eligible project pool covers a use-of-proceeds bond, and compute what a general-purpose loan to the same client contributes to the bank’s Taxonomy numerator.
| Parameter you can move | Range | Default |
|---|---|---|
| Annual capital expenditure | 100 to 2000 EUR m | 600 EUR m |
| Eligible share of capex | 0 to 100 % | 35 % |
| Look-back period | 0 to 3 years | 2 years |
| Forward allocation period | 0 to 3 years | 1 years |
| Green bond size | 100 to 1500 EUR m | 500 EUR m |
| Client’s Taxonomy-aligned turnover | 0 to 100 % | 8 % |
| Meridian’s drawn general-purpose loan | 0 to 300 EUR m | 30 EUR m |
| Result at default settings | Value |
|---|---|
| Eligible capex per year | 210.0 EUR m |
| Eligible pool | 630.0 EUR m |
| Pool / bond size | 1.26 x |
| Loan amount counted as Taxonomy-aligned by the bank | 2.40 EUR m |
Try it. Raise the bond to EUR 750m: coverage falls to 0.84 and the structurer must refuse the size or the label.
Rates and FX. Meridian’s structurers proposed to mirror the loan’s KPIs in the swap, with a small spread adjustment. Halvard declined: the hedge-accounting analysis and the documentation cost more than the few thousand euros at stake. Many sustainable ideas end this way, and saying so to the client is part of the job.
Carbon desk. The forward purchase of allowances is the only instrument in the relationship that directly transfers transition risk. It fixes for the hedged volume; it does nothing about , the regulatory schedule.
Transaction banking. Halvard’s treasurer asks whether its deposits can be labelled green. Meridian’s answer is cautious: a deposit is a liability of the bank, and the label holds only if the bank can show a matching pool of eligible assets not already pledged to its own green bonds (B14, C15).
M&A. Halvard considers selling a lime business with 1.1 Mt of emissions. The buyer’s valuation depends on the allowance-cost path of 5.2. The sale would cut Halvard’s reported emissions, and Meridian’s financed emissions with them, without removing a tonne from the atmosphere. Advisers must be able to say this plainly.
Securities services. The paying agent moves coupons; it does not verify the use of proceeds. Students often assume that someone in the post-trade chain checks the green label. Nobody does: the control is the issuer’s allocation report and its external verification.
WHY IT MATTERS ON THE DESK — Seven desks produced three labelled products (the loan, the bond, possibly the deposit) and four touchpoints with no label at all. Most of the sustainability work of a bank is unlabelled: it is a parameter in a valuation, a sentence in a credit memo, a question about what a word means in a marketing document.
Question. How much of Halvard’s 9.0 Mt appears in Meridian’s own carbon accounts?
Data. EVIC is market capitalisation plus gross debt: EUR 6,300m + EUR 3,700m = EUR 10,000m. Meridian’s drawn loan is EUR 30m. Its share of the bond as bookrunner is one quarter, EUR 125m. Emissions are scope 1 and 2; scope 3 is reported separately (A03).
Calculation.
is the client’s annual emissions; 33% is the PCAF weighting factor for capital-markets facilitation.
Result. The attribution factor of the loan is 0.30%: financed emissions are 27,000 tCO2e. The attribution factor of the bond share is 1.25%: 112,500 t before weighting, 37,125 t of facilitated emissions after weighting, recognised in the year of issue only.
INTERACTIVE LAB — Financed and facilitated emissions for one client
Apply the PCAF attribution logic to a drawn loan and to a bookrunner share, and compare the two.
