Corporate lending at Meridian Bank does two things with the bank’s balance sheet. It promises money, through revolving credit facilities that mostly stay undrawn (see B03), and it hands money over, through term loans. This module is about the second: a loan drawn to pay for something identified, repaid on a schedule, and, when the “something” is environmentally or socially useful and the borrower accepts four disciplines, labelled a green or social loan.
The clients are companies that invest more than their cash flow in a given period: a rail operator renewing its fleet, a utility building a network, a hospital group building a site, a mid-cap making an acquisition. Some have no access to the bond market, because they are too small, unrated or privately held. Others prefer a loan because it can be drawn in instalments as invoices fall due, repaid early without a make-whole premium, and amended by a phone call to a dozen banks instead of a vote of anonymous bondholders. The borrower of our case, Ardenne Rail, is in the first group: a privately held regional passenger operator with a BBB rating, too infrequent a borrower for a benchmark bond.
How the desk earns money is simpler than for an RCF, because the money is actually lent. A BBB term loan pays a margin of roughly 100 to 180 bp over EURIBOR on the drawn amount, a commitment fee on the undrawn amount during the drawdown period, and an upfront fee of some tens of basis points. We will see in section 5 that Meridian’s EUR 80m share of the Ardenne loan earns about EUR 750,000 a year on average and returns about 9.7% on allocated capital: closer to the 12% hurdle than an undrawn RCF, but still below it. The relationship (hedging, cash management, the next bond) has to supply the rest. The green label changes this arithmetic very little. What it changes is where the loan can be counted and funded inside the bank, which section 6 treats in detail.
WHO DOES WHAT — The coverage banker owns the client and brings the financing need (see B01). The loan structurer designs the tenor, repayment profile, pricing and covenants, and negotiates the term sheet. The sustainable finance solutions team acts as green loan coordinator: it checks the project against the Green Loan Principles and the bank’s eligibility grid, and tests Taxonomy alignment. The credit analyst writes the credit application and the credit committee approves the hold. Legal and external counsel draft the facility agreement on the Loan Market Association (LMA) form. The loan agency (see B17) checks conditions precedent, processes drawdowns and collects the annual green reports. Finance tags the loan for the Green Asset Ratio, and Treasury decides whether it enters the pool of assets behind the bank’s own green bonds (see C15).
Adjacent functions matter more for a green loan than for a plain one. The label creates data obligations for years after signing: someone must hold the allocation register, someone must re-test eligibility when an asset is sold, and someone must remove the tag if the loan stops qualifying. Those tasks fall between the front office, the agency and Finance, and that is where green loans go wrong (see E11).
A realistic week in mid-November 2026. Monday: signing of the Ardenne facility and first drawdown request. Tuesday: the classification committee reviews a “green” loan proposed by a real-estate client whose energy performance certificates are missing; it is sent back. Wednesday: credit committee on a EUR 60m social loan to a not-for-profit care-home operator. Thursday: annual review of a 2023 green loan whose borrower has sold part of the financed wind portfolio; the desk checks whether the remaining assets still cover the outstanding amount. Friday: Finance asks for the evidence file of every loan tagged “Taxonomy-aligned, known use of proceeds” before the year-end reporting run. The numbers of this module are the ones needed in those five meetings.
IN ONE SENTENCE — A term loan is a fixed amount lent for a fixed period, drawn once or in a few instalments during an availability period, and repaid on a contractual schedule; unlike a revolving facility, what is repaid cannot be borrowed again.
INTUITION — A term loan is a mortgage for a company. You borrow to buy something that lasts, you repay over a period that resembles the life of what you bought, and the bank cares about two things: whether your income covers the instalments, and what happens at the end if a large final payment is left.
Four design choices define the product.
Availability period. Capex is paid in stages, so the facility can be drawn in several loans during a period (typically 6 to 36 months) against a utilisation request delivered a few business days before. Undrawn amounts are cancelled at the end of the period. During it, the lenders are committed and earn a commitment fee, also called a ticking fee when it starts some weeks after signing.
Repayment profile. A bullet loan is repaid in one payment at maturity. An amortising loan is repaid by instalments, usually equal semi-annual amounts of principal. A balloon is an amortising loan with a large final payment. The profile determines the average life, and the average life drives almost everything else: interest paid, funding cost, capital consumed.
FORMULA
is the weighted average life in years; is the principal repaid at time (in years from the drawdown). Equivalently, is the area under the curve of the outstanding amount divided by the amount borrowed.
INTERACTIVE LAB — Bullet, amortising or balloon: average life and interest of a term loan
See how the repayment profile of a fully drawn term loan changes its weighted average life and the interest paid over its life.
| Parameter you can move | Range | Default |
|---|---|---|
| Amount drawn at signing | 50 to 1000 EUR m | 100 EUR m |
| Final maturity | 2 to 10 years | 5 years |
| Balloon repaid at final maturity | 0 to 100 % of amount | 0 % of amount |
| Margin over EURIBOR | 50 to 400 bp | 150 bp |
| EURIBOR (flat) | 0 to 6 % | 2.5 % |
| Result at default settings | Value |
|---|---|
| Semi-annual principal instalment | 10.00 EUR m |
| Weighted average life | 2.750 years |
| Total interest over the life | 11.00 EUR m |
| Total interest if the loan were a bullet | 20.00 EUR m |
Try it. Set the balloon to 50%: the average life rises from 2.75 to 3.875 years and the bank’s refinancing risk at maturity goes from nil to half the loan.
A EUR 100m five-year loan at EURIBOR (2.50%) plus 150 bp costs EUR 20.0m of interest as a bullet and EUR 11.0m if fully amortised in ten equal instalments, because its average life falls from 5 to 2.75 years. The rate is the same; the amount of money borrowed over time is not.
Interest. Interest is floating: EURIBOR for the interest period (three or six months), floored at zero, plus the margin, calculated on an actual/360 basis and paid at the end of each period. Borrowers financing long-lived assets usually swap most of it to a fixed rate (see C07), which is the first piece of ancillary business for the lenders.
Prepayment. A term loan can be prepaid at the end of an interest period without penalty, apart from break costs if prepaid mid-period. This free option is worth something to the borrower and is one reason loans and bonds are not priced the same way.
| Price | Paid on | Typical BBB level (case assumption) |
|---|---|---|
| Margin | Drawn amount, each interest period | 100 to 180 bp over EURIBOR |
| Commitment fee | Undrawn available amount | 30 to 40% of the margin |
| Upfront (participation) fee | Each lender’s commitment, at signing | 30 to 70 bp flat |
| Arrangement or coordination fee | Paid to the arranging banks | Fee letter, not public |
| Agency fee | Paid to the facility agent | EUR 20,000 to 60,000 a year |
Term loans are often priced with a margin grid linked to leverage or to the rating: the margin steps up when credit quality falls. A green loan may add a small discount for the label; section 5.5 measures it.
To compare offers, the structurer converts fees into a running equivalent, the all-in margin: total margin, commitment fees and upfront fees over the life, divided by the amount of money actually borrowed over time (the sum of outstanding amounts multiplied by the time they are outstanding, in euro-years).
PITFALL — Dividing an upfront fee by the legal tenor understates its weight. Fifty basis points on a seven-year loan is 7 bp a year only if the loan is a bullet drawn on day one. On a loan drawn progressively and amortised, with an average life of 4.9 years, it is worth about 10 bp a year. Always divide by the average life.
The lender’s risk is that the borrower’s cash flow does not cover debt service, or that a balloon cannot be refinanced. Protection is contractual, since a corporate term loan is typically unsecured (asset-backed structures on rolling stock belong to B09). The LMA recommended form for investment-grade facilities organises it in layers:
FORMULA
Net debt is financial debt less cash; EBITDA is earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortisation over the last twelve months, as defined in the agreement; is the covenant ceiling. The headroom is the fall in EBITDA that would bring the ratio exactly to the ceiling.
WHY IT MATTERS ON THE DESK — The covenant is not there to be enforced. It is there to bring the borrower back to the table while there is still value to protect. When headroom falls below 10%, the lenders obtain a waiver fee, a higher margin or a deleveraging plan. A structurer who sets a ceiling with 40% headroom has sold the bank a covenant that will never bind.
The mandate letter and the term sheet come first; the facility agreement, the fee letters and the agency arrangements follow. For amounts above what one bank wants to hold, the loan is syndicated or, for a mid-sized borrower, clubbed among relationship banks at pre-agreed tickets (see B04). Each lender’s decisions are several, not joint: no lender is responsible for another’s share. The facility agent, one of the banks, is the single counter for payments, notices and votes. LMA documentation is member-only; this module relies on public summaries by law firms for its content.
IN ONE SENTENCE — A green loan is a loan whose proceeds, or an equivalent amount, are applied exclusively to eligible green projects, and whose borrower accepts four disciplines on the choice of projects, the tracking of money and reporting; a social loan is the same instrument for projects with social outcomes for a target population.
INTUITION — A plain loan is a gift card valid everywhere; a green loan is a gift card valid in one shop, with the receipts sent to the giver every year. The card has the same face value and, nearly, the same price. What changes is that the giver can show the receipts to others.
The label is attached to the use of proceeds, never to the borrower. A coal-heavy utility can take a green loan for a wind farm; a wind developer’s general-purpose loan is not automatically green. This is the opposite of the sustainability-linked loan of B03, where money is free of use and the price moves with the borrower’s performance. The two can be combined, but each must then satisfy its own principles.
The credit risk is that of the borrower, exactly as for a plain loan: in a corporate green loan the lenders have recourse to the whole company, and the financed trains do not secure the debt. The label gives no additional protection in a default. It is a claim about where the money went, and the whole standard is about making that claim checkable.
The Green Loan Principles (GLP) were first published in March 2018 and are maintained jointly by the LMA, the Asia Pacific Loan Market Association (APLMA) and the Loan Syndications and Trading Association (LSTA). The version in force is dated 26 March 2025. The Social Loan Principles (SLP), of the same date, mirror them. They are voluntary and applied deal by deal; no authority grants or withdraws the label. On 3 November 2026 the three associations published the final Transition Loan Principles together with updated guidance on green, social and sustainability-linked loans; the four components below were not changed.
