Project finance is the part of the bank that lends to a company created for a single purpose, owning a single asset, with no history and no other source of repayment than the cash that asset will produce. At Meridian Bank the team sits in Corporate Banking, inside the Energy and Real Assets department, next to energy transition finance (see B07), real estate finance (see B08) and asset finance (see B09). It reports to the head of structured finance, not to the country coverage heads, because the skill is the structure and not the client relationship alone.
The clients are of three kinds. Industrial sponsors: utilities and energy companies that develop, build and operate (Helios Renewables, the reference issuer of this course, is one). Financial sponsors: infrastructure funds, pension funds and insurers that buy stakes for a long, contracted yield. Developers: smaller firms that originate projects and sell them at financial close or at commissioning. The same people come back deal after deal, which matters: project finance is a repeated game between a few hundred professionals in Europe.
The desk earns money in five ways, here with the orders of magnitude used in this module’s case (they are case assumptions, consistent with what practitioners quote for European offshore wind):
| Revenue | Paid on | Case order of magnitude |
|---|---|---|
| Arranging and underwriting fee | Debt arranged, at close | 150 to 250 bp flat |
| Margin over EURIBOR | Drawn amount, for 15 to 20 years | 150 to 225 bp |
| Commitment fee | Undrawn amount during construction | 35 to 40% of margin |
| Hedging | Interest rate swap, execution spread | A few bp running on the notional |
| Agency, account bank, advisory | Flat annual fees, deposits | EUR 0.1m to 0.5m a year |
A EUR 1.4bn transaction therefore generates about EUR 28m of upfront fees for the lending group and around EUR 25m of margin in its first year of operation. The loan itself is thin (section 6 shows a stand-alone RAROC below Meridian’s hurdle); the business works because the bank arranges more than it keeps, sells swaps and services on top, and recycles capital when the project refinances.
WHO DOES WHAT — A deal team of four or five carries a transaction for 9 to 18 months. The managing director owns the sponsor relationship and the credit committee. The director negotiates the term sheet and the documents. The associate runs the workstreams: advisers, due diligence question lists, credit paper. The analyst lives in the financial model. Around them: the specialised lending credit officer (second line, signs the rating and the slotting category), the environmental and social risk (ESR) team (categorises the project under the Equator Principles and signs off the action plan), loan syndication (see B04), the rates desk for the hedging (see C07), Legal with external counsel, the facility agent and portfolio management, which monitors the loan for the following twenty years (see B17).
A realistic week in November 2026, three weeks before the financial close of Cap Ferrat Offshore Wind. Monday: the lenders’ technical adviser circulates the final energy yield report; the analyst updates the P50 and P90 cases and the debt size moves by EUR 6m. Tuesday: all-lenders call on the direct agreement with the turbine supplier, two hours on the cap on delay liquidated damages. Wednesday: the ESR officer reviews the marine mammal mitigation plan with the independent environmental and social consultant and adds a condition precedent to first piling. Thursday: credit committee for the final hold, the slotting category and the hedging limit. Friday: the model auditor issues its draft opinion, the hedging banks rehearse the swap execution protocol, and the associate updates the conditions precedent checklist, which has 214 lines.
WHY IT MATTERS ON THE DESK — In corporate lending you analyse a balance sheet and trust a management. Here there is no balance sheet yet and no management to speak of: the credit is a set of contracts and a spreadsheet. The job is to know which contract carries which risk, and what happens to the cash flow when one of them fails.
IN ONE SENTENCE — In project finance the lender is repaid only from the cash flows of one ring-fenced project and, if those fail, from the project’s assets and contracts, never from the shareholders’ other assets.
INTUITION — Lending to a corporate is lending to a restaurant chain: if one restaurant fails, the others pay. Project finance is lending to one restaurant whose owner has told you in writing that you may never knock on his door. So you check the lease, the supplier contracts, the chef’s contract and the insurance yourself, and you hold the keys.
The borrower is a special purpose vehicle (SPV), often called ProjectCo. It signs every contract of the project and owns nothing else. The shareholders, called sponsors, put in equity and shareholder loans and undertake very little beyond that: to fund their equity (often backed by letters of credit) and sometimes to cover defined cost overruns. That is why the term “limited recourse” is more accurate than “non-recourse”: recourse exists, but it is listed and capped.
The contracts form a circle around the SPV, and each one moves a risk to the party best able to bear it:
| Contract | Counterparty | Risk moved away from the SPV |
|---|---|---|
| Construction (EPC or multi-contract) | Turbine supplier, foundation and cable contractors, installation vessels | Cost, delay and performance at completion |
| Operation and maintenance (O&M) | Turbine manufacturer, then independent service provider | Availability and operating cost |
| Offtake | State-backed counterparty (CfD), corporate buyer (PPA) or the market | Price, sometimes volume |
| Grid connection | Transmission system operator | Export capacity and connection delay |
| Insurance | Insurers, through a broker | Physical damage, delay in start-up, third-party liability |
| Hedging | Swap banks | Interest rate (and currency if any) |
Large offshore wind farms are rarely built under one turnkey EPC (engineering, procurement and construction) contract. Sponsors split the work into four to eight packages (turbines, foundations, array cables, offshore substation, installation) and manage the interfaces themselves. Lenders accept this “multi-contracting” from experienced sponsors and ask for more contingency and a stronger completion test in exchange.
The offtake contract decides how much debt a project can carry, so the vocabulary must be precise.
A contract for difference (CfD) fixes a strike price. The project sells its power on the market; when the reference market price is below the strike, the counterparty pays the difference; when it is above, the project pays the difference back (two-way CfD). The project keeps volume risk (wind) and loses price risk. In France the scheme is called complément de rémunération, is awarded by tender, and the contract is signed with EDF Obligation d’Achat on behalf of the State.
A power purchase agreement (PPA) sells power to a utility or a corporate buyer at an agreed price for 10 to 15 years. The price risk becomes a counterparty risk: the debt is only as good as the buyer. Pay-as-produced PPAs leave volume risk with the project; baseload PPAs add shape risk, because the project must buy power when the wind does not blow.
Merchant means selling at the market price. Lenders then use a conservative price forecast from a market adviser, discount it further for the “capture rate” (a wind farm sells when all wind farms produce, so it earns less than the average price), and require far more cushion.
PITFALL — A CfD does not make revenue certain. It makes the price certain for the megawatt-hours actually produced and sold in hours when the scheme pays. Wind, availability, grid curtailment and hours of negative prices, when recent support schemes suspend payments, remain with the project.
IN ONE SENTENCE — Cash flow available for debt service (CFADS) is the cash the project has left, in a period, after paying everything that ranks ahead of lenders: operating costs, taxes and maintenance capital expenditure.
is the cash received from power sales and CfD payments in period ; the cash operating costs (O&M, insurance, seabed lease, grid charges, SPV management); the tax actually paid; maintenance capital expenditure not funded by a reserve; the change in working capital. CFADS is a cash figure: no depreciation, no provisions. It is not EBITDA, although in a simple project the two are close.
The waterfall (or cash-flow cascade) is the contractual order in which the account bank may release cash from the SPV’s revenue account. It is a clause of the accounts agreement, and the agent enforces it payment by payment:
INTUITION — The waterfall is a row of buckets on a staircase. Water (cash) fills the top bucket first and overflows to the next. Sponsors hold the last bucket; lenders have fitted a tap just above it, and they close it when the level looks low.
FORMULA
, the debt service cover ratio, compares the cash of one period with the debt service of the same period. , the loan life cover ratio, compares the present value of all CFADS from period to the final maturity of the loan, discounted at the cost of debt , with the debt outstanding at the start of the period. The project life cover ratio (PLCR) extends the sum to the end of the project’s life, beyond loan maturity.
The DSCR answers “can the project pay this year?”; the LLCR answers “can it repay the whole loan if we reschedule?”; the difference between PLCR and LLCR measures the tail, the contracted years left after the loan is repaid, which is the lenders’ margin for restructuring. Each ratio is computed twice: backward-looking on actual accounts (covenant tests) and forward-looking from the model (sizing, lock-up, forecasts).
A mortgage lender sizes on the value of the house; a project lender sizes on cash. The rule is simple: every period, debt service may not exceed CFADS divided by the target DSCR. If CFADS is flat, the largest loan is the present value of that capped debt service.
FORMULA
is the debt capacity; the target cover ratio; the all-in interest rate; the number of repayment periods; the annuity factor.
With a CFADS of EUR 100m a year, a target DSCR of 1.30x, a rate of 5% and 15 annual repayments, debt service is capped at EUR 76.9m, the annuity factor is 10.38 and the debt capacity is EUR 798.4m, about 8.0 times CFADS. A DSCR of 1.30x means that cash flow can fall by 23.1% before a payment is missed.
INTERACTIVE LAB — From cash flow to debt capacity
See how the target DSCR, the interest rate and the tenor turn a flat CFADS into a maximum debt amount.
| Parameter you can move | Range | Default |
|---|---|---|
| CFADS per year (flat) | 20 to 300 EUR m | 100 EUR m |
| Target DSCR | 1.1 to 2.0 x | 1.3 x |
| All-in interest rate | 2 to 9 % | 5 % |
| Repayment period | 5 to 25 years | 15 years |
| Result at default settings | Value |
|---|---|
| Maximum annual debt service | 76.9 EUR m |
| Annuity factor | 10.380 x |
| Debt capacity | 798.4 EUR m |
| Debt capacity as a multiple of CFADS | 7.98 x |
| Fall in CFADS absorbed before a payment default | 23.1 % |
Try it. Move the target DSCR from 1.20x (contracted revenue) to 2.00x (merchant revenue): the same cash flow supports 40% less debt.
When CFADS is not flat, the debt service is given the same shape as the cash flow so that the DSCR is identical every year. This is sculpting; section 5.4 applies it. The alternative, an annuity, wastes capacity in the good years and squeezes the ratio in the weak ones.
Sponsors use project finance for three reasons: it caps their loss at their equity, it keeps the debt out of their corporate ratios when they do not control the SPV, and it lifts their return. The third is arithmetic: as long as the project earns more than the cost of debt, each euro of debt substituted for equity raises the equity return.
