The Energy and Real Assets desk of Meridian Bank sits inside Corporate Banking, next to the renewable project finance team described in B06. The two teams share the same tools (non-recourse lending to a special purpose vehicle, a financial model, a covenant package) but not the same problem. A solar farm in 2026 is a commodity: the technology is proven, the revenue contract is standard, and forty banks will bid for the debt. The assets of this module are the ones where at least one of those three statements fails.
| Asset family | Who pays the revenue | Main unproven element |
|---|---|---|
| Electricity grids, interconnectors | Network users, through a regulated tariff | None; the issue is the volume of capex |
| Battery and pumped storage | Power markets, capacity schemes, tolling counterparties | Revenue model |
| Electrolytic hydrogen | Industrial offtaker plus public support | Technology at scale, cost, demand |
| CCUS (capture, transport, storage) | Emitters’ avoided carbon cost plus public support | Whole-chain interface, carbon price |
| Nuclear (new build, life extension) | Power market under a CfD or regulated model | Construction cost and duration |
| Gas plants, coal phase-out, hard-to-abate industry | Power or product markets | Lifetime of the asset under climate policy |
Clients. Utilities and network operators, industrial gas companies, oil and gas majors redeploying capital, steel, cement and chemicals groups, infrastructure funds, and public bodies that grant support. Many transactions involve a State or the European Investment Bank on the same side of the table as the commercial banks.
How the desk earns money. Four lines, in the usual order of size over the life of a deal. First, the interest margin on the amount Meridian keeps: 150 to 200 bp over EURIBOR for a regulated grid or a contracted asset, 250 to 350 bp for a first-of-a-kind technology (case assumptions consistent with what lenders describe publicly; individual pricing is not published). Second, upfront fees: arranging and underwriting fees of 1.5% to 2.5% of the amount underwritten, paid at financial close. Third, hedging: project loans are floating-rate and lenders require 75% to 100% of the interest-rate risk to be swapped for the life of the loan, so the swap desk earns a credit margin on a long-dated derivative (see C07). Fourth, advisory mandates: a financial adviser to a sponsor or to a public authority earns a monthly retainer and a success fee, without using the balance sheet. A team of twenty-five people that closes eight to twelve transactions a year and manages a portfolio of a few billion euros will typically report revenues in the low hundreds of millions.
The team. Origination bankers hold the sponsor relationship and know the subsidy calendar. Structurers build the term sheet and run the lenders’ financial model. The portfolio management group monitors covenants after closing. Around them: the credit risk department with its specialised lending analysts, who sign the rating and the credit opinion; the ESG risk team, which classifies the project under the Equator Principles and checks Taxonomy alignment; the syndication desk (see B04); the rates desk for the hedge; the loan agency (see B17); and three external advisers paid by the borrower but reporting to the lenders, namely the lenders’ technical adviser (LTA), the market adviser and the legal counsel. In this module the LTA is the most important person outside the bank: nobody at Meridian can judge whether a 200 MW electrolyser will lose 1% or 3% of efficiency a year.
A realistic week. Monday: pipeline meeting; the head of desk ranks deals by probability of close and by expected RAROC, and asks which ones depend on an auction result not yet published. Tuesday: call with the LTA on the draft technical report of a hydrogen project; the structurer updates the degradation curve in the model and the debt capacity falls by EUR 12m. Wednesday: pre-screening with credit risk on a battery storage portfolio; the analyst refuses to lend against more than five years of merchant revenues. Thursday: negotiation session with the sponsors’ counsel on the direct agreement with the State agency that pays the subsidy. Friday: annual review of a gas-fired plant financed in 2019; the question on the table is whether the remaining six years of loan are still covered by the capacity contract.
WHY IT MATTERS ON THE DESK — Sustainable finance courses usually present the transition as a list of technologies. A banker meets it as a list of revenue contracts. The question at credit committee is never “is hydrogen green?” but “who pays, for how long, under which law, and what happens to the debt if they stop?”
B06 teaches project finance in full; here is what you need to carry into this module. Lenders lend to a special purpose vehicle (SPV) that owns one asset. They have no claim on the sponsors once the plant is complete. Repayment comes only from the cash flow available for debt service (CFADS): revenues minus operating costs, taxes and maintenance capex, before any payment to lenders or shareholders. Debt is therefore sized on CFADS and not on asset value. Protection comes from contracts (construction, operation, offtake, supply), from security over everything the SPV owns, and from a cash waterfall that pays lenders before shareholders.
IN ONE SENTENCE — The debt a project can carry is the present value of the cash flow that lenders are prepared to count on, divided by the cushion they demand.
INTUITION — A bank that lends to a salaried employee and to a freelancer with the same average income does not offer the same mortgage. It counts the salary almost in full and the freelance income at a discount. The debt service coverage ratio is that discount, applied to a project.
FORMULA
is the debt service coverage ratio of period ; the cash flow available for debt service; the debt service (interest plus scheduled principal); the debt capacity when CFADS is flat; the target ratio set by lenders; the annuity factor at the all-in interest rate over a repayment period of years.
Two parameters carry the lenders’ whole opinion of the revenue: the target DSCR and the tenor. A tolling agreement with an investment-grade utility for fifteen years is sized at about 1.30x over fifteen years. Merchant revenues from power markets are sized at 1.80x to 2.20x over a shorter period, when they are counted at all.
CASE — Take a storage project (not the case of section 5) with a CFADS of EUR 20m a year and an all-in rate of 5.00%. Under a fifteen-year tolling contract sized at 1.30x, debt service can reach EUR 15.38m and debt capacity is EUR 159.7m. The same asset on a merchant basis, sized at 2.00x over ten years, carries EUR 77.2m. The steel and the batteries are identical; the contract has doubled the debt.
INTERACTIVE LAB — How the revenue contract sets the debt: capacity against DSCR and tenor
Compute the debt a flat cash flow can support for a given target DSCR, tenor and interest rate, and see how fast capacity falls when lenders ask for a larger cushion.
| Parameter you can move | Range | Default |
|---|---|---|
| Cash flow available for debt service | 5 to 100 EUR m per year | 20 EUR m per year |
| Target DSCR | 1.1 to 2.5 x | 1.3 x |
| Repayment period | 5 to 25 years | 15 years |
| All-in fixed interest rate | 2 to 9 % | 5 % |
| Result at default settings | Value |
|---|---|
| Maximum annual debt service | 15.38 EUR m |
| Debt capacity | 159.7 EUR m |
| Debt as a multiple of CFADS | 7.98 x |
Try it. Keep the DSCR at 1.30x and shorten the tenor from 15 to 7 years, the length of a typical capacity-market contract: how much debt disappears?
Every asset in this module earns its revenue in one of three ways, or in a mix.
Regulated. A transmission or distribution network is a natural monopoly. A regulator sets the revenue it may collect so that an efficient operator recovers its costs and earns a fair return on the capital invested, measured by the regulated asset base (RAB).
FORMULA
is the allowed revenue of year ; the rate of return set by the regulator for the regulatory period (four to five years in most European regimes); the regulated asset base, which grows with capex and falls with depreciation; the regulatory depreciation; the operating cost allowance.
CASE — A transmission operator with a RAB of EUR 10bn, a regulatory WACC of 5.0%, a forty-year regulatory life and an opex allowance of EUR 600m collects EUR 1,350m: EUR 500m of return, EUR 250m of depreciation and the opex. If it is financed 60% by debt at 4.0%, interest costs EUR 240m and the pre-tax return on the EUR 4bn of equity is 6.5%. Cut the WACC by 50 bp at the next reset and that return falls to 5.25%: the risk of a grid is the regulator, not the wind or the power price.
INTERACTIVE LAB — Allowed revenue of a regulated network
Build the allowed revenue of a regulated asset base and see how the return on equity reacts to the regulatory WACC and to the cost of debt.
| Parameter you can move | Range | Default |
|---|---|---|
| Regulated asset base | 1 to 40 EUR bn | 10 EUR bn |
| Regulatory WACC (pre-tax) | 3 to 8 % | 5 % |
| Regulatory asset life | 20 to 60 years | 40 years |
| Opex allowance | 0 to 3000 EUR m | 600 EUR m |
| Debt as a share of RAB | 30 to 80 % | 60 % |
| Actual cost of debt | 1 to 7 % | 4 % |
| Result at default settings | Value |
|---|---|
| Return on RAB | 500 EUR m |
| Regulatory depreciation | 250 EUR m |
| Allowed revenue | 1,350 EUR m |
| Interest on debt | 240 EUR m |
| Pre-tax return on equity | 6.50 % |
Try it. Raise the cost of debt to 5% while the regulatory WACC stays at 5%: gearing no longer adds anything to the return on equity.
Grids are mostly financed on the balance sheet of the operator (bonds, corporate loans, EIB loans), not by project finance. The desk meets them through interconnectors, offshore grid connections, and the hybrid and green bonds of network companies. The RAB logic has also been extended to other assets: the United Kingdom finances the Sizewell C nuclear plant, which reached its final investment decision in July 2025, under a RAB model in which consumers start paying during construction.
Contracted. A creditworthy counterparty commits to pay a price, a fixed fee or a price difference for ten to twenty years. The family includes power purchase agreements (PPA), tolling agreements (the counterparty pays a fee for the use of a battery or a plant and keeps the market risk), capacity contracts, take-or-pay offtake contracts, and contracts for difference (CfD) with a State entity.
IN ONE SENTENCE — A contract for difference pays the project the gap between a strike price fixed at signing and a market reference price, and takes the gap back when the reference is above the strike.
FORMULA
is the strike price; the reference price observed on the market or computed by a formula; the eligible volume. When exceeds , the payment is negative in a two-way contract and the project pays the counterparty.
PITFALL — A CfD hedges price, not volume. If the plant does not run, or cannot sell, there is nothing to multiply the difference by. Most of the pain in early hydrogen and CCUS structures sits in .