The 2025 revision did one important thing: it separated what the borrower shall do (mandatory to claim alignment) from what it should do (recommended) and what it may do. Several former recommendations became obligations, notably annual reporting, and the clause that had exempted loans signed before March 2023 was deleted, so a loan extended or refinanced today is judged against the current text.
| Component | Mandatory core (“shall”) | Recommended (“should”) |
|---|---|---|
| 1. Use of proceeds | Green projects described in the finance documents; clear environmental benefit, assessed and quantified where feasible | For refinancing: share refinanced and look-back period |
| 2. Project evaluation and selection | Communicate objectives, how projects are judged eligible, how environmental and social risks are managed | Reference to taxonomies, standards, exclusion criteria |
| 3. Management of proceeds | Credit to a dedicated account or track otherwise; each green tranche tracked separately | Internal attestation; disclosure of temporary placement of unallocated funds |
| 4. Reporting | Annual update until full allocation (until maturity for revolving facilities): projects, amounts, expected and where feasible achieved impact | Quantitative indicators with methodology; publication where feasible |
Four points of practice follow from the text.
Tranche or whole facility. A green loan may be one or more tranches of a larger facility. Each green tranche must be designated as such and its proceeds tracked separately. A facility that mixes green and non-green tranches cannot be called a green facility as a whole: only the tranche carries the label. This is the central structuring decision of our case.
Revolving green loans. The GLP apply to revolving facilities, where proceeds cannot be traced drawing by drawing in the same way. Either the facility contains a dedicated green tranche, or the borrower reports how the drawings were used; where a general-purpose RCF can also fund green projects, only the drawn amounts allocated to them count as green. Reporting then runs until maturity, because the money keeps turning. Typical users are developers who draw to build and repay on sale, and companies financing eligible working capital. For the bank, a revolving green loan is the hardest to monitor: the eligible pool must cover drawings at every date, not once.
Refinancing and look-back. Proceeds may refinance existing eligible assets, provided they still deliver the benefit. The guidance asks the borrower to disclose the look-back period, and to avoid financing the same asset twice. Lenders set their own limits; a look-back of two to three years for capex is common practice in bank policies (a practice, not a rule of the GLP).
External review. A review is recommended, not required. The GLP accept self-certification by a borrower with demonstrated internal expertise, on the reasoning that loan markets are relationship-driven and lenders know their borrower. In practice, syndicated green loans of the size of our case come with a second-party opinion on the borrower’s framework before signing, and often with an assurance report on allocation afterwards.
A loan that deliberately mixes green and social projects may be called a sustainability loan. The guidance also recognises “pure play” borrowers (90% or more of revenues or assets in green activities), whose loans still need the four components to be green.
The SLP replace environmental benefit by social outcome and add one notion: the target population (people below a poverty line, excluded groups, people with disabilities, the unemployed, under-served communities, and in some cases the general population). Eligible categories include affordable basic infrastructure, access to essential services such as health and education, affordable housing, employment generation including small-business financing, food security and socio-economic advancement. In European corporate banking, the regular borrowers are social-housing providers, hospitals, care operators and universities. The difficulty is measurement: outputs (beds, dwellings) are easy to count, outcomes (health, inclusion) are not, and no official European classification of social activities exists, since work on a social taxonomy has not led to legislation. The LMA has published no specific drafting for social loans; the green provisions are adapted.
In November 2024 the LMA published draft provisions for green loans (often called the green loan rider), to be inserted in its recommended forms. From public summaries, and from market practice, a green facility agreement adds to the plain one:
PITFALL — The purpose clause of a standard LMA agreement says that no lender is bound to monitor or verify the application of the amounts borrowed. A green label resting on that clause alone is a declaration, not a control. The control is the allocation register, the reports and the cover test described in section 5.7, and somebody in the bank must be named as responsible for them.
No European regulation defines a green loan. In December 2023 the European Banking Authority, answering a call for advice from the Commission, proposed a voluntary EU green loan label based on the Taxonomy; no legislative proposal has followed as of November 2026, and the European Green Bond Standard (Regulation (EU) 2023/2631) covers bonds only. Regulation reaches the product through four side doors.
The EU Taxonomy and the Green Asset Ratio. The GLP say a borrower should consider local taxonomies; they do not require alignment. But the lender’s own disclosure is built on the Taxonomy. For a loan with known use of proceeds, the bank assesses the financed activity itself against the technical screening criteria, instead of applying the borrower’s company-wide ratios. A green loan is thus the one corporate loan that the bank can make 100% Taxonomy-aligned through its own structuring, and that is the main internal reason banks like the product. The rules were simplified by Delegated Regulation (EU) 2026/73, published on 8 January 2026 and applicable from 1 January 2026: exposures to undertakings outside the scope of the CSRD, derivatives, on-demand interbank loans, cash and goodwill leave both the numerator and the denominator of the ratio; known-use-of-proceeds assets need not be assessed when they are cumulatively below 10% of that category; and until 31 December 2027 a financial undertaking may omit the detailed KPIs if it states that it claims no association with Taxonomy-aligned activities. The scope of the CSRD itself was narrowed by Directive (EU) 2026/470 (published 26 February 2026) to undertakings exceeding both 1,000 employees and EUR 450m of net turnover.
The Taxonomy test itself has three parts: the activity makes a substantial contribution to one of six environmental objectives; it does no significant harm (DNSH) to the other five; and the undertaking respects minimum safeguards on human rights, corruption, taxation and fair competition. For rolling stock, the relevant entry is activity 6.1 of Annex I to the Climate Delegated Act (Delegated Regulation (EU) 2021/2139), passenger interurban rail transport, which covers the purchase, financing, leasing and operation of trains. The mitigation criterion is zero direct (tailpipe) CO2 emissions, with a second limb for bimode trains that run emission-free where the track is electrified. Section 5.4 applies it.
Prudential rules. CRR3 contains no green supporting factor: a green loan carries the risk weight of its borrower (see E02). The infrastructure supporting factor of Article 501a is a different matter, reserved for exposures to entities created to finance or operate infrastructure, not for a corporate loan.
Conduct and claims. A bank that markets a loan as green, counts it in a published sustainable finance target or funds it with a green bond makes a sustainability claim of its own. Supervisors’ work on greenwashing since 2023 applies to it (see E10).
Use-of-proceeds loans are the part of the sustainable loan market that is growing. According to Environmental Finance Data quoted in the LMA’s Horizons (March 2026), global sustainable lending fell 22% in 2025 to USD 749bn, entirely because of sustainability-linked loans, while green loan volume rose by about USD 63bn. Practitioners nevertheless describe a market under strain at the smaller end: borrowers question the reporting cost for a thin or absent price benefit, few lenders insist on a dedicated account for proceeds, and banks have started to offer lighter products that recognise green activity without claiming GLP alignment. Section 8 gives the data and the debate.
INTERACTIVE LAB — Life of a green term loan, from the capex plan to declassification risk
Follow the Ardenne Rail facility through the people who touch it and the documents they produce.
| # | Who | Does what | Deliverable |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | CFO and group treasurer, Ardenne Rail | Present the fleet renewal plan and ask three relationship banks for financing proposals (September 2026) | Capex plan, request for proposals |
| 2 | Coverage banker and loan structurer, Meridian | Propose amount, tenor, repayment profile, pricing and covenants after a credit pre-screening and a first RAROC | Indicative term sheet |
| 3 | CFO, Ardenne Rail | Mandates Meridian as coordinator, green loan coordinator and facility agent of a five-bank club | Mandate letter, fee letters |
| 4 | Sustainable finance solutions, Meridian, with Ardenne treasury and sustainability teams | Map the capex plan to eligible categories, exclude non-eligible items, write the framework and size the green facility | Green financing framework, eligible project schedule |
| 5 | External reviewer | Assesses the framework against the Green Loan Principles and comments on Taxonomy alignment | Second-party opinion |
| 6 | Classification committee, Meridian | Validates GLP alignment and the Taxonomy test; decides the internal tags | Classification decision and evidence file |
| 7 | Credit analyst and credit committee, Meridian | Analyse the credit, the covenants and the RAROC; approve the final hold | Credit application, approval for EUR 80m |
| 8 | External counsel and Legal | Draft the facility agreement on the LMA form with the green provisions; signing on 16 November 2026 | Facility agreement |
| 9 | Facility agent (Meridian loan agency) | Checks conditions precedent, records the green static data, processes each utilisation request against supplier invoices | Conditions precedent letter, drawdown notices, allocation register entries |
| 10 | Finance and Treasury, Meridian | Tag the loan as known use of proceeds for the Green Asset Ratio and admit it to the eligible pool of the bank’s green bonds | Reporting tags, FTP rebate |
| 11 | Ardenne Rail and external auditor | Each year, report allocation and impact; the auditor gives limited assurance on allocation | Green loan report, assurance report |
| 12 | Facility agent and green loan coordinator | Distribute the report, run the eligible-asset cover test, follow up disposals | Annual monitoring memo |
| 13 | Lenders, on the coordinator’s analysis | On a shortfall not cured in time: declassify, apply the margin step-up, remove the tags | Declassification notice, system changes |
Origination and mandate (steps 1 to 3). Ardenne’s request for proposals asks for a seven-year amortising facility and “a green format if it helps”. Before any figure leaves Meridian, credit risk gives a pre-screening opinion (rating, appetite for the name, maximum hold) and the structurer runs a first RAROC. The mandate letter appoints Meridian to three roles with three fee lines: coordinator of the club, green loan coordinator, and facility agent. The green loan coordinator letter defines the role narrowly: Meridian helps the borrower structure the green features and answers lenders’ questions; it does not verify the borrower’s information on behalf of other lenders, each of which makes its own assessment (see B04 on the liability of coordinators).
Green structuring (steps 4 and 5). This takes three to four weeks in parallel with the credit work. The sustainable finance team goes through the capex plan line by line with the borrower’s treasury, fleet and sustainability teams. The deliverable is a green financing framework of a dozen pages, organised under the four GLP components, with a schedule of eligible projects, and for each: description, cost, expected delivery, eligible category, Taxonomy activity, and impact indicator. The external reviewer receives the framework and supporting evidence, interviews the company and issues a second-party opinion, paid by the borrower. The opinion is a condition precedent to signing.
Internal classification (step 6). Meridian separates the people who sell the loan from the people who decide whether it is green. The classification committee (sustainable finance, risk, Finance, compliance) receives a file of three items: the GLP checklist, the Taxonomy test with evidence for each criterion, and the proposed tags. It decides three separate things, which students often merge: whether the loan is a green loan under the GLP (market label); whether, and for what share, it is Taxonomy-aligned (regulatory reporting); and whether it is eligible for the pool backing the bank’s green bonds (funding). A loan can be the first without being the second.