| Parameter you can move | Range | Default |
|---|---|---|
| Drawn loan outstanding | 0 to 300 EUR m | 30 EUR m |
| Bank’s share of the bond issue | 0 to 500 EUR m | 125 EUR m |
| Market capitalisation | 1000 to 20000 EUR m | 6300 EUR m |
| Gross debt | 0 to 10000 EUR m | 3700 EUR m |
| Client emissions, scope 1+2 | 0.1 to 30 Mt CO2e | 9 Mt CO2e |
| Facilitation weighting factor | 33 / 100 | 33 % |
| Result at default settings | Value |
|---|---|
| EVIC | 10,000 EUR m |
| Attribution factor of the loan | 0.30 % |
| Financed emissions | 27,000 tCO2e |
| Attribution factor of the bond share | 1.25 % |
| Facilitated emissions before weighting | 112,500 tCO2e |
| Facilitated emissions | 37,125 tCO2e |
| Financed emissions per EUR k of lending revenue (EUR 451.8k) | 59.8 t |
Try it. Draw the whole EUR 150m: financed emissions are multiplied by five with no change in Halvard’s chimneys. Then cut the market capitalisation by EUR 2bn: emissions attributed to the bank rise by a quarter because the share price fell.
Reading. Four observations, all uncomfortable. The undrawn EUR 120m carries no financed emissions, although the bank holds capital against it. One bond mandate in which Meridian keeps no risk generates more attributed emissions (37,125 t) than the loan it actually funds (27,000 t), and would generate four times more without the 33% weighting, a factor that remains contested. The figure moves with the share price through EVIC. And we applied the general-purpose method to a green bond: how use-of-proceeds instruments should be treated in facilitated emissions is one of the points on which practice is not settled (E07). These numbers steer banks’ sector targets, so their mechanics matter more than their apparent precision.
For that reason banks rarely steer a sector such as cement on absolute financed emissions. Meridian’s cement target is expressed as a physical intensity of its portfolio, in kilograms of CO2 per tonne of cementitious product, weighted by exposure. On that metric Halvard helps or hurts the bank’s trajectory according to how its own intensity compares with the portfolio average and how fast it falls, whatever the share price does. This is also why the first KPI of the sustainability-linked RCF is the same intensity: the loan’s test, the bank’s sector target and the client’s transition plan read the same number once a year. Per euro of lending revenue the relationship carries 59.8 tonnes of financed emissions, a ratio that the bank’s management uses to compare clients within a sector (E07).
Question. Does Halvard earn Meridian’s cost of capital?
Data. Lending revenue EUR 451,800 with 40% costs; other revenue EUR 2,265,700 with 60% costs and EUR 2.5 of RWA per euro of revenue; PD 0.20%, LGD 40%; credit conversion factor of 40% on the undrawn commitment.
Calculation. EAD = 30 + 40% x 120 = EUR 78m. RWA of the loan = 78 x 39.02% = EUR 30.43m; capital EUR 3.96m; expected loss EUR 62,400.
Result. Stand-alone, the RCF returns 3.96%, a third of the hurdle. With the other six desks, RWA rise to EUR 36.10m and capital to EUR 4.69m; the pre-tax result is EUR 1.115m and the relationship RAROC 17.82%. The loan alone would need EUR 1.22m of ancillary revenue to reach 12%; Halvard brings nearly twice that.
INTERACTIVE LAB — From the loan’s RAROC to the relationship RAROC
Compute capital and return on the RCF alone, then add the revenue and RWA of the other desks and find the cross-sell needed to reach the hurdle.
| Parameter you can move | Range | Default |
|---|---|---|
| Meridian hold in the RCF | 10 to 300 EUR m | 150 EUR m |
| Average utilisation | 0 to 100 % | 20 % |
| One-year PD | 0.05 to 4 % | 0.2 % |
| Revenue of the six other desks | 0 to 5000 EUR k | 2265.7 EUR k |
| Result at default settings | Value |
|---|---|
| Lending revenue | 451.8 EUR k |
| Exposure at default | 78.0 EUR m |
| RWA of the loan (F-IRB) | 30.43 EUR m |
| RWA of the loan under the standardised approach (75%) | 58.50 EUR m |
| Capital for the loan | 3,956.4 EUR k |
| Expected loss | 62.4 EUR k |
| RAROC of the loan alone | 3.96 % |
| RWA of the relationship | 36.10 EUR m |
| Capital for the relationship | 4,692.7 EUR k |
| Pre-tax result of the relationship | 1,115.0 EUR k |
| Relationship RAROC | 17.82 % |
| Other revenue needed to reach 12% | 1,219.4 EUR k |
Try it. Set the other revenue to zero: the relationship is the loan, at 3.96%. Then find by hand the level at which the curve crosses the hurdle and compare with the output.