Merchant. The asset sells at market prices. A stand-alone battery earns from arbitrage between cheap and expensive hours and from balancing services to the grid operator. These revenues have been high in some markets and have fallen quickly where many batteries have connected, because each new battery flattens the spread the others live on. Lenders respond with shorter tenors, higher DSCRs, cash sweeps (excess cash repays debt early) and, increasingly, with floors bought from traders or tolling contracts for part of the capacity.
A structure is bankable when each material risk is borne by a party that can price it and survive it. The credit paper of the desk walks through a standard grid, and the transition assets differ from a wind farm on the first, the third and the fifth line.
| Risk | Standard mitigant | What lenders ask for a new technology |
|---|---|---|
| Completion | Fixed-price, date-certain EPC contract with liquidated damages | A single wrap, or sponsor completion guarantees; more contingency |
| Performance | Guarantees from the equipment maker; O&M contract | Long-term service agreement covering stack or component replacement; reserve account |
| Revenue: price | Fixed-price contract or CfD | Contract with a State entity; direct agreement with lenders |
| Revenue: volume | Resource studies (wind, sun) | Take-or-pay; proof that the offtaker physically needs the product |
| Supply | Not applicable to wind and solar | Electricity or fuel supply contract matched to the offtake |
| Regulation | Stable support scheme | Change-in-law protection; certification regime (RFNBO, storage permits) |
Three practical consequences follow. Gearing is lower: where an offshore wind farm with a CfD is financed with 75% to 80% of debt, a first electrolyser or capture plant will be nearer 60% to 70%, and some are financed entirely on the sponsor’s balance sheet. Sponsors stay on the hook longer, through completion guarantees and contingent equity. And public money appears in the capital structure, which is the subject of section 3.4.
The finance documents are those of B06: a common terms agreement, facility agreements per tranche, an intercreditor agreement, security documents, hedging agreements under an ISDA Master Agreement, and direct agreements by which each major counterparty (contractor, offtaker, power supplier, the State agency paying support) acknowledges the lenders’ security and grants them step-in rights. What is specific here is the subsidy contract. It is a public-law contract whose payment formula, caps, termination events and assignment rules were written for a policy purpose, and lenders must take it as it is. The legal due diligence report on that contract is read line by line at credit committee.
Most assets of this module replace a fossil process whose cost includes a carbon price. In the European Union that price is set by the Emissions Trading System (EU ETS, see C10). Allowances traded between about EUR 82 and EUR 88 per tonne in August to October 2026. On 17 July 2026 the Commission proposed the framework for 2031 to 2040, with a slower reduction of the cap (linear reduction factor of 3.7% for 2031 to 2035), a halved intake rate for the Market Stability Reserve from 2028, free allocation extended to 2040 under conditions, and a first route for certified carbon removals. This is a proposal: Parliament and Council have not agreed a text, and the market trades on each rumour of the negotiation.
IN ONE SENTENCE — A clean technology is competitive without subsidy when the carbon price is at least equal to its abatement cost, the extra cost it carries per tonne of carbon dioxide it avoids.
FORMULA
is the abatement cost in EUR per tonne of CO2; and the unit costs of the clean product and of the fossil one before any carbon cost; and the emissions per unit of product.
For grid-scale wind and solar the abatement cost is now low or negative. For electrolytic hydrogen, for carbon capture on cement, for hydrogen-based steel, it is a multiple of today’s carbon price (section 5.2 computes more than EUR 500 for the case). No lender will finance fifteen years of revenue that depends on the allowance price trebling. Public support fills the gap, in three forms.
Investment grants reduce the capital to be remunerated: the EU Innovation Fund, national programmes, Important Projects of Common European Interest. Fixed premiums pay an amount per unit produced: the European Hydrogen Bank auctions award a fixed premium per kilogram of renewable hydrogen for up to ten years. Contracts for difference pay a variable amount. The power CfD refers to the electricity price. The carbon contract for difference (CCfD) refers to the carbon price or to the cost of the conventional product: the State pays the gap between the cost of the low-carbon process and that reference, and the payment shrinks as the carbon price rises. Germany ran a first round in 2024, in which fifteen companies were successful, and launched a second round of up to EUR 5bn on 5 May 2026 with fifteen-year contracts, now also open to carbon capture for process emissions.
INTUITION — A fixed premium is a lump of sugar: pleasant, but it does not help if the coffee gets more bitter. A carbon contract for difference is a thermostat: the State adds exactly what is missing to reach the agreed temperature, and takes heat back when the room is too warm.
WHY IT MATTERS ON THE DESK — The form of the support decides who holds carbon-price risk. Under a fixed premium the project keeps it, and lenders must form a view on allowances and gas for fifteen years. Under a two-way CCfD the State keeps it, and lenders can treat the revenue as contracted. The debt capacity of the same plant can differ by a third.
Hydrogen. European law distinguishes two certified products. Renewable hydrogen, called a renewable fuel of non-biological origin (RFNBO), must be produced with renewable electricity under the conditions of Delegated Regulation (EU) 2023/1184: a power purchase agreement with renewable plants, located in the same or a connected bidding zone, with production matched to the electrolyser’s consumption monthly until the end of 2029 and hourly from 2030, and with an additionality rule (new, unsubsidised plants) from which installations commissioned before 2028 are exempt until 2038. A bidding zone whose grid emits less than 18 gCO2e per megajoule, as France usually does, is dispensed from additionality but not from the correlation rules. Low-carbon hydrogen covers the rest (nuclear electricity, grid mix, gas with capture), with a methodology adopted by the Commission in July 2025. Both must save at least 70% of emissions against a fossil comparator of 94 gCO2e per megajoule, which gives about 3.4 kg of CO2e per kilogram of hydrogen. A targeted review of the RFNBO rules, announced by the Commission in April 2026, had not been published by mid-July; the official in charge told Parliament it would come “very shortly in the autumn”, and industry expects the hourly rule and the additionality cut-off to be pushed back. At the date of this module the rules above are the law.
The label matters because demand is created by quota. The revised Renewable Energy Directive (RED III, Directive (EU) 2023/2413) requires that 42% of the hydrogen used in industry be RFNBO by 2030 and 60% by 2035, and sets a sub-target for RFNBO in transport fuels, which a refinery can meet by using renewable hydrogen in its processes. Only RFNBO counts; low-carbon hydrogen does not.
The EU Taxonomy. Under the Climate Delegated Act, the manufacture of hydrogen makes a substantial contribution to climate mitigation when life-cycle emissions are below 3 tCO2e per tonne of hydrogen, slightly stricter than the 70% saving rule. Electricity transmission and distribution, storage of electricity, and the transport and geological storage of CO2 have their own criteria. Nuclear and gas-fired generation entered through the Complementary Delegated Act (Delegated Regulation (EU) 2022/1214), as transitional activities under conditions: for gas, life-cycle emissions below 100 gCO2e per kWh, or, for plants permitted until 2030, direct emissions below 270 g per kWh or an average of 550 kg per kW of capacity a year over twenty years, replacement of a more polluting plant and a commitment to switch to renewable or low-carbon gases by 2035. The General Court dismissed Austria’s action against that act in September 2025. An aligned project loan can be designated a green loan under the Green Loan Principles (version of March 2025), counts in the lender’s Taxonomy ratios, and can be refinanced by a bond under the European Green Bond Standard, applicable since 21 December 2024 (see C01 and C15).
The Equator Principles and the EBA. Project finance above USD 10m of capital cost falls under the Equator Principles (fourth version, in force since October 2020): categorisation A, B or C by environmental and social impact, an impact assessment, an independent review, covenants and monitoring. In designated countries such as France, compliance with host-country law stands in for the IFC Performance Standards. The association counted about 126 signatories in May 2026 after several departures, including the large United States banks in 2025 and Nordea in 2026. Independently of any voluntary commitment, the EBA Guidelines on the management of ESG risks have applied to large institutions since 11 January 2026 and require the bank to assess transition and physical risk at origination for this kind of exposure (see E01).
Some assets are not green and never will be, but financing them may lower emissions: a gas plant that replaces coal and backs up renewables, a capture unit on a cement kiln, the early closure of a coal plant. Until recently the loan market had no label for them.
That has changed. The Commission’s Recommendation (EU) 2023/1425 described transition finance in general terms. ICMA published Climate Transition Bond Guidelines in November 2025, creating a use-of-proceeds transition label alongside its Climate Transition Finance Handbook. The LMA, APLMA and LSTA published a Guide to Transition Loans with a draft set of principles on 16 October 2025, and the final Transition Loan Principles with guidance on 3 November 2026, a few days before this module was written (the texts are for members; this section relies on the associations’ public pages and on law-firm summaries). The principles keep the architecture of the Green Loan Principles (use of proceeds, project evaluation and selection, management of proceeds, reporting) and add a first component, the borrower’s entity-level transition strategy. Eligible projects are those that deliver quantified emission reductions on a pathway consistent with the Paris Agreement but do not qualify as green; early decommissioning is explicitly eligible. Lenders must assess carbon lock-in: the lifetime of the asset, its cumulative emissions, whether a low-carbon alternative was feasible, whether the asset can be retrofitted, and a dated phase-out when the investment is only an interim step.
IN ONE SENTENCE — Lock-in is the risk that financing a long-lived fossil asset today commits the economy, or the borrower, to emissions that a credible decarbonisation pathway no longer allows; stranding is the financial face of the same risk.
Roncalli (Handbook, section 10.3) traces the notion of stranded assets from the “stranded costs” of utility deregulation in the 1990s to the carbon-budget arithmetic of the Carbon Tracker reports of 2011 and 2013, and retains the definition of Caldecott and co-authors: assets that suffer unanticipated or premature write-downs, devaluations or conversion to liabilities. Following Daumas, he describes a cascade: stranded resources (reserves that cannot be burned) lead to stranded capital (plants retired before the end of their technical life), which leads to stranded financial assets, among them loans to projects that stop being viable. He lists three drivers: policy and legal action, stakeholder preferences, and technology. A lender to a gas plant faces all three in one variable, the number of hours the plant will run and the margin it will earn in each.