Credit approval (step 7). The credit application is that of a plain term loan: business and contract risk, projections, debt capacity, covenant headroom, rating, RAROC. The green features appear in two places only: the ESG risk section, and the pricing section if a discount is requested.
Documentation and closing (steps 8 and 9). Counsel insert the green provisions. At closing the agent checks the conditions precedent and records the facility in the loan system, including the green static data: green flag, eligible project schedule, report due date, cover test, margin step-up on declassification. Each utilisation request is accompanied by the supplier invoices or milestone certificates it pays. The agent books the proceeds to a dedicated sub-account from which only payments to the listed suppliers are made, and Ardenne’s treasury enters each payment in the allocation register.
Tagging and funding (step 10). Finance sets the reporting attributes from the committee’s decision, with the evidence file attached. Treasury admits the loan to the eligible pool and grants the funding rebate from the first drawdown (section 5.5).
Annual cycle and events (steps 11 to 13). Section 5.7 replays the monitoring and an event that threatens the label.
Ardenne Rail is a fictional, privately held operator of regional and interurban passenger trains under public service contracts with three regional transport authorities. It owns its fleet, part electric, part diesel. All figures below are case assumptions.
| Item | Figure |
|---|---|
| Revenue 2026 (of which public service compensation about 60%) | EUR 1,150m |
| Employees | 4,300 |
| EBITDA 2026; expected 2028 with the renewed contract | EUR 250m; EUR 290m |
| Net debt at end 2026 before the programme | EUR 610m |
| Rating | BBB (one agency); Meridian internal PD 0.20% |
| Taxonomy-aligned share of turnover; of capex (2025 report) | 62%; 78% |
With 4,300 employees and more than EUR 450m of turnover, Ardenne remains inside the scope of the CSRD after the 2026 reform, so it publishes Taxonomy ratios and Meridian’s exposure to it stays in the Green Asset Ratio.
The main contract, renewed in 2026 for twelve years, requires Ardenne to replace diesel units on two lines being electrified and to add capacity. The programme for 2027 and 2028 is as follows.
| Capex item | Cost (EUR m) | Green eligibility |
|---|---|---|
| 30 electric multiple units at EUR 11.0m | 330 | Eligible, clean transportation |
| 6 battery-electric units at EUR 12.5m for a branch line | 75 | Eligible, clean transportation |
| Depot electrification and charging equipment | 35 | Eligible, clean transportation |
| Mid-life overhaul of 22 diesel units | 80 | Not eligible |
| Total programme | 520 |
Ardenne asks for EUR 400m of debt and will fund EUR 120m from operating cash flow. The CFO’s three questions frame the case: what will it cost, can it be green, and is green cheaper?
The credit story is simple to state. Ardenne’s revenue is contractual: the authorities pay a compensation per train-kilometre, indexed on wages and energy, and fare revenue is a minority. The risks are operational (punctuality penalties, late deliveries of new trains), political (a region may reorganise its network when a contract ends) and financial (leverage rises by more than one turn of EBITDA during the programme). The existing debt is a EUR 300m revolving facility, half drawn, and EUR 460m of bilateral loans and private placements. The five banks of the club are the lenders of that revolving facility: each takes EUR 80m, that is 20%. A club at equal tickets needs no underwriting and no market flex; its price is a negotiation between the CFO and five credit committees, and Meridian’s job as coordinator is to find the terms all five can approve.
Question. What repayment profile fits the asset and the contract, and what does the facility cost?
Data. The trains are delivered over two years and last 35 years, but the contract that pays for them runs twelve. The club agrees a seven-year facility, signed on 16 November 2026, with a balloon to be refinanced in 2033 when five years of contract remain. Terms: four drawdowns of EUR 100m at signing and at months 6, 12 and 18; availability period 24 months; ten semi-annual instalments of 6% of the facility (EUR 24m) from month 30 to month 84; balloon of 40% (EUR 160m) at month 84. Margin 135 bp over six-month EURIBOR (assumed flat at 2.50%); commitment fee 35% of the margin, that is 47.25 bp, on the undrawn amount; upfront fee 50 bp.
Calculation. The outstanding amount steps up from EUR 100m to EUR 400m over the first four half-years, stays at EUR 400m for two half-years counting the one that ends at month 30, then falls by EUR 24m each half-year to EUR 184m in the last. Summing the fourteen half-yearly balances gives EUR 3,920m, hence an average outstanding amount of EUR 280m and 1,960 million euro-years of money borrowed. The undrawn balances (EUR 300m, 200m, 100m) add up to 300 million euro-years.
The numerator, in EUR m, is the margin (1.35% of 1,960), the commitment fees (0.4725% of 300) and the upfront fee (0.50% of 400).
Result. Over seven years Ardenne pays EUR 26.46m of margin, EUR 1.42m of commitment fees and EUR 2.0m upfront: EUR 29.88m for the lenders’ credit, liquidity and capital, or 152.4 bp a year on the money actually borrowed. EURIBOR interest adds EUR 49.0m at 2.50%, for a total financing cost of EUR 78.88m.
INTERACTIVE LAB — The Ardenne facility: drawdowns, repayments and what the lenders are paid
Build the half-yearly outstanding and undrawn amounts of the facility and derive its average life, its fees and its all-in margin.
| Parameter you can move | Range | Default |
|---|---|---|
| Facility amount | 100 to 1000 EUR m | 400 EUR m |
| Semi-annual instalment (ten instalments from month 30) | 0 to 10 % of facility | 6 % of facility |
| Margin over EURIBOR | 50 to 300 bp | 135 bp |
| Commitment fee as share of margin | 20 to 50 % | 35 % |
| Upfront fee, flat | 0 to 150 bp | 50 bp |
| EURIBOR (flat) | 0 to 6 % | 2.5 % |
| Result at default settings | Value |
|---|---|
| Balloon at month 84 | 160.0 EUR m |
| Average outstanding amount over 7 years | 280.0 EUR m |
| Weighted average life from signing | 4.90 years |
| Margin paid over the life | 26.460 EUR m |
| Commitment fees paid | 1.4175 EUR m |
| Upfront fee | 2.00 EUR m |
| Total paid to lenders above EURIBOR | 29.878 EUR m |
| All-in margin on money borrowed | 152.4 bp |
| EURIBOR interest over the life | 49.00 EUR m |
| Total financing cost | 78.877 EUR m |
Try it. Set the instalment to 10%: the balloon disappears, the average life falls to 4.0 years, and the lenders no longer depend on a refinancing in 2033.
Why this profile. Three alternatives were discussed. A seven-year bullet would have been simplest for Ardenne but leaves EUR 400m to refinance in one day, which two of the five banks refused for an unlisted borrower. A fully amortising loan (instalments of 10%) removes the refinancing risk but takes EUR 80m a year out of cash flow from 2029, which the covenant projections could not carry while the new trains are still ramping up. The 6% instalments with a 40% balloon are the compromise: EUR 48m a year is affordable against an expected EBITDA of EUR 290m, and the balloon is refinanced against a fleet that will then be young. The drawdown calendar follows the manufacturer’s milestone invoices (order, body shells, delivery, acceptance), and Ardenne may defer a drawing by notice if a delivery slips; undrawn amounts at month 24 are cancelled. Ardenne will swap 75% of each drawing to a fixed rate on the amortising profile, so that its interest cost is known when it signs the fleet’s operating budget with the authorities; with the curve flat at 2.50%, the fixed all-in rate is close to 3.85% before fees.
Reading. The legal tenor is seven years; the economic tenor is 4.9. Every later figure (funding cost, capital, value of a discount) uses the 1,960 million euro-years, not EUR 400m times seven. The balloon is the credit question of the structure: in 2033 Ardenne must refinance EUR 160m with five years of contract left, which the committee accepts because the trains are then five years old and worth far more than the balloon.
Question. Where to set the leverage covenant, and how far can EBITDA fall before it is breached?
Data. Net debt is EUR 610m at the end of 2026 for an EBITDA of EUR 250m. The EUR 400m of new debt is fully drawn by mid-2028; cash flow in the period pays the other EUR 120m of capex and nothing else, so net debt peaks at EUR 1,010m at the end of 2028, when EBITDA is expected at EUR 290m. The term sheet sets net debt to EBITDA at or below 3.75 times and interest cover at or above 4.0 times, tested semi-annually. The all-in rate on debt is taken as EURIBOR plus margin, 3.85%.
Calculation.
Interest cover at the peak: finance charges of 3.85% on EUR 1,010m are EUR 38.9m, so the cover is 7.46 times.
Result. At the peak, leverage is 3.48 times against a ceiling of 3.75. EBITDA can miss the plan by 7.1%, or debt can exceed it by EUR 77.5m, before a breach. Interest cover is not the binding test.
INTERACTIVE LAB — Leverage covenant headroom at the peak of the capex programme
Compute leverage, interest cover and covenant headroom at the end of 2028, and see how fast headroom disappears if EBITDA misses the plan.
| Parameter you can move | Range | Default |
|---|---|---|
| Net debt before the programme | 300 to 900 EUR m | 610 EUR m |
| New debt drawn | 0 to 600 EUR m | 400 EUR m |
| EBITDA at the test date | 200 to 350 EUR m | 290 EUR m |
| Leverage covenant ceiling | 3 to 5 x | 3.75 x |
| All-in interest rate on net debt | 2 to 7 % | 3.85 % |
| Result at default settings | Value |
|---|---|
| Net debt / EBITDA | 3.48 x |
| EBITDA at which the covenant is breached | 269.3 EUR m |
| EBITDA headroom | 7.1 % |
| Additional debt possible at this EBITDA | 77.5 EUR m |
| Net finance charges | 38.9 EUR m |
| Interest cover (EBITDA / net finance charges) | 7.46 x |
Try it. Raise the ceiling to 4.25 times, as the CFO first asked: headroom becomes 18% and the covenant would no longer warn the lenders before the situation is serious.
Reading. A headroom of 7% at the peak is tight by design, and the credit committee discusses it at length: train deliveries are often late, and a late train earns nothing while its debt is drawn. The committee accepts 3.75 times with a step-down to 3.50 from 2030, because public service compensation makes EBITDA stable. None of this discussion mentions the word green. The trains’ environmental quality does not repay the loan; the contract does.
Question. Can the EUR 400m be a green loan, and how much of it is Taxonomy-aligned?