Reading. This is the economics of every large-corporate relationship: the balance sheet is lent at a loss against the hurdle, and the return is made elsewhere. It explains behaviour that otherwise looks irrational, such as banks competing to join an RCF that destroys value on paper. It also frames the sustainability question correctly. The annual cost of the sustainability work on Halvard (the coordinator’s time, the framework, the KPI test, the data collection) is estimated at EUR 60,000, or 2.2% of the wallet. Nobody pays for it explicitly. It is justified if it protects the EUR 2.7m: by winning the green bond mandate, by keeping the coordinator role, by knowing before the others whether the pass-through assumption of 5.2 is 60% or zero.
Question. What goes into the one-page conclusion that the senior banker and the credit analyst sign in step 13 of the lifecycle?
Put the stages side by side. On the risk side, Halvard is a stable BBB whose main vulnerability is a regulatory cost with a known timetable. The analyst keeps the rating, records the stress of 5.2 in the climate section of the credit memo, and proposes to the committee a watch item instead of a downgrade: the pass-through observed in Halvard’s selling prices as free allocation declines, to be checked at each annual review. If prices follow costs, the central case holds. If imports or substitution prevent it, the PD path is the lower curve of the chart in 5.2 and the tenor of new commitments should shorten.
On the business side, the relationship earns 17.82% against a 12% hurdle, with EUR 4.69m of capital. The banker’s recommendation is to keep the EUR 150m hold in the RCF, since the wallet depends on it, and to direct the marginal effort to what both pays and reduces the bank’s own risk: the financing of the transition capital expenditure. In practice that means a second green or transition bond when the eligible pool allows, guarantees for the capture project, and possibly a term loan for it, whose RAROC would be read like that of section 2.1.
On the bank’s own metrics, Halvard adds 27,000 t of financed emissions and, in a year with a bond, 37,125 t of facilitated emissions; it adds EUR 150m to the bank’s sustainability-linked lending volume and one green bond to its league-table credit. The reporting team will ask the banker to confirm each of these flags.
Finally the banker writes what the bank will not do. It will not label the swap. It will not call the deposits green without an asset pool. It will not present the sale of the lime business as a decarbonisation. Each refusal costs a little goodwill today and protects the EUR 2.7m wallet from the day a journalist, an auditor or a supervisor reads the file.
WHO DOES WHAT — The senior banker signs the account plan and the profitability page. The credit analyst signs the rating and the climate section. The ESG risk officer countersigns the transition score. The sustainability coordinator signs the KPI test. The head of the Sustainable Finance Group signs the labels. Five signatures, one client, and none of them belongs to a “green banker”.
| Stage | Key figure | Value |
|---|---|---|
| 5.1 | Leverage; carbon intensity | 2.50x; 1,500 t per EUR m |
| 5.1 | Carbon cost today; share of EBITDA | EUR 157.5m; 14.6% |
| 5.2 | Stress: EBITDA lost; leverage | EUR 138.6m; 2.87x |
| 5.2 | Stress: PD; risk weight | 0.36%; 53.08% (from 0.20%; 39.02%) |
| 5.2 | Same stress, no pass-through: PD | 1.18% |
| 5.2 | Same stress, plan delivered (20% cut): PD | 0.30% |
| 5.3 | Flood: event loss; expected annual loss | EUR 8.0m; EUR 0.16m |
| 5.4 | Wallet; lending share | EUR 2.72m; 16.6% |
| 5.5 | Eligible pool; coverage of the bond | EUR 630m; 1.26x |
| 5.6 | Financed; facilitated emissions | 27,000 t; 37,125 t |
| 5.7 | Loan: EAD; RWA; capital | EUR 78m; EUR 30.43m; EUR 3.96m |
| 5.7 | RAROC of the loan; of the relationship | 3.96%; 17.82% |
| 5.7 | Other revenue needed for 12% | EUR 1.22m |
Each of the seven desks consumes a different kind of capital, and the map of the bank is also a map of the rulebook.
