Asset finance lends against things that move and earn: ships, aircraft, trains, and by extension containers, trucks and helicopters. In Meridian Bank the activity sits in the corporate and investment bank, inside Corporate Banking, under the name Transportation and Asset Finance. It is organised in three sector teams (shipping, aviation, rail), plus a leasing subsidiary that writes smaller tickets for equipment. The sector teams are staffed with people who know the assets: a shipping banker can tell you what a 5,500 TEU container vessel earns per day this month and what a ten-year-old one sold for last week.
The clients are shipowners and liner operators, airlines and aircraft lessors, rolling-stock leasing companies, rail operators, and the special purpose companies they set up to own each asset. The defining feature is that the lender looks first at the asset and its earnings and only second at the balance sheet of the group. A loan of EUR 96m against two vessels is sized on what the vessels cost, what they will be worth during the life of the loan and what they earn per day.
The desk earns money in four ways. The first is the margin on drawn loans: 150 to 300 bp for most shipping names, less for investment-grade liner companies and flag carriers, more for small private owners. Because the loans are drawn from day one and amortise slowly, the margin is by far the largest line. The second is the arrangement fee, 75 to 150 bp of the amount, paid at signing. The third is ancillary business: interest-rate swaps (owners fix their rates), foreign exchange (yard instalments, crew costs), earnings accounts and cash management. The fourth is agency: an annual fee of a few tens of thousands of euros for the facility agent and the security trustee. A front-office team of fifteen in shipping typically manages a book of a few billion euros and generates revenues of several tens of millions; orders of magnitude, since banks rarely publish the line separately.
The team around a deal is larger than in plain corporate lending:
| Role | What they do | Document they produce |
|---|---|---|
| Relationship manager (coverage) | Owns the client, originates the mandate | Call memo, pitch |
| Structurer (Transportation Finance) | Sizes the loan, negotiates terms | Term sheet, financial model |
| Credit analyst (sector desk) | Independent second look | Credit opinion for committee |
| Sustainable finance specialist | Alignment calculation, KPI design | Poseidon score sheet, ESG memo |
| Loan agency and middle office | Conditions precedent, drawdown, covenant tests | CP checklist, compliance file |
Outside the bank, a ship loan mobilises two independent valuers (sale-and-purchase brokers), a technical adviser, maritime lawyers in the flag state, an insurance adviser who checks hull, protection-and-indemnity and mortgagee’s interest cover, and the classification society, which is also the “recognised organisation” that verifies fuel consumption data for the International Maritime Organization (IMO).
WHO DOES WHAT — A realistic week on the shipping desk in November. Monday: valuations for the semi-annual security cover tests arrive; middle office flags two loans close to the covenant. Tuesday: credit committee for a newbuilding loan; the sustainable finance specialist presents the vessel’s expected alignment score. Wednesday: call with a Greek owner whose charterer wants to redeliver early. Thursday: deadline pressure, because the Poseidon Principles scores must be sent to the Secretariat by 15 November; three owners have still not released their fuel data. Friday: drawdown notice for a delivery in Korea next week; agency checks the builder’s certificate, the mortgage registration slot and the insurance letters.
Since 2019 the desk has had a second scoreboard next to its profit and loss account: the climate alignment of the portfolio, published every December. That is the subject of this module, after the finance.
IN ONE SENTENCE — An asset-backed loan is a loan whose size, tenor and repayment are set by the value and the earning life of a specific asset, and which is secured by a mortgage on that asset.
INTUITION — It is a home mortgage for a machine that earns a salary. The bank lends a fraction of the price, the machine’s wages pay the instalments, and if they stop the bank takes the keys and sells.
The owner usually places each vessel or aircraft in a single-purpose company (SPV). The SPV borrows, grants a first-priority mortgage and assigns its earnings and insurances to the lenders; the parent often guarantees. Four numbers define the loan.
Advance ratio or loan-to-value (LTV). Lenders advance 50 to 70% of the lower of contract price and market value for ships, up to 80 to 85% for new aircraft. The rest is the owner’s equity. A lower advance protects against the first enemy of the business, the price cycle of the asset.
Tenor. The legal final maturity: 5 to 12 years for ships, up to 12 for aircraft, longer for rail.
Repayment profile. A ship lives 25 years, far longer than the loan. Lenders therefore set instalments as if the loan were repaid over a longer “profile” (15 to 20 years from delivery, so that the debt would be zero when the vessel reaches a given age), and require repayment of whatever is left at the legal maturity.
Balloon. That remainder. It is repaid by selling the asset or, far more often, by refinancing it.
FORMULA
is the loan amount; the repayment profile in years; the annual instalment (paid quarterly in practice); the tenor; the balloon; the weighted average life, the average time a euro of principal stays outstanding; the value of the asset at the end of year ; the loan-to-value at that date.
For the desk starts from a straight line between the price when new and the scrap value at the end of the economic life. Scrap value is concrete: the steel weight of the ship (lightweight tonnage) multiplied by the price demolition yards pay per tonne.
CASE — Nordhavn’s two vessels cost EUR 80m each. A 60% advance gives a loan of EUR 96m. With an 18-year profile the annual instalment is EUR 5.33m; after 10 years EUR 53.33m has been repaid and the balloon is EUR 42.67m, or 44.4% of the loan. The weighted average life is 7.5 years. Each vessel is assumed to be worth EUR 8.8m as scrap after 25 years (22,000 lightweight tonnes at EUR 400), so the pair loses EUR 5.70m of value a year and is worth EUR 103.04m after ten years: the LTV falls from 60% to 41.4%. In the first year, with EURIBOR at 2.50% and a margin of 220 bp, debt service is EUR 9.85m.
INTERACTIVE LAB — Repayment profile, balloon and loan-to-value of a ship loan
Size an asset-backed loan from price and advance ratio, build the repayment profile and compare the debt outstanding with the straight-line value of the vessels.
| Parameter you can move | Range | Default |
|---|---|---|
| Price per vessel | 30 to 200 EUR m | 80 EUR m |
| Number of vessels | 1 / 2 / 3 / 4 | 2 |
| Advance ratio | 40 to 85 % | 60 % |
| Tenor | 3 to 12 years | 10 years |
| Repayment profile | 10 to 25 years | 18 years |
| Scrap value per vessel | 0 to 20 EUR m | 8.8 EUR m |
| Economic life | 15 to 30 years | 25 years |
| EURIBOR | 0 to 6 % | 2.5 % |
| Margin | 100 to 400 bp | 220 bp |
| Result at default settings | Value |
|---|---|
| Loan amount | 96.00 EUR m |
| Annual instalment | 5.333 EUR m |
| Balloon at maturity | 42.67 EUR m |
| Balloon as share of the loan | 44.4 % |
| Weighted average life | 7.50 years |
| Straight-line value of the fleet at maturity | 103.04 EUR m |
| Loan-to-value at maturity | 41.4 % |
| Debt service in year 1 | 9.845 EUR m |
Try it. Shorten the tenor to 5 years with the same 18-year profile: the balloon rises to 72% of the loan, and the bank is exposed to the ship market of a single year.
PITFALL — A falling LTV on a straight-line value curve proves nothing. Ship values do not follow straight lines; they follow freight rates. A five-year-old container vessel has been worth more than its newbuilding price in a boom and half of its book value in a slump. The profile protects the lender only together with the covenants below.
Pricing and covenants. The margin is fixed for the life of the loan or steps with LTV. The classic covenants are a security cover ratio or value maintenance clause (the market value of the mortgaged vessels, tested twice a year by two brokers, must stay above 120 to 135% of the loan; otherwise the borrower prepays or posts more collateral), minimum liquidity per vessel, and at group level a leverage or equity ratio. Earnings are paid into an account pledged to the lenders.
Risk. Three risks dominate. Earnings risk: freight and charter rates swing violently, and a vessel on the spot market can earn less than its running costs. Value risk: the collateral falls exactly when the borrower is weak, since both depend on the same market. Refinancing risk: the balloon falls due on a date fixed years in advance. Operational events (casualty, pollution, arrest, sanctions breach) are handled by insurance and covenants.
WHY IT MATTERS ON THE DESK — The whole craft of the desk is to keep three curves apart: debt outstanding, asset value and cumulative earnings. Every structural term (advance, profile, cover ratio, cash sweep) exists to preserve the gap between the first curve and the other two through a full cycle.
A lease separates use from ownership. The lessor buys the asset and the lessee pays rent for using it.
IN ONE SENTENCE — In a finance lease the rents repay the whole cost, so the lessee carries the risks of ownership; in an operating lease the rents repay only part of it, and the lessor bets on the value of the asset at the end.
INTUITION — Hiring a car for three years with a guaranteed buy-back price, against buying it on credit. In the first case the leasing company worries about the second-hand market; in the second you do.
FORMULA
is the annual rent paid in arrears; the cost of the asset; the residual value the lessor assumes at the end of the lease; the return the lessor requires; the term in years; the annuity factor, the present value of one euro a year for years.
CASE — A lessor buying one of the Nordhavn vessels for EUR 80m, requiring 6% and assuming it will be worth EUR 51.52m after ten years (64.4% of cost, the straight-line figure), would charge EUR 6.96m a year, a lease rate factor of 8.7% of cost. A full-payout finance lease with no residual would cost EUR 10.87m. The difference of EUR 3.91m a year is what the residual assumption is worth to the lessee. If the vessel is finally worth 30% less than assumed, the lessor’s realised return is 4.16%, not 6%.