Step 1: eligibility under the GLP. Electric and battery-electric trains and the depot’s electrical equipment fall under clean transportation, a listed category, with an evident benefit against the diesel units they replace. The diesel overhaul does not: extending the life of fossil-fuelled rolling stock cannot be presented as a green project, even if it lowers particulate emissions. The eligible pool is therefore EUR 440m out of a EUR 520m programme.
Step 2: tranche or whole facility. Had Ardenne asked for EUR 480m, the structurer would have split the facility into a green tranche A and a plain tranche B, because a facility with a non-green tranche cannot be called green as a whole. Here the debt requested, EUR 400m, is below the eligible pool, so the whole facility can be green, provided the purpose clause restricts it to the three eligible items and Ardenne’s own cash pays for the diesel overhaul. The loan covers 90.9% of the eligible pool, leaving EUR 40m of eligible cost funded by equity. That margin of unfunded eligible assets is not a detail: it is what will protect the label in section 5.7.
Step 3: management of proceeds. Drawdowns are credited to a dedicated sub-account and paid out against invoices of the listed suppliers. The allocation register attributes the loan to the three items in proportion to their cost, a convention written in the framework: EUR 300.0m to the electric units, EUR 68.2m to the battery units and EUR 31.8m to the depot.
Step 4: the Taxonomy test. Meridian’s sustainable finance team tests each item, with evidence, against activity 6.1 (trains) and activity 6.14 (rail infrastructure) of the Climate Delegated Act.
| Test | Electric and battery units | Depot works |
|---|---|---|
| Substantial contribution (mitigation) | Zero tailpipe CO2: met, manufacturer’s technical file | Electrified trackside infrastructure: met in principle |
| DNSH adaptation | Climate risk assessment of fleet and lines (2025): provided | Site-level assessment for flood risk: not available |
| DNSH circular economy | End-of-life and battery recycling plan: provided | Construction waste plan: not available |
| DNSH pollution | No combustion engine: not applicable | Noise and dust measures: provided |
| Minimum safeguards | Human rights due diligence, anti-corruption and tax policies: provided, at company level | Same |
What the evidence looks like. The table hides most of the work. For the substantial-contribution criterion, the file contains the technical specification annexed to the purchase contract, which shows that the units have no combustion engine; the battery units draw from the overhead line and from their batteries only. For adaptation, the regulation asks for a climate risk and vulnerability assessment proportionate to the activity: Ardenne commissioned one in 2025 for its network, covering heat (rail buckling, cooling of traction equipment) and flooding of the river valleys it serves, with an adaptation plan; the coordinator checks that the new units and the lines they will run on are inside its perimeter. For the circular economy, the manufacturer’s recyclability statement and the battery take-back clause of the supply contract are filed. For minimum safeguards, which are tested on the undertaking and not on the asset, the file holds Ardenne’s human rights due diligence policy, its code of conduct and the absence of final convictions on corruption, tax or competition law, taken from its sustainability statement. None of these documents was written for the bank; the skill of the coordinator is to know which existing document answers which criterion, and to say plainly when none does. The depot is that case: the works are plainly useful, but the contractor has not yet produced a waste management plan and the site was outside the 2025 climate assessment.
The second-party opinion. The reviewer’s opinion, delivered a week before signing, concludes that the framework is aligned with the four components of the GLP, rates the expected contribution of the trains as significant, and notes two limits: the impact baseline is chosen by the company, and the depot’s Taxonomy alignment is not demonstrated. Meridian’s committee reads the opinion as a second view, not as a substitute for its own test: the opinion is addressed to the borrower, is paid by it, and takes no position on the bank’s regulatory reporting.
Result. The trains pass. The depot is eligible but cannot be shown to be aligned today, because two DNSH items lack evidence. Meridian therefore records EUR 405m of the EUR 440m pool as aligned: a Taxonomy-aligned share of 92.0% of the loan. On Meridian’s EUR 80m hold, once fully drawn, EUR 73.6m enters the numerator of the Green Asset Ratio. Had the same EUR 80m been a general-purpose loan, Meridian would have applied Ardenne’s published ratios: EUR 49.6m on the turnover basis (62%) and EUR 62.4m on the capex basis (78%).
INTERACTIVE LAB — Eligible pool, allocation of the loan and Taxonomy-aligned share
Size the eligible pool, allocate the loan pro rata to costs, and compare what a use-of-proceeds loan and a general-purpose loan contribute to the lender’s Green Asset Ratio.
| Parameter you can move | Range | Default |
|---|---|---|
| Electric multiple units (EUR 11.0m each) | 0 to 40 units | 30 units |
| Battery-electric units (EUR 12.5m each) | 0 to 12 units | 6 units |
| Depot electrification | 0 to 80 EUR m | 35 EUR m |
| Depot shown to be Taxonomy-aligned | no / yes | no |
| Diesel overhaul (not eligible) | 0 to 150 EUR m | 80 EUR m |
| Debt requested | 100 to 600 EUR m | 400 EUR m |
| Meridian share of the facility | 5 to 100 % | 20 % |
| Borrower’s Taxonomy-aligned turnover | 0 to 100 % | 62 % |
| Borrower’s Taxonomy-aligned capex | 0 to 100 % | 78 % |
| Result at default settings | Value |
|---|---|
| Eligible pool | 440.0 EUR m |
| Maximum green amount (rest must be a plain tranche) | 400.0 EUR m |
| Plain tranche needed | 0.0 EUR m |
| Green loan as share of eligible pool | 90.9 % |
| Eligible cost not funded by the loan | 40.0 EUR m |
| Allocated to electric units | 300.0 EUR m |
| Allocated to battery units | 68.2 EUR m |
| Allocated to the depot | 31.8 EUR m |
| Taxonomy-aligned share of the green loan | 92.0 % |
| Meridian aligned amount, known use of proceeds | 73.6 EUR m |
| Same hold as general-purpose loan, turnover basis | 49.6 EUR m |
| Same hold as general-purpose loan, capex basis | 62.4 EUR m |
Try it. Raise the debt requested to EUR 480m: EUR 40m must go into a plain tranche, and the green tranche then has no unfunded eligible asset behind it.
Reading. Three labels have been decided and they do not coincide: 100% of the facility is a green loan under the GLP; 92% is Taxonomy-aligned; and the bank’s Green Asset Ratio receives EUR 73.6m, against EUR 49.6m if the loan had been left unstructured. The evidence gap on the depot is typical: the substantial-contribution criterion is rarely the obstacle, the DNSH paperwork is. The coordinator records an action for 2027: obtain the site flood assessment and the waste plan, and re-present the depot to the committee.
Question. The CFO asks for 5 bp off the margin “because it is green”. What can Meridian offer, what is it worth to Ardenne, and what does the label cost?
Data. Meridian’s policy (a case assumption, representative of a minority of banks) is the following. A green loan has the same credit risk as a plain one, so the credit margin does not change. But Meridian funds part of its balance sheet with green bonds, which price about 3 bp inside its conventional curve, the same order as the greenium of the Helios bond (see C01). Treasury passes this advantage to the desks as an FTP rebate of 3 bp on the drawn amount of loans admitted to the eligible pool. The desk may pass it on. The club agrees a green discount of 3 bp: margin of 132 bp while the loan is designated green, 135 bp after a declassification. The commitment fee follows the margin. Ardenne’s costs for the label: EUR 60,000 for the second-party opinion and EUR 30,000 a year for the allocation and impact report and its assurance, on top of internal time.
Calculation. One basis point of margin applies to the 1,960 million euro-years drawn, and at 35% to the 300 million euro-years undrawn:
Three basis points are worth EUR 619,500 over the life. The label costs . Discounting half-yearly savings and yearly costs at 3.85% gives a present value of EUR 543,600 for the discount and EUR 241,100 for the costs.
Result. Net of label costs, the green format saves Ardenne EUR 349,500 over seven years, or EUR 302,500 in present value. That is 0.79% of the EUR 78.88m financing cost, and less than a tenth of one percent of the capex. The discount that just pays for the label is 1.3 bp.
INTERACTIVE LAB — What a green margin discount is worth to Ardenne, net of the cost of the label
Value a discount on margin and commitment fee over the actual drawn and undrawn schedule, and compare it with the borrower’s review and reporting costs.
| Parameter you can move | Range | Default |
|---|---|---|
| Green discount on the margin | 0 to 10 bp | 3 bp |
| Second-party opinion, at signing | 0 to 150 EUR k | 60 EUR k |
| Annual reporting and assurance cost | 0 to 100 EUR k | 30 EUR k |
| Discount rate | 0 to 8 % | 3.85 % |
| Total financing cost of the facility | 40 to 150 EUR m | 78.8775 EUR m |
| Result at default settings | Value |
|---|---|
| Value of 1 bp over the life | 206.5 EUR k |
| Saving from the discount, undiscounted | 619.5 EUR k |
| Cost of the label, undiscounted | 270.0 EUR k |
| Net benefit, undiscounted | 349.5 EUR k |
| Present value of the saving | 543.6 EUR k |
| Present value of the costs | 241.1 EUR k |
| Net present value of the green format | 302.5 EUR k |
| Break-even discount | 1.31 bp |
| Saving as share of total financing cost | 0.79 % |
Try it. Set the discount to zero, the most common case in the market: the green format then costs the borrower EUR 270,000 and must be justified by something other than price.
What the other lenders said. The discount was not unanimous at first. Two club banks have green bond programmes and internal rebates like Meridian’s and accepted 3 bp at once. One has a published target for green lending and accepted for that reason. The fifth has neither and argued, correctly from its own position, that it was being asked to give up revenue for a label that brings it nothing; it accepted when the step-up on declassification was added, since the discount is then conditional on the borrower keeping its side. Ardenne’s request for 5 bp was refused by all five: beyond the funding advantage, the discount would have come out of a return already below the hurdle.
Reading. The honest answer to the CFO has three parts. First, there is no credit reason for a discount: the green loan ranks equally with Ardenne’s other debt and defaults with it. Second, where a discount exists it comes from the lender’s side (cheaper green funding, internal targets, reporting value), and it is a few basis points at most; many green loans carry none. Third, at 3 bp the net gain is about EUR 50,000 a year on a EUR 520m programme. Ardenne should not choose the green format for the price. The reasons that survive are others: several club banks have more appetite, and larger tickets, for assets that count in their green ratios; the regional authorities that pay Ardenne want the fleet renewal documented as green; and the framework, once written, serves for the next financing. Section 8 sets this against the published evidence.
Question. What does Meridian earn on its EUR 80m, and what do the discount and the rebate do to its return?