| Desk | Main capital driver | Rule |
|---|---|---|
| Lending, guarantees | Credit risk on drawn and undrawn amounts | Standardised or IRB approach, credit conversion factors |
| Rates, FX, carbon | Counterparty credit risk, CVA, market risk on the trader’s position | SA-CCR, CVA framework, market-risk rules |
| DCM, M&A, securities services | Operational risk; underwriting risk for a few days | Standardised approach for operational risk |
| Transaction banking | Operational risk; credit risk on overdrafts and guarantees | As above |
For the RCF, CRR3 fixes the mechanics. The undrawn commitment enters exposure at a credit conversion factor of 40%; under the foundation IRB approach the loss given default is 40% for senior unsecured corporate exposures and the probability of default has a floor of 0.05%. Halvard, with revenues above EUR 500m, cannot be treated under the advanced approach. Exposure at default is EUR 78m, the risk weight 39.02%, RWA EUR 30.43m and capital EUR 3.96m. Under the standardised approach a BBB corporate is weighted 75%: RWA would be EUR 58.5m. The output floor, which limits the benefit of internal models to a share of standardised RWA (55% in 2026, 72.5% when fully phased in), makes that second figure relevant even to an IRB bank (E02).
For fee businesses the new standardised approach for operational risk bases capital on a business indicator built from income, so that capital is roughly proportional to revenue. This is the logic behind the course convention of EUR 2.5 of RWA per euro of ancillary revenue. It is a simplification: a swap with Halvard also creates counterparty exposure that depends on its mark-to-market, and a guarantee is a credit exposure in its own right.
PITFALL — Looking for the sustainability line in this table. There is none. Nothing in Pillar 1 distinguishes Halvard’s sustainability-linked RCF from a plain one, or its green bond from a conventional one. Climate enters capital through the inputs (the PD, as in 5.2; collateral values) and through Pillar 2, where the supervisor may add requirements if it judges ESG risks poorly managed.
The relationship RAROC of 5.7, in EUR thousand:
| Line | Lending | Six other desks | Total |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenues | 451.8 | 2,265.7 | 2,717.5 |
| Operating costs (40%; 60%) | -180.7 | -1,359.4 | -1,540.2 |
| Expected loss | -62.4 | 0 | -62.4 |
| Pre-tax result | 208.7 | 906.3 | 1,115.0 |
| Capital (13% of RWA) | 3,956.4 | 736.4 | 4,692.7 |
After tax at 25% the net result is EUR 836,200 and RAROC = 836.2 / 4,692.7 = 17.82%.
The sustainable feature. If Halvard meets all three targets, the ratchet takes 3 bp off the margin: EUR 9,000 on the drawn EUR 30m and EUR 12,600 on the commitment fee, EUR 21,600 in total. The RAROC of the loan falls from 3.96% to 3.55% and that of the relationship from 17.82% to 17.47%. Nothing else moves: not the PD, not the capital. The bank pays for the feature out of its margin.
The transition stress. Now apply the scenario of 5.2. With a PD of 0.36% the expected loss rises to EUR 112,800 and the capital for the loan to EUR 5.38m. The loan’s RAROC falls to 2.20% and the relationship’s to 13.05%, still above the hurdle; with the ratchet at full discount, 12.78%. Without pass-through the PD is 1.18%, the loan’s RAROC is negative (-0.83%) and the relationship earns 6.35%. With the transition plan delivered, the relationship earns 14.44%.