CASE — A new 800 MW combined-cycle gas turbine (an illustration, not the case of section 5) emits 0.348 tCO2 per MWh at 58% efficiency. Assume it runs 4,500 hours in its first year and 200 hours fewer each year as renewables take its place; that it earns EUR 40 per MWh before carbon; that the allowance price starts at EUR 85 and rises by EUR 7 a year; that half of its carbon cost is passed through into the power price; and that fixed costs net of capacity payments are EUR 10m a year. Its operating cash flow is EUR 80.8m in year 1. It falls below a debt service of EUR 45m in year 6 and below zero in year 16. A fifteen-year loan would be repaid, on paper, from a plant that covers its debt service for five years.
INTERACTIVE LAB — Lock-in test: when does a new gas plant stop covering its debt?
Project the operating cash flow of a gas-fired plant under falling running hours and a rising carbon price, and read the year in which debt service is no longer covered and the year in which the plant is stranded.
| Parameter you can move | Range | Default |
|---|---|---|
| Capacity | 200 to 1200 MW | 800 MW |
| Running hours in year 1 | 1000 to 7000 h | 4500 h |
| Fall in running hours per year | 0 to 500 h | 200 h |
| Margin per MWh before carbon cost | 10 to 80 EUR | 40 EUR |
| Carbon price in year 1 | 40 to 150 EUR per t | 85 EUR per t |
| Rise in carbon price per year | 0 to 20 EUR per t | 7 EUR per t |
| Carbon cost passed through to the power price | 0 to 100 % | 50 % |
| Fixed costs net of capacity payments | 0 to 40 EUR m | 10 EUR m |
| Annual debt service | 10 to 90 EUR m | 45 EUR m |
| Result at default settings | Value |
|---|---|
| Operating cash flow in year 1 | 80.8 EUR m |
| Operating cash flow in year 10 | 20.8 EUR m |
| First year with DSCR below 1.00x | 6 year |
| First year with negative cash flow (stranding) | 16 year |
Try it. Set the pass-through to 100%, the textbook case where gas always sets the power price: the plant still strands, because running hours fall. Then find the debt service that a ten-year tenor can support.
PITFALL — Do not test a gas plant with a flat carbon price and flat running hours and conclude that it is safe. And do not make the opposite error of assuming the plant bears its full carbon cost: when gas plants set the power price, most of that cost is recovered in the price. The variable that kills the loan is usually the hours.
On the desk, the lock-in test becomes four conditions in the term sheet: a tenor well inside the period of contracted revenues (capacity contract or tolling), a cash sweep that accelerates repayment, a technical requirement (readiness for hydrogen blending or for a capture unit, as in the Taxonomy criteria), and a dated commitment in the borrower’s transition plan. The same logic applies in reverse to the managed phase-out of coal: a lender refinances a plant on condition that it closes years earlier than planned, and the lost cash flows are compensated by cheaper blended funding or by the sale of “transition credits” for the avoided emissions. GFANZ published guidance on managed phase-out in 2022 and 2023 and the Monetary Authority of Singapore has sponsored work on transition credits; closed transactions remain rare, and the pilot retirements discussed in Indonesia and the Philippines have taken years to negotiate. Treat the structure as real but unproven.
When public and commercial money sit in the same capital structure, the result is called blended finance (see C14 for emerging-market structures). In Europe it takes four forms on this desk.
WHY IT MATTERS ON THE DESK — For the desk, the EIB is a co-lender whose credit process takes longer than a commercial bank’s and whose environmental and procurement requirements become those of the whole deal. Its presence raises debt capacity a little through a lower blended margin and a great deal through the amount of debt it takes off a thin commercial market.
Since the Net-Zero Banking Alliance voted on 3 October 2025 to cease operations and to leave only its target-setting guidance in place, bank climate commitments are a matter of each bank’s own policy, of supervisory expectations, and of the prudential transition plans required by CRD6 (see E12). On this desk they appear as sector policies with three kinds of rule: exclusions (no project financing of new coal plants, of new oil and gas fields, with wording that varies from bank to bank), conditions (a gas plant only with a lock-in test and a phase-out date), and portfolio targets. The portfolio target most quoted in 2026 is the ratio of low-carbon to fossil energy supply financing. BloombergNEF computed it at 0.97 for the banking sector in 2025 (report of September 2026), against a ratio of about 4 to 1 that its net-zero scenarios call for this decade. Section 6.5 shows what one deal does to that number.
INTERACTIVE LAB — From subsidy award to first repayment: the life of a first-of-a-kind project loan
Follow a non-recourse financing of a transition asset from mandate to operation, with the actor and the document at each step.
| # | Who | Does what | Deliverable |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Sponsors and financial adviser | Bid in the public support tender with a financing plan and letters of interest from banks | Bid file; bank support letters |
| 2 | Origination banker (Energy and Real Assets) | Win the mandate as mandated lead arranger after a request for proposals | Mandate letter, indicative term sheet |
| 3 | ESG risk team | Screen against sector policies, categorise under the Equator Principles, pre-check Taxonomy criteria | ESG screening memo, EP category |
| 4 | Lenders’ technical, market and legal advisers | Review technology, contracts, power supply, offtake and the subsidy contract | Due diligence reports addressed to lenders |
| 5 | Structurer | Build the lenders’ base case and downside cases, size the debt, draft covenants | Financial model, term sheet, model audit |
| 6 | EIB and public guarantor | Appraise the project under their own technical, environmental and procurement rules | EIB board approval, guarantee term sheet |
| 7 | Credit risk (specialised lending analyst) | Assign the internal rating and slotting category, write the credit opinion | Rating sheet, credit opinion |
| 8 | Credit committee | Approve underwriting amount, final hold, pricing and conditions | Credit approval with conditions precedent |
| 9 | Legal counsel and structurer | Negotiate finance documents and direct agreements with offtakers, contractor and State agency | Signed common terms agreement, security, direct agreements |
| 10 | Rates desk | Execute the interest-rate swaps at financial close | ISDA confirmations, hedging report |
| 11 | Syndication desk | Sell down from the underwritten amount to the final hold | Transfer certificates, allocation list |
| 12 | Loan agency and technical adviser | Check conditions precedent and certify each construction drawdown | Drawdown notices, construction reports |
| 13 | Portfolio management | Test completion, then monitor ratios, reserve accounts and certification every six months | Compliance certificates, annual review, green loan report |
Before the mandate. Public support is tendered before the debt is raised, so banks are asked to back a bid whose price they did not set. The support letter is not a commitment, but a desk that signs one for a strike price it later finds unfinanceable loses the client. The origination banker therefore runs a first sizing on the sponsor’s model before the bid. Auction rules then set the clock: winners of the third European Hydrogen Bank auction, for instance, must reach financial close within two and a half years of signing their grant agreement and operate within five.
Screening and due diligence (three to six months). The ESG risk team produces its memo first, because a refusal under a sector policy must come before the bank spends its reputation with the sponsors. The technical adviser’s report covers the design, the references of the equipment supplier at comparable scale, the degradation curve, the availability assumption, the construction schedule and the capital budget with its contingency. The market adviser covers power prices and the fallback market for the product. Counsel reports on each project contract and on the subsidy contract: payment formula, caps, termination, assignment to lenders, change in law. Controls: every report is addressed to the lenders with a reliance letter, and the model is audited by an independent firm.
Structuring and approval (two months). The structurer fixes the base case with the advisers’ inputs, not the sponsor’s, then sizes the debt and writes the covenants: a lock-up ratio below which dividends are blocked, a default ratio, reserve accounts, information undertakings. The credit analyst assigns an internal rating on the specialised lending scale and a regulatory slotting category. The credit paper states the gross underwriting, the target hold, the pricing, the RAROC and the list of conditions precedent. In parallel the EIB runs its own appraisal, which commonly takes longer than the banks’; its environmental and procurement conditions end up in the common terms.
Financial close. All documents are signed on the same day, the swaps are executed at the screen rate plus an agreed credit margin, with the model re-run live so that the debt amount matches the final swap rate, and upfront fees are paid from the first drawdown.
Construction (two to three years). The loan is drawn monthly against the technical adviser’s certificate that the works are on schedule and that remaining funds cover remaining costs (the cost-to-complete test). Equity is either paid first or backed by letters of credit. Completion is a contractual test, not a ribbon: performance runs at guaranteed output and efficiency, certification of the product, reserve accounts funded.
Operation. Every six months the borrower delivers a compliance certificate with historical and projected ratios. For a hydrogen plant the portfolio manager also receives the certification audit under the voluntary scheme recognised for RFNBO, the allocation and impact report required by the green loan label, and the annual statement of the subsidy agency. A breach of the lock-up ratio blocks distributions; a missed certification can stop the subsidy, which is why it sits among the events of default.
WHO DOES WHAT — Structurer: model, term sheet, covenants. Credit analyst: rating, slotting, opinion. ESG risk: Equator category, Taxonomy file, green loan eligibility. Technical adviser: every number that comes from physics. Agent: every euro that leaves the account. Portfolio manager: everything after the closing dinner, for fifteen years.
Question. What exactly is Meridian asked to finance, and who stands behind each cash flow?
Rhône Hydrogen Valley SAS (RHV) is an SPV created to build and operate a 200 MW electrolyser in the chemical corridor south of Lyon. All names are fictional. The sponsors are Ardèche Énergies, a utility (50%), Calyx Industrial Gases (30%) and Tessalia Infrastructure Partners, a fund (20%). The hydrogen is delivered by a 12 km pipeline to two neighbours: the Feyrand refinery, which uses hydrogen to desulphurise fuels and needs RFNBO volumes for its RED III transport obligation, and Azur Chimie, an ammonia and specialty chemicals producer. Both make their hydrogen today by steam methane reforming (SMR) of natural gas. In November 2026 the sponsors ask Meridian to act as mandated lead arranger, hedge provider and account bank, for a financial close in spring 2027 and operation from late 2029.
| Item | Case assumption |
|---|---|
| Electrolyser | 200 MW electrical input, 6,875 full-load hours a year |
| Specific consumption | 55 kWh per kg of hydrogen, life average including auxiliaries and degradation |
| Total project cost | EUR 640m: EPC and equipment 480, pipeline and grid connection 45, owner’s costs 30, contingency 45, financing costs and reserves 40 |
| Investment grant | EUR 100m, paid during construction |
| Electricity | 80% under fifteen-year renewable PPAs at EUR 57.5 per MWh; 20% bought on the market, EUR 70 per MWh in the lenders’ case |
| Operating costs excluding power | EUR 25.75m a year: service agreement 13.0, stack replacement reserve 6.0, water, grid fees, insurance and SPV costs 6.75 |
| Offtake | Fifteen-year take-or-pay: Feyrand 15,000 t, Azur Chimie 6,250 t a year |
| Public support | Fifteen-year two-way contract with a State agency on the contracted volumes (section 5.3) |
The plant produces 200 MW × 6,875 h = 1,375 GWh of electricity consumed, divided by 55 kWh per kg, that is 25,000 tonnes of hydrogen a year, at a load factor of 78.5%. Of these, 21,250 tonnes (85%) are sold under take-or-pay and 3,750 tonnes have no contract. For orientation, the 140 MW Austrian plant financed by the EIB in 2026 is announced at up to 23,000 tonnes a year for about EUR 600m, pipeline included; the case sits in the same range per megawatt.