Data. Meridian holds 20% of every flow: on average over seven years EUR 56.0m drawn and EUR 8.57m undrawn. The desk pays Treasury a liquidity premium of 30 bp on drawn amounts (6 bp per year of average life, 4.9 years, rounded) and a contingent liquidity charge of 4 bp on undrawn amounts (section 6.3). Operating costs are 40% of lending revenues and 60% of fee revenues, both measured before discount and rebate, since a lower price does not lower the cost of running the loan. Meridian’s roles pay a coordination fee of EUR 200,000 at signing and an agency fee of EUR 40,000 a year. PD 0.20%, F-IRB with LGD 40%, CCF 40% on the undrawn commitment, maturity 2.5 years in the formula, capital 13% of RWA, tax 25%.
Calculation, plain loan at 135 bp, annual averages over the life:
| Line | Computation | EUR k |
|---|---|---|
| Net margin on drawn amount | 56.0m x (135 - 30) bp | 588.0 |
| Commitment fee net of liquidity charge | 8.57m x (47.25 - 4) bp | 37.1 |
| Upfront fee spread over 7 years | 80m x 50 bp / 7 | 57.1 |
| Lending revenues | 682.2 | |
| Coordination and agency fees | 200 / 7 + 40 | 68.6 |
| Operating costs | 40% x 682.2 + 60% x 68.6 | -314.0 |
| Expected loss | 0.20% x 40% x 59.43m | -47.5 |
| Pre-tax result | 389.2 |
Capital: ; risk weight 39.02%; RWA EUR 23.19m; allocated capital EUR 3.014m.
Result. The plain loan returns 9.68%, below the 12% hurdle. With the 3 bp discount and no rebate, Meridian gives up EUR 17,700 a year and the return falls to 9.24%. With the Treasury rebate of 3 bp on the drawn amount, EUR 16,800 comes back and the return is 9.66%: the green loan as actually structured is almost neutral for the desk. To reach 12%, the relationship must bring about EUR 270,000 a year of ancillary revenues (interest-rate hedging of the loan, cash management, the next bond), each euro of which carries EUR 2.5 of RWA and a 60% cost ratio.
INTERACTIVE LAB — Meridian’s RAROC on its EUR 80m hold: plain, with green discount, with funding rebate
Rebuild the lender’s average annual revenues, expected loss, capital and RAROC, then see what the green discount removes, what the green funding rebate returns and what cross-sell must add.
| Parameter you can move | Range | Default |
|---|---|---|
| Meridian final hold | 20 to 200 EUR m | 80 EUR m |
| Margin before green discount | 80 to 250 bp | 135 bp |
| Green discount given to the borrower | 0 to 10 bp | 3 bp |
| FTP rebate for green-funded assets | 0 to 10 bp | 3 bp |
| Ancillary revenues from the relationship | 0 to 1000 EUR k per year | 0 EUR k per year |
| One-year PD | 0.05 to 2 % | 0.2 % |
| Maturity M in the IRB formula | 1 to 5 years | 2.5 years |
| FTP liquidity premium on drawn amounts | 0 to 80 bp | 30 bp |
| Result at default settings | Value |
|---|---|
| Average drawn amount | 56.00 EUR m |
| Average undrawn amount | 8.57 EUR m |
| Net margin on drawn amount | 588.0 EUR k |
| Commitment fee net of liquidity charge | 37.1 EUR k |
| Upfront fee spread over 7 years | 57.1 EUR k |
| Lending revenues | 682.2 EUR k |
| Coordination and agency fees | 68.6 EUR k |
| Operating costs | 314.0 EUR k |
| Expected loss | 47.5 EUR k |
| Pre-tax result, plain loan | 389.2 EUR k |
| Exposure at default | 59.43 EUR m |
| Risk weight | 39.02 % |
| Risk-weighted assets | 23.19 EUR m |
| Allocated capital | 3.014 EUR m |
| Revenue given up through the discount | 17.7 EUR k |
| Revenue returned by the FTP rebate | 16.8 EUR k |
| RAROC, plain loan | 9.68 % |
| RAROC with discount, no rebate | 9.24 % |
| RAROC with discount and rebate | 9.66 % |
| Relationship RAROC (green loan plus ancillary) | 9.66 % |
| Ancillary revenues needed to reach 12% | 270 EUR k |
Try it. Set the rebate to zero: the 3 bp discount is then paid out of the desk’s return, which is why a bank with no green funding advantage rarely offers one.
Who earns what. Out of the EUR 29.9m that Ardenne pays the club above EURIBOR over seven years, Meridian’s lending share is one fifth, before funding costs. Its roles add a coordination fee of EUR 200,000 and an agency fee of EUR 40,000 a year: modest amounts, but earned without capital, and the reason banks compete for the coordinator and agent titles. The second-party opinion provider and the auditor are paid by the borrower, not by the lenders. The coverage banker’s scorecard records the loan twice: as revenue, and as EUR 80m of green financing towards the bank’s target. The second entry is one reason the classification decision is taken by a committee on which the coverage banker does not sit.
Reading. Two facts are worth keeping. A term loan to a BBB borrower earns close to its cost of capital on its own, where an undrawn RCF earns a third of it (see B03): money lent is paid for, promises are not. And the green discount is financed by the bank’s own green funding, not by a lower view of risk. If Meridian measured maturity at the loan’s effective 4.9 years instead of the 2.5 years of its foundation set-up, the risk weight would be 58.7% and the plain RAROC 6.4%: the convention matters more than any green feature.
The annual report (spring 2029, on 2028). The GLP require the report until full allocation. Ardenne’s facility agreement extends it to maturity, as lenders that tag the loan need evidence each year. The report contains the allocation register (EUR 400m drawn and allocated by June 2028), the list of units delivered, and impact indicators. The auditor gives limited assurance on allocation; the impact figures are the company’s.
Question. What impact can Ardenne report, and how solid is it?
Data. Each of the 36 units runs 180,000 km a year and consumes 7 kWh per km. The electricity mix of Ardenne’s supply emits 150 gCO2e per kWh. The diesel units replaced burn 1.0 litre per km, at 2.68 kgCO2e per litre.
Calculation. The new fleet runs 6.48 million km and uses 45.4 GWh a year. Its emissions are tCO2e, against tCO2e for diesel on the same service.
Result. Avoided emissions are 10,562 tCO2e a year: 24 tCO2e per EUR m of eligible investment, of which 1,920 tCO2e can be attributed to Meridian’s share of the financing (80 / 440).
INTERACTIVE LAB — Impact report: emissions of the new fleet against the diesel baseline
Compute the electricity use and emissions of the financed trains, the diesel baseline and the avoided emissions, and see how the result depends on the carbon content of electricity.
| Parameter you can move | Range | Default |
|---|---|---|
| Units financed | 1 to 60 units | 36 units |
| Distance per unit per year | 50 to 300 thousand km | 180 thousand km |
| Electricity consumption | 3 to 12 kWh per km | 7 kWh per km |
| Emission factor of electricity | 0 to 800 gCO2e per kWh | 150 gCO2e per kWh |
| Diesel consumption of the units replaced | 0.5 to 2 litres per km | 1 litres per km |
| Eligible investment | 100 to 800 EUR m | 440 EUR m |
| Meridian outstanding amount | 0 to 200 EUR m | 80 EUR m |
| Result at default settings | Value |
|---|---|
| Electricity used per year | 45.36 GWh |
| Emissions of the new fleet (scope 2) | 6,804 tCO2e |
| Diesel baseline | 17,366 tCO2e |
| Avoided emissions per year | 10,562 tCO2e |
| Avoided emissions per EUR m invested | 24.0 tCO2e |
| Avoided emissions attributed to Meridian | 1,920 tCO2e |
| Electricity emission factor at which the benefit is nil | 383 gCO2e per kWh |
Try it. Set the electricity factor to 400 gCO2e per kWh: on a coal-heavy grid the electric train emits more than the diesel it replaces, although it still passes the zero-tailpipe criterion.
Reading. The figure is real but it is a comparison with a baseline the borrower chose. It depends on the grid: above 383 gCO2e per kWh the benefit vanishes, while the Taxonomy criterion, which looks at the tailpipe only, would still be met. It also leaves out passengers shifted from cars, which Ardenne is tempted to add and the coordinator advises against, for lack of data. “Avoided emissions” are reported beside, never netted against, the bank’s financed emissions (section 6.5).
An asset sale (January 2030). A regional authority cancels the electrification of the branch line. Ardenne sells the six battery units, at cost, to another operator, and informs the agent as the information undertaking requires.
Question. Is the loan still green?
Data. The facility agreement contains an eligible-asset cover test: the cost of eligible assets owned must at all times be at least equal to the outstanding amount of the loan. On a shortfall, Ardenne has six months to add eligible assets or prepay the shortfall; failing that, a declassification event occurs: the green designation ends, the margin returns to 135 bp, and the parties stop presenting the loan as green. No event of default arises. In January 2030 the outstanding amount is EUR 352m.
Calculation. The eligible pool falls from EUR 440m to .
Result. The test is met without any action: the EUR 40m of eligible assets that the loan never funded and the EUR 48m already repaid absorb the EUR 75m sale. The register is re-cut pro rata on the remaining pool, and the aligned share of the loan becomes , or EUR 63.6m on Meridian’s EUR 70.4m. Had Ardenne also sold four electric units, the pool would be EUR 321m, the cover 91.2% and the shortfall EUR 31m: prepay, replace or lose the label. Declassification would cost Ardenne 3 bp on EUR 352m, EUR 105,600 a year, and Meridian its tags.
INTERACTIVE LAB — Eligible-asset cover test after disposals
Re-run the cover test of the green loan when financed assets are sold, and measure the shortfall, the aligned share and the cost of a declassification.
| Parameter you can move | Range | Default |
|---|---|---|
| Outstanding amount of the loan | 184 to 400 EUR m | 352 EUR m |
| Battery units sold (EUR 12.5m each) | 0 to 6 units | 6 units |
| Electric units sold (EUR 11.0m each) | 0 to 30 units | 0 units |
| Meridian share | 5 to 100 % | 20 % |
| Margin step-up on declassification | 0 to 10 bp | 3 bp |
| Result at default settings | Value |
|---|---|
| Eligible assets still owned | 365.0 EUR m |
| Eligible-asset cover | 103.7 % |
| Shortfall to cure within six months | 0.0 EUR m |
| Taxonomy-aligned share of the outstanding loan | 90.4 % |
| Meridian outstanding amount | 70.4 EUR m |
| Meridian Taxonomy-aligned amount | 63.6 EUR m |
| Annual cost of the step-up to the borrower if declassified | 105.6 EUR k |
Try it. Keep the six battery units sold and sell electric units one by one: the cover falls below 100% at the second unit.