INTERACTIVE LAB — Operating lease rent and the lessor’s residual-value bet
Compute the rent of a lease from the residual value the lessor assumes, and the lessor’s realised return if the asset is worth less at the end.
| Parameter you can move | Range | Default |
|---|---|---|
| Asset cost | 20 to 200 EUR m | 80 EUR m |
| Lease term | 3 to 15 years | 10 years |
| Residual value assumed | 0 to 80 % of cost | 64.4 % of cost |
| Return required by the lessor | 2 to 12 % | 6 % |
| Shortfall of realised against assumed residual | 0 to 60 % | 30 % |
| Result at default settings | Value |
|---|---|
| Annual rent | 6.961 EUR m |
| Lease rate factor (rent / cost) | 8.70 % |
| Rent of a full-payout lease (no residual) | 10.869 EUR m |
| Rent saved thanks to the residual assumption | 3.909 EUR m |
| Lessor’s realised return | 4.16 % |
Try it. Raise the assumed residual to 75% of cost: the rent falls, the lessee is happy, and the lessor has sold an option it may regret.
For the bank the legal form changes the nature of the risk more than the cash flows. In a mortgage loan and in a finance lease the bank has a credit risk secured by the asset. In an operating lease held by the bank’s leasing subsidiary, the bank owns the asset and carries the residual value itself, in its own accounts.
Two structures deserve a word because students meet them on the first day. The sale and leaseback: the owner sells the vessel or aircraft to a lessor and charters it back, often with purchase options and a purchase obligation at the end; economically it is a secured loan at a higher advance ratio, and it is the product through which Chinese leasing companies took a large share of ship finance in the last decade. The JOLCO (Japanese operating lease with call option): Japanese investors provide 20 to 30% of the price as equity through a partnership that owns the asset, banks lend the rest to that partnership, and the airline or shipowner leases the asset with a call option at a fixed price around year ten. The investors take accelerated tax depreciation in Japan, which lets them accept a low explicit return; the lessee obtains close to 100% financing at an attractive all-in cost. Everyone expects the call option to be exercised; if it is not, the investors discover that they own a ship.
| Feature | Shipping | Aviation | Rail |
|---|---|---|---|
| Typical borrower | Owner SPV, parent guarantee | Airline, lessor, SPV | Leasing company (ROSCO), concession SPV |
| Economic life | 20 to 25 years | 25 years | 30 to 40 years |
| Currency | USD mostly | USD | Local currency |
| Value driver | Freight cycle, fuel and rules | Type liquidity, engines, maintenance | Contract with the transport authority |
| Security law | Flag-state mortgage | Cape Town Convention | National law, Luxembourg Rail Protocol |
Aircraft are the most liquid collateral of the three: a narrowbody of a current type can be placed with dozens of operators, the Cape Town Convention and its Aircraft Protocol give creditors an international registry and repossession rights in ratifying states, and roughly half of the world fleet is owned by lessors. Value depends on the maintenance status of engines and airframe, which is why leases include maintenance reserves and return conditions. Rail is the opposite: rolling stock is specific to a network (gauge, voltage, signalling, platform height), so its value depends on the operating contract or on the willingness of the transport authority to transfer the fleet to the next operator. The Luxembourg Rail Protocol to the Cape Town Convention, in force since 8 March 2024, created an international registry for interests in rolling stock, a first step towards a more liquid collateral. Ships sit in between: a deep second-hand market, but violent cycles.
A ship loan file contains the facility agreement (drafted on Loan Market Association lines; the LMA recommended forms are for members and this module relies on public summaries), the mortgage and deed of covenants registered in the flag state, the assignments of earnings, insurances and charters, account pledges, a pledge over the shares of the SPV, the parent guarantee, undertakings from the technical and commercial managers, and the swap documentation. Pre-delivery finance for a ship under construction adds an assignment of the shipbuilding contract and of the refund guarantee issued by the yard’s bank. Each of these is a condition precedent to drawdown, which is why loan agency teams on this desk are legal project managers as much as payment processors.
A corporate loan finances a balance sheet; its climate profile is that of a company and its strategy. An asset loan finances one machine whose fuel consumption is measured every year. Shipping carries most of world trade by volume and emits a few percent of global greenhouse gases; aviation is of the same order. Both are “hard to abate”: the energy density of batteries excludes them on long distances, the alternative fuels cost a multiple of fossil fuel, and the assets last 25 years. A vessel delivered in 2027 will still trade in 2050, the year the IMO wants shipping at net zero. The financing decision taken this month locks in a technology for a generation.
Three layers sit on top of the plain product: sector alignment frameworks used by lenders (Poseidon, Pegasus), labelled products (green loans, sustainability-linked loans), and public regulation that changes the cash flows and the value of the asset.
IN ONE SENTENCE — The Poseidon Principles are a framework under which lenders measure every year the carbon intensity of each ship they finance, compare it with a decarbonisation trajectory derived from the IMO strategy, and publish the weighted average gap for their portfolio.
Launched in June 2019 and hosted by the Global Maritime Forum, the Principles had 36 signatory financial institutions in 14 countries at the time of the sixth annual disclosure report (15 December 2025), representing close to three quarters of the global ship finance portfolio according to the Secretariat. There are four principles: assessment of climate alignment, accountability (data come from the IMO Data Collection System, verified by a recognised organisation), enforcement (a standard covenant in new loan agreements obliges the borrower to deliver the data), and transparency (annual publication of the portfolio score).
The metric is the Annual Efficiency Ratio (AER).
FORMULA
is the annual consumption of fuel ; its emission factor in grams of CO2 equivalent, on a well-to-wake basis since Technical Guidance version 5 (production and transport of the fuel plus combustion, including methane and nitrous oxide); the deadweight of the vessel in tonnes, a proxy for the cargo it can carry; the distance sailed in nautical miles; the intensity required in year for a vessel of that type and size on trajectory ; the vessel’s alignment delta (negative or zero means aligned); the vessel’s share of the lender’s outstanding ship debt; the portfolio score.
INTUITION — It is litres per 100 km, except that the “car” is rated on the tonnes it could carry, not on those it actually carried. A ship sailing half empty or in ballast has the same AER as a full one.
Since the 2023 revision of the IMO strategy, signatories report against two trajectories, both reaching net zero around 2050 relative to 2008: a minimum trajectory (minus 20% in 2030, minus 70% in 2040) and a striving trajectory (minus 30% and minus 80%). Passenger and vehicle-carrying ship types use a variant based on gross tonnage. The scope is credit secured by vessel mortgages or title finance (and unsecured export-credit loans tied to a vessel) for ships of 5,000 gross tonnes and above trading internationally. Scores are sent to the Secretariat by 15 November and published by 31 December.
PITFALL — The Poseidon score is a measurement, not a target and not a lending restriction. A signatory may finance a misaligned vessel; it must only count it. And because AER uses capacity, not cargo, and depends on speed and routing, it moves for reasons unrelated to the ship: the Secretariat itself noted that longer routes around the Red Sea affected recent scores.
Sister frameworks cover other seats at the table: the Sea Cargo Charter for charterers and the Poseidon Principles for Marine Insurance for hull underwriters. For aviation, the Pegasus Guidelines, launched on 4 April 2024 by RMI with BNP Paribas, Citi, Crédit Agricole CIB, Société Générale and Standard Chartered, apply the same logic to aviation lending portfolios: an emission intensity per unit of transport work, compared with a 1.5°C scenario, disclosed annually at portfolio level. Aviation is harder than shipping because the intensity depends on the airline’s whole operation (load factor, network, cabin layout) more than on the aircraft, and because banks often lend to a lessor that does not fly.
Green loans (use of proceeds, Green Loan Principles of the LMA and sister associations) finance an eligible asset. In rail, eligibility is simple: electric rolling stock has zero direct emissions and qualifies under almost every taxonomy. In shipping and aviation it is contested. Is a dual-fuel vessel green when it may burn fossil fuel for its whole life? Is a new-generation narrowbody that burns 15 to 20% less kerosene than its predecessor a green asset or just a new aircraft? The market has largely answered the second question by not labelling: fleet renewal is financed as transition at best.
Sustainability-linked loans (see B03 for the mechanics) are the dominant labelled format in shipping. The typical KPI is the fleet’s AER relative to a trajectory, sometimes the IMO Carbon Intensity Indicator rating, with a margin adjustment of a few basis points up and down. The link with Poseidon is natural: the bank already collects the data.
Sustainability-linked leases and JOLCOs exist, with rent adjustments. In aviation, KPIs refer to emission intensity or to the share of sustainable aviation fuel (SAF).
This is where asset finance differs from most of the course: the rules put a price on the fuel, and therefore on the asset.
IMO. The 2023 IMO Strategy on Reduction of GHG Emissions from Ships sets net zero “by or around” 2050, indicative checkpoints of minus 20% (striving for 30%) in 2030 and minus 70% (striving for 80%) in 2040 relative to 2008, and an uptake of zero or near-zero emission fuels of at least 5% of energy by 2030. Existing measures are technical (EEDI for new ships, EEXI for existing ones) and operational (the Carbon Intensity Indicator, which rates each ship from A to E every year since 2023). The IMO Net-Zero Framework, a global fuel-intensity standard combined with a price on emissions above the standard, was approved in April 2025 as draft amendments to MARPOL Annex VI. Its adoption, planned for an extraordinary session in October 2025, was adjourned for a year under pressure from the United States and several oil-producing states. MEPC 84 (27 April to 1 May 2026) kept the text alive without adopting it. At the date of this course the next steps are MEPC 85 (30 November to 3 December 2026) and the resumed extraordinary session on 4 December 2026. A banker writing a credit application this month must treat the global carbon price as probable but neither certain nor dated.