INTERACTIVE LAB — The transmission belt in one widget: carbon price, PD, capital, RAROC
Run the carbon-cost shock through Halvard’s leverage and PD into Meridian’s expected loss, capital and RAROC, with or without the margin ratchet and the client’s transition plan.
| Parameter you can move | Range | Default |
|---|---|---|
| EUA price | 60 to 200 EUR/t | 120 EUR/t |
| Free allocation (share of scope 1) | 0 to 75 % | 50 % |
| Pass-through of the extra cost | 0 to 100 % | 60 % |
| Cut in scope 1 emissions delivered | 0 to 50 % | 0 % |
| Sustainability margin adjustment | -3 to 3 bp | 0 bp |
| Result at default settings | Value |
|---|---|
| PD read on the rating grid | 0.362 % |
| Expected loss | 112.8 EUR k |
| Capital for the loan | 5,382.8 EUR k |
| Effect of the ratchet on revenue | 0.0 EUR k |
| Net result of the relationship after tax | 798.4 EUR k |
| RAROC of the loan alone | 2.20 % |
| Relationship RAROC | 13.05 % |
Try it. Compare two levers. The ratchet at full discount costs 0.35 points of relationship RAROC. A fall in pass-through from 60% to 0% costs 6.7 points. The price of the label is small beside the price of the risk.
WHY IT MATTERS ON THE DESK — The ratchet is visible, negotiated and tiny. The PD migration is invisible until the rating committee meets, and it is twenty times larger. A bank that spends its sustainability effort on the first and none on the second has the proportions wrong. E03 develops how climate enters loan pricing.
Treasury charges the lending desk 30 bp for five-year funding on drawn amounts and 5.6 bp on undrawn amounts, the cost of the liquidity buffer that regulation requires against committed lines (derived in B03). Halvard’s EUR 150m of deposits work the other way. They fund the bank, and Treasury credits the transaction-banking desk for them; the 30 bp deposit margin is that credit minus what Halvard is paid. Their regulatory value depends on their nature: the liquidity coverage ratio assumes that 25% of operational deposits (those needed for payments and cash management) leave in a month of stress, against 40% of other corporate deposits. This explains why cash management is prized: it brings the stable kind.
Sustainability enters funding from the other end of the bank. When Meridian issues its own green bond, it needs eligible loans to allocate the proceeds to. A general-purpose RCF to Halvard does not qualify; a dedicated loan for the capture unit could. Some banks pass a small funding benefit to desks that originate eligible assets, through the FTP (E04, C15).
The RCF is measured at amortised cost under IFRS 9, provided its cash flows are solely payments of principal and interest. The amendments to IFRS 9 issued in May 2024 and effective from 1 January 2026 clarify how to assess contingent features such as a sustainability-linked ratchet; a small adjustment of this kind does not in general prevent amortised cost (E05). Expected credit losses are provisioned from day one: twelve-month losses while the loan is in stage 1, lifetime losses if credit risk has increased significantly (stage 2). The stress of 5.2, if it became the central scenario, would be an argument for stage 2 well before any default. The upfront fee is spread over the life of the facility; bookrunner and advisory fees are recognised when the service is performed (IFRS 15); the swap and the allowance forwards are at fair value through profit or loss in the trading book.
Each transaction leaves a trace in the bank’s own reporting, and the traces do not coincide.
Taxonomy ratios. The Green Asset Ratio is the share of the bank’s covered assets that finance Taxonomy-aligned activities. A general-purpose loan counts in proportion to the borrower’s aligned turnover or capital expenditure. With 8% of Halvard’s turnover aligned (case assumption), EUR 2.4m of the EUR 30m drawn enters the numerator. The EUR 120m undrawn does not count, nor does the bond Meridian arranged but does not hold. Since the 2026 simplification, exposures to companies outside the CSRD scope are excluded from the denominator, which removes one well-known distortion; further changes are under review.
Pillar 3 ESG. CRR3 requires prudential disclosures on ESG risks. The EBA’s revised technical standards of June 2026 set a first reference date of 31 December 2026 for most institutions and removed the Taxonomy ratio templates to avoid duplication with sustainability reporting. Halvard appears there as an exposure to a carbon-intensive sector, with its financed emissions.
Financed and facilitated emissions. 27,000 t and 37,125 t, reported separately, as computed in 5.6.
Sustainable finance volumes. Meridian, like its peers, publishes an amount of sustainable financing arranged or granted, on a definition of its own. The EUR 150m sustainability-linked commitment and its share of the green bond both count there. This is the least standardised figure of the four, and the one most quoted in the press.