Who does what, on which day. Ardenne’s treasurer notifies the agent within ten business days of the sale, as the agreement requires, with the sale contract and an updated asset list. The agent forwards the notice to the lenders and to Meridian’s green loan coordinator, who re-runs the test, checks that the remaining trains are still in service on Ardenne’s lines and that none of them backs another green financing, and writes a one-page memo: event, test before and after, conclusion, updated allocation. The memo goes to the club within a week. Inside Meridian, the same memo goes to Finance, which changes the aligned share in the reporting system, and to Treasury, which keeps the loan in the green bond pool but for a smaller aligned amount. In the shortfall scenario the sequence would continue: the agent serves a shortfall notice, the six-month cure period starts, and Ardenne chooses between prepaying EUR 31m from the sale proceeds (which it holds in cash, so the cure is easy) and designating new eligible assets, which would need the coordinator’s review. Only if neither happens does the agent issue the declassification notice; the margin moves to 135 bp from the next interest period, the green flag is removed from the loan system, the FTP rebate stops, and the loan leaves the green target and the bond pool on the same date. A declassified loan is still a performing loan: no covenant is breached and no provision is raised.
Reading. The loan survives because it was sized below the eligible pool and amortises faster than the assets depreciate. A green loan sized at 100% of the pool, with a bullet repayment, would have been in shortfall on the first disposal. On the desk, this is the practical argument for the 90% sizing of section 5.4, and for writing the test in the agreement instead of relying on the purpose clause. Meridian’s agency records the event, the coordinator circulates a one-page memo to the club, Finance updates the aligned share from 92.0% to 90.4%, and nothing is announced, because nothing has been lost.
Two committees approved the transaction in the week of 2 November 2026, and their minutes summarise the case. The credit committee approved a hold of EUR 80m for seven years, rating BBB, with three conditions: leverage covenant at 3.75 times stepping down to 3.50 from 2030; hedging of at least 75% of the drawn amount; and a relationship plan showing at least EUR 270,000 a year of ancillary revenues, to be reviewed annually. It noted a stand-alone RAROC of 9.66% and did not treat the green label as a mitigant of credit risk. The classification committee validated the facility as a green loan under the GLP for 100% of its amount, as Taxonomy-aligned for 92.0%, and as eligible for the green bond pool for the aligned part. It named the loan agency as owner of the annual cover test and Finance as owner of the tags, and asked the coordinator to bring the depot back when its evidence is complete. The two decisions are independent: the first could have been positive and the second negative, in which case Ardenne would have had the same money, at 135 bp, without the label.
| Stage | Key figure | Value |
|---|---|---|
| 5.1 | Programme; eligible pool; green loan | EUR 520m; 440m; 400m |
| 5.2 | Average outstanding; weighted average life | EUR 280m; 4.9 years |
| 5.2 | Margin, commitment fees, upfront fee over the life | EUR 26.46m; 1.42m; 2.0m |
| 5.2 | All-in margin; total financing cost | 152.4 bp; EUR 78.88m |
| 5.3 | Leverage 2026; at peak 2028; covenant | 2.44x; 3.48x; 3.75x |
| 5.3 | EBITDA headroom; debt headroom; interest cover | 7.1%; EUR 77.5m; 7.46x |
| 5.4 | Loan as share of eligible pool; unfunded eligible cost | 90.9%; EUR 40m |
| 5.4 | Allocation: electric, battery, depot | EUR 300.0m; 68.2m; 31.8m |
| 5.4 | Taxonomy-aligned share; Meridian aligned amount | 92.0%; EUR 73.6m |
| 5.4 | Same hold as general-purpose loan (turnover; capex) | EUR 49.6m; 62.4m |
| 5.5 | Value of 1 bp; of the 3 bp discount | EUR 206,500; 619,500 |
| 5.5 | Label costs; net benefit; NPV; break-even | EUR 270,000; 349,500; 302,500; 1.3 bp |
| 5.6 | Meridian lending revenues; pre-tax result | EUR 682,200; 389,200 |
| 5.6 | EAD; RWA; capital | EUR 59.43m; 23.19m; 3.014m |
| 5.6 | RAROC plain; with discount; with discount and rebate | 9.68%; 9.24%; 9.66% |
| 5.6 | Ancillary revenues needed for 12% | EUR 270,000 a year |
| 5.7 | Avoided emissions; attributed to Meridian | 10,562 tCO2e; 1,920 tCO2e |
| 5.7 | Cover after sale of battery units; aligned share | 103.7%; 90.4% |
| 5.7 | Shortfall if four electric units also sold | EUR 31m |
IN ONE SENTENCE — A green corporate loan consumes exactly the capital of a plain loan to the same borrower: the risk weight depends on who owes the money, not on what the money bought.
CRR3 (Regulation (EU) 2024/1623) has applied since 1 January 2025. Three of its rules shape the capital of the Ardenne loan.
Drawn and undrawn. The drawn amount is the exposure. The undrawn commitment during the availability period is converted with a credit conversion factor of 40%, under both the standardised and the foundation IRB approaches. From month 18 the facility is fully drawn and the factor no longer matters.
Foundation IRB. Ardenne’s revenues exceed EUR 500m, so Meridian may not use its own LGD estimates: it applies the regulatory LGD of 40% for a senior unsecured corporate exposure, a PD floor of 0.05%, and the corporate risk-weight function without the former 1.06 scaling factor. With a PD of 0.20% and a maturity of 2.5 years the risk weight is 39.02%. On the fully drawn EUR 80m: RWA EUR 31.2m, capital EUR 4.06m.
Standardised approach and output floor. A corporate rated BBB is weighted 75%: RWA EUR 60m, capital EUR 7.8m. The output floor obliges an IRB bank to hold at least a percentage of standardised RWA at the level of the whole bank: 55% in 2026, rising to 72.5% in 2030. For a floor-bound bank the marginal RWA of this loan would be EUR 43.5m once the floor is fully phased in.
PITFALL — The maturity term is the hidden lever of term-loan capital. At the loan’s effective 4.9 years the F-IRB risk weight would be 58.7% instead of 39.0%, and RWA on EUR 80m would be EUR 47.0m. Before comparing RAROC figures from two banks, ask which maturity each puts in the formula.
INTERACTIVE LAB — Capital for the Ardenne hold under CRR3: F-IRB, standardised approach and output floor
Compute RWA and capital for a drawn term-loan exposure under the foundation IRB formula and under the standardised approach, and see the effect of the maturity term.
| Parameter you can move | Range | Default |
|---|---|---|
| Exposure (fully drawn hold) | 10 to 200 EUR m | 80 EUR m |
| One-year PD | 0.05 to 4 % | 0.2 % |
| LGD (F-IRB senior unsecured corporate 40%) | 20 to 45 % | 40 % |
| Maturity M in the IRB formula | 1 to 5 years | 2.5 years |
| Standardised risk weight (BBB corporate 75%) | 20 to 150 % | 75 % |
| Result at default settings | Value |
|---|---|
| F-IRB risk weight | 39.02 % |
| RWA under F-IRB | 31.21 EUR m |
| Capital under F-IRB (13%) | 4.058 EUR m |
| RWA under the standardised approach | 60.00 EUR m |
| Capital under the standardised approach (13%) | 7.800 EUR m |
| 72.5% of standardised RWA (output floor, 2030) | 43.50 EUR m |
Try it. Move the PD from 0.20% to 1.00%, a BB borrower: capital roughly doubles, a far larger effect than any green feature could have.
No green supporting factor exists in CRR3, and the EBA has so far declined to recommend one for lack of evidence that green exposures are less risky (see E02). If the trains were pledged, Meridian could recognise collateral and a lower LGD; that is the asset-finance structure of B09, with different documentation.
The table of section 5.6 is the one that appears in the credit application: an average over the life. The green feature moves two lines. The discount removes EUR 17,700 of revenue a year; the Treasury rebate returns EUR 16,800. Costs rise a little (the coordinator’s time, the annual cover test), which Meridian, like most banks, does not charge to the deal. Expected loss and capital do not move.
The average hides a profile. In year 1 Meridian’s exposure is small and it collects commitment fees on the undrawn part; in years 3 and 4 the loan is at its peak; in the last years the upfront fee, spread on a straight line, weighs more against a shrinking balance.
INTERACTIVE LAB — RAROC of the green loan year by year
Follow revenues, capital and RAROC of Meridian’s hold through the seven years, with the fixed 2.5-year maturity and with the remaining average life in the IRB formula.
| Parameter you can move | Range | Default |
|---|---|---|
| Meridian final hold | 20 to 200 EUR m | 80 EUR m |
| Margin before green discount | 80 to 250 bp | 135 bp |
| Green discount | 0 to 10 bp | 3 bp |
| FTP rebate for green-funded assets | 0 to 10 bp | 3 bp |
| One-year PD | 0.05 to 2 % | 0.2 % |
| Result at default settings | Value |
|---|---|
| RAROC in year 1 | 9.91 % |
| RAROC in year 3 (peak exposure) | 9.31 % |
| RAROC in year 7 | 10.46 % |
| Average drawn amount in year 3 | 77.6 EUR m |
| Capital in year 3 | 3.936 EUR m |
| RAROC in year 1 with remaining average life as M | 6.58 % |
Try it. Compare the two curves: with the remaining average life as maturity, the loan destroys value in its first years and earns its hurdle only when it has aged.
With the fixed maturity the return is 9.91% in year 1, 9.31% in year 3 and 10.46% in year 7; in year 3 Meridian has EUR 77.6m drawn and EUR 3.94m of capital committed. With the remaining life in the formula, year 1 falls to 6.58% and only the last two years reach the hurdle. This is why portfolio managers like seasoned amortising loans and why distribution desks sell young ones (see B16).
INTUITION — The lending desk does not borrow from depositors; it borrows from Treasury, at a price that reflects what it costs the bank to raise money for the same duration. A seven-year amortising loan is charged like a 4.9-year one, because that is how long, on average, the money is out.