The term sheet in brief. Senior facilities of EUR 385m, drawn over thirty months and repaid in twenty-six half-yearly instalments from completion. Margin of 300 bp on the commercial tranche, with a step-up of 25 bp every five years that the calculations below ignore. Interest-rate hedging for 90% of the debt over its full life. A debt service reserve account of six months, about EUR 20m, funded at completion. Security over the shares of RHV, its bank accounts, the plant, the pipeline, and the rights under every project contract, with direct agreements from the EPC contractor, the service provider, the two offtakers, the PPA sellers and the State agency. The EPC contract is a single fixed-price wrap by Orion Engineering covering the electrolyser stacks supplied by Voltaic H2, with delay damages and guaranteed consumption at the start of life. A long-term service agreement transfers stack replacement to the supplier against the annual reserve contribution. The sponsors provide a completion guarantee, contingent equity of EUR 30m, and parent guarantees from the offtakers’ groups for the take-or-pay payments.
Read that paragraph as a credit analyst does: each sentence removes one risk from the lenders and places it with a named party. What remains with the lenders after all of them is the subject of sections 5.3 to 5.5.
Two prices in the table deserve a warning. On 28 October 2026 the European gas benchmark briefly traded at EUR 100 per MWh, about three times its level before the Middle East conflict of 2026, and French baseload power for 2027 was quoted near EUR 122. The lenders’ case uses long-run assumptions agreed with the market adviser (gas at EUR 35, market power at EUR 70), and treats today’s prices as a scenario. A fifteen-year loan is not sized on a crisis, in either direction.
Question. How far is RHV’s hydrogen from the product it replaces?
IN ONE SENTENCE — The levelised cost of hydrogen is the constant price per kilogram that pays for the electricity, the operating costs and the capital, including its return, over the life of the plant.
FORMULA
is the specific consumption in MWh per kg (0.055); the average electricity price in EUR per MWh; the annual operating cost excluding power; the annual output in kg; the total investment; the grant; the capital recovery factor at a cost of capital over years.
Data. Average power price: 0.8 × 57.5 + 0.2 × 70 = EUR 60.0 per MWh. Cost of capital 7.5% over the fifteen contracted years, no residual value. For fossil hydrogen the market adviser uses a standard reference: 45 kWh of gas and 9.0 kg of CO2 per kg of hydrogen, plus EUR 0.50 of fixed costs.
Calculation. Electricity: 0.055 × 60 = EUR 3.30 per kg. Operations: 25.75 / 25 = EUR 1.03. Capital: (640 − 100) × 0.11329 = EUR 61.2m a year, or EUR 2.45 per kg. Fossil reference with gas at EUR 35 and carbon at EUR 85: 0.045 × 35 + 0.009 × 85 + 0.50 = 1.575 + 0.765 + 0.50 = EUR 2.84.
Result. LCOH is EUR 6.78 per kg against EUR 2.84: a gap of EUR 3.94. RHV avoids 8.5 kg of CO2 per kg (9.0 for SMR less 0.5 assumed for its own life-cycle emissions), so the abatement cost is (6.78 − 2.075) / 0.0085 = EUR 553 per tonne of CO2, six and a half times the allowance price.
INTERACTIVE LAB — Levelised cost of hydrogen against fossil hydrogen
Decompose the cost of electrolytic hydrogen into electricity, operations and capital, compare it with hydrogen from natural gas, and compute the implied carbon abatement cost.
| Parameter you can move | Range | Default |
|---|---|---|
| Electrolyser capacity | 20 to 500 MW | 200 MW |
| Full-load hours | 2000 to 8500 h per year | 6875 h per year |
| Specific consumption | 45 to 65 kWh per kg | 55 kWh per kg |
| Average electricity price | 0 to 150 EUR per MWh | 60 EUR per MWh |
| Operating costs excluding power | 5 to 60 EUR m | 25.75 EUR m |
| Total project cost | 100 to 1500 EUR m | 640 EUR m |
| Investment grant | 0 to 400 EUR m | 100 EUR m |
| Cost of capital | 3 to 12 % | 7.5 % |
| Natural gas price | 10 to 150 EUR per MWh | 35 EUR per MWh |
| Carbon price | 0 to 300 EUR per t | 85 EUR per t |
| Result at default settings | Value |
|---|---|
| Annual output | 25.00 kt |
| Electricity consumed | 1,375 GWh |
| Load factor | 78.5 % |
| Electricity cost | 3.30 EUR per kg |
| Operating cost | 1.03 EUR per kg |
| Capital cost | 2.45 EUR per kg |
| Levelised cost of hydrogen | 6.78 EUR per kg |
| Fossil hydrogen reference | 2.84 EUR per kg |
| Gap | 3.94 EUR per kg |
| Abatement cost | 553 EUR per tCO2 |
Try it. Set the electricity price to zero. The hydrogen still costs more than the fossil reference at long-run gas prices: capital and operations alone exceed it.
Reading. Three lessons. Electricity is half the cost, so an electrolyser is first a power-price position. Free electricity would not close the gap: at a zero power price the cost is still EUR 3.48. And the gas price moves the comparison far more than the carbon price does: with gas at EUR 90, the reference rises to EUR 5.32 and the gap falls to EUR 1.46, while EUR 100 more on the allowance adds only EUR 0.90.
PITFALL — Do not compare the cost of renewable hydrogen with the fossil reference at today’s crisis gas price and conclude that the gap has closed. The same crisis has pushed the power price up, and the electrolyser buys power. Only the contracted part of its electricity is protected.
Question. Who pays the EUR 3.94 gap, and what does the payment depend on?
Data. Two contracts apply to each contracted kilogram. Under the offtake contracts, Feyrand and Azur Chimie pay what fossil hydrogen would cost them, computed by the reference formula of section 5.2 with published gas and carbon indices, plus a premium of EUR 1.00 for the certified product. Under the support contract, a State agency pays the difference between a strike of EUR 6.30 per kg, set by RHV’s bid, and the same reference. The contract is two-way and the payment is capped at EUR 4.00 per kg. This design is a case assumption in the spirit of a carbon contract for difference; the terms of the actual French support contracts awarded in July 2026 are not reproduced here.
FORMULA
is the offtake price per kg; the fossil reference for a gas price in EUR per MWh and a carbon price in EUR per tonne; the premium (1.00); the support payment; the strike (6.30); the cap (4.00); the total received by RHV.
Calculation. With = 35 and = 85: = 2.84; offtake price 3.84; support 6.30 − 2.84 = 3.46; total EUR 7.30 per kg. On 21,250 tonnes, the State pays EUR 73.5m a year, EUR 1,103m over fifteen years if prices never moved. Support is 47.4% of the price received.
Result. As long as the cap does not bind, = EUR 7.30 whatever the gas and carbon prices. With gas at EUR 90, the offtakers pay 6.32 and the State 0.99. The support falls to zero when gas reaches EUR 111.9 at the current carbon price, or when carbon reaches EUR 469 at the long-run gas price; above those levels RHV pays the State. The cap binds when gas falls below EUR 23.0: with gas at EUR 15 the reference is 1.94 and RHV receives 6.94.
INTERACTIVE LAB — Who pays for each kilogram: offtaker and State under a two-way support contract
Split the price received per contracted kilogram between the offtaker and the State as gas and carbon prices move, and compute the annual cost of the support.
| Parameter you can move | Range | Default |
|---|---|---|
| Natural gas price | 5 to 150 EUR per MWh | 35 EUR per MWh |
| Carbon price | 0 to 500 EUR per t | 85 EUR per t |
| Strike of the support contract | 3 to 9 EUR per kg | 6.3 EUR per kg |
| Offtake premium over fossil reference | 0 to 3 EUR per kg | 1 EUR per kg |
| Cap on the support payment | 1 to 6 EUR per kg | 4 EUR per kg |
| Contracted volume | 5 to 25 kt per year | 21.25 kt per year |
| Result at default settings | Value |
|---|---|
| Fossil reference | 2.84 EUR per kg |
| Paid by the offtaker | 3.84 EUR per kg |
| Paid by the State (negative: paid to the State) | 3.46 EUR per kg |
| Total received | 7.30 EUR per kg |
| Support as a share of the total | 47.4 % |
| Annual support | 73.5 EUR m |
| Support over 15 years at constant prices | 1,103 EUR m |
| Gas price at which support is zero | 111.9 EUR per MWh |
| Carbon price at which support is zero | 469 EUR per t |
| Gas price below which the cap binds | 23.0 EUR per MWh |
| 15-year support per MW of a 200 MW plant | 5.51 EUR m |
Try it. Raise the carbon price to EUR 200: the State pays EUR 1.04 less per kilogram, the offtaker EUR 1.04 more, and the project receives exactly the same total.
Reading. The contract moves gas and carbon risk to the State, which is the thermostat of section 3.1. The annual cost to the public budget is of the same order as the real French award of July 2026 (EUR 778m over fifteen years for 161.4 MW of supported capacity, that is about EUR 4.8m per supported megawatt, against EUR 5.5m per megawatt here at long-run prices). Three risks stay with RHV: the cap, if gas becomes very cheap; the counterparties, because half of the price comes from two industrial sites and half from one State agency; and everything that is not a price.