EU ETS. Directive (EU) 2023/959 brought shipping into the EU Emissions Trading System. Ships of 5,000 gross tonnes and above surrender allowances for 100% of emissions on voyages between EU ports and at berth, and 50% on voyages into or out of the EU. The obligation was phased in: 40% of 2024 emissions, 70% of 2025, 100% from 2026 emissions onwards, with methane and nitrous oxide added in 2026. There is no free allocation. The liable “shipping company” is the owner or the manager that has assumed responsibility under the ISM Code, which matters for lenders: an unpaid allowance bill follows the ship.
FuelEU Maritime. Regulation (EU) 2023/1805, applicable since 1 January 2025, limits the well-to-wake greenhouse-gas intensity of the energy used on board, with the same geographic scope as the ETS. The limit is the 2020 reference of 91.16 gCO2e/MJ reduced by 2% from 2025, 6% from 2030, 14.5% from 2035, 31% from 2040, 62% from 2045 and 80% from 2050. A ship above the limit pays a penalty of EUR 2,400 per tonne of fuel-oil equivalent of its shortfall. A ship below the limit generates a surplus that can be banked, or pooled with other ships, including those of other companies, against payment. The first compliance year closed with documents of compliance due by 30 June 2026.
INTUITION — The ETS is a tax on each tonne you emit. FuelEU is an emissions standard like the fleet-average CO2 limits imposed on car makers: what matters is the average of your pool, and a clean ship can sell its excess virtue to a dirty one.
Aviation. ReFuelEU Aviation (Regulation (EU) 2023/2405) obliges fuel suppliers at EU airports to blend a minimum share of SAF: 2% since 2025, 6% from 2030, 20% from 2035, rising to 70% in 2050, with a sub-mandate for synthetic fuels from 2030. Intra-European flights are in the EU ETS, with free allocation to airlines ended from 2026. Internationally, CORSIA requires airlines to offset the growth of emissions above a baseline; its first phase ends in 2026 and the scheme becomes mandatory for most states from 2027.
EU Taxonomy. Sea and coastal freight transport is activity 6.10 of the Climate Delegated Act (Delegated Regulation (EU) 2021/2139). The first-generation criteria (zero direct emissions, or until the end of 2025 dual-fuel vessels deriving at least 25% of their energy from zero-emission fuels, or an energy-efficiency design index 10% better than required combined with the capacity to run on renewable fuels) have been supplemented by criteria for later years that combine design efficiency with limits on the greenhouse-gas intensity of the energy actually used. Vessels dedicated to the transport of fossil fuels are excluded. The practical consequence is the important one: from 2026, capability alone no longer makes a ship taxonomy-aligned; the fuel does. Rail (activities 6.1 and 6.2) qualifies with zero direct tailpipe emissions, including bi-mode trains when running under catenary. Aircraft (activity 6.18 and following, added in 2023) qualify on stringent efficiency margins and replacement conditions that are contested as too generous by non-governmental organisations and as too complex by lessors.
Recycling. The Hong Kong Convention on ship recycling entered into force on 26 June 2025; EU-flagged ships must in addition be dismantled in yards on the EU list. For a lender this is the social and environmental end of the residual-value calculation: the scrap price of section 2 is higher on a beach than in a compliant yard.
The Poseidon clause is standard in the loan agreements of signatories. Sustainability-linked margins in shipping are small (2.5 to 10 bp either way) and almost always tied to AER or CII. Dual-fuel ordering has been strong in container shipping and car carriers: according to the World Shipping Council and DNV, 400 dual-fuel container ships and vehicle carriers were in service at the end of 2025 and about three quarters of that orderbook was dual-fuel capable, though with a marked shift from methanol towards LNG in 2025 (methanol-capable orders fell from 149 ships in 2024 to 61). That shift is itself the lesson for a lender: owners are hedging on fuels, and nobody knows which molecule wins.
INTERACTIVE LAB — A newbuilding ship loan from mandate to the annual alignment report
Follow the actors, actions and documents of a secured ship loan with a Poseidon clause and a sustainability-linked margin.
| # | Who | Does what | Deliverable |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Relationship manager (shipping coverage) | Meets the owner’s CFO, learns of the newbuilding programme and the request for post-delivery finance | Call memo, request for proposal |
| 2 | Structurer (Transportation Finance) | Sizes the loan on price, value curve and earnings; proposes advance, profile, balloon and covenants | Indicative term sheet, cash-flow model |
| 3 | Sustainable finance specialist | Computes the expected AER of the vessels and their alignment against both Poseidon trajectories; proposes the KPI and margin ratchet | Alignment sheet, KPI proposal |
| 4 | Approved brokers and technical adviser | Value the vessels (charter-free, as delivered) and review the specification and the yard | Two valuation certificates, technical report |
| 5 | KYC and sanctions desk | Screens owner, SPVs, managers, yard, flag and intended trade | KYC file, sanctions clearance |
| 6 | Credit analyst (transportation sector desk) | Rates the borrower, challenges the value and earnings stresses, including the fuel-transition scenario | Credit opinion with PD, LGD and RAROC |
| 7 | Credit committee | Approves amount, hold, pricing and conditions | Credit approval with conditions |
| 8 | Mandated lead arrangers and external counsel | Negotiate the facility agreement, security documents, Poseidon clause and sustainability provisions | Signed facility agreement and security package |
| 9 | Loan agency (facility agent and security trustee) | Collects conditions precedent: builder’s certificate, class, flag registration, insurances, mortgage ready for registration | CP satisfaction letter |
| 10 | Treasury and markets desk | Funds the drawdown at FTP; executes the interest-rate swap for the borrower | Drawdown, swap confirmation |
| 11 | Loan agency and middle office | Tests security cover twice a year with fresh valuations; monitors liquidity, insurances and earnings account | Compliance certificates, covenant file |
| 12 | Recognised organisation (classification society) | Verifies the vessel’s IMO DCS fuel data for the year and releases it to the lenders under the borrower’s authorisation | Statement of compliance, data set |
| 13 | Sustainable finance specialist | Computes the vessel deltas, adjusts the margin for the next period, sends the portfolio score to the Poseidon Secretariat by 15 November | Margin notice, portfolio score |
| 14 | Structurer and relationship manager | Two years before maturity, open the discussion on refinancing or sale to repay the balloon | Refinancing proposal |
Origination and structuring. The term sheet of a ship loan is drafted in a week by people who have done fifty. The work goes into three stresses that the credit application must show: earnings (at what daily rate does the vessel stop covering its debt service?), value (how far can the market fall before the security cover is breached?) and refinancing (what LTV will the next lender see at maturity?). The sustainable finance specialist is involved before the term sheet, since the alignment of a new vessel is a number the committee now expects next to the LTV.
Due diligence. Valuations are “charter-free, willing buyer, willing seller” opinions; they are opinions on a market, not appraisals of the specific ship, which is why the technical report matters. KYC in shipping is heavy: ownership chains run through several jurisdictions, and the sanctions desk reviews the intended trade as well as the people.
Approval. The credit opinion carries the PD of the obligor, the LGD after collateral, the RAROC, and since 2023 in most banks a paragraph on transition risk: fuel capability, expected regulatory cost per year, expected alignment. The committee can impose conditions such as a lower advance for a conventionally fuelled vessel.
Documentation and closing. The Poseidon clause is short: the borrower undertakes to provide, each year, the data reported under the IMO Data Collection System together with the statement of compliance, and authorises the recognised organisation to send it directly to the lenders. Closing takes place at delivery, typically at the yard: the lenders’ funds are released against the protocol of delivery and acceptance, the registration of the vessel under its flag and the mortgage, in a choreography measured in minutes because the yard will not release the ship without the money and the bank will not release the money without the mortgage.
Life of the loan. Agency tests the security cover with new valuations every six months. The annual climate cycle runs as follows: fuel data for year are verified by the recognised organisation in the spring of , the bank computes deltas in the summer and autumn, the margin adjustment applies from the next interest period, and the portfolio score is published in December.
Exit. A ship loan rarely ends by scheduled repayment. It ends by sale of the vessel (mandatory prepayment), by refinancing, or by enforcement: arrest of the vessel in a creditor-friendly port and judicial sale, a process the bank’s workout team has rehearsed and hopes never to run.
Nordhavn Lines is a fictional family-controlled liner operator based in Aarhus. It runs short-sea and feeder container services between North Sea, Baltic and Iberian ports with a fleet of 28 vessels, of which 17 are owned. Meridian rates it BB (one-year PD 1.00%). All data below are case assumptions.
In 2024 Nordhavn ordered two 5,500 TEU container vessels from a Korean yard, for delivery in January 2027. Each has a dual-fuel main engine able to burn methanol or conventional fuel oil. The contract price, hedged into euros, is EUR 80m per vessel; the yard quoted EUR 70m for a conventional sister ship, so the dual-fuel capability costs EUR 10m per vessel, 14% more. Nordhavn earns its freight mostly in euros and, unusually in a dollar industry, wants a euro loan.
The request, received in September 2026: a post-delivery senior secured term loan for both vessels, with a sustainability-linked margin. Three banks, all Poseidon signatories, form a club; Meridian is mandated lead arranger, facility agent and sustainability coordinator.
| Term | Value |
|---|---|
| Borrowers | Two single-vessel SPVs, joint and several; guarantee of Nordhavn Lines |
| Amount | EUR 96m (60% of contract price), EUR 32m per bank |
| Tenor and profile | 10 years from delivery; 18-year profile; balloon EUR 42.67m |
| Pricing | EURIBOR + 220 bp; arrangement fee 100 bp; ratchet of 5 bp either way |
| Security cover | Market value of the vessels at least 125% of the loan |
| Vessel data (each) | Value |
|---|---|
| Deadweight | 68,000 tonnes |
| Distance sailed | 80,000 nautical miles a year |
| Energy used | 451,000 GJ a year (11,000 t of fuel-oil equivalent at 41 GJ/t) |
| Trade | Between EU ports only: 100% in scope of EU ETS and FuelEU |
| Scrap value | EUR 8.8m (22,000 lightweight tonnes at EUR 400) |
The loan mechanics were derived in section 2.1: instalment EUR 5.33m a year, balloon 44.4% of the loan, weighted average life 7.5 years, straight-line LTV falling from 60% to 41.4%. Loan year ends on 31 December of year .