Treasury charges the swap rate for the interest-rate profile plus a liquidity premium for term funding: 6 bp per year of average life, hence 29.4 bp for 4.9 years, rounded to 30 bp. The charge is fixed at each drawdown for the life of that drawing, so the desk carries no funding risk afterwards. For the undrawn commitment, the Liquidity Coverage Ratio assumes that non-financial corporates draw 10% of committed credit facilities in a 30-day stress; Treasury holds that amount in liquid assets at a net carry cost of 40 bp, hence a charge of 4 bp on the undrawn amount. Under the Net Stable Funding Ratio a corporate loan with more than one year to run requires 85% of stable funding, which is what the liquidity premium pays for.
The green rebate. Meridian issues green senior bonds under a framework whose eligible pool is made of loans such as this one (see C15). If those bonds price 3 bp inside the conventional curve, Treasury can either keep the saving or pass it to the desks that originate eligible assets. Meridian passes it: 3 bp on drawn amounts for loans validated by the classification committee, withdrawn on declassification. On Meridian’s average EUR 56m this is EUR 16,800 a year. Two cautions. The rebate exists only if the bank really issues green bonds and has too few eligible assets, so that the marginal green loan has funding value; a bank with a surplus of eligible assets has no reason to pay for more. And a loan can enter the pool of a bond issued under the European Green Bond Standard only for its Taxonomy-aligned part, which sends the desk back to the test of section 5.4.
Classification. Meridian holds the loan to collect its cash flows, and these are solely payments of principal and interest (SPPI): the restriction on the use of proceeds does not touch the cash flows at all. The 3 bp step-up on declassification is a contingent feature unrelated to credit risk. Since the amendments to IFRS 9 issued in May 2024, effective from 1 January 2026 and endorsed in the EU by Regulation (EU) 2025/1047, such a feature is compatible with SPPI when the cash flows cannot differ significantly from those of the same loan without it; 3 bp on 135 bp qualifies. The loan is measured at amortised cost, with the IFRS 7 disclosures on contingent features that the amendments introduced.
Fees. The upfront fee is part of the effective interest rate and is recognised over the life of the loan, in proportion to the amortised cost, not on a straight line; the straight line of the RAROC is a management simplification that flatters the late years slightly. Commitment fees during the availability period, when drawdown is probable, are also deferred into the effective rate. The coordination fee rewards a service performed at signing and is recognised then (IFRS 15); the agency fee is recognised over time.
Impairment. The loan and the undrawn commitment are in Stage 1 at origination: Meridian books 12-month expected credit losses, of the order of the EUR 47,500 expected loss of the RAROC. A transfer to Stage 2 requires a significant increase in credit risk. A declassification is not one in itself, although the events behind it (a cancelled contract, forced asset sales) may be.
The borrower. Ardenne recognises the loan at amortised cost and, under IAS 23, capitalises borrowing costs incurred while the trains are being built. Its own Taxonomy reporting counts the trains in aligned capex, and the second-party opinion and the allocation report are disclosed with its sustainability statement (see E05 for the full treatment).
Green Asset Ratio. For exposures with known use of proceeds, the bank counts the share of the gross carrying amount that finances aligned activities, on its own assessment and evidence. Section 5.4 gave EUR 73.6m for the fully drawn hold. Meridian has EUR 151bn of covered assets under Delegated Regulation 2026/73, of which EUR 10.1bn are aligned, a ratio of 6.69% (see A02 and E06). The Ardenne loan adds EUR 80m to the denominator and EUR 73.6m to the numerator: the ratio rises by 4.5 bp. It takes some twenty-three loans of this kind to move the ratio by one percentage point. This is why the ratio is criticised (it is dominated by what a bank cannot count, not by what it finances), why Delegated Regulation (EU) 2026/73 simplified it, and why the EBA’s final draft Pillar 3 standards of June 2026 remove the GAR and BTAR templates from Pillar 3, leaving the ratio in the sustainability statement only (see E06). Two operational rules matter for the desk: the evidence must be kept for the life of the loan, and industry bodies point out that the disclosure rules require known-use-of-proceeds exposures to be reassessed when the technical criteria change, after a grace period of five years. A seven-year loan can therefore lose alignment through a change of rules, without any change in the trains.
Financed emissions. Under the PCAF standard (Part A, edition of December 2025), a general-purpose corporate loan is attributed a share of the borrower’s emissions equal to the outstanding amount divided by the borrower’s total equity and debt, for an unlisted company. The December 2025 edition adds a method for use-of-proceeds structures; in outline, and as Meridian applies it, the bank attributes to itself the emissions of the financed assets in proportion to its share of their financing. For the Ardenne hold: of the 6,804 tCO2e of the new fleet, or 1,237 tCO2e. Treated as a general-purpose loan to a company emitting 210,000 tCO2e (scope 1 and 2) with EUR 2,400m of equity and debt, the same EUR 80m would carry 7,000 tCO2e. The green loan lowers Meridian’s reported financed emissions per euro lent because the money can be traced to low-emitting assets, while Ardenne’s diesel fleet still runs. Both figures are true; a reader must know which rule produced them (see E07).
INTERACTIVE LAB — What the hold adds to Meridian’s Green Asset Ratio and financed emissions
Compute the change in the Green Asset Ratio and compare financed emissions under the use-of-proceeds and general-purpose attribution rules.
| Parameter you can move | Range | Default |
|---|---|---|
| Meridian outstanding amount | 0 to 200 EUR m | 80 EUR m |
| Taxonomy-aligned amount of the hold | 0 to 200 EUR m | 73.64 EUR m |
| Covered assets of the bank | 100 to 1000 EUR bn | 151 EUR bn |
| Green Asset Ratio before the loan | 0 to 20 % | 6.69 % |
| Cost of the financed assets | 100 to 800 EUR m | 440 EUR m |
| Emissions of the financed assets | 0 to 30000 tCO2e | 6804 tCO2e |
| Borrower scope 1 and 2 emissions | 10 to 1000 ktCO2e | 210 ktCO2e |
| Borrower total equity and debt | 500 to 10000 EUR m | 2400 EUR m |
| Result at default settings | Value |
|---|---|
| Green Asset Ratio after the loan | 6.7352 % |
| Change in the ratio | 4.52 bp |
| Number of such loans to add one percentage point | 23 loans |
| Attribution factor, use of proceeds | 18.18 % |
| Financed emissions, use-of-proceeds rule | 1,237 tCO2e |
| Attribution factor, general purpose | 3.33 % |
| Financed emissions, general-purpose rule | 7,000 tCO2e |
Try it. Set the aligned amount to zero: a non-aligned loan to a company inside the CSRD scope lowers the ratio slightly, because it enters the denominator only.
Sustainable finance targets and Pillar 3. Meridian counts the full EUR 80m commitment, at signing, in its published sustainable finance target, because the loan is GLP-aligned and validated by the committee; it removes the outstanding amount on declassification. The revised Pillar 3 templates keep a table of exposures that mitigate climate risk whether or not they are Taxonomy-aligned, where a loan such as this one, including its non-aligned depot share, can be reported. Three numbers thus describe the same loan: EUR 80m in the target, EUR 73.6m in the ratio, and 1,237 tCO2e in the inventory. Each is defensible and none is comparable with another bank’s without reading the methodology.
| Risk | What can go wrong | Control | Owner |
|---|---|---|---|
| Credit | Late deliveries, contract loss, balloon not refinanced | Rating, covenants, annual review | Credit risk |
| Eligibility | Financed item is not green, or evidence is missing | GLP checklist, Taxonomy test, external review | Classification committee |
| Diversion of proceeds | Money pays for non-eligible capex | Dedicated sub-account, drawdown against invoices, register | Loan agency |
| Double counting | Same asset backs two green financings | Framework-level register, assurance on allocation | Borrower, auditor |
| Loss of eligibility | Disposal, change of use, change of criteria | Information undertaking, cover test, cure period | Coordinator, agency |
| Stale tags | Loan declassified but still reported as green | Single owner of the tag, four-eyes check, annual attestation | Finance |
| Pricing | Discount given without funding benefit | RAROC approved on the discount case | Structurer, Treasury |
| Claims | Bank or borrower overstates impact | Publicity clause, sign-off of communications | Compliance |
| Liability | Lenders rely on the coordinator’s analysis | Narrow mandate, no verification duty | Legal |
Red-flag checklist for a structurer, an analyst or a lender invited into a club:
WHY IT MATTERS ON THE DESK — Almost every public case of a mislabelled green loan is an operational failure discovered years after signing: a tag nobody removed, a register nobody kept. The classification at origination is the visible part of the work; the control that protects the bank is the dull annual one.
Volumes. Environmental Finance Data, published in the LMA’s Horizons in March 2026, put global sustainable lending at USD 749bn in 2025, down 22% from the record of 2024. Sustainability-linked loans fell by USD 279bn; green loans rose by USD 63.4bn and loans mixing green and social projects by USD 9.6bn, to USD 20bn. The same source expects use-of-proceeds lending to keep growing in 2026, helped by project-based financings, among them data-centre construction, whose green credentials are themselves debated. The first half of 2026 was weak for the market as a whole, at about USD 235bn (Environmental Finance, September 2026). Social loans remain a small segment.
Quality. Moody’s, quoted by Environmental Finance in September 2026, reports that about 90% of the green, social and sustainability loans it has reviewed obtained one of its two highest sustainability quality scores, against just over half for sustainability-linked loans. Use-of-proceeds structures are easier to assess: either the money went to the asset or it did not.
Practice on the ground. A Pinsent Masons analysis of March 2026 describes the other side: a slowdown in interest among smaller borrowers over the preceding year, borrowers put off by reporting costs when margins are already low, few lenders enforcing a dedicated proceeds account, lenders offering lighter products that recognise green activity without claiming GLP alignment, and banks asking whether they are outliers in applying the principles strictly. It expects a further review of the GLP.
Is there a loan greenium? The evidence is thinner than for bonds, because loan margins are negotiated, bundled with fees and relationship business, and rarely observed for a twin loan.
Put in proportion: the literature supports a price difference linked to who the borrower is and who the lender is. It does not establish a discount caused by the green loan label for a given borrower, and practitioners report that explicit green discounts are small or absent. The 3 bp of the case, justified by the lender’s own funding, is at the upper end of what a desk can defend; compare the 3 bp greenium of the Helios bond (see C01) and the discussion of the bond greenium in Roncalli’s handbook.