Take a project costing EUR 1,000m that produces EUR 90m of CFADS for 25 years: its project internal rate of return (IRR) is 7.54%. Financed at 70% with an 18-year annuity loan at 5%, debt service is EUR 59.9m, the DSCR 1.50x, and the equity IRR rises to 10.88%. At 80% gearing the equity IRR is 12.52%, but the DSCR falls to 1.32x.
INTERACTIVE LAB — Leverage and the sponsors’ return
Compare the project IRR with the equity IRR as gearing rises, and watch the DSCR fall at the same time.
| Parameter you can move | Range | Default |
|---|---|---|
| Project cost | 200 to 3000 EUR m | 1000 EUR m |
| CFADS per year (flat) | 10 to 300 EUR m | 90 EUR m |
| Project life | 15 to 35 years | 25 years |
| Gearing (debt / cost) | 0 to 85 % | 70 % |
| Interest rate on debt | 2 to 8 % | 5 % |
| Debt tenor (annuity) | 5 to 25 years | 18 years |
| Result at default settings | Value |
|---|---|
| Project IRR (before financing) | 7.54 % |
| Debt | 700 EUR m |
| Equity | 300 EUR m |
| Annual debt service | 59.9 EUR m |
| DSCR | 1.50 x |
| Equity IRR | 10.88 % |
Try it. Raise the interest rate to 7.5%, just under the project IRR: leverage no longer adds anything. Above it, leverage destroys equity return.
WHY IT MATTERS ON THE DESK — The negotiation between sponsors and lenders is this chart. Sponsors push gearing up for return; lenders push it down for cover. The offtake contract, the wind study and the target DSCR are the arguments each side uses to move along the curve.
Lenders split risk into two periods. Construction risk (cost overrun, delay, a vessel that does not arrive, a foundation design that fails) is covered by fixed-price contracts with liquidated damages, contingency in the budget, standby equity, delay-in-start-up insurance and a lenders’ technical adviser (LTA), the independent engineer who certifies each drawdown. Operating risk (wind below forecast, availability, component failure, counterparty default) is covered by the cover ratios, the reserves, long-term service agreements with availability guarantees, and the lock-up.
The security package gives lenders control, not value: a pledge over the SPV’s shares, pledges over every bank account, assignment by way of security of receivables under the project contracts and the insurance policies, and direct agreements with each key counterparty. A direct agreement lets lenders be told of a default by the SPV, cure it, and step in, that is replace the SPV by a substitute before the contract is terminated. An offshore wind farm seized and sold for scrap is worth little; the same farm kept running under its CfD is worth the debt.
The documents are the common terms agreement (definitions, conditions precedent, covenants, events of default, shared by all debt tranches), the facility agreements, the accounts agreement (the waterfall), the intercreditor agreement (lenders against hedging banks and sponsors), the security documents, the hedging agreements under ISDA, and the equity contribution agreement. The financial model is itself a contractual document: ratios are computed “in accordance with the model”, which is audited by a third party.
A renewable project loan is “green” by nature of its use of proceeds. No margin ratchet and no KPI are needed (compare with B03): the question is not whether the asset is green but whether it is built and operated without harm, and whether the claims made about it are measured. Four layers apply, and they must be kept apart because they answer different questions:
| Layer | Question it answers | Who checks |
|---|---|---|
| Equator Principles and IFC Performance Standards | Are the project’s environmental and social risks identified and managed? | ESR team, independent consultant |
| Green Loan Principles | Can the loan be labelled green? | Green loan coordinator |
| EU Taxonomy | Is the activity environmentally sustainable under EU law? | Sponsors, bank, reviewer |
| European Green Bond Standard | Can a refinancing bond carry the “EuGB” designation? | Registered external reviewer |
PITFALL — A wind farm can be Taxonomy-eligible, carry a green loan label and still be refused by the bank’s ESR team, for instance because piling noise mitigation is inadequate or because fishing communities were not consulted. “Green” is about the product of the asset; environmental and social risk is about how the asset is built.
The Equator Principles (EP) are a voluntary risk management framework that signatory banks, the Equator Principles Financial Institutions (EPFIs), apply to project-related financing. The current version, EP4, has been in effect since 1 October 2020. It applies to project finance and project finance advisory when total project capital costs reach USD 10 million, and to project-related corporate loans, bridge loans and some refinancings under further conditions. Meridian is an EPFI in this course.
The ten principles read as a process:
| Principle | Content | Output in the deal |
|---|---|---|
| 1 Review and categorisation | A (significant, irreversible impacts), B (limited, mitigable), C (minimal) | Categorisation memo |
| 2 Assessment | Environmental and social impact assessment; climate change risk assessment | ESIA, CCRA |
| 3 Applicable standards | Host-country law in Designated Countries; IFC Performance Standards elsewhere | Standards matrix |
| 4 Management system and action plan | ESMS, management plans, Equator Principles Action Plan | ESAP annexed to the loan |
| 5 and 6 Stakeholders, grievances | Consultation, consent of indigenous peoples where relevant, grievance mechanism | Stakeholder engagement plan |
| 7 Independent review | Independent consultant for category A and, as appropriate, B | IESC due-diligence report |
| 8 Covenants | Compliance with law, plans and action plan; reporting | Covenants, events of default |
| 9 Independent monitoring | Over the life of the loan | Monitoring reports |
| 10 Reporting | Client publishes an ESIA summary; EPFI reports annually | Public disclosure |
Two points matter for a French offshore wind farm. First, France is a Designated Country: its permitting, impact assessment and consultation law is deemed robust, so compliance with host-country law is the applicable standard, although EP4 still asks the bank to evaluate the project’s specific risks and to decide whether one or more IFC Performance Standards should be used as additional guidance. Second, the climate change risk assessment has two triggers: physical risk for all category A and, as appropriate, category B projects; transition risk and an alternatives analysis when combined Scope 1 and Scope 2 emissions exceed 100,000 tonnes of CO2 equivalent a year, a threshold a wind farm does not approach.
The framework is under strain. Four large United States banks left in March 2024. BankTrack, a non-governmental organisation that tracks signatories, counted 126 EPFIs in June 2026, against 138 before those departures, and notes that the review of the principles announced in November 2023 has produced no published timetable. The principles remain the common language of syndicates: an EPFI will not join a deal whose due diligence was not run to EP standard.
The eight IFC Performance Standards (2012) are the content behind the process: PS1 assessment and management system; PS2 labour and working conditions; PS3 resource efficiency and pollution prevention; PS4 community health, safety and security; PS5 land acquisition and involuntary resettlement, which includes economic displacement; PS6 biodiversity and living natural resources; PS7 indigenous peoples; PS8 cultural heritage. They are completed by the World Bank Group Environmental, Health and Safety Guidelines, of which one covers wind energy.
For offshore wind the live issues are PS6 (marine mammals and underwater noise during piling, seabirds and migratory birds, benthic habitats such as seagrass meadows), PS5 (fishers who lose access to grounds are economically displaced even if nobody is resettled), PS2 (working conditions on installation vessels and in the supply chain) and PS4 (navigation safety). IFC is updating its whole Sustainability Framework: according to its website (September 2026), the dialogue phase is expected to end in December 2026 and public consultation on a first draft to start in January 2027. Until a new text is adopted, the 2012 standards are the reference in loan documents.
Under the EU Taxonomy Climate Delegated Act (Delegated Regulation (EU) 2021/2139), activity 4.3 “Electricity generation from wind power” makes a substantial contribution to climate change mitigation by its nature: there is no emissions threshold to pass. Alignment therefore depends entirely on the other two tests.
Do no significant harm (DNSH). Adaptation: a climate risk and vulnerability assessment of the asset over its life, with adaptation solutions (Appendix A). Water and marine resources: for offshore wind, the activity must not hamper the achievement of good environmental status under the Marine Strategy Framework Directive, with measures on underwater noise. Circular economy: assessing the availability of, and where feasible using, equipment and components that are durable and recyclable, a live topic for blades. Biodiversity: an environmental impact assessment with mitigation and compensation implemented, and for offshore wind specific attention to biodiversity and seabed integrity (Appendix D). Pollution: no specific criterion.
Minimum safeguards (Article 18 of the Taxonomy Regulation): alignment with the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, which in practice means human rights due diligence along the supply chain of turbines, steel and cables.
NOTE — The work done for the Equator Principles is the evidence base for DNSH: the impact assessment, the marine noise plan, the climate change risk assessment. A good desk designs the due diligence once, so that the independent consultant’s report explicitly maps its findings to the Taxonomy criteria. This saves a second study when the project refinances with a bond.
The Taxonomy rules were simplified in 2025: a delegated regulation adopted by the Commission on 4 July 2025, published in the Official Journal on 8 January 2026 and applicable from 1 January 2026, cut the reporting templates and introduced materiality thresholds; it also simplified part of the pollution-related DNSH criteria. The technical criteria for wind were not changed.
During construction, the bank loan is usually labelled under the Green Loan Principles (LMA, APLMA and LSTA): use of proceeds, project evaluation, management of proceeds, reporting. For a single-asset SPV the four components are satisfied almost by construction, and the label costs little. Its value is mainly internal to lenders, who tag the loan as green in their own frameworks and may refinance it with their green bonds (see C15).
After commissioning, when construction risk has gone, sponsors often refinance bank debt with long-dated bonds placed with insurers and pension funds. Since 21 December 2024 such a bond can use the designation “European Green Bond” under Regulation (EU) 2023/2631 (the EuGBS) if the issuer allocates the proceeds to Taxonomy-aligned activities (with a flexibility pocket of 15% for activities without criteria), publishes a prospectus, a pre-issuance factsheet reviewed by an external reviewer supervised by ESMA, annual allocation reports and an impact report. A single wind farm that documented its alignment at financial close is the simplest possible EuGB issuer: one asset, one activity, 100% of proceeds. Section 5.8 prices that refinancing.
A wind farm emits almost nothing in operation, so its financed emissions are small. Banks and sponsors therefore like to report avoided emissions: the emissions that would have occurred had the same electricity been produced by the system the project displaces. The figure depends entirely on the baseline chosen, which is a counterfactual and cannot be observed. PCAF published supplemental guidance on financed avoided emissions with its updated standard on 2 December 2025; it asks that avoided emissions be reported separately from financed emissions, never netted against them. Section 5.7 shows why the baseline deserves more attention than the result.