PITFALL — Adding these up or expecting them to agree. One client is at the same time 8% green in the Taxonomy ratio, a carbon-intensive exposure in Pillar 3, EUR 150m of sustainable finance in the bank’s communication and 27,000 t in its carbon accounts. Each figure answers a different question (E06, E07).
| Risk | Control | Owner |
|---|---|---|
| Transition risk underestimated in the rating | Climate section in the credit memo; scenario on carbon cost and pass-through | Credit analyst; Credit risk |
| Physical risk unknown for lack of asset locations | Location data requested for single-asset and secured lending | Credit risk; Data office |
| Label granted to a weak structure | Independent label review before launch; external review | Sustainable Finance Group |
| Wrong sustainability flag in systems | Quarterly reconciliation of flags to documents | Middle office; Finance |
| Misleading marketing of a product | Review of pitch books and term sheets | Compliance |
| Conflict of interest from volume targets | Label decision separated from origination bonus | Management; HR |
| Contested client or transaction | Sector policies; reputational risk committee | ESG risk; senior management |
| Emissions figures driven by market noise | Disclosure of method; intensity metrics for steering | Finance; Risk |
| Litigation over the bank’s own commitments | Legal review of public targets and plans | Legal; Board |
Red-flag checklist for a banker on any desk.
Scale of the labelled market. According to Moody’s figures reported by ESG Today, labelled sustainable bond issuance was around USD 900bn in 2025, with a similar amount expected for 2026. The first quarter of 2026 saw USD 241bn, 17% below a year earlier; in the second quarter green bonds reached a quarterly record of USD 193bn. Composition has shifted towards use-of-proceeds: sustainability-linked bonds have run at about USD 3bn a quarter, a marginal product, and transition-labelled bonds, at USD 4.1bn in the first quarter, are growing from a small base. Sustainable loan volumes fell in 2025, led by sustainability-linked loans (B03 gives the figures).
The other side of the ledger. BloombergNEF’s annual study, reported in September 2026, put bank financing of energy supply at USD 2.3tn in 2025, with 97 cents going to low-carbon supply for every dollar to fossil fuels, against a ratio of about four to one that its scenarios associate with net zero. The NGO report Banking on Climate Chaos (June 2026) counts USD 906bn of fossil-fuel financing by 65 large banks in 2025, 8% more than in 2024. The two studies use different scopes, but they agree on the direction: sustainable finance has grown alongside conventional energy finance and has not replaced it.
Supervision. A periodic penalty payment for a climate-related failing, EUR 7.55m on Crédit Agricole, was announced by the ECB on 13 February 2026 and relates to 75 days of delay in 2024. The ECB’s priorities for 2026-28 treat climate and nature risk as moving towards business-as-usual supervision. The EBA Guidelines on ESG risk management have applied to large banks since 11 January 2026.
Simplification. The EU has narrowed sustainability reporting (Omnibus directive, February 2026), simplified Taxonomy reporting (Delegated Regulation (EU) 2026/73) and is reviewing banks’ indicators: the EBA’s advice of 29 October 2026 proposes dropping the trading-book and fee indicators. For bankers the practical effect is fewer clients with audited sustainability data, and so more estimates.
Alliances and standards. The Net-Zero Banking Alliance ceased operations in October 2025. Standard-setting continued without it: ICMA’s Climate Transition Bond Guidelines (6 November 2025) and the loan associations’ final Transition Loan Principles (3 November 2026) give transition finance its own labels.
Open debates in November 2026. Should capital rules distinguish green from brown exposures, in either direction? Is the 33% weighting of facilitated emissions defensible? Do labelled products change what companies do, or only describe it? Can banks hold portfolio targets without a collective framework, in a world where large jurisdictions diverge? This course takes no position of principle; it shows, desk by desk, what the numbers are.
INTERACTIVE LAB — Check your map of the bank
Fourteen questions on the business lines, the transmission channels, the product families and the case figures.
Q1. A EUR 100m BBB term loan at 110 bp earns a RAROC of 5.91% at Meridian. What is the main reason the bank still grants it?