WHY IT MATTERS ON THE DESK — At credit committee the structurer will be asked one question on this page: “what is the revenue if the carbon price halves?” The answer, “the same, as long as gas stays above EUR 31.5; at today’s carbon price the cap binds only below EUR 23”, is what turns a hydrogen project from a commodity bet into a contracted asset. The follow-up, “and if the refinery closes?”, is section 5.5.
Question. How much senior debt can RHV carry?
Data. The lenders’ case counts the uncontracted 3,750 tonnes at EUR 3.50 per kg, close to the long-run fossil reference plus a small premium. Tax is negligible in the first years because of depreciation and interest, and is ignored here. Senior debt is repaid over thirteen years from completion, two years inside the contracts. Lenders ask for a DSCR of 1.45x, above the 1.30x to 1.35x of a contracted wind farm, to reflect the technology. The all-in fixed rate after hedging is 5.00% (section 5.6).
Calculation.
| Line | Computation | EUR m |
|---|---|---|
| Contracted revenue | 21,250 t × 7.30 | 155.125 |
| Uncontracted revenue | 3,750 t × 3.50 | 13.125 |
| Electricity | 1,375 GWh × 60.0 | −82.500 |
| Operating costs | case data | −25.750 |
| CFADS | 60.000 |
Maximum debt service: 60.0 / 1.45 = EUR 41.38m. Annuity factor at 5.00% over thirteen years: 9.3936. Debt capacity: 41.38 × 9.3936 = EUR 388.7m.
Result. The facility is set at EUR 385m. Its annual debt service is EUR 40.99m, the DSCR 1.46x, the loan life cover ratio (LLCR, present value of CFADS over the life of the loan divided by debt) also 1.46x because cash flows are flat, and the project life cover ratio, which adds the two-year tail, 1.62x. The average life of the debt is 7.7 years from completion. Sources and uses balance as follows: grant 100, senior debt 385, equity and shareholder loans 155, total 640. Debt is 71.3% of debt plus equity.
INTERACTIVE LAB — From revenue to debt: sizing the Rhône Hydrogen Valley facility
Build the cash flow available for debt service of the electrolyser, size the debt at the target DSCR and read the cover ratios of the facility actually signed.
| Parameter you can move | Range | Default |
|---|---|---|
| Hydrogen produced | 10 to 26 kt per year | 25 kt per year |
| Contracted volume | 0 to 25 kt per year | 21.25 kt per year |
| Total price on contracted volume | 4 to 10 EUR per kg | 7.3 EUR per kg |
| Price of uncontracted volume | 0 to 8 EUR per kg | 3.5 EUR per kg |
| Average electricity price | 20 to 130 EUR per MWh | 60 EUR per MWh |
| Operating costs excluding power | 10 to 50 EUR m | 25.75 EUR m |
| Target DSCR | 1.2 to 2.2 x | 1.45 x |
| All-in fixed rate | 3 to 8 % | 5 % |
| Repayment period | 8 to 15 years | 13 years |
| Facility signed | 100 to 500 EUR m | 385 EUR m |
| Equity and shareholder loans | 50 to 400 EUR m | 155 EUR m |
| Result at default settings | Value |
|---|---|
| Revenue | 168.250 EUR m |
| Electricity cost | 82.500 EUR m |
| CFADS | 60.00 EUR m |
| Margin over electricity, contracted kg | 4.00 EUR per kg |
| Margin over electricity, uncontracted kg | 0.20 EUR per kg |
| Maximum debt service | 41.38 EUR m |
| Debt capacity | 388.7 EUR m |
| Debt service of the facility | 40.99 EUR m |
| DSCR of the facility | 1.46 x |
| Project life cover ratio (two-year tail) | 1.62 x |
| Average life from completion | 7.7 years |
| Debt / (debt + equity) | 71.3 % |
Try it. Set the price of uncontracted volume to zero while still producing it: the DSCR drops to 1.14x. Then cut production to the contracted 21.25 kt and watch most of the damage disappear.
Reading. Each contracted kilogram leaves EUR 4.00 after electricity; each uncontracted kilogram leaves EUR 0.20. The uncontracted 15% of the output brings EUR 0.75m of margin out of 60. It is not worth lending against, but it is worth understanding: if those kilograms had to be produced and given away, the DSCR would be 1.14x; since the operator can simply not produce them, the true floor is the contracted case. A first-of-a-kind structure is read this way, line by line, looking for what is obligation and what is option.
Question. What breaks the debt?
Data. Covenants: distributions are locked up below a DSCR of 1.15x; default below 1.05x. The cases below change one assumption at a time; electricity is paid as consumed at the blended price (the mismatch between a fixed PPA volume and a lower consumption is discussed after the table).
| Case | Change | CFADS (EUR m) | DSCR |
|---|---|---|---|
| Base | none | 60.00 | 1.46x |
| A. Low availability | output 20,000 t | 54.25 | 1.32x |
| B. Power crisis | market power at EUR 122.5 | 45.56 | 1.11x |
| C. Certification | 4,500 t lose the EUR 1.00 premium | 55.50 | 1.35x |
| D. Offtaker lost, no outlet | Azur Chimie’s 6,250 t not produced | 35.00 | 0.85x |
Calculation, case D. Contracted sales fall to 15,000 t and production to 18,750 t. Revenue: 15,000 × 7.30 + 3,750 × 3.50 = EUR 122.6m. Electricity: 18,750 t × 55 kWh × 60 = EUR 61.9m. CFADS: 122.6 − 61.9 − 25.75 = EUR 35.0m, for a debt service of EUR 41.0m.
Break-evens. With every kilogram sold under contract, debt service is just covered at 16,680 tonnes a year, 66.7% of nameplate output. At full output, the market power price that brings the DSCR to the lock-up level is EUR 116.8 per MWh, and to 1.00x, EUR 139.1.
INTERACTIVE LAB — Stress-testing the electrolyser: volume, power price, certification, offtaker
Recompute CFADS and DSCR when production, the market power price, the certified share or an offtaker’s take changes, and locate the break-even points against the lock-up and default covenants.
| Parameter you can move | Range | Default |
|---|---|---|
| Hydrogen the plant can produce | 8 to 26 kt per year | 25 kt per year |
| Contracted volume actually taken | 0 to 100 % | 100 % |
| Market power price (20% of supply) | 20 to 250 EUR per MWh | 70 EUR per MWh |
| PPA price (80% of supply) | 30 to 90 EUR per MWh | 57.5 EUR per MWh |
| Contracted volume losing the EUR 1.00 premium | 0 to 21 kt | 0 kt |
| Price of uncontracted volume | 0 to 8 EUR per kg | 3.5 EUR per kg |
| Annual debt service | 20 to 60 EUR m | 40.985 EUR m |
| Result at default settings | Value |
|---|---|
| Hydrogen produced and sold | 25.00 kt |
| Average electricity price | 60.00 EUR per MWh |
| Revenue | 168.25 EUR m |
| Electricity cost | 82.50 EUR m |
| CFADS | 60.00 EUR m |
| DSCR | 1.46 x |
| Break-even contracted volume (DSCR 1.00x) | 16.68 kt |
| Break-even as a share of nameplate output | 66.7 % |
| Market power price at lock-up (1.15x) | 116.8 EUR per MWh |
| Market power price at DSCR 1.00x | 139.1 EUR per MWh |
Try it. Combine cases A and B (20 kt and a market power price of EUR 122.5): does the project still pay its debt service, and may it still pay dividends?
Reading.
Case A. Losing a fifth of the output costs under a tenth of CFADS, because the first tonnes lost are the uncontracted ones and electricity is saved. This is true only if the PPAs are pay-as-consumed. If RHV must take or pay for 1,100 GWh at EUR 57.5 and resell the surplus on the market, a low-output year combined with low market prices creates a loss the table does not show. The technical adviser’s availability assumption and the PPA volume clause must be read together.
Case B. The power crisis is today’s forward market, not a tail event. With only 20% of supply exposed, it consumes a quarter of CFADS and trips the lock-up. Lenders will ask for a higher contracted share or for a right to curtail production in expensive hours, which the hourly matching rule may impose anyway from 2030.
Case C. If hourly matching cuts the certified share and Feyrand stops paying the premium on 4,500 tonnes, the DSCR falls by a tenth of a turn. Certification risk is real but second-order, unless the support contract itself requires RFNBO status, in which case it becomes case D.
Case D. This is the scenario that defaults, and it is not a price scenario. Hydrogen has no liquid market and no network: RHV’s pipeline ends at two fences. If Azur Chimie closes its ammonia unit, the take-or-pay claim is worth what an unsecured claim on a closed plant is worth, and no support is paid on kilograms not produced. The real credit question is therefore the competitiveness of the two host sites over fifteen years, in a period when European refining and fertiliser capacity is itself under transition pressure. The mitigants are those of a corporate credit: parent guarantees for the take-or-pay payments, termination payments sized on outstanding debt, and a merchant outlet (truck loading, a future pipeline link) valued at zero in the base case.
PITFALL — “Fully contracted, State-backed” describes price. Check the volume: an offtaker who is the only physical outlet is a single point of failure whatever the subsidy says. Rate the host sites as carefully as the project.
Question. What does public money change for the lenders and for the cost of the hydrogen?
Data. The EUR 385m of senior debt is split between an EIB tranche of EUR 154m (40%) at a margin of 175 bp and a commercial tranche of EUR 231m at 300 bp, pari passu, same tenor (case assumptions). Meridian underwrites EUR 80m of the commercial tranche and targets a final hold of EUR 60m. The swap rate is 2.50%.
Calculation. Blended margin: 0.4 × 175 + 0.6 × 300 = 250 bp; all-in rate 5.00%, the rate used in section 5.4. Without the EIB, the rate would be 5.50%, the annuity factor 9.1171 and the debt capacity at 1.45x EUR 377.3m. The grant, annualised at the 7.5% cost of capital, is worth 100 × 0.11329 = EUR 11.3m a year, or EUR 0.45 per kg.