The credit committee of 10 November 2026 will ask six questions, and the case follows them in order. Do the vessels earn their debt service? What happens to the collateral in a slump, and in a slump combined with a wrong bet on fuel? Will the vessels be aligned with the Poseidon trajectories, and on what conditions? What do the European rules cost or pay, since they decide whether the green fuel is ever burnt? What should the sustainability clause measure, and what is it worth? And does Meridian earn its cost of capital? The first two questions would have been asked in 2006. The next three are new, and the craft lies in bringing their answers back into the first two instead of filing them in a separate ESG annex.
Two structural choices were settled before the term sheet. The loan is post-delivery only: Nordhavn pays the yard instalments from its own cash and an existing corporate facility, so the lenders take no construction risk and need no refund guarantee. And the two vessels are cross-collateralised: each SPV guarantees the other, so that the security cover is tested on the pair, and the sale of one vessel triggers a prepayment that keeps the remaining LTV no higher than before.
Question. Do the earnings of the two vessels cover debt service, and with what margin of safety?
Data. Nordhavn operates the vessels in its own services, so there is no charter to assign. The structurer therefore uses the rate at which the vessels could be chartered out: a time-charter equivalent (TCE) of EUR 30,000 a day for this size, against a ten-year average closer to EUR 22,000 (case assumptions; charter rates for container ships have ranged over a factor of ten in the last decade). Operating expenses (crew, maintenance, insurance, management) are EUR 7,500 a day. The vessel is available 355 days a year. Fuel is paid by the operator and is treated in stage 4.
FORMULA
is the debt service coverage ratio; the number of vessels; and are daily amounts; the operating days; the annual instalment; the reference rate; the margin; the loan outstanding at the start of the year; the break-even rate at which earnings just cover debt service.
Calculation. EBITDA is = EUR 15.975m. Interest in year one is 4.70% of EUR 96m, EUR 4.51m; with the instalment of EUR 5.33m, debt service is EUR 9.85m.
Result. DSCR is 1.62. The break-even rate is EUR 21,367 a day. At the ten-year average of EUR 22,000 the DSCR is 1.05.
INTERACTIVE LAB — Debt service coverage and break-even charter rate
Test whether the earnings of the two vessels cover interest and instalments, and find the daily rate at which they stop doing so.
| Parameter you can move | Range | Default |
|---|---|---|
| Time-charter equivalent | 10000 to 60000 EUR/day | 30000 EUR/day |
| Operating expenses | 4000 to 12000 EUR/day | 7500 EUR/day |
| Operating days | 330 to 365 days | 355 days |
| Loan year | 1 to 10 | 1 |
| EURIBOR | 0 to 6 % | 2.5 % |
| Margin | 100 to 400 bp | 220 bp |
| Result at default settings | Value |
|---|---|
| EBITDA of the two vessels | 15.975 EUR m |
| Interest | 4.512 EUR m |
| Debt service | 9.845 EUR m |
| DSCR | 1.62 x |
| Break-even TCE | 21,367 EUR/day |
Try it. Set the rate to EUR 18,000 a day, a level seen in weak container markets: the vessels no longer cover their debt service and the parent guarantee becomes the real credit.
Reading. The loan is comfortable at today’s rates and thin at average rates. This is normal in shipping and it is why the guarantee of the group, the liquidity covenant and the cover ratio exist. Note what the calculation leaves out: the balloon. Debt service in year ten, excluding the balloon, is EUR 7.59m; including it, EUR 50.26m. No vessel earns its balloon; the market refinances it. The value of the vessels in year ten is therefore not a secondary question. It is the question.
Question. How far can the value of the vessels fall before the covenant is breached, before the balloon cannot be refinanced, and before the lenders lose money?
Data. The straight-line value of the pair is . The lenders test market value twice a year against 125% of the loan. Two distinct shocks are applied:
FORMULA
is the straight-line value; the cyclical haircut; the transition discount; the stressed value; the required cover (1.25); the loan outstanding; the headroom, the fall in value that brings the cover exactly to its minimum; the cost of arrest, judicial sale and lay-up, taken at 10% of the proceeds; the lenders’ loss if the borrower defaults at that date.
Calculation and result. At delivery the headroom is 25%: a normal cyclical trough already breaches the covenant. After three years the loan has fallen to EUR 80m and the straight-line value to EUR 142.91m, so headroom is 30.0%: a 30% fall leaves a stressed value of EUR 100.04m, an LTV of 79.97% and the covenant just holds. At maturity the headroom is 48.2%.
Now combine the shocks at maturity: a 30% trough and a 20% transition discount. The stressed value is EUR 57.70m and the balloon of EUR 42.67m stands at an LTV of 73.9%. A new lender advancing 60% of that value offers EUR 34.62m; Nordhavn must find EUR 8.05m of equity in the middle of a slump. If instead Nordhavn defaulted in year three under the same combined stress, the sale would net EUR 72.03m against EUR 80m outstanding: a loss of EUR 7.97m, 10% of the exposure.
INTERACTIVE LAB — Security cover, refinancing gap and loss under value stress
Apply a cyclical haircut and a fuel-transition discount to the value of the vessels at any date and read the covenant, the refinancing gap and the loss in default.
| Parameter you can move | Range | Default |
|---|---|---|
| Years after delivery | 0 to 10 | 3 |
| Cyclical haircut | 0 to 60 % | 30 % |
| Transition discount | 0 to 40 % | 0 % |
| Required security cover | 110 to 150 % | 125 % |
| Advance ratio of a refinancing lender | 40 to 70 % | 60 % |
| Enforcement costs | 0 to 25 % of proceeds | 10 % of proceeds |
| Result at default settings | Value |
|---|---|
| Loan outstanding | 80.00 EUR m |
| Straight-line value | 142.91 EUR m |
| Stressed value | 100.04 EUR m |
| Stressed loan-to-value | 79.97 % |
| Fall in value that breaches the covenant | 30.0 % |
| Prepayment needed to restore the cover | 0.00 EUR m |
| Equity needed to refinance the outstanding | 19.98 EUR m |
| Loss if default and sale | 0.00 EUR m |
Try it. Set the year to 0 and the cyclical haircut to 30%: the covenant is breached at once and Nordhavn must prepay EUR 6.4m. The first years of a ship loan are the dangerous ones.
Reading. Two lessons. First, the risk is front-loaded: amortisation builds headroom by about two points a year, which is why lenders dislike long drawdown periods and interest-only starts. Second, transition risk is not a new category; it enters as a discount on and multiplies with the cycle. The honest difficulty is choosing . Stage 4 gives an anchor for the conventional ship: from 2035 a fossil-fuelled vessel in this trade would bear a FuelEU penalty of EUR 3.96m a year, half of its EBITDA of EUR 7.99m. A buyer will not pay full price for that ship. For the dual-fuel ship there is no such anchor, only a judgement about fuel availability. The committee asked for the 20% case and was right to.
PITFALL — “Dual-fuel protects the residual value” is a sales argument, not a result. It holds if green methanol is available at a price that the regulation makes competitive. It fails if another fuel wins. And a conventional vessel is not doomed either: it can blend biofuels in its existing engine. The lender buys an option on a fuel, at EUR 10m per vessel, and should say so in the credit application.
Question. Will the vessels be aligned with the Poseidon trajectories, on which fuel, and for how long?
Data. Well-to-wake emission factors: 91.7 gCO2e/MJ for fuel oil (close to the FuelEU default values for residual fuels), about 100 gCO2e/MJ for “grey” methanol made from natural gas (31.3 upstream plus 69.1 at combustion in the FuelEU defaults), and 15 gCO2e/MJ for certified bio-methanol or e-methanol (case assumption; the actual figure comes from the fuel’s sustainability certificate). In methanol mode a small share of pilot fuel oil is still burnt; we count it in the fossil share. The required intensity comes from the Poseidon Technical Guidance, which gives for each ship type a 2008 baseline as a function of size. We do not reproduce the official coefficients: we take a baseline of 9.5 gCO2e per tonne-mile for this vessel as a case assumption and draw each trajectory as straight lines through its checkpoints (2008, 2030, 2040, 2050).
Calculation. With the share of energy from green methanol, the vessel’s emission factor is and
On fuel oil alone, AER is 7.60 gCO2e per tonne-mile. The minimum trajectory requires = 7.86 in 2027 and the striving trajectory 7.04.
Result.
| Year | Required (minimum) | Delta, fossil | Delta, 30% green | Green share needed |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2027 | 7.86 | −3.3% | −27.5% | 0% |
| 2030 | 7.60 | 0.0% | −25.1% | 0.04% |
| 2033 | 6.18 | +23.1% | −7.8% | 22.4% |
| 2036 | 4.75 | +60.0% | +19.9% | 44.9% |
Against the striving trajectory the fossil-fuelled vessel is misaligned from the first day (+8.0% in 2027) and needs a 15.0% green share in 2030 and 59.8% in 2036.