Answer: A. The return is read at relationship level: ancillary revenue with little capital lifts the total above the hurdle.
Q2. Which business line typically produces the largest share of a large CIB’s revenue?
Answer: C. In the BNP Paribas example, Global Markets was about 45% of CIB revenues in the fourth quarter of 2025.
Q3. Double materiality means that a company reports on
Answer: B. Financial materiality is outside-in, impact materiality inside-out; the ESRS require both.
Q4. For supervisors, climate risk is
Answer: D. The Basel Committee describes risk drivers and transmission channels into existing risk types.
Q5. In the Halvard stress, which assumption moves the PD most?
Answer: B. From 60% to 0% pass-through the PD goes from 0.36% to 1.18%.
Q6. A sustainability-linked loan differs from a green loan because
Answer: C. KPI-linked products promise an outcome at company level; use-of-proceeds products promise a destination for the money.
Q7. Meridian’s financed emissions on Halvard are computed on
Answer: C. PCAF attributes on the outstanding amount; undrawn commitments carry no financed emissions.
Q8. Facilitated emissions under PCAF Part B are
Answer: A. They are a flow measure for capital-markets activity, weighted at 33% and reported separately.
Q9. Under EU prudential rules in November 2026, a green loan to a BBB corporate has, compared with a conventional loan to the same borrower,
Answer: D. There is no green supporting factor; capital depends on the borrower’s risk parameters.
Q10. Halvard’s eligible pool is EUR 630m. Which green bond size is acceptable?
Answer: B. The bond cannot exceed the eligible expenditure available for allocation; coverage is 1.26x for EUR 500m.
Q11. Who decides whether a deal may carry a sustainability label at Meridian?
Answer: C. The label is separated from origination to control conflicts of interest.
Q12. What does the full 3 bp ratchet cost Meridian on its EUR 150m hold, 20% drawn?
Answer: C. EUR 30m x 3 bp plus EUR 120m x 35% x 3 bp = 9,000 + 12,600.
Q13. Halvard’s physical risk barely moves its rating because
Answer: B. The event loss is EUR 8.0m against EBITDA of EUR 1,080m; for a single-asset borrower the answer reverses.
Q14. The sale of a carbon-intensive subsidiary by a client
Answer: D. Emissions move with ownership; the reporting perimeter changes, the physical flow does not.
Meridian lends EUR 200m, fully drawn, for five years to an A-rated corporate (PD 0.07%) at 60 bp over EURIBOR. FTP is 30 bp. Compute the RAROC and the ancillary revenue needed to reach 12%.
Solution. Revenue: 200m x 30 bp = EUR 600,000. Costs at 40%: EUR 240,000. Expected loss: 0.07% x 40% x 200m = EUR 56,000. The F-IRB risk weight at a PD of 0.07% is 21.36%: RWA EUR 42.72m, capital EUR 5.554m. RAROC = (600 - 240 - 56) x 0.75 / 5,554 = 4.11%. Each euro of ancillary revenue adds 0.40 x 0.75 = EUR 0.30 of net result and requires 0.13 x 2.5 x 12% = EUR 0.039 of return on its own capital, a surplus of EUR 0.261. The loan is short of 12% x 5,554 - 228 = EUR 438,500 of net result, so the ancillary revenue needed is 438.5 / 0.261 = EUR 1.68m a year. A better rating lowers capital but lowers the margin faster.
A steel group emits 5.0 Mt of scope 1. Free allocation falls from 80% to 40% and the allowance price rises from EUR 80 to EUR 130. It passes on 30% of the extra cost. EBITDA is EUR 700m and net debt EUR 1,400m. Use the rating grid of section 5.2.
Solution. Today’s bill: 5.0 x 20% x 80 = EUR 80m. Stressed bill: 5.0 x 60% x 130 = EUR 390m. Increase EUR 310m, of which 70% is retained: EBITDA falls by EUR 217m to EUR 483m. Leverage goes from 2.00x to 2.90x. On the grid, 2.90x lies 40% of the way from 2.5x to 3.5x: PD = 0.20% x 5^0.40 = 0.38%. Before the stress, 2.00x lay halfway between 1.5x (0.07%) and 2.5x (0.20%): PD = 0.118%. The PD triples, a move of about two notches, because the pass-through is low in a market exposed to imports.