INTERACTIVE LAB — What the EIB tranche and the grant are worth
Compute the blended margin of a debt package with an EIB tranche, the debt capacity with and without it, and the value of an investment grant per kilogram of hydrogen.
| Parameter you can move | Range | Default |
|---|---|---|
| Senior debt | 100 to 600 EUR m | 385 EUR m |
| EIB share of senior debt | 0 to 60 % | 40 % |
| Commercial margin | 100 to 450 bp | 300 bp |
| EIB margin | 50 to 300 bp | 175 bp |
| Swap rate | 0 to 5 % | 2.5 % |
| CFADS | 20 to 120 EUR m | 60 EUR m |
| Target DSCR | 1.2 to 2 x | 1.45 x |
| Investment grant | 0 to 300 EUR m | 100 EUR m |
| Total project cost | 300 to 1200 EUR m | 640 EUR m |
| Result at default settings | Value |
|---|---|
| Blended margin | 250 bp |
| All-in rate | 5.00 % |
| Debt capacity with the EIB tranche | 388.7 EUR m |
| Debt capacity without it | 377.3 EUR m |
| First-year interest saving | 1.925 EUR m |
| Commercial tranche to place | 231 EUR m |
| Grant per kg of hydrogen (25 kt, 7.5%, 15 years) | 0.45 EUR |
| Grant plus EIB as a share of sources | 39.7 % |
Try it. Set the grant to zero: the EUR 0.45 per kg it was worth must come from a higher strike, which is the same public money paid over fifteen years instead of upfront.
Result and reading. The EIB’s lower margin adds EUR 11.4m of debt capacity and saves EUR 1.9m of interest in the first year: useful, not decisive. Its real contribution is the EUR 154m it takes. A commercial tranche of EUR 231m can be placed with five or six banks at EUR 40m to 60m each; EUR 385m of first-of-a-kind hydrogen risk would need ten, and in 2026 there may not be ten. Grant and EIB together provide 39.7% of the sources, and the State agency provides 47% of the revenue. The honest description of RHV is a public-private partnership in which commercial banks take construction, operating and host-site risk on about a third of the capital.
That description is in line with the market. The Stegra hydrogen-based steel plant in Sweden, which had announced EUR 6.5bn of funding in 2024, needed a EUR 1.4bn rescue round in spring 2026 to finish construction. First-of-a-kind projects overrun, which is why lenders insisted on the completion guarantee and the contingent equity of section 5.1 on top of the EUR 45m contingency.
Question. Which sustainable classification can Meridian give the loan, and on what evidence?
Data. RHV’s life-cycle emissions are assumed at 0.5 kg of CO2e per kg of hydrogen (PPA power for 80%, French grid for 20%), to be confirmed by the certification body.
Assessment. Taxonomy: 0.5 tCO2e per tonne is below the 3.0 threshold for hydrogen manufacture; the ESG risk team must still document the “do no significant harm” criteria (water use and the abstraction permit on the Rhône, pollution, a climate risk assessment covering low river flows and heat) and the minimum safeguards of the sponsors. Certification: the PPA-backed share is RFNBO under the rules in force, with monthly matching until 2029; the grid-backed share qualifies as low-carbon. Label: the facility is a green loan under the Green Loan Principles, with the four components covered by the project structure itself, since proceeds can only be spent on the plant and the agent tracks every drawdown. Equator Principles: Category B (limited and site-specific impacts on an existing industrial platform), in a designated country, so the reference is French permitting law, including the regime for classified installations given the storage of hydrogen on site.
Reading. The green classification is the easy part of this file, and it changes nothing in sections 5.2 to 5.6. Its fragile point is the same as the credit’s: from 2030 the RFNBO share depends on hourly matching, so the green loan report, the offtaker’s premium and the support contract all rely on one annual certificate. The classification that would have required judgement is the alternative investment the refinery might have made, a capture unit on its existing SMR. That would be a transition loan, with the lock-in questions of section 3.3.
Question. Does a EUR 60m hold at 300 bp meet Meridian’s 12% hurdle?
Data. Credit risk rates RHV in the BB grade once operating (one-year PD 1.00%). Meridian applies F-IRB with the 40% regulatory LGD of senior unsecured corporate exposures, because pledges over SPV shares, accounts and a single-purpose plant are not eligible collateral in the foundation approach (case assumption on Meridian’s permission). Funds transfer price: the loan has an average life of about ten years from signing (two and a half years of construction plus 7.7), hence a liquidity premium of 60 bp. Upfront fees: 2.25% on the EUR 80m underwritten, EUR 1.8m, recognised over eight years, EUR 0.225m a year. Ancillary revenue (share of the swap credit margin, account bank fees): EUR 0.20m a year, carrying EUR 2.5 of RWA per euro.
Calculation, capital. The F-IRB risk weight for PD 1.00%, LGD 40% and M 2.5 is 82.06%: RWA EUR 49.2m on the loan and capital of EUR 6.40m. For comparison, the supervisory slotting approach would give 90% in the “good” category (EUR 54.0m), and the standardised approach 100% for an operational project (EUR 60.0m) and 130% before completion (EUR 78.0m).
INTERACTIVE LAB — Capital for a project finance exposure: F-IRB, slotting and standardised approach
Compare the RWA of a specialised lending exposure under the three CRR3 routes, and see the effect of the infrastructure supporting factor and of a sovereign guarantee on part of the hold.
| Parameter you can move | Range | Default |
|---|---|---|
| Drawn exposure | 10 to 200 EUR m | 60 EUR m |
| One-year PD (F-IRB) | 0.05 to 5 % | 1 % |
| LGD (F-IRB) | 20 to 45 % | 40 % |
| Maturity M in the IRB formula | 1 to 5 years | 2.5 years |
| Slotting category (remaining maturity above 2.5 years) | Strong / Good / Satisfactory / Weak | Good |
| Standardised approach: project phase | Pre-operational / Operational / High-quality operational | Operational |
| Infrastructure supporting factor | 1 / 0.75 | 1 |
| Share guaranteed by a 0%-weighted sovereign | 0 to 80 % | 0 % |
| Result at default settings | Value |
|---|---|
| F-IRB risk weight | 82.06 % |
| RWA under F-IRB | 49.24 EUR m |
| RWA under slotting | 54.00 EUR m |
| RWA under the standardised approach | 60.00 EUR m |
| 72.5% of standardised RWA (output floor, fully phased) | 43.50 EUR m |
| Allocated capital under F-IRB (13%) | 6.40 EUR m |
Try it. Move the slotting category from Good to Satisfactory, where a first-of-a-kind project may well land: the slotting RWA exceeds the F-IRB figure by 40%.
Calculation, RAROC.
| Line | Computation | EUR m |
|---|---|---|
| Net margin over FTP | 60 × (300 − 60) bp | 1.440 |
| Upfront fees, per year | 1.8 / 8 | 0.225 |
| Ancillary revenue | case data | 0.200 |
| Revenues | 1.865 | |
| Operating costs | 40% × 1.665 + 60% × 0.200 | −0.786 |
| Expected loss | 1.00% × 40% × 60 | −0.240 |
| Pre-tax result | 0.839 | |
| After tax at 25% | 0.629 | |
| RWA | 49.24 + 2.5 × 0.20 | 49.74 |
| Allocated capital | 13% × 49.74 | 6.466 |
| RAROC | 0.629 / 6.466 | 9.7% |
INTERACTIVE LAB — RAROC of Meridian’s hold in Rhône Hydrogen Valley
Work out the RAROC of the hold line by line and find the margin, or the capital treatment, that brings it to the 12% hurdle.
| Parameter you can move | Range | Default |
|---|---|---|
| Final hold, drawn | 20 to 120 EUR m | 60 EUR m |
| Margin over EURIBOR | 150 to 450 bp | 300 bp |
| FTP liquidity premium | 0 to 120 bp | 60 bp |
| Upfront fees recognised per year | 0 to 1 EUR m | 0.225 EUR m |
| Ancillary revenue per year | 0 to 1 EUR m | 0.2 EUR m |
| One-year PD | 0.1 to 5 % | 1 % |
| LGD | 20 to 45 % | 40 % |
| Infrastructure supporting factor | 1 / 0.75 | 1 |
| Result at default settings | Value |
|---|---|
| Net margin over FTP | 1.440 EUR m |
| Revenues | 1.865 EUR m |
| Operating costs | 0.786 EUR m |
| Expected loss | 0.240 EUR m |
| RWA including ancillary business | 49.74 EUR m |
| Allocated capital | 6.466 EUR m |
| RAROC after tax | 9.7 % |
| Margin needed for a 12% RAROC | 354 bp |
Try it. Set the PD to 2%, the level a credit analyst might assign during construction, and read the margin the hurdle would then require.
Result. RAROC is 9.7%, below the 12% hurdle. The margin that would reach the hurdle is 354 bp.
Reading. At the price the market offers, a first-of-a-kind hydrogen loan does not pay for its capital on a hold basis. The credit paper lists three ways to close the gap, each with a named owner. The capital management team examines whether the infrastructure supporting factor of Article 501a CRR applies; if it did, RWA would be multiplied by 0.75 and RAROC would be 12.9%. Its answer for now is no (section 6.1). Syndication proposes to hold less: the upfront fee on EUR 80m is earned whatever the hold. And the coverage banker shows the wider relationship with Ardèche Énergies (see B01). The committee approves the deal at 300 bp with a hold of EUR 60m and a recorded exception to the hurdle, justified by the franchise and reviewed at completion. That is how many transition loans are approved in practice; the student should know it and should be able to say what the exception costs: (12% − 9.7%) × EUR 6.47m of capital, about EUR 0.15m of after-tax return a year.
Question. What does the portfolio manager do when reality departs from the base case?
Data (scenario). In 2030, the first full year under hourly matching, the plant produced 23,500 tonnes. Market power averaged EUR 95 per MWh. The certification audit found that 3,000 tonnes delivered to the refinery could not be certified RFNBO, and Feyrand withheld the premium on them.