Regulatory calendar. GLP and SLP: version of 26 March 2025; Transition Loan Principles and updated guidance: 3 November 2026. Taxonomy disclosures: Delegated Regulation (EU) 2026/73 applicable from 1 January 2026; the EBA’s advice of 29 October 2026 to drop the trading-book and fees KPIs and simplify the GAR templates had not been acted on by the Commission in November 2026. CSRD scope: Directive (EU) 2026/470, to be transposed by 19 March 2027. Pillar 3: EBA final draft standards of June 2026, first reference date 31 December 2026. PCAF: edition of December 2025.
Open debates in November 2026. Should a green loan require Taxonomy alignment in Europe, as the EBA’s 2023 proposal for a voluntary label implied, or stay principles-based to remain usable outside the Union and by smaller borrowers? Should lenders be obliged to monitor proceeds, where the principles only oblige borrowers to track them? Do lighter green products widen access or dilute the label? Will transition loans take the hard-to-abate projects that the green label rightly refuses, such as Ardenne’s diesel overhaul? And should banks count a green loan at commitment, at drawing or at aligned amount in their targets? The position this module defends is that a green loan is first a good loan, and that its label is worth what the register behind it is worth.
INTERACTIVE LAB — Self-assessment: green and social use-of-proceeds loans
Check the mechanics of the term loan, the Green Loan Principles, the Taxonomy test and the bank-side economics.
Q1. A EUR 200m six-year term loan is fully drawn at signing and repaid in twelve equal semi-annual instalments. Its weighted average life is
Answer: B. Instalments fall at 0.5, 1, … 6 years; the average of these dates is 3.25 years.
Q2. Under the Green Loan Principles, what makes a loan green?
Answer: A. The label attaches to the use of proceeds and the four components; the borrower’s profile and price mechanics are not criteria.
Q3. A EUR 500m facility has a EUR 350m tranche for wind farms and a EUR 150m general-purpose tranche. It can be described as
Answer: C. A facility mixing green and non-green tranches cannot be labelled green as a whole; only the tranche carries the label.
Q4. Which statement about external review under the 2025 Green Loan Principles is correct?
Answer: D. The principles recommend a review where appropriate and accept self-certification by borrowers with demonstrated expertise.
Q5. Since the March 2025 version, annual reporting on the use of proceeds is
Answer: B. Reporting became a ‘shall’ requirement: annually until full allocation, or until maturity for a revolving facility.
Q6. In a typical green facility agreement, a breach of the green provisions leads to
Answer: C. Market practice treats green breaches as a label matter; an event of default for green misrepresentation is unusual.
Q7. For the lender’s Green Asset Ratio, a corporate loan with known use of proceeds is assessed
Answer: A. Known use of proceeds means the bank tests the financed activity; company-wide ratios apply to general-purpose loans.
Q8. The depot in the case is green under the GLP but not counted as Taxonomy-aligned because
Answer: D. Alignment needs substantial contribution, DNSH and safeguards, each with evidence; the DNSH file was incomplete.
Q9. Meridian’s 3 bp green discount is financed by
Answer: B. The loan has the borrower’s credit risk and capital; the only saving is on the bank’s funding side.
Q10. Under CRR3, the capital for a green corporate loan compared with a plain loan to the same borrower is
Answer: C. There is no green supporting factor; the risk weight depends on the borrower’s PD, the LGD and the maturity.
Q11. After the sale of the battery units, the Ardenne loan stays green because
Answer: A. The cover test compares eligible assets owned with the outstanding amount: 103.7%.
Q12. On a grid emitting 400 gCO2e per kWh, the electric trains of the case
Answer: D. 7 kWh per km at 400 g is 2.8 kg per km against 2.68 kg for diesel; the criterion looks at tailpipe emissions only.
Q13. The upfront fee on a term loan is recognised by the lender under IFRS 9
Answer: B. Origination fees are integral to the effective interest rate; a straight-line spread in the RAROC is a simplification.
Q14. Which sizing protects a green loan best against later disposals?
Answer: C. Unfunded eligible assets and repayments both build headroom in the cover test.
Valmont Tram borrows EUR 250m for five years, drawn in two equal parts at signing and at month 6. Repayment: six semi-annual instalments of EUR 25m from month 30 to month 60, the rest as a balloon at month 60. Margin 160 bp, commitment fee 40% of margin, upfront fee 60 bp. Compute the balloon, the average life and the all-in margin.
Solution. Instalments total EUR 150m, of which five are paid before maturity; the last is paid with the balloon of EUR 100m at month 60. Half-yearly outstanding amounts: 125, 250, 250, 250, 250, then 225, 200, 175, 150, 125. Their sum is 2,000, so euro-years are 1,000 and the average life is 1,000 / 250 = 4.0 years. Undrawn: EUR 125m for one half-year, 62.5 euro-years. Margin: 1.60% x 1,000 = EUR 16.0m. Commitment fee: 0.64% x 62.5 = EUR 0.40m. Upfront: EUR 1.5m. All-in margin: 17.9 / 1,000 = 179 bp.
A water utility has a EUR 300m programme: EUR 180m of network renewal with evidence for all Taxonomy criteria, EUR 60m of treatment works eligible under the GLP but without DNSH evidence, and EUR 60m for a head office. It asks for EUR 270m of debt. A bank holds 15%. Size the tranches, compute the aligned share of the green tranche under pro rata allocation, and the bank’s aligned amount. The borrower’s aligned turnover is 40%: compare.
Solution. Eligible pool: EUR 240m. Debt above it, EUR 30m, must be a plain tranche; the green tranche is at most EUR 240m, and then has no unfunded eligible asset. A prudent structure is a green tranche of EUR 215m (about 90% of the pool) and a plain tranche of EUR 55m. Aligned share: 180 / 240 = 75%. Bank’s hold of the green tranche: 15% x 215 = EUR 32.25m; aligned amount EUR 24.2m. Its hold of the plain tranche, EUR 8.25m, counts at the turnover ratio: EUR 3.3m. Total EUR 27.5m, against 15% x 270 x 40% = EUR 16.2m if the whole facility were general-purpose.
A bank holds EUR 50m of a fully drawn five-year bullet green loan. Margin 180 bp, liquidity premium 30 bp, upfront fee 40 bp spread over five years, cost-income 40%, PD 1.00%, LGD 40%, F-IRB risk weight 82% (given), capital 13% of RWA, tax 25%. Compute the RAROC. Then compute it with a 5 bp green discount and no funding rebate, and the rebate needed to restore it.
Solution. Net margin: 50m x 150 bp = EUR 750,000. Upfront: 50m x 40 bp / 5 = EUR 40,000. Revenues EUR 790,000; costs EUR 316,000; expected loss 1% x 40% x 50m = EUR 200,000. Pre-tax result EUR 274,000. RWA EUR 41m; capital EUR 5.33m. RAROC = 274,000 x 0.75 / 5,330,000 = 3.86%. The discount removes 50m x 5 bp = EUR 25,000: pre-tax EUR 249,000, RAROC 3.50%. A rebate of 5 bp on the drawn amount restores it exactly, since the loan is fully drawn. The loan is far below the hurdle in both cases: a BB term loan at 180 bp does not pay for its expected loss and capital, and the green question is secondary.
1. What is the difference between a green loan and a sustainability-linked loan? A green loan restricts the use of the money: proceeds go only to eligible green projects, and the borrower tracks and reports them. A sustainability-linked loan leaves the money free and links the margin to the borrower’s performance against sustainability targets. The first is a claim about assets, the second about the company’s trajectory. They are governed by different principles and can be combined only if both sets are met.
2. Name the four core components of the Green Loan Principles and say what changed in 2025. Use of proceeds, process for project evaluation and selection, management of proceeds, and reporting. The March 2025 version separated mandatory requirements from recommendations: describing the projects in the documents, demonstrating the environmental benefit, tracking proceeds and reporting annually became “shall” obligations. It also removed the exemption for older loans, so a refinancing is tested against the current text. External review remains recommended, not mandatory.
3. A client wants EUR 300m, of which EUR 200m for a solar portfolio and EUR 100m for general purposes. How do you structure it? As two tranches: a green tranche for the solar assets, sized somewhat below their cost to leave room for disposals, and a plain tranche for the rest. The whole facility cannot be called green. The green tranche gets its own purpose clause, sub-account, reporting undertaking and declassification mechanism. I would also check with Finance that the solar assets pass the Taxonomy test, because that decides how the tranche is reported.
4. Is there a greenium on green loans? Much less clearly than on bonds. Academic studies find that greener borrowers pay less, especially with committed lenders, but that is a borrower effect, not a label effect. In practice explicit green discounts are a few basis points or zero, and where they exist they are funded by the lender: a cheaper green bond, an internal target. On a EUR 400m amortising loan, 3 bp is worth about EUR 600,000 over seven years before label costs, so price is not the main reason to choose the format.
5. Why would a bank want green loans if they earn no more and cost the same capital? Because they are the corporate loans it can count in full: in the Green Asset Ratio on the financed activity, in its sustainable finance target, and in the asset pool that backs its own green bonds. They also come with better information on the borrower’s capex, and they support the client relationship. None of this changes the credit decision, and the bank must be able to show that the tag is still valid each year.
6. How do you test Taxonomy alignment of an electric train? Three steps. Substantial contribution: the activity is passenger rail transport and the train has zero tailpipe CO2 emissions. Do no significant harm: a climate risk assessment for adaptation, end-of-life and battery management for the circular economy, engine emission limits for pollution where relevant. Minimum safeguards: the operator’s policies on human rights, corruption, tax and competition. Each step needs a document in the file; in practice the DNSH evidence is where assets fail.
7. The borrower sells part of the financed assets in year four. What do you do? I check the facility agreement: information undertaking, cover test, cure period. I recompute eligible assets against the outstanding amount. If cover holds, I update the allocation register and the aligned share and inform the lenders. If not, the borrower must add eligible assets or prepay the shortfall within the cure period; otherwise the loan is declassified, the step-up applies, and I make sure Finance and Treasury remove the tags the same day.
8. Walk me through the RAROC of a term loan and say where the green feature appears. Revenues are the margin over the funds transfer price on the drawn amount, commitment fees net of the liquidity charge, and the upfront fee spread over the life, plus any role fees. I deduct operating costs and the expected loss, PD times LGD times exposure, apply tax, and divide by capital at 13% of RWA. For Ardenne that gives about 9.7%. The green feature appears as a small revenue loss if a discount is given and a small funding gain if Treasury rebates green funding; capital and expected loss are unchanged.
Standards and market documentation
Regulation and accounting
Supervisory papers
Market data
Academic papers and textbooks