INTERACTIVE LAB — Life of a renewable project financing, from tender award to refinancing
Follow Cap Ferrat Offshore Wind through the people who touch it and the documents they produce.
| # | Who | Does what | Deliverable |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Sponsors and their financial adviser | Win the tender, set up the SPV, build the base-case model and send a request for proposals to relationship banks | Information memorandum, sponsor model, request for proposals |
| 2 | Project finance origination, Meridian | Pre-screens with credit risk and ESR, computes a first debt size and RAROC, bids for a mandated lead arranger role | Indicative term sheet, greenlight memo |
| 3 | Sponsors | Appoint the mandated lead arrangers and allocate the roles (technical, insurance, modelling, documentation, hedging, environmental bank) | Mandate letter, roles matrix |
| 4 | Lenders’ advisers (technical adviser, wind consultant, insurance adviser, legal counsel, market adviser) | Run due diligence on contracts, design, energy yield, permits and insurance | Due-diligence reports with reliance letters |
| 5 | ESR team, Meridian, with the independent environmental and social consultant | Categorise the project under the Equator Principles, review the impact assessment, agree the action plan | Categorisation memo, IESC report, environmental and social action plan |
| 6 | Structuring team, Meridian | Sizes and sculpts the debt on the lenders’ base case, runs sensitivities, negotiates the term sheet | Lenders’ base case, agreed term sheet |
| 7 | Specialised lending credit officer and credit committee | Rate the project, assign the slotting category, approve the underwriting and the final hold | Credit application, approval with conditions |
| 8 | External counsel, Legal and the model auditor | Draft the finance documents and direct agreements; audit the model | Common terms agreement, security documents, model audit opinion |
| 9 | All parties, then the facility agent | Sign; the agent checks the conditions precedent; the hedging banks execute the swaps on a recorded call | Signed documents, conditions precedent certificate, swap confirmations |
| 10 | SPV, lenders’ technical adviser, facility agent | Monthly drawdowns during construction against the adviser’s certificate of progress and cost to complete | Utilisation requests, construction reports |
| 11 | Loan syndication, Meridian | Sells the underwritten amount down to the final hold in general syndication | Transfer certificates, final allocation |
| 12 | Lenders’ technical adviser and facility agent | Certify completion: performance tests passed, reserves funded, CfD in effect | Completion certificate, start of repayment |
| 13 | Portfolio management and the agent | Semi-annual ratio tests, model updates, environmental monitoring, waivers, annual rating review | Compliance certificates, monitoring reports, annual review |
| 14 | Sponsors, DCM and the external reviewer | Refinance with a project bond once the farm has an operating record | Prospectus, EuGB factsheet and pre-issuance review, prepayment notice |
From tender to mandate. Lenders are involved before the tender is won: sponsors need “letters of support” to show the State that their bid is financeable. After the award, the financial adviser runs a competition between banks on margin, fees, gearing and cover ratios. The bank’s internal control at this stage is a pre-screening committee that looks at three things: sponsor and sector policy (does the energy policy allow it, is the sponsor known), a first environmental and social categorisation, and a first RAROC.
Due diligence. Lenders do not rely on the sponsors’ studies. They appoint their own advisers, paid by the SPV, who address their reports to the lenders and accept liability towards them through reliance letters. The LTA reviews design, contracts, schedule and budget; a wind consultant produces the lenders’ energy yield; the insurance adviser checks the programme against market capacity; the market adviser gives price curves if any revenue is merchant; legal counsel reviews permits, the CfD and every project contract. The control is the due-diligence issues list, a table where each finding is closed, priced into the base case, or turned into a condition precedent or a covenant.
Structuring and credit approval. The modelling bank maintains the single model used by all lenders. The lenders’ base case differs from the sponsors’ case in a few deliberate places: P90 instead of P50 energy for sizing, higher operating costs, lower availability, no value for revenue after the CfD. Credit risk rates the SPV with a dedicated project finance scorecard, assigns the supervisory slotting category (section 6), and sets conditions: maximum hold, hedging ratio, sell-down deadline.
Signing, conditions precedent, financial close. Signing commits the banks; financial close is the day the conditions precedent are met and the first drawdown is possible. The list covers corporate documents, executed project contracts, permits free of third-party appeals, insurance in place, the model audit opinion, legal opinions, equity commitments, the environmental and social action plan, and know-your-customer files. Hedging is executed at close so that the rate in the model becomes the rate of the deal: the swap rate set that morning changes the final debt size by a few million euros, which the model recalculates live.
Construction. Money leaves the bank only against a drawdown certificate countersigned by the LTA, stating that work is on schedule, that the cost to complete is covered by undrawn debt and uncalled equity, and that no default is continuing. This “cost-to-complete test” is the main control of the period. The ESR team receives the construction-phase environmental monitoring: pile-driving logs, marine mammal observer reports, incident registers.
Completion and operations. Completion is a contractual test, not a ribbon-cutting: all turbines commissioned, a power curve test, an availability test over several months, reserve accounts funded. From then on, portfolio management receives semi-annual compliance certificates with the historic and forecast DSCR, the annual operating budget, the technical adviser’s operating report and the environmental monitoring report. Waiver requests, when a covenant needs changing, are voted by lenders at a majority set in the intercreditor agreement.
Question. How much does the project cost once financing costs are included, and who funds what?
Data. Cap Ferrat Offshore Wind SAS is the SPV of a 500 MW wind farm in the French Mediterranean, awarded in a State tender with a 20-year two-way CfD. All of what follows is fictional and built for teaching. Shareholders: Helios Renewables 40% (operator), Aquilon Énergies 35%, Kestrel Infrastructure Partners 25%. Financial close is planned for 30 November 2026; construction lasts three years; commercial operation starts on 1 December 2029. As in French tenders, the export connection is built and paid for by the transmission system operator, RTE, so it is not in the project budget.
NOTE — The economics are calibrated on public French reference points: the 1.5 GW Centre Manche 2 project was awarded on 24 September 2025 at EUR 66/MWh for an announced investment of EUR 4.5bn, floating projects in the Mediterranean were awarded at higher tariffs, and the tender for a site off Oléron attracted no bid in 2025 under a ceiling of EUR 100/MWh. Our strike of EUR 99/MWh and cost of EUR 3.8m per MW describe a small, deep and expensive site. Whether foundations are fixed or floating is not our subject; we assume a technology that lenders accept as proven.
Construction contracts total EUR 1,570m (turbines, foundations, cables, substation, installation), contingency is EUR 110m (7.0% of contracts), development and owner’s costs EUR 100m. Senior debt is EUR 1,400m (justified in 5.4), drawn 20%, 40% and 40% over the three years. All-in rate 4.30%: a swap rate of 2.50% plus a margin of 180 bp. Commitment fee 35% of the margin, that is 63 bp, on undrawn amounts. Upfront fee 2.0%.
Calculation. Interest during construction (IDC) is interest on the average drawn balance of each year. With draws at mid-year on average, the loan is outstanding for the equivalent of 1.3 “full-loan years” (0.1 in year 1, 0.4 in year 2, 0.8 in year 3) and undrawn for 1.7:
Amounts are in EUR million. Financing costs during construction are EUR 121.25m.
Result.
| Uses | EUR m | Sources | EUR m |
|---|---|---|---|
| Construction contracts | 1,570.00 | Senior term loan | 1,400.00 |
| Contingency | 110.00 | Equity and shareholder loans | 501.25 |
| Development and owner’s costs | 100.00 | ||
| Financing costs | 121.25 | ||
| Total | 1,901.25 | Total | 1,901.25 |
Gearing is 73.6% and the all-in cost EUR 3.80m per MW. Helios’s 40% share of the equity is EUR 200.5m, which is the kind of use its EUR 500m green bond finances (see C01). The debt service reserve is covered by a letter of credit facility of EUR 53.3m (six months of first-year debt service) and is not funded in cash.
INTERACTIVE LAB — Sources and uses at financial close
Rebuild the project budget, including interest during construction and fees, and derive equity and gearing.
| Parameter you can move | Range | Default |
|---|---|---|
| Construction contracts | 1000 to 2500 EUR m | 1570 EUR m |
| Contingency | 0 to 300 EUR m | 110 EUR m |
| Development and owner’s costs | 0 to 300 EUR m | 100 EUR m |
| Senior debt | 500 to 1800 EUR m | 1400 EUR m |
| All-in interest rate | 2 to 8 % | 4.3 % |
| Margin | 100 to 300 bp | 180 bp |
| Commitment fee as share of margin | 20 to 50 % | 35 % |
| Upfront fee | 0 to 3 % | 2 % |
| Share of the lead sponsor | 10 to 100 % | 40 % |
| Result at default settings | Value |
|---|---|
| Interest during construction | 78.26 EUR m |
| Commitment fees | 14.99 EUR m |
| Upfront fee | 28.00 EUR m |
| Total financing costs during construction | 121.25 EUR m |
| Total project cost | 1,901.25 EUR m |
| Equity and shareholder loans | 501.25 EUR m |
| Gearing | 73.6 % |
| Cost per MW (500 MW) | 3.80 EUR m |
| Equity of the lead sponsor | 200.5 EUR m |
Try it. Cut the debt to EUR 1,200m: financing costs fall by EUR 17m but sponsors must find EUR 183m more equity.
Reading. Financing costs are 6.4% of the budget: the price of building for three years with borrowed money. They are capitalised, that is funded by the loan itself, which is why a delay is expensive twice: more IDC, and a later first revenue.
Question. How much electricity will the farm produce, and with what confidence?
IN ONE SENTENCE — P50 is the annual production the farm has one chance in two of exceeding; P90 is the production it has nine chances in ten of exceeding.
INTUITION — Ask a commuter how long the journey takes: “40 minutes” is the P50. Ask when to leave for an exam: he leaves 55 minutes early, the P90. Sponsors value equity on the usual journey; lenders size debt on the exam-day journey.
Data. The lenders’ wind consultant gives a net capacity factor of 48% (after wake losses, electrical losses and unavailability) and a total uncertainty of 8% (one standard deviation, one-year horizon), which combines measurement and modelling uncertainty with the natural variability of wind from one year to the next, taken at 6%.
FORMULA
is annual energy; the installed capacity in MW; 8,760 the hours in a year; the net capacity factor; the inverse standard normal distribution, so that for P90; the total uncertainty as a share of the P50.