Calculation. Blended power price: 0.8 × 57.5 + 0.2 × 95 = EUR 65.0. Revenue: 21,250 × 7.30 − 3,000 × 1.00 + 2,250 × 3.50 = EUR 160.0m. Electricity: 23,500 × 55 × 65.0 = EUR 84.0m. CFADS: 160.0 − 84.0 − 25.75 = EUR 50.2m. DSCR: 1.23x.
Reading. The ratio is above the 1.15x lock-up, so dividends may be paid, but the cushion has gone from 46% to 23% in the first year in which three ordinary things happened together. The portfolio manager writes four points in the annual review. First, at EUR 65 of blended power the uncontracted kilograms lose money (3.50 − 0.055 × 65 = −EUR 0.08 per kg): the operator should stop producing them. Second, the technical adviser must explain the 6% output shortfall: outage, or faster degradation? The stack replacement reserve answers only the second. Third, the certification gap must be closed by adding PPAs with a production profile that fits the hours of operation, or by storing hydrogen; either has a cost that belongs in the next budget. Fourth, the internal rating is confirmed with a negative outlook, which raises the expected loss used in the IFRS 9 staging discussion (section 6.4). None of this is a waiver request. It is the ordinary monitoring of a loan whose margin of safety was thinner than the headline DSCR suggested.
| Key figure | Value | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Output; electricity consumed; load factor | 25,000 t; 1,375 GWh; 78.5% | 5.1, b07-lcoh |
| LCOH; fossil reference; gap | EUR 6.78; 2.84; 3.94 per kg | 5.2 |
| Abatement cost | EUR 553 per tCO2 | 5.2 |
| Price received on contracted volume | EUR 7.30 per kg (offtaker 3.84, State 3.46) | 5.3 |
| Annual support at long-run prices | EUR 73.5m; 47.4% of the price | 5.3 |
| Support falls to zero at | gas EUR 111.9 or carbon EUR 469 | 5.3 |
| CFADS | EUR 60.0m | 5.4 |
| Debt capacity at 1.45x; facility | EUR 388.7m; EUR 385m | 5.4 |
| DSCR; PLCR; average life | 1.46x; 1.62x; 7.7 years | 5.4 |
| Gearing; sources | 71.3%; grant 100, debt 385, equity 155 | 5.4 |
| DSCR in cases A, B, C, D | 1.32x; 1.11x; 1.35x; 0.85x | 5.5 |
| Break-even volume; power price at 1.00x | 16,680 t (66.7%); EUR 139.1 | 5.5 |
| Blended margin; capacity without EIB | 250 bp; EUR 377.3m | 5.6 |
| Grant per kg; public share of sources | EUR 0.45; 39.7% | 5.6 |
| Meridian: underwriting; hold | EUR 80m; EUR 60m | 5.6 |
| RWA: F-IRB; slotting (good); standardised | EUR 49.2m; 54.0m; 60.0m | 5.8 |
| Revenues; costs; expected loss | EUR 1.865m; 0.786m; 0.240m | 5.8 |
| Capital; RAROC; margin for 12% | EUR 6.47m; 9.7%; 354 bp | 5.8 |
| RAROC with the 0.75 supporting factor | 12.9% | 5.8 |
| 2031 review: CFADS; DSCR | EUR 50.2m; 1.23x | 5.9 |
A loan to RHV is a specialised lending exposure of the project finance type: the borrower is an entity created to own the asset, lenders control the cash flows, and repayment depends on the asset. CRR3 (Regulation (EU) 2024/1623, applicable since 1 January 2025) offers three routes.
| Route | Rule | RHV, operating |
|---|---|---|
| Standardised | Unrated project finance: 130% before operation, 100% in operation, 80% if “high quality” | 100% |
| Slotting | Supervisory categories for banks that cannot estimate PD: 70%, 90%, 115%, 250% above 2.5 years | 90% if “good” |
| F-IRB | Corporate formula with the bank’s own PD and regulatory LGD | 82.06% |
Meridian uses F-IRB. The figures of section 5.8 apply to the operating phase. During construction the picture is heavier: the undrawn commitment carries a 40% credit conversion factor, and the internal rating is typically one or two notches lower until completion. For banks constrained by the output floor (55% of standardised RWA in 2026, 72.5% when fully phased in), the 130% pre-operational weight is the one that binds.
The infrastructure supporting factor (Article 501a CRR) multiplies RWA by 0.75 for exposures to entities that operate or finance structures providing essential public services, under a list of conditions: predictable cash flows that cover all repayments; revenues that are availability-based, regulated or contracted with a public or adequately rated counterparty; contractual protection of lenders; seniority and security; an experienced sponsor during construction; and an assessment of the project’s contribution to environmental objectives. Meridian’s capital management team does not apply it to RHV at signing: the two offtakers are unrated private companies, part of the output is uncontracted, and whether hydrogen delivered to a refinery is an essential public service is arguable. The team will re-test at completion. A regulated interconnector would pass without discussion. Note that the factor is an infrastructure measure, not a green one: CRR3 contains no green supporting factor (see E02).
A public guarantee works by substitution: on the guaranteed share, the risk weight of the guarantor replaces that of the project. A 50% guarantee from a 0%-weighted sovereign would halve RWA to EUR 24.6m (block b07-rwa), at the cost of the guarantee fee.
The table of section 5.8 is the one that appears in the credit application. The green character of the asset changes none of its lines directly. It does not lower the PD, the LGD or the risk weight. It does not lower the FTP unless treasury grants a rebate for assets eligible to back its green bonds, which Meridian does not (see E04 and C15). What the transition nature of the asset changes is indirect and goes both ways: a higher margin than a mature asset, a higher PD, an upfront fee swollen by complexity, the presence of a cheaper public co-lender that caps what commercial banks can charge, and a policy-driven willingness of the bank to accept 9.7% where 12% is the rule. Stated plainly: the bank subsidises the transaction by EUR 0.15m a year relative to its own hurdle, in the name of its strategy.
Treasury charges the desk the cost of funding a loan to its expected life, not to the three-month reset of its interest. With an average life of about ten years, RHV costs 60 bp of liquidity premium, twice that of a five-year corporate loan, and that is a fifth of the margin. During the thirty months of construction, the undrawn part of the commitment is a committed facility to a non-financial borrower: it creates an outflow assumption in the liquidity coverage ratio, and the buffer held against it has a carry cost of 40 bp that the commitment fee must cover. Long project loans also weigh on the net stable funding ratio, which is why treasury welcomes assets it can refinance: an EIB global loan, a covered or green bond, or a sale to institutional investors once the plant operates (see B16).
Under IFRS 9 the loan is held to collect and measured at amortised cost, provided its cash flows are solely payments of principal and interest. For a non-recourse loan this is a real test: the bank must look through to the asset and show that it is exposed to credit risk and not to the performance of the project as an equity holder would be. Adequate equity beneath the debt (EUR 155m here) and a margin that is not indexed to output support the conclusion. Upfront fees that are part of the yield are spread through the effective interest rate, which is why section 5.8 counts EUR 0.225m a year and not EUR 1.8m at closing; the part of the arranging fee that rewards the syndication service is recognised when the sell-down is complete.
Expected credit losses are booked in stage 1 (twelve-month losses) at origination. The events of section 5.9 are the kind that trigger the question of a significant increase in credit risk and a move to stage 2, with lifetime losses on a ten-year exposure. Transition-specific scenarios (delay of support payments, change in certification rules) belong in the forward-looking information of the model (see E01 and E05). The swap sits in the trading book of the rates desk, with a credit valuation adjustment on a long-dated uncollateralised exposure to an SPV (see E09).
Financed and avoided emissions. For project finance, the PCAF standard (edition of December 2025) attributes the project’s emissions in proportion to the lender’s share of total equity and debt. Avoided emissions may be reported, separately and never netted.
Energy supply financing ratio. Assume that in 2026 Meridian has financed EUR 4.2bn of low-carbon energy supply and EUR 3.5bn of fossil supply (case assumptions).
CASE — Meridian’s EUR 60m is 11.1% of RHV’s EUR 540m of debt and equity. With project emissions of 12,500 tCO2e a year (0.5 kg per kg), Meridian reports 1,389 tCO2e of financed emissions and may disclose 23,611 tCO2e of avoided emissions. The EUR 80m underwritten moves the energy supply ratio from 1.20 to 1.22. To reach 4 to 1 with the same low-carbon volume, fossil financing would have to fall from EUR 3.5bn to EUR 1.07bn.
INTERACTIVE LAB — What one deal does to the bank’s climate metrics
Attribute project emissions and avoided emissions to the lender under PCAF, and measure the effect of the deal on the low-carbon to fossil energy supply financing ratio.
| Parameter you can move | Range | Default |
|---|---|---|
| Outstanding amount of the lender | 10 to 200 EUR m | 60 EUR m |
| Project debt plus equity | 200 to 1500 EUR m | 540 EUR m |
| Hydrogen produced | 5 to 50 kt per year | 25 kt per year |
| Project emissions | 0 to 4 kgCO2e per kg | 0.5 kgCO2e per kg |
| Fossil reference emissions | 6 to 12 kgCO2e per kg | 9 kgCO2e per kg |
| Low-carbon energy supply financing | 0.5 to 20 EUR bn | 4.2 EUR bn |
| Fossil energy supply financing | 0.5 to 20 EUR bn | 3.5 EUR bn |
| Amount of the deal counted | 0 to 500 EUR m | 80 EUR m |
| Result at default settings | Value |
|---|---|
| Attribution factor | 11.1 % |
| Financed emissions | 1,389 tCO2e per year |
| Avoided emissions attributed (reported separately) | 23,611 tCO2e per year |
| Energy supply ratio before the deal | 1.20 x |
| Energy supply ratio after the deal | 1.22 x |
| Fossil financing compatible with 4 to 1 | 1.07 EUR bn |
Try it. Count a EUR 500m low-carbon deal: the ratio reaches 1.34. Now cut fossil financing by the same EUR 500m instead and compare.