INTERACTIVE LAB — Poseidon alignment of a vessel: AER against the minimum and striving trajectories
Compute the well-to-wake AER of a vessel for a given share of green fuel and compare it with both trajectories, year by year.
| Parameter you can move | Range | Default |
|---|---|---|
| Share of energy from green methanol | 0 to 95 % | 0 % |
| Year | 2027 to 2040 | 2027 |
| 2008 baseline for the vessel (case assumption) | 6 to 14 gCO2e/t.nm | 9.5 gCO2e/t.nm |
| Energy used per year | 200 to 900 TJ | 451 TJ |
| Distance sailed | 40000 to 120000 nm | 80000 nm |
| Well-to-wake factor of the green fuel | 0 to 40 gCO2e/MJ | 15 gCO2e/MJ |
| Result at default settings | Value |
|---|---|
| AER of the vessel | 7.602 gCO2e/t.nm |
| Required, minimum trajectory | 7.859 gCO2e/t.nm |
| Alignment delta, minimum | -3.3 % |
| Required, striving trajectory | 7.039 gCO2e/t.nm |
| Alignment delta, striving | 8.0 % |
| Green share needed, minimum | 0.00 % |
| Green share needed, striving | 8.86 % |
Try it. Reduce the distance sailed to 70,000 nm with the same energy use (slower port turnarounds, more waiting): the AER worsens although nothing changed on the ship.
Reading. Three points for the credit committee.
A new, efficient hull is aligned on fossil fuel for three years, then drifts out as the trajectory falls by about 2.5% of baseline a year after 2030. “Methanol-capable” contributes nothing to the score: the Poseidon calculation sees fuel burnt, not tanks installed. The vessel is aligned over the life of the loan only if the green share rises from zero to 45% by 2036.
Grey methanol would make things worse. At about 100 gCO2e/MJ well to wake against 91.7 for fuel oil, a ship running on natural-gas methanol scores 9% worse than on the fuel it was supposed to replace. A sustainability clause that rewards “methanol use” without specifying the certificate rewards the wrong thing.
The score also depends on the baseline and on operations. A reader who moves the distance slider sees the delta change by several points with no change in fuel. The number has the precision of a ratio of two verified quantities and the meaning of a rough proxy.
A word on how the number is produced, because the student who joins the desk will produce it. Each spring the borrower’s technical manager uploads the vessel’s fuel consumption by fuel type, distance and hours under way to the recognised organisation, which verifies it against bunker delivery notes and issues the IMO statement of compliance. Under the Poseidon clause the same data set is released to the lenders. The specialist maps each fuel to its emission factor: defaults from the Technical Guidance for fossil fuels, and for bio- or e-fuels the value on the proof of sustainability issued under a recognised certification scheme, which the borrower must attach. A missing certificate means the default fossil factor applies. The calculation itself takes minutes; chasing the data and the certificates takes weeks, and it is the facility agent, not the borrower, who is embarrassed if the 15 November deadline is missed.
Question. Burning green methanol costs more than fuel oil. How much of the difference do the EU ETS and FuelEU Maritime pay back, per vessel and per year?
Data (case assumptions). Fuel oil at EUR 12 per GJ (about EUR 490 a tonne); green methanol at EUR 40 per GJ (about EUR 800 a tonne, methanol holding 19.9 GJ per tonne against 41). EU allowances at EUR 75 per tonne of CO2. Fuel oil emits 3.151 t of CO2 per tonne burnt; certified green methanol is zero-rated in the ETS. FuelEU surplus sold in a pool at EUR 200 per tonne of CO2e; pool prices are bilateral and opaque, so this is the weakest assumption of the case. The whole energy use is in scope.
FORMULA
is the FuelEU compliance balance in grams of CO2e (positive: surplus); the limit of year with the reduction (2% in 2027); the actual well-to-wake intensity of the energy used, in gCO2e/MJ; the energy in scope in MJ; 41,000 the energy of a tonne of fuel-oil equivalent in MJ; 2,400 the penalty in euros per such tonne.
Calculation, one vessel, 2027. On fuel oil: fuel costs EUR 5.41m; allowances for 34,661 t of CO2 cost EUR 2.60m; the intensity of 91.7 exceeds the limit of 89.34, the deficit is 1,066 t of CO2e and the penalty EUR 0.68m. Total EUR 8.69m. With 30% green methanol: fuel EUR 9.20m (EUR 3.79m more), allowances EUR 1.82m (EUR 0.78m less), intensity 68.69, surplus 9,312 t worth EUR 1.86m in a pool. Total EUR 9.16m.
Result. The net extra cost of running 30% green in 2027 is EUR 0.47m per vessel, although the fuel bill rises by EUR 3.79m. Regulation pays back 88% of the premium. In 2035, with the limit 14.5% below the reference, the fossil vessel pays a penalty of EUR 3.96m and a total of EUR 11.97m, while the 30% green vessel costs EUR 10.19m: green is then EUR 1.79m cheaper.
INTERACTIVE LAB — Fuel, EU ETS and FuelEU Maritime: annual cost of one vessel by green share
Add up the fuel bill, the cost of EU allowances and the FuelEU penalty or surplus for a chosen share of green methanol, and compare with the all-fossil case.
| Parameter you can move | Range | Default |
|---|---|---|
| Share of energy from green methanol | 0 to 95 % | 30 % |
| FuelEU reduction in force | 2 / 6 / 14.5 / 31 | 2 |
| EU allowance price | 0 to 200 EUR/tCO2 | 75 EUR/tCO2 |
| Fuel oil price | 6 to 25 EUR/GJ | 12 EUR/GJ |
| Green methanol price | 15 to 80 EUR/GJ | 40 EUR/GJ |
| Price of FuelEU surplus in a pool | 0 to 600 EUR/tCO2e | 200 EUR/tCO2e |
| Result at default settings | Value |
|---|---|
| Fuel bill | 9.200 EUR m |
| Extra fuel cost against all-fossil | 3.788 EUR m |
| EU allowances | 1.820 EUR m |
| Well-to-wake intensity of energy used | 68.69 gCO2e/MJ |
| FuelEU compliance balance | 9,312 tCO2e |
| FuelEU penalty | 0.000 EUR m |
| Value of FuelEU surplus | 1.862 EUR m |
| Total annual cost | 9.158 EUR m |
| Total annual cost, all fossil | 8.692 EUR m |
| Net extra cost of the green share | 0.466 EUR m |
| Share of the fuel premium paid back by regulation | 88 % |
| Green share that just meets the FuelEU limit | 3.1 % |
| Abatement cost of the fuel switch | 365 EUR/tCO2e |
| FuelEU penalty per tonne of CO2e of shortfall | 638 EUR/tCO2e |
Try it. Set the pool price to zero: without a buyer for its surplus, the green share costs EUR 2.3m a year more than fossil in 2027. The business case of the first movers rests on a market that barely existed two years ago.
Reading. Put the three carbon prices side by side. Replacing fuel oil by green methanol costs EUR 28 per GJ and avoids 76.7 kg of CO2e per GJ: an abatement cost of EUR 365 per tonne. The ETS pays EUR 75. Taken alone, the carbon market finances a fifth of the switch, and a banker who looked only at allowance prices would conclude that green fuel never pays. But the FuelEU penalty, converted into the same unit, is EUR 2,400 for 3.76 t of CO2e, or EUR 638 per tonne. It is the standard, not the carbon price, that makes the fuel competitive inside the EU, and only for the volumes needed to comply: the minimum green share is 3.1% in 2027, 7.8% in 2030 and 17.9% in 2035. Beyond that, the vessel depends on other ships buying its surplus.
In proportion, then: the regulation makes a modest green share roughly cost-neutral in European trades today and clearly favourable from 2035. It does not finance the 45% share that Poseidon alignment requires in 2036, and it does nothing outside the EU scope, which is where most ships trade. That gap is what the Net-Zero Framework was meant to close.
Who actually bears these costs matters to the lender. Nordhavn is both owner and operator, so fuel, allowances and FuelEU balances all sit in the company whose guarantee backs the loan. Had the vessels been chartered out, the charterer would buy the fuel and, under the clauses now common in time charters, hand over the allowances, while the FuelEU balance stays legally with the party responsible for the ship’s compliance; the lender would then read the charter party as carefully as the loan agreement. Liner operators pass part of the cost to shippers through surcharges per container on European legs, and sell “green” transport to cargo owners with their own scope 3 targets at a premium. In the credit application these are upside, not base case: surcharges are competed away when the market is weak, which is exactly when the lender needs them.
Question. What KPI, what ratchet, and what is it worth?
Design. The coordinator proposes one KPI: the average alignment delta of the two vessels against the Poseidon minimum trajectory, computed from verified IMO DCS data with well-to-wake factors taken from fuel certificates. If the delta is at or below minus 5%, the margin falls by 5 bp; between minus 5% and zero, no change; above zero, the margin rises by 5 bp. Nordhavn asked for the striving trajectory to be left out; Meridian accepted for the first five years, with a switch to the striving trajectory from 2032 written into the agreement. The KPI is material (fuel is the vessels’ emissions), measured by a third party, and benchmarked on an external trajectory; on those three tests it is stronger than most corporate KPIs seen in B03.
Calculation. Five basis points on EUR 96m are EUR 48,000 in year one. Summed over the opening balances of the ten years (EUR 720m-years), the maximum discount is EUR 360,000. Meridian’s share in year one is EUR 16,000.
Result and reading. Running both vessels at 30% green costs EUR 7.58m a year more in fuel before regulatory effects (EUR 0.93m after them, in 2027). The discount is 0.6% of the first figure and 5% of the second.