A bank has a EUR 80m drawn term loan to a company with a market capitalisation of EUR 2,500m, gross debt of EUR 1,500m and emissions of 5.6 Mt. It is also one of three equal bookrunners on the company’s EUR 600m bond. Compute financed and facilitated emissions, then financed emissions after a EUR 800m fall in market capitalisation.
Solution. EVIC = EUR 4,000m. Financed: 80 / 4,000 = 2.0% x 5.6 Mt = 112,000 t. Bookrunner share: EUR 200m, or 5.0% of EVIC: 280,000 t before weighting and 92,400 t at 33%. After the fall, EVIC is EUR 3,200m and the attribution factor 2.5%: financed emissions rise to 140,000 t, 25% more, with no change in the company’s emissions or in the loan.
1. Walk me through how a CIB makes money. A CIB has four engines. Corporate banking earns a net interest margin and fees by lending and by handling clients’ payments and trade. Investment banking earns fees for placing bonds and shares and for advising on M&A. Global markets earns client margins and bid-offer spreads by making prices in rates, FX, credit, equities and commodities. Securities services earns basis points on assets it keeps and administers. Markets is usually the largest by revenue, lending the largest by capital.
2. Why would a bank join a revolving credit facility that returns 4% on capital? Because the facility is priced as part of a relationship. Clients award bond mandates, hedging and cash management to the banks that commit balance sheet. In the Halvard case the loan returns 3.96% alone and the relationship 17.82%. The discipline is to check each year that the ancillary revenue actually arrives, and to reduce the hold if it does not.
3. What is double materiality, and which half matters to a credit officer? It is the idea that sustainability matters both for its financial effect on the company and for the company’s impact on the world. A credit officer works on the first: does this issue change the borrower’s cash flows or collateral over the life of the loan? The second half matters to him or her indirectly, because impacts tend to become costs through regulation, litigation or lost customers.
4. How does a carbon price become a credit loss? Through the borrower’s income statement. The price multiplies the emissions the borrower must pay for; the part it cannot pass on to customers reduces EBITDA; leverage rises; the rating falls; the bank’s expected loss and capital rise. The decisive assumptions are the free-allocation schedule and the pass-through rate, both of which are questions of industrial economics.
5. What is the difference between financed and facilitated emissions? Financed emissions are attributed to a bank in proportion to the money it has in a client’s balance sheet, every year for as long as the exposure lasts. Facilitated emissions are attributed for capital-markets deals the bank arranges without holding, in the year of the deal, with a 33% weighting under PCAF. They are reported separately. A bank active in DCM can have large facilitated emissions with a small loan book.
6. Does a green loan cost the bank less capital? No. Under CRR3 the risk weight depends on the borrower’s PD, the LGD and the exposure, not on the purpose of the loan, and there is no green supporting factor. A green asset may be less risky, in which case the benefit should show in the rating. The loan may also help the bank’s funding, if it can back a green bond, and its Taxonomy ratios.
7. Give an example of a sustainability idea you would advise a client against. A sustainability-linked swap mirroring the KPIs of the client’s loan, when the adjustment is a couple of basis points. The documentation, the hedge-accounting analysis and the reporting cost more than the incentive is worth, and the product adds a label without adding an effect. Saying no protects the client and the bank’s credibility for the deals that matter.
8. Where does greenwashing risk sit in a bank? Wherever a claim is made: a label on a deal, a sentence in a pitch, a flag in a system, a figure in the bank’s own report. The first line owns the claim, Compliance reviews marketing, the Sustainable Finance Group controls labels, Finance controls the published numbers. The typical failure is not a lie but a gap: a flag that no document supports, or a target that nobody was asked to deliver.
Regulation (stable identifiers)
Supervisory papers and decisions
Standards
Market data
Textbook