Calculation and result. MWh, that is 2,102.4 GWh or 4,205 full-load hours. P90 is 89.75% of that, 1,886.9 GWh; P75 is 1,989.0 GWh; P99 is 1,711.1 GWh. At the strike of EUR 99/MWh, first-year revenue is EUR 208.14m at P50 and EUR 186.80m at P90.
INTERACTIVE LAB — Energy yield: from P50 to P90 and P99
Turn capacity, capacity factor and uncertainty into exceedance levels of annual production and revenue.
| Parameter you can move | Range | Default |
|---|---|---|
| Installed capacity | 50 to 1500 MW | 500 MW |
| Net capacity factor (P50) | 20 to 60 % | 48 % |
| Total one-year uncertainty | 6 to 15 % | 8 % |
| Averaging horizon | 1 / 10 | 1 years |
| CfD strike price | 40 to 150 EUR/MWh | 99 EUR/MWh |
| Result at default settings | Value |
|---|---|
| P50 production | 2,102.4 GWh |
| P75 production | 1,989.0 GWh |
| P90 production | 1,886.9 GWh |
| P99 production | 1,711.1 GWh |
| P90 as a share of P50 | 89.75 % |
| Uncertainty over the horizon | 8.00 % |
| Full-load hours at P50 | 4,205 h |
| Revenue at P50 | 208.14 EUR m |
| Revenue at P90 | 186.80 EUR m |
Try it. Switch the horizon to 10 years: annual variability averages out, uncertainty falls from 8% to 5.6% and the P90 rises by 64 GWh. Which P90 is used for sizing is a negotiated term.
Reading. The 215.5 GWh between P50 and P90 are worth EUR 21.3m a year, more than the interest margin of the whole lending group. Two P90s exist: the one-year P90 tells you what a bad year looks like (relevant for the DSCR of a single period), the ten-year P90 what a bad decade looks like (relevant for repayment over the loan life). On a ten-year horizon the P90 is 1,950.9 GWh. Our lenders size on the one-year figure, the conservative choice; many deals use the ten-year figure and test a one-year P99 on the side.
PITFALL — P90 is a statement about wind and model uncertainty only. It says nothing of a cable failure, a serial defect on a gearbox or a grid outage. Those go in the availability assumption and the stress cases, not in sigma.
Question. In a normal first year, where does each euro of revenue go?
Data. Operating costs are EUR 58m in year 1 (EUR 116,000 per MW: service agreement, vessels, insurance, seabed fee, offshore wind tax, SPV costs), indexed at 2.0% a year. The strike is indexed at 1.2% a year, since the indexation formula of the CfD passes only part of inflation. Senior debt service in year 1 is EUR 106.60m (derived in 5.4). The maintenance reserve receives EUR 4m a year. Distributions are allowed if the DSCR of the period is at least 1.10x. Two simplifications, stated once: periods are annual (real loans are semi-annual), and corporate tax paid is taken as nil during the loan life (in the first years tax depreciation and interest absorb most of the taxable profit; a real model computes it line by line).
Calculation and result.
| Step of the waterfall | P50 year (EUR m) | P99 year (EUR m) |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue | 208.14 | 169.40 |
| Operating costs | -58.00 | -58.00 |
| CFADS | 150.14 | 111.40 |
| Senior debt service | -106.60 | -106.60 |
| Maintenance reserve | -4.00 | -4.00 |
| Cash after reserves | 39.54 | 0.80 |
| Distributions to sponsors | 39.54 | 0.00 |
In the P50 year the DSCR is 1.41x and sponsors receive EUR 39.54m, a cash yield of 7.9% on their EUR 501.25m. In a one-year P99 wind year (1,711.1 GWh) CFADS is EUR 111.40m, the DSCR is 1.045x: debt is paid, the EUR 0.80m left is trapped in the SPV because the lock-up test fails, and the ratio is below the 1.05x default level discussed in 5.5.
INTERACTIVE LAB — One year of the cash-flow waterfall
Run a year of revenue down the waterfall and see when the lock-up closes the tap on distributions.
| Parameter you can move | Range | Default |
|---|---|---|
| Energy produced | 1400 to 2500 GWh | 2102.4 GWh |
| CfD strike price | 40 to 150 EUR/MWh | 99 EUR/MWh |
| Operating costs | 30 to 100 EUR m | 58 EUR m |
| Senior debt service | 50 to 160 EUR m | 106.6 EUR m |
| Maintenance reserve top-up | 0 to 15 EUR m | 4 EUR m |
| Lock-up DSCR | 1 to 1.3 x | 1.1 x |
| Result at default settings | Value |
|---|---|
| Revenue | 208.14 EUR m |
| CFADS | 150.14 EUR m |
| DSCR of the period | 1.408 x |
| Cash after debt service and reserves | 39.54 EUR m |
| Distributions to sponsors | 39.54 EUR m |
| Cash trapped by the lock-up | 0.00 EUR m |
| Cash yield on EUR 501.25m of equity | 7.9 % |
| DSRA requirement (six months of debt service) | 53.3 EUR m |
Try it. Lower the energy to 1,886.9 GWh (P90): debt is covered 1.21x and sponsors still receive EUR 18m. This is what ‘sized on P90’ buys the lender.
Reading. Operating costs take 28% of revenue, lenders 51%, sponsors 19% in a normal year. Sponsors are paid last and only when the year was good enough: the lock-up converts a weak year into extra liquidity inside the SPV, at no cost to lenders.
Question. Why EUR 1,400m, and what repayment profile?
Data. Term sheet: target DSCR 1.20x on the P90 case; repayment over 18 years from commercial operation, leaving a tail of two CfD years; all-in rate 4.30%, fully hedged for the purpose of the model. CFADS at P90 is EUR 128.80m in year 1 (EUR 186.80m of revenue less EUR 58m of costs) and rises slowly to EUR 147.58m in year 18, because the strike is indexed on a larger base than costs.
Calculation. Each year, the maximum debt service is the P90 CFADS divided by 1.20. Discounting the eighteen amounts at 4.30% gives the debt capacity:
Sponsors and arrangers round down to EUR 1,400m. Scaling every year’s debt service by 1,400 / 1,409.55 keeps the profile and gives a uniform DSCR of 1.208x at P90.
Result.
| Indicator | Value |
|---|---|
| Debt capacity at 1.20x on P90 | EUR 1,409.55m |
| Debt retained | EUR 1,400m |
| DSCR at P90, every year | 1.208x |
| DSCR at P50, minimum and average | 1.408x and 1.415x |
| Debt service, year 1 and year 18 | EUR 106.60m and EUR 122.15m |
| Year 1 split | Interest EUR 60.20m, principal EUR 46.40m |
| Average life from commercial operation | 10.93 years |
| Outstanding after two years of operation | EUR 1,304.30m |
INTERACTIVE LAB — Sizing and sculpting the Cap Ferrat debt
Derive debt capacity from the P90 cash flow and a target DSCR, sculpt the repayment, and compare with an annuity.
| Parameter you can move | Range | Default |
|---|---|---|
| CfD strike price, year 1 | 50 to 140 EUR/MWh | 99 EUR/MWh |
| Indexation of the strike | 0 to 2 % per year | 1.2 % per year |
| Net capacity factor (P50) | 35 to 55 % | 48 % |
| Uncertainty (one standard deviation) | 5 to 15 % | 8 % |
| Operating costs, year 1 (indexed 2%) | 30 to 90 EUR m | 58 EUR m |
| Target DSCR on P90 | 1.1 to 1.5 x | 1.2 x |
| All-in interest rate | 2.5 to 7 % | 4.3 % |
| Repayment period | 10 to 20 years | 18 years |
| Debt retained | 500 to 1800 EUR m | 1400 EUR m |
| Result at default settings | Value |
|---|---|
| CFADS at P90, year 1 | 128.80 EUR m |
| CFADS at P50, year 1 | 150.14 EUR m |
| Debt capacity at the target DSCR | 1,409.55 EUR m |
| DSCR at P90 with the debt retained | 1.208 x |
| Minimum DSCR at P50 | 1.408 x |
| Average DSCR at P50 | 1.415 x |
| Debt service, year 1 | 106.60 EUR m |
| of which interest | 60.20 EUR m |
| of which principal | 46.40 EUR m |
| Debt service, final year | 122.15 EUR m |
| Average life from commercial operation | 10.93 years |
| Outstanding after two years | 1,304.3 EUR m |
| Debt service if repaid as an annuity | 113.30 EUR m |
| Minimum DSCR at P90 with an annuity | 1.137 x |
Try it. Set the strike to EUR 66/MWh, the tariff of a much larger and cheaper French project: this small site would support only EUR 708m. The tariff, not the bank, sets the leverage.
Reading. Three lessons. First, the debt amount is an output: change the target DSCR from 1.20x to 1.30x and capacity falls by EUR 108m, which sponsors must replace with equity. Second, a 100 bp rise in the rate before close costs about EUR 109m of capacity (EUR 1,300.20m at 5.30%), which is why sponsors pre-hedge or ask banks for rate-lock mechanisms. Third, sculpting matters: an annuity of EUR 113.30m a year would repay the same loan but leave a DSCR of only 1.137x in year 1, below target, while wasting cover in the last years.
PITFALL — “Minimum DSCR of 1.21x” and “average DSCR of 1.41x” describe the same loan, at P90 and at P50. Always ask which case a ratio is quoted on. Information memoranda quote the flattering one.
Question. How far can performance fall before sponsors are locked up, before a default is called, before a payment is missed?
Data. Covenants: distribution lock-up below a DSCR of 1.10x; event of default below 1.05x; both tested on a 12-month basis. The stress cases agreed with the LTA: wind at P90 and at P99; operating costs 20% above budget for the whole life; 5% of revenue lost to unavailability, curtailment or unpaid negative-price hours.
Calculation and result. The base-case LLCR at commercial operation is the present value at 4.30% of eighteen years of P50 CFADS, EUR 1,979.9m, divided by EUR 1,400m: 1.414x.
| Case | Minimum DSCR | LLCR | Consequence |
|---|---|---|---|
| Base case (P50) | 1.408x | 1.414x | None |
| Wind at one-year P90, every year | 1.208x | 1.208x | None |
| Operating costs +20% | 1.289x | 1.295x | None |
| Revenue loss of 5% | 1.311x | 1.314x | None |
| P90 wind and costs +20% | 1.075x | 1.089x | Lock-up |
| Wind at one-year P99 | 1.034x | 1.040x | Lock-up, below default level |
Break-even points, as a share of P50 production sustained every year: lock-up at 84.6%, default covenant at 82.2%, payment shortfall (DSCR of 1.00x) at 79.8%. The farm would have to produce 20.2% less than expected, permanently, before lenders are not paid in full from current cash flow, and they would still hold the reserve account and two years of CfD tail.