INTERACTIVE LAB — What the 5 bp ratchet is worth against the cost of green fuel
Compute the annual and cumulative value of the margin ratchet on the amortising loan and compare it with the fuel premium of the two vessels.
| Parameter you can move | Range | Default |
|---|---|---|
| Margin adjustment | 0 to 25 bp | 5 bp |
| Share of green methanol | 0 to 95 % | 30 % |
| Price gap, green methanol minus fuel oil | 5 to 60 EUR/GJ | 28 EUR/GJ |
| Net extra cost per vessel after ETS and FuelEU | -3 to 5 EUR m | 0.466 EUR m |
| Meridian’s share of the loan | 10 to 100 % | 33.3333 % |
| Result at default settings | Value |
|---|---|
| Discount in year 1 | 48,000 EUR |
| Cumulative discount over 10 years | 360,000 EUR |
| Cost to Meridian in year 1 | 16,000 EUR |
| Gross fuel premium, two vessels | 7.577 EUR m |
| Discount as share of the gross premium | 0.63 % |
| Net extra cost, two vessels | 0.932 EUR m |
| Discount as share of the net extra cost | 5.2 % |
Try it. Raise the ratchet to 25 bp, five times market practice: it still covers only 3% of the gross fuel premium.
The margin ratchet does not finance the transition of Nordhavn; the regulation and, if they accept a surcharge, its customers do. What the clause buys is different and real: verified data every year, a contractual definition of what counts as green fuel, and a common language between the owner and its lenders about a risk that sits in the collateral. It should be sold internally as that, not as an incentive.
Question. Does Meridian’s EUR 32m hold meet the 12% hurdle?
Data. Margin 220 bp. The loan has a weighted average life of 7.5 years, so the FTP liquidity premium is 45 bp (6 bp per year). Arrangement fee 100 bp on the hold, spread over 7.5 years. Cost-income 40% on lending revenues. PD 1.00%. The loan is to SPVs guaranteed by an operating group, and Meridian treats it under F-IRB as a corporate exposure secured by eligible physical collateral: section 6.1 shows that at a 60% LTV the regulatory LGD is 25% and the risk weight 51.29%. Ancillary revenue (the interest-rate swap on Nordhavn’s share, earnings accounts, foreign exchange on fuel purchases) is estimated at EUR 0.20m a year, at a 60% cost-income ratio and EUR 2.5 of RWA per euro of revenue. Year-one view on the opening balance.
Calculation.
| Line | Calculation | EUR m |
|---|---|---|
| Net margin | 32 × (220 − 45) bp | 0.560 |
| Fee, spread | 32 × 1% / 7.5 | 0.043 |
| Operating costs, lending | 40% × 0.603 | −0.241 |
| Expected loss | 1.00% × 25% × 32 | −0.080 |
| Ancillary, net of costs | 0.20 × (1 − 60%) | 0.080 |
Pre-tax result: EUR 0.362m. RWA: 51.29% × 32 = EUR 16.41m, plus EUR 0.50m for the ancillary business, EUR 16.91m. Allocated capital at 13%: EUR 2.20m.
Result. RAROC is 12.3% with ancillary business and 9.9% for the loan alone. With the 5 bp discount it is 12.0%.
INTERACTIVE LAB — RAROC of Meridian’s hold under four capital treatments
Work out the RAROC of the ship loan line by line and see how it depends on the capital approach, the sustainability discount and ancillary business.
| Parameter you can move | Range | Default |
|---|---|---|
| Capital treatment | F-IRB secured (LGD 25%) / Slotting, good (90%) / SA object finance (100%) / SA high quality (80%) / Output floor (72.5% of SA) | F-IRB secured (LGD 25%) |
| Hold | 10 to 96 EUR m | 32 EUR m |
| Margin | 100 to 400 bp | 220 bp |
| FTP liquidity premium | 0 to 100 bp | 45 bp |
| Arrangement fee | 0 to 200 bp | 100 bp |
| Sustainability discount applied | -5 to 5 bp | 0 bp |
| Ancillary revenue | 0 to 1 EUR m | 0.2 EUR m |
| One-year PD | 0.2 to 4 % | 1 % |
| Result at default settings | Value |
|---|---|
| Lending revenue (net margin + fee) | 0.603 EUR m |
| Operating costs on lending | 0.241 EUR m |
| Expected loss | 0.080 EUR m |
| Pre-tax result including ancillary | 0.362 EUR m |
| Risk weight of the loan | 51.29 % |
| RWA including ancillary | 16.91 EUR m |
| Allocated capital | 2.199 EUR m |
| RAROC | 12.3 % |
| RAROC of the loan alone | 9.9 % |
Try it. Switch to the standardised approach: the same loan at the same margin returns 6.4%. The business exists in its present form because internal models recognise the ship as collateral.
Reading. The deal passes, narrowly, and only as a relationship: the loan alone earns 9.9%. The 5 bp discount costs 0.3 point of RAROC and leaves the deal on the hurdle; Meridian accepts it because the symmetric step-up is as likely over ten years. Nothing in the capital calculation rewards the dual-fuel engine or the alignment: there is no green supporting factor in CRR3 (see E02). The sustainable features enter the bank’s economics through one channel only, the one that the capital formula does not see: the value of the collateral in 2036.
The hold of one third is itself a decision. Shipping clubs are small because every lender must be able to act quickly in an enforcement, and because owners want banks that know them. Meridian could have underwritten the whole EUR 96m and sold down, earning a skim on the fee, but a single-name exposure of that size to a BB family company would have exceeded the sector desk’s limit. The limit, not the RAROC, sized the ticket; that is the usual order of things.
Question. What does the file look like three years in, when the first tests have been run?
Suppose the container market has turned in 2029 and brokers value the pair 30% below trend at the end of the third year. The loan stands at EUR 80m, the stressed value at EUR 100.04m, the LTV at 79.97%: the cover ratio is 125.05% and the covenant holds by less than EUR 40,000 of value. Loan agency circulates the certificates with a warning; the structurer calls the CFO before the next test, because one more point of decline triggers a prepayment.
On the climate side, Nordhavn bunkered 10% green methanol in 2029, enough to comply with FuelEU for both new vessels and to shelter two older ones in its pool. The recognised organisation releases the data in April 2030. The specialist computes an AER of 6.97 against a requirement of 7.69 for 2029: a delta of −9.4%, below the −5% threshold. The margin falls by 5 bp from the next interest period and the vessels enter Meridian’s 2030 Poseidon submission as aligned. Nordhavn’s own arithmetic was simpler: at 10% green, the total cost per vessel was EUR 8.54m against EUR 8.69m on fossil fuel alone, a saving of EUR 0.16m. The first tonnes of green fuel pay for themselves because they remove the penalty and create a small surplus.
Reading. In the same quarter the file shows a borrower rewarded for alignment and a collateral on the edge of a covenant breach. The two are unrelated: the cycle does not care about the fuel. A lender who lets the first number colour its reading of the second has confused two scoreboards. And the alignment is temporary: with the limit falling from 2030 and the trajectory steepening, the same 10% share gives a delta of +4.8% by 2032, when the agreed switch to the striving trajectory also applies.
| Item | Figure | Stage |
|---|---|---|
| Loan, instalment, balloon | EUR 96m; EUR 5.33m a year; EUR 42.67m (44.4%) | 2.1 |
| Weighted average life; LTV at delivery and maturity | 7.5 years; 60% and 41.4% | 2.1 |
| Year-one debt service, DSCR, break-even rate | EUR 9.85m; 1.62; EUR 21,367 a day | 5.2 |
| Covenant headroom at years 0, 3, 10 | 25%, 30.0%, 48.2% | 5.3 |
| Refinancing gap at maturity (−30% cycle, −20% transition) | EUR 8.05m; LTV 73.9% | 5.3 |
| AER on fuel oil; minimum and striving requirement 2027 | 7.60; 7.86 and 7.04 gCO2e/t.nm | 5.4 |
| Delta on fuel oil, minimum: 2027, 2033, 2036 | −3.3%, +23.1%, +60.0% | 5.4 |
| Green share needed for alignment in 2036 | 44.9% (minimum), 59.8% (striving) | 5.4 |
| Cost per vessel 2027, fossil and 30% green | EUR 8.69m and EUR 9.16m; net EUR 0.47m | 5.5 |
| FuelEU penalty on fuel oil: 2027, 2030, 2035 | EUR 0.68m, 1.73m, 3.96m | 5.5 |
| Abatement cost; ETS price; FuelEU implied price | EUR 365, 75 and 638 per tCO2e | 5.5 |
| Ratchet: year one, ten years | EUR 48,000; EUR 360,000 | 5.6 |
| Year-three test at −30%: LTV, cover; delta at 10% green (2029) | 79.97%, 125.05%; −9.4% | 5.8 |
| RWA, capital, RAROC of Meridian’s hold | EUR 16.91m; EUR 2.20m; 12.3% (12.0% with discount) | 5.7 |
IN ONE SENTENCE — A ship reduces the capital of a loan only to the extent that the regulation lets the bank count it, and the three approaches of CRR3 count it very differently.
CRR3 (Regulation (EU) 2024/1623, applicable since 1 January 2025) defines object finance as a sub-class of specialised lending: the financing of physical assets such as ships, aircraft, satellites, railcars and fleets, where repayment depends on the cash flows of those assets.
Standardised approach (Article 122a). An unrated object finance exposure is weighted 100%, whatever the LTV. As a transitional derogation until 31 December 2032 (Article 495b(3)), exposures deemed of high quality may be weighted 80%, subject to conditions on exposure-to-value, repayment profile, refinancing risk and contractual protection. The EBA must report on object finance by 31 December 2030, including on whether a permanent high-quality category is warranted.