The lesson is one of proportion: the ratio is moved by the denominator. No realistic pipeline of hydrogen loans changes it as much as the bank’s policy on oil and gas does.
Taxonomy ratios and Pillar 3. RHV is Taxonomy-aligned, yet it may not appear in Meridian’s Green Asset Ratio. Under Delegated Regulation (EU) 2026/73, published in the Official Journal on 8 January 2026, exposures to undertakings outside the scope of the CSRD leave both numerator and denominator, and an SPV of this size is generally outside it (unless it finances a group in scope). The EBA’s final draft standards of 22 June 2026, not yet adopted by the Commission, stop the Taxonomy templates in Pillar 3 for large institutions, to avoid duplicating the CSRD report, with a first reference date of 31 December 2026 for the remaining ESG templates. The loan will still appear there, in the transition-risk template by sector (manufacture of industrial gases) and in financed emissions (see E06 and E07). On 29 October 2026 the EBA advised the Commission to drop the trading-book and fees KPIs and simplify the GAR templates; the Commission had not acted on it in November 2026.
| Risk | Control | Owner |
|---|---|---|
| Construction overrun, delay | Wrapped EPC, contingency, completion guarantee, cost-to-complete test | Structurer, technical adviser |
| Faster degradation, low availability | Service agreement, stack reserve, conservative curve in base case | Technical adviser, portfolio manager |
| Loss of an offtaker or host site | Parent guarantee, termination payment, credit review of host sites | Credit risk |
| Power price and PPA mismatch | Contracted share, curtailment right, volume clause review | Structurer, market adviser |
| Support contract: cap, termination, change in law | Legal due diligence, direct agreement with the agency | Legal counsel |
| Certification failure from 2030 | Covenant on certified share, annual audit, event of default if support is lost | ESG risk, portfolio manager |
| Lock-in on transition assets | Tenor inside contracted period, cash sweep, retrofit and phase-out undertakings | Credit committee |
| Overstated climate claims | Avoided emissions disclosed separately with method; label only if criteria documented | ESG risk, compliance (E10) |
| Hurdle exceptions accumulating | Register of exceptions, review at completion | Head of desk, finance |
Red flags.
Open debates. Whether support should be reserved for renewable hydrogen or opened to low-carbon hydrogen, which the third European auction began to do. Whether hourly matching protects the climate or merely raises cost. Whether a carbon contract for difference that pays less when gas is expensive leaves the State with a hidden gas position. Whether transition labels will finance real phase-outs or relabel ordinary lending to high emitters. And whether banks should lend below their hurdle to first-of-a-kind assets, or leave them to public banks until the second generation.
INTERACTIVE LAB — Check your understanding
Twelve questions on revenue models, support mechanisms, sizing, lock-in and the bank’s economics.
Q1. Debt capacity of a project with flat CFADS equals:
Answer: B. Lenders cap debt service at CFADS divided by the DSCR and capitalise it at the loan rate over the tenor.
Q2. Under a two-way carbon contract for difference, when the carbon price rises:
Answer: A. The reference price rises with carbon, so the gap to the strike shrinks; the offtaker pays more and the total stays at the strike.
Q3. In the case, the largest single cost of producing hydrogen is:
Answer: D. Electricity is EUR 3.30 of EUR 6.78 per kg.
Q4. The abatement cost of EUR 553 per tonne in the case means that:
Answer: C. Abatement cost is the extra cost per tonne avoided; it is the break-even carbon price.
Q5. Which scenario brings the case DSCR below 1.00x?
Answer: B. Volume without outlet is not covered by the support contract; CFADS falls to EUR 35m against EUR 41m of debt service.
Q6. From 1 January 2030, under the rules in force in November 2026, RFNBO hydrogen requires:
Answer: D. Delegated Regulation 2023/1184 moves from monthly to hourly correlation in 2030; a review is expected but not adopted.
Q7. For a new gas plant, the variable that most often breaks the loan in a lock-in test is:
Answer: A. Part of the carbon cost is recovered in the power price; displacement by renewables is not.
Q8. The EIB tranche in the case mainly helps commercial lenders by:
Answer: C. The EIB lends pari passu; its EUR 154m shrinks the commercial tranche to EUR 231m and the blended margin to 250 bp.
Q9. Under the CRR3 standardised approach, an unrated project finance exposure in the construction phase is weighted:
Answer: C. 130% pre-operational, 100% operational, 80% high-quality operational.
Q10. The infrastructure supporting factor of Article 501a CRR:
Answer: A. It is an infrastructure measure with conditions, not a green supporting factor.
Q11. Meridian’s RAROC on the case hold is 9.7%. The credit committee can properly:
Answer: D. The hurdle does not change with the label; exceptions must be explicit and owned.
Q12. Under PCAF, a lender’s share of a project’s emissions is its outstanding amount divided by:
Answer: B. Attribution for project finance uses total equity plus debt of the project.
A 100 MW electrolyser runs 5,000 hours a year at 52 kWh per kg. Power costs EUR 50 per MWh, operating costs are EUR 9m a year, the investment is EUR 260m with a EUR 40m grant, and the capital recovery factor is 13.147% (10% over 15 years). Gas is at EUR 40 and carbon at EUR 90. Compute the LCOH, the gap and the abatement cost (8.5 kg avoided per kg).
Solution. Output: 500 GWh / 52 kWh per kg = 9,615 t. Electricity: 0.052 × 50 = EUR 2.60. Operations: 9 / 9.615 = EUR 0.94. Capital: 220 × 0.13147 = EUR 28.92m, or EUR 3.01 per kg. LCOH: EUR 6.54. Fossil reference: 0.045 × 40 + 0.009 × 90 + 0.50 = EUR 3.11; gap EUR 3.43. Reference before carbon: 2.30; abatement cost (6.54 − 2.30) / 0.0085 = EUR 499 per tonne. Lower hours raise the capital cost per kg; cheaper power does not compensate.
A battery project has a CFADS of EUR 32m, of which 60% comes from a twelve-year tolling contract and 40% from the market. The rate is 5.5%. Lenders size the tolling part at 1.35x over twelve years and the merchant part at 2.00x over seven years. Annuity factors: 8.6185 (12 years) and 5.6830 (7 years). What is the debt capacity, and what would it be if all revenues were under the tolling contract?
Solution. Tolling: 19.2 / 1.35 = EUR 14.22m of debt service, times 8.6185 = EUR 122.6m. Merchant: 12.8 / 2.00 = EUR 6.4m, times 5.6830 = EUR 36.4m. Total EUR 158.9m. Fully tolled: 32 / 1.35 × 8.6185 = EUR 204.3m. The 40% of merchant revenue supports 23% of the debt.
Meridian holds EUR 40m of a loan to a regulated interconnector rated BBB (PD 0.20%, LGD 40%, F-IRB risk weight 39.02%). Margin 160 bp, FTP 48 bp, upfront fees recognised EUR 0.05m a year, no ancillary revenue. Compute RAROC without and with the 0.75 supporting factor.
Solution. Net margin: 40 × 112 bp = EUR 0.448m; revenues EUR 0.498m; costs at 40%: EUR 0.199m; expected loss: 0.20% × 40% × 40 = EUR 0.032m; pre-tax EUR 0.267m; after tax EUR 0.200m. RWA: 40 × 39.02% = EUR 15.61m; capital EUR 2.03m; RAROC 9.9%. With the factor: RWA EUR 11.71m, capital EUR 1.52m, RAROC 13.1%. For a regulated asset the factor is what brings a thin-margin loan above the hurdle.
1. Why is an electrolyser harder to finance than an offshore wind farm? The wind farm sells a product with a deep market under a standard State contract, using a proven technology. The electrolyser sells to one or two sites, with no fallback market, a product that costs two to three times its fossil substitute, using equipment with little operating history at scale. Lenders therefore need a support contract, a take-or-pay, stronger sponsor support and a higher DSCR, and they still carry host-site risk.
2. Explain a carbon contract for difference to a client. The State agrees a strike that reflects the cost of the low-carbon process and pays the difference with a reference based on the conventional cost, including carbon. When carbon or gas rises, the payment falls; if the reference exceeds the strike, the company pays back. The company gets a stable revenue per unit and the State pays only for the gap that exists.
3. What is the difference between LLCR and DSCR, and when do they diverge? DSCR compares one period’s cash flow with that period’s debt service. LLCR compares the present value of all cash flows over the loan life with the outstanding debt. They are equal when cash flows and debt service are flat; they diverge when debt is sculpted or when cash flows are uneven, in which case a weak year can hide behind a comfortable LLCR.
4. A sponsor asks for a fifteen-year loan on a new gas plant with a ten-year capacity contract. What do you answer? That the tenor must sit inside the contracted period or amortise most of the debt within it, with a cash sweep. I would run a lock-in test with falling hours and a rising carbon price, ask for a retrofit design and a phase-out date consistent with the borrower’s transition plan, and check our sector policy and the Taxonomy criteria before calling anything transitional.
5. Does financing a Taxonomy-aligned project reduce the bank’s capital requirement? No. CRR3 has no green supporting factor. The infrastructure supporting factor may apply if its conditions are met, whatever the colour of the asset. The alignment matters for reporting, for the green loan label and for refinancing through green bonds, not for RWA.
6. What does the EIB bring to a deal, and what does it cost? A large ticket at a lower margin and a long tenor, which shrinks the commercial tranche and signals public backing. The cost is time and conditions: its own technical, environmental and procurement appraisal, a board calendar, and intercreditor terms that commercial lenders must accept.
7. How would you explain a RAROC below the hurdle to the credit committee? I would show the standalone figure without adjustment, then the levers: fee income already earned on the underwriting, a lower hold, ancillary business, and capital treatment at completion. If the deal is still below the hurdle, I would ask for an explicit exception with its cost in euros and a review date, and not adjust the PD or the cost allocation to make the number work.
8. Which single number would you watch after closing on the case? The certified volume actually taken by each offtaker, month by month. It captures plant availability, the offtakers’ health and certification at once, and it is what the support payment is multiplied by.
Regulation (stable identifiers)
Standards and market practice
Market data and public support
Academic and reference