INTERACTIVE LAB — Stress-testing the Cap Ferrat cover ratios
Apply wind, cost and availability stresses to the sculpted loan and read minimum DSCR, LLCR and covenant triggers.
| Parameter you can move | Range | Default |
|---|---|---|
| Production as a share of P50 | 70 to 110 % | 100 % |
| Operating cost overrun | 0 to 50 % | 0 % |
| Revenue lost to unavailability or curtailment | 0 to 20 % | 0 % |
| Lock-up DSCR | 1.05 to 1.3 x | 1.1 x |
| Default DSCR | 1 to 1.15 x | 1.05 x |
| Result at default settings | Value |
|---|---|
| CFADS, year 1 | 150.14 EUR m |
| Minimum DSCR | 1.408 x |
| Average DSCR | 1.415 x |
| Present value of CFADS over the loan life | 1,979.9 EUR m |
| LLCR at commercial operation | 1.414 x |
| Lock-up triggered (1 = yes) | 0 |
| Default covenant breached (1 = yes) | 0 |
| Production at which lock-up starts | 84.6 % of P50 |
| Production at which the default level is hit | 82.2 % of P50 |
| Production at which DSCR is 1.00x | 79.8 % of P50 |
Try it. Combine P90 wind (89.75%) with a 20% cost overrun: the loan is still serviced but sponsors receive nothing. Then find the cost overrun that, alone, triggers lock-up.
Reading. Single stresses do not hurt; combinations do. The uncomfortable line is the last: a one-in-a-hundred wind year leaves the loan serviced (1.034x) but under the 1.05x default level. That is the price of a thin 1.20x target on a one-year P90. In practice the documents soften it: the covenant is tested on twelve rolling months with the reserve account behind it, sponsors have an equity cure right (they may inject cash that counts as CFADS, a limited number of times), and a default lets lenders act but does not oblige them to. A lender reading the credit paper should still see this line, and the credit committee should know that it accepted it.
Question. How much debt would the same farm carry with a corporate PPA, or with no contract?
Data. Lender terms by revenue regime (case assumptions reflecting the hierarchy that lenders apply): CfD as above; a 15-year pay-as-produced corporate PPA at a flat EUR 85/MWh with an investment-grade buyer, debt sized on the contracted years only, 13-year repayment, DSCR 1.35x on P90, all-in rate 4.60%; merchant, with a lenders’ low-case captured price of EUR 62/MWh flat, 15-year repayment, DSCR 1.80x on P90, all-in rate 5.00%.
Result.
| Revenue regime | Debt capacity | Gearing | Equity needed |
|---|---|---|---|
| 20-year CfD at EUR 99/MWh | EUR 1,409.6m | 73.6% (debt retained EUR 1,400m) | EUR 501m |
| 15-year corporate PPA at EUR 85/MWh | EUR 682.2m | 35.9% | EUR 1,219m |
| Merchant at EUR 62/MWh | EUR 295.9m | 15.6% | EUR 1,605m |
INTERACTIVE LAB — Debt capacity by revenue regime
Compare the debt the same wind farm supports under a CfD, a corporate PPA and merchant sales.
| Parameter you can move | Range | Default |
|---|---|---|
| CfD strike (indexed 1.2%, 18 years, DSCR 1.20x, 4.30%) | 50 to 140 EUR/MWh | 99 EUR/MWh |
| PPA price (flat, 13 years, DSCR 1.35x, 4.60%) | 40 to 120 EUR/MWh | 85 EUR/MWh |
| Merchant low-case price (flat, 15 years, DSCR 1.80x, 5.00%) | 30 to 110 EUR/MWh | 62 EUR/MWh |
| Result at default settings | Value |
|---|---|
| Debt capacity with the CfD | 1,409.6 EUR m |
| Debt capacity with the PPA | 682.2 EUR m |
| Debt capacity merchant | 295.9 EUR m |
| Gearing with the PPA | 35.9 % |
| Gearing merchant | 15.6 % |
| Equity needed with the PPA | 1,219 EUR m |
| Equity needed merchant | 1,605 EUR m |
Try it. Raise the merchant price to EUR 70/MWh: capacity gains EUR 87m but stays a quarter of the CfD case. Leverage follows the quality of revenue, not its level alone.
Reading. The CfD is worth roughly EUR 730m of additional debt compared with the PPA, and EUR 1.1bn compared with merchant sales. This is the most important sustainable-finance fact of the module, and it has nothing to do with labels: public revenue support lowers the cost of capital of renewable projects by making them bankable at high leverage. When a government shifts from CfDs to merchant exposure, the banks’ answer is arithmetical, not political. Real PPA-backed deals do better than our table because lenders give some value to the merchant tail and blend contracts; the order of the three regimes does not change.
Question. What does the ESR team require before close, and what climate benefit may Meridian claim?
Categorisation and findings. Meridian’s ESR officer and the environmental bank of the syndicate classify the project in category B under the Equator Principles: impacts are real but limited, site-specific and addressable by mitigation. An independent environmental and social consultant (IESC) reviews the impact assessment and the permits against French law and, as additional guidance, IFC Performance Standards 1, 2, 4 and 6. Its red-flag report lists four findings, each closed in the documents:
| Finding | Standard | Treatment in the loan |
|---|---|---|
| Underwater noise during foundation works on a cetacean corridor | PS6, Taxonomy DNSH (marine) | Condition precedent to first offshore works: noise mitigation plan and marine mammal observers; seasonal restriction covenant |
| Seagrass meadows on the cable landfall route | PS6, DNSH (biodiversity) | Route change before close; monitoring covenant; compensation plan |
| Professional fishers losing access during construction | PS5 (economic displacement) | Compensation agreement and grievance mechanism in the action plan |
| No human rights due diligence on the supply chain of steel and cables | PS2, minimum safeguards | Action plan item within six months; supplier code and audit rights |
The environmental and social action plan (ESAP) is annexed to the common terms agreement. A breach of the plan that is not remedied is an event of default, which gives the ESR team something no policy gives: contractual leverage for twenty years. The physical climate risk assessment (stronger storms, higher sea temperature, wave loads) feeds both the Equator file and the Taxonomy adaptation criterion; the LTA confirms that design loads cover the scenarios.
Avoided emissions. The farm produces 2,102.4 GWh a year at P50. Life-cycle emissions of offshore wind are about 12 g of CO2 equivalent per kWh (median of the IPCC Fifth Assessment Report), that is 25.2 kt a year once spread over production. What it avoids depends on what it displaces:
| Baseline displaced | Emission factor | Net avoided emissions |
|---|---|---|
| French average mix (case assumption: a few tens of g/kWh) | 25 g/kWh | 27.3 kt a year |
| European average mix (order of magnitude) | 200 g/kWh | 395.3 kt a year |
| Gas-fired combined cycle plant at the margin | 350 g/kWh | 710.6 kt a year |
PCAF attributes project emissions to a lender in proportion to its share of the project’s total equity and debt. Meridian’s final hold of EUR 150m (section 6) gives an attribution factor of 150 / 1,901.25 = 7.89%. Its share of avoided emissions is therefore 56.1 kt a year on the gas baseline, 31.2 kt on the European average and 2.2 kt on the French average; its share of the life-cycle emissions is 2.0 kt.
INTERACTIVE LAB — Avoided emissions and the choice of baseline
Compute avoided emissions under three baselines and attribute them to the lender under the PCAF project finance rule.
| Parameter you can move | Range | Default |
|---|---|---|
| Annual production | 500 to 3000 GWh | 2102.4 GWh |
| Emission factor of the displaced electricity | 25 / 200 / 350 | 350 gCO2e/kWh |
| Life-cycle emissions of offshore wind | 5 to 30 gCO2e/kWh | 12 gCO2e/kWh |
| Lender’s outstanding amount | 10 to 400 EUR m | 150 EUR m |
| Total project equity and debt | 500 to 3000 EUR m | 1901.25 EUR m |
| Result at default settings | Value |
|---|---|
| Gross avoided emissions | 735.8 ktCO2e |
| Life-cycle emissions spread over the year | 25.2 ktCO2e |
| Net avoided emissions | 710.6 ktCO2e |
| Attribution factor of the lender | 7.89 % |
| Avoided emissions attributed to the lender | 56.1 ktCO2e |
| Life-cycle emissions attributed to the lender | 2.0 ktCO2e |
| Avoided emissions per EUR m lent | 374 tCO2e |
Try it. Switch between the three baselines: the same turbines ‘avoid’ 26 times more carbon on the gas baseline than on the French mix. Nothing physical has changed.
Reading. A factor of 26 separates the lowest and the highest answer. None is false: French power is already low-carbon on average, yet an extra wind megawatt-hour often displaces gas-fired generation somewhere in the interconnected European market. The honest practice is to state the baseline, the source and the year, to prefer a conservative factor, to report avoided emissions next to financed emissions and never net of them, and to remember that the attribution factor shrinks as the loan amortises. A bank that adds up avoided emissions computed on marginal gas across its renewable book, and sets the total against its financed emissions from oil and gas, is making a claim that no standard supports.
Question. In December 2031, with two years of operating record, is it worth replacing the bank loan by a project bond under the EuGBS?
Data. Outstanding debt after two repayments: EUR 1,304.30m, of which Meridian holds EUR 139.75m. The loan margin is 180 bp for the remaining 16 years. Institutional investors offer a fully amortising bond with the same repayment profile at a spread of 135 bp over swaps (case assumption). Issue costs (arrangers, rating, legal, prospectus, external reviewer) are 1.0% of the amount. The existing swaps are kept, so there is no break cost.