Slotting (Article 153(5)). An IRB bank that cannot estimate PD for specialised lending assigns the exposure to a category: strong 70%, good 90%, satisfactory 115%, weak 250%, with lower weights for strong and good below 2.5 years of remaining maturity. The EBA consulted from 7 May to 7 August 2026 on revised technical standards for the slotting criteria.
F-IRB with collateral. When the obligor is rated as a corporate, as Nordhavn is through its guarantee, the foundation approach recognises “other physical collateral” by splitting the exposure into a secured and an unsecured part.
FORMULA
is the exposure; the current value of the collateral; the supervisory haircut, 40% for other physical collateral; the secured part; the LGD of the secured part, 25%; the senior unsecured LGD, 40%; the resulting LGD used in the risk-weight formula of B03.
INTUITION — The supervisor behaves like a pawnbroker who values your watch at 60% of its price and then still expects to lose a quarter of what he lends against it.
CASE — At delivery Meridian’s share of the collateral is EUR 53.33m for an exposure of EUR 32m (LTV 60%). After the 40% haircut the collateral counts for exactly EUR 32m: the loan is fully secured in the regulatory sense, the LGD is 25% and the risk weight for a PD of 1.00% is 51.29%, against 82.06% unsecured. At an LTV of 80% only three quarters of the exposure is secured, the LGD is 28.75% and the risk weight 58.98%. The 60% advance ratio of ship finance is not a coincidence: it is the level at which the regulatory haircut is exhausted.
INTERACTIVE LAB — F-IRB: how the vessel reduces LGD and risk weight
Apply the CRR3 haircut for physical collateral to a ship loan and see how the regulatory LGD and the risk weight move with the loan-to-value.
| Parameter you can move | Range | Default |
|---|---|---|
| Loan-to-value | 30 to 120 % | 60 % |
| One-year PD | 0.2 to 4 % | 1 % |
| Exposure | 10 to 96 EUR m | 32 EUR m |
| Result at default settings | Value |
|---|---|
| Secured part of the exposure | 32.00 EUR m |
| Regulatory LGD | 25.00 % |
| Risk weight | 51.29 % |
| Risk weight if unsecured (LGD 40%) | 82.06 % |
| RWA | 16.41 EUR m |
| Allocated capital (13%) | 2.134 EUR m |
Try it. Raise the LTV to 85%, the level reached in section 5.3 after a 30% fall in values at delivery: the capital consumed rises just when the borrower is weakest.
Three caveats. The collateral is eligible only if the bank demonstrates liquid markets and reliable prices for the asset type and has the supervisor’s permission; it must revalue regularly. Banks on the advanced approach estimate their own LGD, now subject to input floors that are phased in until 2029 and that the industry contests for object finance (European Banking Federation white paper, June 2026). And the output floor compares the bank’s total RWA with 72.5% of the standardised figure when fully phased in: at the margin, a bank bound by the floor carries this loan at 72.5%, not 51.29%, and section 5.7 showed the RAROC falling to 8.8%. Nothing in any of the three approaches distinguishes a dual-fuel vessel from a conventional one.
The table of section 5.7 is the one in the credit application. The sustainability features change three things. The ratchet moves revenues by EUR 16,000 a year either way, 0.3 point of RAROC. The cost of collecting data and computing scores is real (a specialist’s time, the recognised organisation’s fee paid by the borrower) and is not charged to the deal. The third effect is the only large one and it is not in the formula: if dual-fuel capability preserves value in a stress, the economic LGD is lower than for a conventional sister ship, and the bank’s internal model, where it has one, may eventually show it. Today no bank has the default data to prove it.
A ten-year amortising loan is funded at its weighted average life: 7.5 years, a liquidity premium of 45 bp, a fifth of the margin. There is no undrawn commitment after delivery and hence no liquidity buffer; during a pre-delivery period the commitment would carry the 40 bp buffer cost on its undrawn part. Most ship and aircraft loans are in dollars: a euro bank funds them through the cross-currency basis or with dollar deposits, and the cost and availability of dollar funding has historically been the reason European banks retreated from the business in stress years. Loans secured by ships or aircraft can serve as collateral for covered bonds in a few jurisdictions (ship Pfandbriefe in Germany, for example), which lowers the funding cost for the banks that have such programmes; Meridian does not.
The lender. The loan is held to collect and measured at amortised cost under IFRS 9 if its cash flows are solely payments of principal and interest. Two points need a memo. A loan to a single-vessel SPV with no guarantee can be non-recourse in substance, and the bank must then check that it is not exposed to the asset’s performance in the way an investor would be; the Nordhavn guarantee settles the matter here. The margin ratchet is a contingent feature: the amendments to IFRS 9 effective for periods beginning on or after 1 January 2026 allow such features when the resulting cash flows do not differ significantly from those of an identical loan without them, with new disclosures; 5 bp qualifies. Expected credit losses use the collateral value in the LGD, so a fall in ship values raises provisions before any default, and a covenant breach is a typical trigger for stage 2. The fee is spread through the effective interest rate.
The borrower carries the vessels at cost less depreciation to scrap value over 25 years under IAS 16, and tests them for impairment under IAS 36 by comparing book value with value in use: a higher regulatory cost of fuel lowers value in use, which is how transition risk reaches the owner’s equity.
Leases. Under IFRS 16 the lessee recognises almost every lease on balance sheet as a right-of-use asset and a liability, so the old attraction of operating leases as off-balance-sheet finance has gone. The lessor still distinguishes finance leases (a receivable) from operating leases (the asset stays on its balance sheet, depreciated to the expected residual value). A leasing subsidiary that revises its residual values downward for conventionally fuelled assets takes the loss in its own accounts.
Poseidon score. The two vessels enter Meridian’s portfolio score with a weight equal to their share of its outstanding ship debt. Financed emissions. The PCAF standard has no shipping-specific method; for a loan financing an identified asset, banks attribute the asset’s emissions in proportion to the outstanding amount over the asset’s value at origination. Meridian’s EUR 32m against EUR 160m gives 20%.
CASE — On fuel oil the two vessels emit 69,322 t of CO2 a year at the funnel and 82,713 t of CO2e well to wake. Meridian’s financed emissions are 13,864 t and 16,543 t respectively, or 517 tCO2e per million euros lent, several times the intensity of an average corporate loan book. If Meridian’s shipping book of EUR 2,000m scores +9.0% against the minimum trajectory (case assumption), adding these vessels at −3.3% moves the portfolio score to +8.8%. One good deal moves the published number by two tenths of a point.
INTERACTIVE LAB — Financed emissions and the effect of the deal on the Poseidon portfolio score
Attribute the vessels’ emissions to the lender and measure how one loan moves a portfolio alignment score.
| Parameter you can move | Range | Default |
|---|---|---|
| Outstanding amount | 5 to 96 EUR m | 32 EUR m |
| Value of the vessels at origination | 100 to 250 EUR m | 160 EUR m |
| Share of green methanol | 0 to 95 % | 0 % |
| Existing shipping book | 200 to 10000 EUR m | 2000 EUR m |
| Existing portfolio score (minimum trajectory) | -20 to 40 % | 9 % |
| Result at default settings | Value |
|---|---|
| Attribution factor | 20.0 % |
| Vessels’ CO2 at the funnel | 69,322 t |
| Vessels’ CO2e well to wake | 82,713 t |
| Financed emissions, CO2 at the funnel | 13,864 t |
| Financed emissions, well to wake | 16,543 tCO2e |
| Financed emissions per EUR m lent | 517 tCO2e |
| Alignment delta of the vessels in 2027 | -3.3 % |
| Portfolio score after the deal | 8.81 % |
Try it. Set the green share to 30%: financed emissions fall by a quarter, and the portfolio score still barely moves. Scores change when the whole book changes.
Green Asset Ratio and Pillar 3. A loan financing an identified vessel is assessed on the taxonomy criteria of the asset. On fossil fuel the vessels are eligible but not aligned under the criteria applicable from 2026, which look at the fuel used; with enough certified fuel they may qualify year by year, which makes the ratio depend on the borrower’s bunkering decisions. Under the simplified disclosure rules published in the Official Journal on 8 January 2026, exposures to undertakings outside the scope of the CSRD may be excluded from the ratio; whether Nordhavn is in scope after the Omnibus thresholds is a question to check at signing. In the EBA Pillar 3 ESG templates, shipping is one of the sectors for which banks disclose an alignment metric against a reference scenario, and the exposure appears among carbon-intensive sectors in the transition-risk template. Meridian’s shipping desk thus feeds three public numbers with one data set: the Poseidon score, financed emissions and the Pillar 3 alignment metric (see E04).
| Risk | Control | Owner |
|---|---|---|
| Fall in vessel value (cycle) | Advance ratio, security cover tests twice a year, prepayment | Structurer, loan agency |
| Fall in value from fuel transition | Transition scenario in the credit application, lower advance or shorter profile for exposed assets | Credit analyst |
| Earnings shortfall | DSCR stress, liquidity covenant, parent guarantee | Credit analyst |
| Balloon refinancing | Maximum LTV at maturity in the structure, early refinancing dialogue | Relationship manager |
| Regulatory liabilities attached to the ship (ETS, FuelEU) | Covenant to comply and to evidence surrender; information undertaking | External counsel, agency |
| Wrong or unverifiable fuel data | Data from the recognised organisation, fuel certificates, Poseidon clause | Sustainable finance specialist |
| Sanctions, casualty, pollution | Screening, insurances incl. mortgagee’s interest, flag and class covenants | KYC desk, insurance adviser |
| Mislabelling of the loan | Internal label committee, second look on KPI and wording | Sustainable finance team |
| Recycling in sub-standard yards | Recycling covenant (Hong Kong Convention, EU list) | External counsel |
Red flags:
What changed recently. Poseidon moved to well-to-wake and two trajectories; the regulation started to bite in cash (ETS at full scope, first FuelEU penalties and pools); the global framework stalled; ordering shifted from methanol to LNG.