Taxonomy check. The bond can be an EuGB if the proceeds finance a Taxonomy-aligned activity. The file prepared at financial close answers the three tests:
| Test | Evidence in the project file |
|---|---|
| Substantial contribution (activity 4.3) | Electricity from wind: met by nature |
| DNSH adaptation | Physical climate risk assessment, design loads confirmed by the LTA |
| DNSH marine, circular economy, biodiversity | Impact assessment, noise and seagrass plans, monitoring reports, decommissioning and blade recycling plan |
| Minimum safeguards | Supply-chain human rights due diligence completed under the ESAP |
Calculation. The saving in each remaining year is the outstanding balance of that year multiplied by the spread difference of 45 bp. In the first year: EUR 1,304.30m at 0.45% = EUR 5.87m. Discounted at 4.30% over the sixteen years, the savings are worth EUR 43.77m. Costs are EUR 13.04m.
Result. Net present value of the refinancing for the sponsors: EUR 30.73m. The bond spread at which the operation breaks even is 166.6 bp.
INTERACTIVE LAB — Refinancing the bank loan with an amortising EuGB project bond
Value the spread saving of a bond refinancing against its costs, year by year on the amortising balance.
| Parameter you can move | Range | Default |
|---|---|---|
| Refinancing after this many years of operation | 1 to 8 years | 2 years |
| Bank loan margin | 120 to 260 bp | 180 bp |
| Margin step-up from year 6 | 0 to 50 bp | 0 bp |
| Bond spread over swaps | 80 to 220 bp | 135 bp |
| Issue costs | 0 to 3 % of amount | 1 % of amount |
| Result at default settings | Value |
|---|---|
| Debt outstanding at refinancing | 1,304.30 EUR m |
| Interest saving in the first year | 5.87 EUR m |
| Present value of savings | 43.77 EUR m |
| Issue costs | 13.04 EUR m |
| Net present value for sponsors | 30.73 EUR m |
| Break-even bond spread | 166.6 bp |
| Prepayment received by Meridian (EUR 150m initial hold) | 139.75 EUR m |
Try it. Add a 20 bp margin step-up from year 6: the gain from refinancing rises to EUR 43m. Step-ups are how bank lenders politely ask to be repaid.
Reading. The gain comes from the disappearance of construction risk and from the appetite of long-term investors for contracted infrastructure cash flows, not from the green designation. By analogy with the Helios bond, whose greenium was 3 bp (see C01), an EuGB designation might be worth a few basis points on EUR 1.3bn, that is a few hundred thousand euros a year: real, small, and not the reason to refinance. Its main value is access: some investors’ green mandates require it. For Meridian the prepayment returns EUR 139.75m of long-dated capital and liquidity after five years on the books instead of twenty-one, which changes the economics of the hold (section 6).
| Item | Figure |
|---|---|
| Capacity, P50 production | 500 MW, 2,102.4 GWh (capacity factor 48%) |
| P90 and P99 production (one year) | 1,886.9 GWh and 1,711.1 GWh |
| Strike and first-year revenue at P50 | EUR 99/MWh, EUR 208.14m |
| Total project cost | EUR 1,901.25m, EUR 3.80m per MW |
| Financing costs during construction | EUR 121.25m (IDC 78.26, commitment 14.99, upfront 28.00) |
| Senior debt, equity, gearing | EUR 1,400m, EUR 501.25m, 73.6% |
| CFADS year 1, P50 and P90 | EUR 150.14m and EUR 128.80m |
| Debt capacity at 1.20x on P90 | EUR 1,409.55m |
| DSCR at P90; at P50 (minimum, average) | 1.208x; 1.408x, 1.415x |
| Debt service year 1; average life | EUR 106.60m; 10.93 years |
| LLCR at commercial operation (P50) | 1.414x |
| Distributions in a P50 first year | EUR 39.54m (7.9% of equity) |
| Break-even production: lock-up, default, 1.00x | 84.6%, 82.2%, 79.8% of P50 |
| Debt capacity with PPA; merchant | EUR 682.2m; EUR 295.9m |
| Net avoided emissions (25, 200, 350 g/kWh) | 27.3, 395.3, 710.6 kt a year |
| Meridian attribution factor; avoided on gas baseline | 7.89%; 56.1 kt a year |
| Refinancing after two years | EUR 1,304.30m outstanding; NPV EUR 30.73m at 135 bp |
Meridian underwrites EUR 350m at signing as one of four mandated lead arrangers and sells down to a final hold of EUR 150m within six months (see B04 and B16). Everything below is computed on that hold, fully drawn, in the first year of operation.
IN ONE SENTENCE — A project finance loan is a “specialised lending” exposure, a sub-class of corporate exposures for which CRR3 offers three capital routes: a table of supervisory risk weights (slotting), the IRB formula, or the standardised approach.
CRR3 (Regulation (EU) 2024/1623) has applied since 1 January 2025. The three routes are:
| Route | Rule | Risk weight for Cap Ferrat in operation |
|---|---|---|
| Supervisory slotting (Article 153(5)) | Five categories; strong 70% (50% under 2.5 years of remaining maturity), good 90% (70%), satisfactory 115%, weak 250%, default 0% | Strong: 70% |
| IRB formula with own PD | Corporate formula; under F-IRB the regulatory LGD is 40% | PD 0.50%: 61.9% |
| Standardised (Article 122a) | Unrated project finance: 130% before operation, 100% in operation, 80% in operation if “high quality” | 100%, or 80% |
Slotting is used when a bank cannot estimate a PD that meets IRB requirements, which is common: project defaults are rare and each project is different. The credit officer scores the project on five factors (financial strength, political and legal environment, transaction characteristics, strength of the sponsor, security package) defined in Delegated Regulation (EU) 2021/598 and reads the risk weight in the table. Expected loss also comes from a table (0.4% for strong above 2.5 years, 0.8% for good, 2.8% for satisfactory). The EBA consulted from May to 7 August 2026 on a revision of these criteria that would, among other changes, clarify how ESG risk drivers enter the assessment and keep the DSCR as the only financial ratio. During construction a bank would typically place the project in “good” (90%); with a CfD, experienced sponsors and completion passed, “strong” is defensible. Meridian uses slotting for project finance in this course.
Under the standardised approach, the 80% weight requires the eight conditions of Article 122a(3): among them contractual limits on the borrower, reserves, revenue from a strong public or rated counterparty, pledged assets and contracts, and the lenders’ right to take control. A State-backed CfD and a full security package meet them.
The infrastructure supporting factor (Article 501a) multiplies the own funds requirement by 0.75 for exposures to entities that operate or finance infrastructure providing essential public services, under a long list of conditions: at least two thirds of repayment from the assets’ income, predictable cash flows, low refinancing risk, senior ranking, tested technology, permits in place, and an assessment by the obligor of the assets’ contribution to environmental objectives. It applies under slotting, IRB and the standardised approach, but cannot be combined with the 80% weight. A standardised bank therefore prefers 100% times 0.75, that is 75%, to 80%.
CASE — Meridian’s EUR 150m under slotting “strong”: RWA of EUR 105m and capital of EUR 13.65m at 13%. With the supporting factor the effective weight is 52.5%, RWA EUR 78.75m and capital EUR 10.24m, a saving of EUR 3.41m. Under the F-IRB formula (PD 0.50%, LGD 40%, M 2.5 years) the weight would be 61.88% before the factor. In a simplified reading of the output floor, 72.5% of the best standardised treatment (75%) gives EUR 81.56m of RWA, slightly above the slotting figure with the factor: at the margin a floor-bound bank gains nothing more from a better slotting category.
INTERACTIVE LAB — Capital for a project finance loan under CRR3
Compare risk weights and capital across slotting, F-IRB and the standardised approach, with and without the infrastructure supporting factor.
| Parameter you can move | Range | Default |
|---|---|---|
| Outstanding amount | 10 to 400 EUR m | 150 EUR m |
| Approach and category | Slotting strong (70%) / Slotting good (90%) / Slotting satisfactory (115%) / F-IRB (PD, LGD) / SA pre-operational (130%) / SA operational (100%) / SA high quality (80%) | Slotting strong (70%) |
| Infrastructure supporting factor (0.75) | yes / no | yes |
| One-year PD (F-IRB only) | 0.05 to 4 % | 0.5 % |
| LGD (F-IRB only) | 10 to 45 % | 40 % |
| Result at default settings | Value |
|---|---|
| Risk weight before supporting factor | 70.00 % |
| Effective risk weight | 52.50 % |
| Risk-weighted assets | 78.75 EUR m |
| Allocated capital (13% of RWA) | 10.24 EUR m |
| Capital without the supporting factor | 13.65 EUR m |
| Capital saved by the supporting factor | 3.41 EUR m |
| F-IRB risk weight for this PD and LGD | 61.88 % |
| 72.5% of the best standardised RWA | 81.56 EUR m |
Try it. Select ‘SA high quality (80%)’ and then ‘SA operational (100%)’ with the supporting factor: the second is cheaper. The two reliefs cannot be added.
PITFALL — The supporting factor is not a green factor. A toll road or a gas pipeline can qualify; an offshore wind farm with an unproven foundation concept may not, because of the “tested technology” condition. CRR3 contains no capital discount for green assets as such (see E02 for the debate).
During construction the picture is worse on every line: the category is lower, the undrawn commitment carries a 40% credit conversion factor, and the underwritten amount not yet sold weighs on capital and on the large exposure limit. This is why the sell-down deadline is a condition of the credit approval.
Assumptions stated once. Margin 180 bp. FTP liquidity premium 60 bp, that is about 6 bp per year of the loan’s average life of roughly ten years. Participation fee of 200 bp on the hold, EUR 3.0m, spread over twelve years (average life from financial close). Cost-income ratio 40%. For expected loss Meridian uses its internal rating of the SPV, BB+, with a one-year PD of 0.50% (interpolated between the BBB and BB grades of the course scale) and the F-IRB LGD of 40%. RWA from slotting “strong” with the supporting factor.
| Line | Computation | EUR m |
|---|---|---|
| Net margin after FTP | 150m x (180 - 60) bp | 1.800 |
| Participation fee spread over 12 years | 150m x 200 bp / 12 | 0.250 |
| Revenues | 2.050 | |
| Operating costs | 40% | -0.820 |
| Expected loss | 0.50% x 40% x 150m | -0.300 |
| Pre-tax result | 0.930 | |
| Tax at 25% | -0.233 | |
| Net result | 0.698 | |
| Allocated capital | 13% x 78.75m | 10.238 |
The loan alone returns a little more than half of the 12% hurdle. Without the supporting factor it returns 5.11%. The margin that would bring the stand-alone loan to 12% is 259 bp, a level the market does not pay for a CfD-backed project. What closes the gap is everything around the loan. Suppose Meridian is also hedging bank and account bank, earning EUR 0.9m a year (swap execution spread recognised over time, deposit margin on the SPV’s balances, agency fees), at a 60% cost-income ratio and EUR 2.5 of RWA per euro of revenue: the relationship RAROC is 9.19%. The rest comes from fees earned once and not shown in this running view: Meridian’s share of the arranging and underwriting fee on EUR 350m while it keeps only EUR 150m, and the acceleration of the unamortised participation fee when the loan is refinanced after five years instead of twenty-one.
INTERACTIVE LAB — Meridian’s RAROC on its EUR 150m hold
Rebuild revenue, expected loss, capital and RAROC line by line; test the supporting factor, green funding and ancillary business.
| Parameter you can move | Range | Default |
|---|---|---|
| Final hold, fully drawn | 20 to 400 EUR m | 150 EUR m |
| Margin | 100 to 350 bp | 180 bp |
| FTP liquidity premium | 0 to 120 bp | 60 bp |
| Participation fee | 0 to 300 bp | 200 bp |
| Years over which the fee is spread | 3 to 21 years | 12 years |
| One-year PD | 0.05 to 4 % | 0.5 % |
| LGD | 10 to 45 % | 40 % |
| Risk weight before supporting factor | 50 to 130 % | 70 % |
| Infrastructure supporting factor | yes / no | yes |
| Ancillary revenues (hedging, accounts, agency) | 0 to 3 EUR m per year | 0.9 EUR m per year |
| Result at default settings | Value |
|---|---|
| Net margin after FTP | 1.800 EUR m |
| Participation fee per year | 0.250 EUR m |
| Revenues | 2.050 EUR m |
| Operating costs (40%) | 0.820 EUR m |
| Expected loss | 0.300 EUR m |
| Pre-tax result | 0.930 EUR m |
| Net result after tax | 0.698 EUR m |
| RWA | 78.75 EUR m |
| Allocated capital | 10.238 EUR m |
| RAROC, loan alone | 6.81 % |
| RAROC without the supporting factor | 5.11 % |
| RAROC if green funding lowers FTP by 3 bp | 7.01 % |
| Relationship RAROC with ancillary revenues | 9.19 % |
| Margin needed for 12%, loan alone | 259 bp |
Try it. Set the fee spread to 5 years, as if the loan were refinanced early: RAROC rises to 8.35%. Then set the category to ‘good’ (90%) and the PD to 1%, the construction-phase view: 3.59%.
What the sustainable feature changes. Less than students expect. The margin carries no green discount: it is set by risk and by competition between banks. Capital relief comes from the infrastructure factor, which is not specific to green assets. The measurable green effect is on funding: if Treasury refinances the loan in Meridian’s own green bond programme and passes on a 3 bp advantage, in line with the Helios greenium, RAROC moves from 6.81% to 7.01%. The other effects are indirect and real: internal sector limits are easier (the loan improves the energy-mix ratio that the bank publishes, see B07), secondary demand from other banks is deeper, which lowers the cost of selling down, and eligibility for the supporting factor is supported by the environmental assessment already in the file.
WHY IT MATTERS ON THE DESK — When a managing director says “we do this deal for the franchise”, this is the arithmetic behind it. The credit committee will ask for the relationship RAROC, the sell-down plan and the refinancing assumption, and will be suspicious of any of the three.
A loan with an average life of eleven years must be funded with long-term resources: it weighs on the net stable funding ratio for two decades, and Treasury charges accordingly (see E04). The 60 bp premium takes one third of the margin, which is why banks try to match these assets with dedicated long funding: covered bonds where the asset is eligible, green bonds, or global loans from the European Investment Bank that pass on part of their funding advantage. The undrawn commitment during construction attracts a contingent liquidity charge, and the letter of credit facility that replaces the cash reserve is itself a commitment. The interest rate risk is not the bank’s: the SPV swaps its floating rate with the hedging banks, and Meridian’s rates desk hedges its share of the swap in the market. What stays is counterparty risk on a twenty-year swap with an SPV, measured under SA-CCR and charged through CVA (see E09); the swap ranks alongside the senior loan in the waterfall and shares the security, which is why hedging banks are normally lenders.
Classification under IFRS 9. The final hold is in a “hold to collect” business model and measured at amortised cost, provided its cash flows are solely payments of principal and interest (SPPI). For non-recourse loans IFRS 9 requires looking through to the underlying asset: if the lender in substance bears the asset’s performance risk like an equity holder (very high gearing, repayment only from residual value), the test fails. At 74% gearing with a contracted cash flow and a 1.2x cover, it passes; the analysis is documented in the credit file. The portion underwritten for sale is not held to collect: it is classified at fair value, so a failed syndication shows immediately in profit and loss.
Fees. The participation fee on the retained amount is part of the effective interest rate and is spread over the expected life; if the loan is prepaid, the unamortised balance is released at once. The arranging fee rewards a service and is recognised under IFRS 15 when the service is complete, in practice at close and at the end of syndication.
Expected credit losses. The loan starts in stage 1 with a twelve-month expected loss. A construction delay, a covenant waiver or a rating downgrade can trigger a significant increase in credit risk and a move to stage 2, where the loss is computed over the remaining life; with fifteen years outstanding the step is large (see E01 and E05). Portfolio managers watch construction reports with this in mind.
Green Asset Ratio. Here is a paradox worth knowing before an interview. The Green Asset Ratio’s numerator has only counted exposures to undertakings subject to EU sustainability reporting; a project SPV is not one. The greenest loan on Meridian’s books therefore did not enter the numerator, and appeared only in the voluntary banking book taxonomy alignment ratio (BTAR). Delegated Regulation (EU) 2026/73, adopted in July 2025 and applicable from 1 January 2026, excludes exposures to non-reporting counterparties from the denominator too (an SPV financing a group in CSRD scope stays in), which removes the penalty without creating a reward. In June 2026 the EBA’s final draft of the revised Pillar 3 ESG standards went further and stopped the Green Asset Ratio templates in Pillar 3 for large institutions (not yet adopted by the Commission in November 2026), leaving Taxonomy reporting to the bank’s sustainability statement (see E06). A student should check the status of both texts at the date of reading.
Pillar 3 ESG. The loan appears in the transition-risk template by sector (electricity production, NACE D35.11) with its financed emissions, and in the physical-risk template: an offshore asset exposed to acute hazards such as storms. The climate risk assessment of the Equator file is the source for that classification.
Financed emissions. Under the PCAF project finance method, Meridian reports 7.89% of the project’s emissions at commercial operation. Operating emissions of a wind farm (service vessels, auxiliary power) are small; even the life-cycle figure of section 5.7 gives only 2.0 kt a year. The loan thus lowers the average emissions intensity of Meridian’s power portfolio, the metric on which banks set sector targets (see E07). Avoided emissions, 56.1 kt on the most favourable baseline and 2.2 kt on the least, are disclosed separately with the baseline stated. As the loan amortises, both the attribution factor and the claim shrink; after a refinancing they go to the bondholders.
| Risk | Control | Owner |
|---|---|---|
| Construction delay or cost overrun | Fixed-price packages, liquidated damages, contingency, standby equity, cost-to-complete test at each drawdown | Deal team, LTA, facility agent |
| Energy yield below forecast | Independent yield study, sizing on P90, lock-up, reserve account | Structuring, credit risk |
| Offtake or regulatory change | Legal due diligence on the CfD, change-in-law clauses, tail | Legal, credit risk |
| Serial defect or low availability | Long-term service agreement with availability guarantee, warranties, maintenance reserve, insurance | LTA, portfolio management |
| Interest rate before and after close | Pre-hedging strategy, swaps at close for 80 to 100% of the debt | Rates desk, deal team |
| Model error | Independent model audit, version control, one model for all lenders | Modelling bank, model auditor |
| Environmental or social breach | Equator categorisation, IESC review, action plan as covenant, independent monitoring | ESR team |
| Underwriting and sell-down | Market sounding, flex clauses, sell-down deadline, fair-value marking | Syndication, market risk |
| Sponsor or contractor failure | Equity letters of credit, direct agreements, step-in rights, replacement clauses | Legal, agent |
| Physical climate risk | Climate risk assessment, design review, insurance adviser’s view on future cover | LTA, insurance adviser, ESR |
| Misstated climate claims | Baseline and method reviewed by sustainability reporting; separate disclosure | Finance, sustainability office |
Sector experience tempers this list: studies by rating agencies of bank project loans, which lenders cite in credit papers, find default rates that fall sharply after construction and ultimate recoveries well above those of unsecured corporate loans, the result of the structural protections described above. The same studies cannot yet say much about offshore wind built after the cost inflation of 2022 to 2024.
Red-flag checklist. Any of these should stop a credit paper or a marketing document:
Volumes. WindEurope reported on 26 February 2026 that Europe invested EUR 45bn in new wind projects in 2025 and installed 19.1 GW, about 90% of it onshore; only 2 GW of offshore capacity was connected, the lowest since 2016, with a catch-up expected in 2026. Offshore wind is where project finance tickets are largest, because a single farm costs several billion euros.
France. The 1.5 GW Centre Manche 2 project was awarded on 24 September 2025 to a TotalEnergies and RWE consortium at EUR 66/MWh, for an announced investment of EUR 4.5bn, a final investment decision expected in early 2029 and first power in 2033; RWE indicated at the award that it intended to exit. The tender for a 1 GW site off Oléron received no bid. In April 2026 the government launched a combined tender for about 10 GW, half fixed and half floating, with first awards expected between late 2026 and early 2027, under an energy programme that targets 15 GW of offshore wind in 2035. For a banker, the lesson of these data points is that tariffs, costs and bidder appetite moved faster in three years than financing terms did.
Standards. Equator Principles: EP4 since October 2020, 126 signatories in June 2026 according to BankTrack, a review announced in 2023 without published timetable. IFC Performance Standards: 2012 text in force, consultation on a first draft of the new framework expected from January 2027. PCAF: updated standard and supplemental guidance on avoided emissions published on 2 December 2025. European Green Bond Standard: applicable since 21 December 2024; IEEFA counted more than EUR 22bn of bonds under the standard in its first year (analysis of 9 February 2026), concentrated in energy and utilities, with few banks among issuers.