Open debates. Is AER, a capacity-based ratio, a fair measure, or should cargo carried be used, as charterers do? Should lenders finance LNG dual-fuel vessels, given methane slip and the lock-in of a fossil fuel? Does financing a new efficient aircraft reduce emissions if the old one is sold and keeps flying? Should object finance receive a lower risk weight permanently, and should that depend on the fuel technology? On the last point the evidence does not exist, and supervisors have so far refused to grant capital relief on environmental grounds alone.
INTERACTIVE LAB — Check your understanding of asset finance and its sustainable layer
Twelve questions on loan mechanics, leases, Poseidon, EU regulation and capital.
Q1. A EUR 60m ship loan has a 15-year repayment profile and a 5-year tenor. What is the balloon?
Answer: C. The annual instalment is 60/15 = EUR 4m; after 5 years EUR 20m is repaid and EUR 40m remains.
Q2. Who carries the residual-value risk in an operating lease?
Answer: A. Rents repay only part of the cost; the lessor recovers the rest from the value of the asset at the end of the lease.
Q3. The Poseidon Principles oblige a signatory bank to:
Answer: C. They are a measurement and disclosure framework, with a standard data covenant; they impose no lending restriction.
Q4. The denominator of the Annual Efficiency Ratio is:
Answer: B. AER uses the vessel’s capacity (deadweight), not its cargo, multiplied by distance; this is its main weakness.
Q5. On a well-to-wake basis, methanol made from natural gas, compared with fuel oil, is:
Answer: D. Around 100 gCO2e/MJ against about 92: upstream emissions outweigh the lower carbon content. Only certified bio- or e-methanol lowers the score.
Q6. From which emissions year do ships surrender EU allowances for 100% of their in-scope emissions?
Answer: C. The phase-in was 40% of 2024 emissions, 70% of 2025 and 100% from 2026.
Q7. The FuelEU Maritime limit applies to:
Answer: A. It is an intensity standard in gCO2e per MJ, 2% below the 91.16 reference from 2025 and 6% from 2030.
Q8. In the case, the implied price of the FuelEU penalty per tonne of CO2e is closest to:
Answer: D. EUR 2,400 per tonne of fuel-oil equivalent, which emits 3.76 t of CO2e well to wake: about EUR 638 per tonne.
Q9. Under the CRR3 standardised approach, an unrated object finance exposure that does not meet the high-quality conditions is weighted:
Answer: B. Article 122a gives 100%; a transitional 80% applies to high-quality object finance until the end of 2032.
Q10. Under F-IRB, a loan at 60% loan-to-value secured by eligible physical collateral has a regulatory LGD of:
Answer: C. After the 40% haircut the collateral covers the whole exposure, so the secured LGD of 25% applies in full.
Q11. Why are the first years of a ship loan the riskiest for the security cover?
Answer: B. In the case, headroom is 25% at delivery and 48% at maturity: amortisation builds the cushion.
Q12. A JOLCO is best described as:
Answer: D. Japanese investors own the asset through a partnership, benefit from tax depreciation, and the lessee holds a call option at a fixed price.
Q13. In the case, the 5 bp margin ratchet represents what share of the gross fuel premium of running 30% green?
Answer: A. EUR 48,000 against EUR 7.58m, or 0.6%.
An airline finances a narrowbody costing EUR 50m with an 80% advance, an 8-year tenor and a 15-year straight-line profile. The aircraft loses 4% of its cost in value each year. Compute the instalment, the balloon, the weighted average life and the LTV at maturity.
Loan: 80% of 50 = EUR 40m. Instalment: 40/15 = EUR 2.667m a year. Repaid after 8 years: EUR 21.33m; balloon EUR 18.67m, 46.7% of the loan. Weighted average life: = (96.0 + 149.3)/40 = 6.13 years, where 36 is the sum of the integers from 1 to 8. Value after 8 years: 50 × (1 − 0.32) = EUR 34m. LTV at maturity: 18.67/34 = 54.9%, against 80% at the start. The lender relies on the liquidity of the type: at 55% of a straight-line value, a 30% fall in values brings the LTV to 78%.
In 2030 a vessel uses 300 TJ of energy in scope at a well-to-wake intensity of 90.5 gCO2e/MJ. Compute the penalty. What share of a fuel at 20 gCO2e/MJ would make it compliant?
Limit in 2030: 91.16 × 0.94 = 85.69 gCO2e/MJ. Compliance balance: (85.69 − 90.5) × 300 million MJ = −1,443 million grams, a deficit of 1,443 t of CO2e. Fuel-oil equivalent: 1,443 million / (90.5 × 41,000) = 388.9 t. Penalty: 388.9 × 2,400 = EUR 933,000. Green share such that : = 4.81/70.5 = 6.8%, or 20.5 TJ. If the green fuel costs EUR 28 per GJ more than fuel oil, compliance by blending costs EUR 0.57m, less than the penalty, before counting the allowances saved.
Meridian lends EUR 40m to a rolling-stock SPV, treated under slotting in the “strong” category (70%). Margin 190 bp, FTP 48 bp, fee 80 bp spread over 6 years, cost-income 40%, expected loss EUR 0.06m. Compute the RAROC and the margin needed to reach 12%.
Revenue: 40 × 142 bp = EUR 0.568m, plus fee 0.32/6 = EUR 0.053m, total EUR 0.621m. Costs: EUR 0.249m. Pre-tax: 0.621 − 0.249 − 0.060 = EUR 0.313m; after tax EUR 0.235m. RWA: EUR 28m; capital EUR 3.64m. RAROC: 6.4%. For 12%, the pre-tax result must be 0.12 × 3.64/0.75 = EUR 0.582m; adding the expected loss and dividing by 60% gives revenues of EUR 1.071m, of which EUR 1.017m from the net margin: 254 bp, hence a client margin of about 302 bp. Under slotting, even a “strong” electric train fleet with a public counterparty needs a margin the market will not pay, which is why banks seek IRB treatment or leave such assets to insurers and infrastructure funds.
1. Why does a ship loan have a balloon? The vessel lives about 25 years and banks do not want to lend for more than 10 or 12. Instalments are set on a longer profile so that the vessel can service its debt from earnings, and the remainder is due at maturity. The balloon is repaid by refinancing or by sale, so the lender is in fact taking a view on the value of the vessel at that date. The control is the LTV at maturity under stress, not the DSCR.
2. What do the Poseidon Principles measure, and what are their limits? They measure, for each financed vessel, the well-to-wake carbon intensity per unit of capacity and distance (AER), and compare it with a trajectory derived from the IMO strategy; the bank publishes the debt-weighted average gap. The limits are that the metric uses capacity, not cargo, that it depends on speed and routing, that the trajectories are constructed, and that it constrains nothing. Its value lies in verified data and in the conversation it forces with every owner.
3. Is a dual-fuel vessel a green asset? Not by itself. Capability is an option; the emissions depend on the fuel burnt, and fossil methanol or LNG with methane slip can be no better than fuel oil. I would call it a transition asset whose green credentials must be evidenced each year by fuel certificates. In a loan, I would link any label or margin benefit to measured well-to-wake intensity, not to the engine.
4. How does carbon regulation enter a credit analysis in shipping? Through three lines. Operating cost: allowances and FuelEU penalties, to be compared with the charter rate and with who bears them under the charter party. Collateral value: a vessel with higher regulatory cost sells at a discount, which I model as a haircut on the value curve. Liability: unpaid allowances or penalties can lead to detention or expulsion orders, so I want compliance covenants and evidence of surrender.
5. Why is FuelEU a stronger driver than the ETS for fuel choice? Because the implied price is much higher. At an allowance price around EUR 75, the ETS covers a fraction of the extra cost of green fuel, whose abatement cost is several hundred euros per tonne. The FuelEU penalty amounts to more than EUR 600 per tonne of CO2e of shortfall, and surplus can be sold to other ships. The standard creates demand for the fuel; the carbon price mostly raises the cost of doing nothing.
6. Explain the difference between slotting, the standardised approach and F-IRB for a ship loan. Under the standardised approach an unrated object finance exposure is weighted 100%, or 80% if it meets the transitional high-quality conditions. Under slotting, the bank maps the deal to one of four categories with weights from 70% to 250%. Under F-IRB, if the obligor has a PD, the ship is recognised as physical collateral after a 40% haircut and the secured part carries an LGD of 25%; at 60% LTV and a 1% PD this gives about 51%. The output floor then limits the benefit at bank level.
7. A client asks for a 5 bp sustainability discount. What do you answer? That 5 bp is market practice and that we are happy to structure it, two-way, on an AER trajectory with data verified by the recognised organisation. I would also be clear that it is worth tens of thousands of euros a year against millions of fuel cost, so it is not what finances the transition. What matters more for the client is the structure: advance ratio, profile and tenor, where a credible fuel strategy can earn better terms from the credit committee.
8. What would make you lower the advance ratio on a conventionally fuelled newbuilding? A trade inside the EU scope, where the penalty from 2035 becomes a large share of EBITDA; no technical provision for retrofit or biofuel blending; a balloon falling due after 2035; and an owner without a pooling strategy. I would quantify the annual regulatory cost, capitalise it over the remaining life to obtain a discount on the value at maturity, and size the loan so that the stressed LTV at the balloon date still attracts a refinancing lender.
Standards and frameworks
Regulation
Supervisory and industry papers
Books and academic references