Prudential. CRR3 in force since January 2025, output floor phasing in to 72.5% by 2030. EBA consultation on the slotting criteria closed on 7 August 2026; final standards were not published at the date of writing. The Pillar 3 ESG standards finalised by the EBA on 22 June 2026 set 31 December 2026 as first reference date for large institutions, subject to adoption by the Commission.
What changed recently on the desk. Three things. First, revenue: two-way CfDs became the European norm for new public support, negative-price hours became a modelled risk and not a footnote, and sponsors ask lenders to finance hybrid revenue (part CfD, part PPA, part merchant). Second, costs and supply chain: turbine and vessel prices rose, some awarded projects were cancelled or renegotiated across Europe, and lenders’ technical advisers now review the contractors’ own financial health. Third, capital: since CRR3 the choice between slotting and models, and the output floor, weigh on which banks stay in long-dated lending and which arrange and distribute to insurers and debt funds.
Open debates. Should prudential rules treat green infrastructure more favourably than brown, or is risk the only legitimate criterion (see E02)? Can avoided emissions be reported at all without misleading, and with which baseline as grids decarbonise, since the same wind farm “avoids” less every year? Is the Designated Country shortcut of the Equator Principles still adequate for biodiversity, when national permitting is being accelerated? And is non-recourse debt at 75% gearing the right tool for projects with merchant exposure, or will more of the sector be financed on sponsors’ balance sheets and refinanced once operating?
INTERACTIVE LAB — Self-assessment: renewable project finance
Fourteen questions on structure, ratios, standards and the bank’s internal treatment.
Q1. What can lenders reach if a non-recourse project fails?
Answer: B. Recourse is limited to the SPV and to listed, capped undertakings such as committed equity.
Q2. With a flat CFADS of EUR 100m, a 1.30x target DSCR, 5% and 15 years, debt capacity is about:
Answer: C. 100 / 1.30 = 76.9 of debt service, times an annuity factor of 10.38.
Q3. A two-way CfD removes which risk from the project?
Answer: B. The strike fixes the price; volume, availability and construction stay with the project.
Q4. Cap Ferrat’s P90 production is 1,886.9 GWh. This means:
Answer: A. P90 is the level exceeded with 90% probability; here 89.75% of the P50.
Q5. Why is debt sculpted and not repaid as an annuity?
Answer: B. Sculpting gives debt service the shape of CFADS; an annuity would leave 1.137x in year 1 against 1.208x.
Q6. In a P99 wind year Cap Ferrat’s DSCR is 1.045x. What happens first?
Answer: B. CFADS still covers debt service; below 1.10x the lock-up traps cash. Below 1.05x a default right also arises, subject to cure.
Q7. Which statement about the LLCR is correct?
Answer: C. LLCR covers the loan life; the PLCR covers the project life.
Q8. Under EP4, a French offshore wind farm is assessed against:
Answer: B. In Designated Countries host law is the applicable standard; EP4 still requires evaluating specific risks.
Q9. For Taxonomy activity 4.3 (wind power), alignment mainly depends on:
Answer: B. Substantial contribution is met by nature; DNSH and safeguards require evidence.
Q10. Under CRR3 slotting, a ‘strong’ project finance exposure with more than 2.5 years of remaining maturity is weighted:
Answer: B. Article 153(5): strong 70% (50% under 2.5 years), good 90%, satisfactory 115%, weak 250%.
Q11. The infrastructure supporting factor:
Answer: B. Article 501a: 0.75, conditions on cash flows, seniority, technology and others; not combinable with the 80% weight.
Q12. Meridian’s stand-alone RAROC on its hold is 6.81%. The main reason it still does the deal is:
Answer: B. The relationship view and one-off fees close the gap; there is no green margin or capital discount.
Q13. The project avoids 27.3 kt or 710.6 kt a year depending on:
Answer: B. 25 g/kWh for the French mix against 350 g/kWh for marginal gas, net of 12 g of life-cycle emissions.
Q14. PCAF’s attribution factor for a project finance loan is:
Answer: A. For Meridian 150 / 1,901.25 = 7.89%, falling as the loan amortises.
A 300 MW solar plant costs EUR 290m. CFADS at P90 is EUR 24m a year, flat; at P50, EUR 27m. Lenders ask for 1.25x on P90, lend at 4.5% and want repayment in 16 annual instalments. Find the debt, the gearing and the P50 DSCR.
Solution. Maximum debt service is 24 / 1.25 = EUR 19.2m. The annuity factor is . Debt capacity is 19.2 x 11.234 = EUR 215.7m. Gearing is 215.7 / 290 = 74.4%, so sponsors fund EUR 74.3m. At P50 the DSCR is 27 / 19.2 = 1.41x. If the rate rose to 5.5% before close, the factor would fall to 10.462 and capacity to EUR 200.9m: EUR 14.8m more equity for 100 bp.
An onshore wind farm of 120 MW has a net capacity factor of 30% and a one-year uncertainty of 10%. It sells at EUR 70/MWh; operating costs are EUR 5.5m; debt service is EUR 11.0m; lock-up at 1.15x. A bank holds EUR 30m of a total financing (equity and debt) of EUR 170m. Compute P50, P90 and P99 production; the DSCR and the distribution status at P90 and P99; the bank’s share of avoided emissions at P50 with a baseline of 200 g/kWh and life-cycle emissions of 11 g/kWh.
Solution. P50 = 120 x 8,760 x 0.30 = 315.36 GWh. P90 = 315.36 x (1 - 1.2816 x 0.10) = 274.94 GWh. P99 = 315.36 x (1 - 2.3263 x 0.10) = 242.00 GWh. At P90, revenue is EUR 19.25m and CFADS EUR 13.75m: DSCR 1.25x, distributions allowed. At P99, revenue is EUR 16.94m and CFADS EUR 11.44m: DSCR 1.04x, debt paid, the EUR 0.44m left is locked up. Net avoided emissions at P50: 315.36 x (200 - 11) / 1,000 = 59.6 kt. Attribution factor 30 / 170 = 17.6%, so 10.5 kt for the bank, a figure it should publish with the 200 g baseline stated.
A bank holds EUR 80m, fully drawn, of a project in slotting category “good” (90%). Margin 160 bp, FTP 50 bp, participation fee 150 bp spread over 10 years, PD 1.00%, LGD 40%, cost-income 40%, capital 13% of RWA, tax 25%. Compute RAROC with and without the infrastructure supporting factor.
Solution. Net margin: 80 x 110 bp = EUR 0.88m. Fee: 80 x 150 bp / 10 = EUR 0.12m. Revenues EUR 1.00m; costs EUR 0.40m; expected loss 1% x 40% x 80 = EUR 0.32m; pre-tax result EUR 0.28m; net EUR 0.21m. Without the factor, RWA are EUR 72m and capital EUR 9.36m: RAROC 2.24%. With it, RWA are EUR 54m and capital EUR 7.02m: RAROC 2.99%. Expected loss absorbs a third of revenue: during construction the loan is carried by the arranging fees and by the prospect of the operating phase, not by its own return.
1. What is the difference between project finance and corporate lending? In corporate lending the bank relies on a diversified balance sheet and a management; in project finance it relies on the cash flow of one asset held in an SPV, with recourse to sponsors limited to what the contracts list. Debt is sized on cash flow cover ratios, not on leverage multiples of EBITDA. The contracts allocate each risk to a named party and the lenders control cash through the waterfall. Documentation, due diligence and monitoring are therefore much heavier, and so are fees.
2. Walk me through how you size the debt of a wind farm. I start from the lenders’ energy yield at P90 and the contracted price to get revenue, deduct operating costs and tax to get CFADS year by year. I divide each year’s CFADS by the target DSCR to get the maximum debt service, and discount these amounts at the all-in cost of debt over the tenor: that is the debt capacity. I then check the result against other limits (maximum gearing, P50 ratio, LLCR) and against the downside cases. The repayment profile is sculpted so that the ratio is constant.
3. Why do lenders use P90 and sponsors P50? P50 is the expected production and the right basis for valuing equity, which receives the upside. Lenders receive no upside, only the downside, so they size on a production that has a 90% chance of being exceeded. The gap between the two, about 10% here, is one of the cushions of the loan. One must always ask whether a P90 is on a one-year or a ten-year basis, since the second is higher.
4. What does a DSCR lock-up do, and why do sponsors accept it? It blocks distributions when the ratio falls below a level set above the default level, 1.10x in our case. Cash stays in the SPV and builds liquidity, which protects lenders without triggering a default. Sponsors accept it because it lets them obtain a lower default threshold and higher gearing. For a banker it is the early-warning covenant that actually operates in practice.
5. How do the Equator Principles change a loan agreement? They turn environmental and social due diligence into contract terms. The project is categorised, an independent consultant reviews the impact assessment, and the findings become an action plan annexed to the agreement. The borrower covenants to comply with law, with its management plans and with the action plan, and to report; independent monitoring continues over the life of the loan. A material unremedied breach is an event of default, which gives the bank leverage that a policy statement does not.
6. Is a wind farm automatically Taxonomy-aligned? No. It is eligible, and the substantial contribution test is met by nature for activity 4.3. Alignment also requires evidence on the do-no-significant-harm criteria (climate adaptation, marine environment, circular economy, biodiversity) and on minimum safeguards, including human rights due diligence in the supply chain. The Equator due diligence provides most of that evidence if it is designed for it. Without the file, the honest statement is “eligible, alignment not demonstrated”.
7. How is a project finance loan treated for capital under CRR3? It is specialised lending. A bank can use supervisory slotting, with risk weights from 70% for a strong exposure to 250% for a weak one, the IRB formula if it can estimate a PD, or the standardised approach at 130% before operation, 100% in operation and 80% for high-quality operating projects. The infrastructure supporting factor multiplies requirements by 0.75 if a list of conditions is met, and cannot be combined with the 80% weight. There is no green-specific discount.
8. Your bank wants to publish the avoided emissions of its renewable loans. What do you advise? Publish them separately from financed emissions and never net the two. State the baseline emission factor, its source and year, and prefer a conservative choice, because the result varies by a factor of more than twenty between the French mix and marginal gas. Attribute with the PCAF factor, on outstanding amounts, so that the claim falls as loans amortise and is not double counted across the syndicate. And say plainly that avoided emissions are a counterfactual estimate, not a measured reduction.
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