Transaction banking is the plumbing of Corporate Banking. It keeps the accounts of companies, moves their money (payments in and out, in all currencies), concentrates their cash every evening, invests what is left over and lends small amounts intraday or overnight when a subsidiary runs short. At Meridian Bank it sits inside Corporate Banking, next to lending (B02, B03) and trade finance (B10 to B12), and it serves the same clients. Its name varies across banks: global transaction banking, cash management, treasury services, global payments. The products are the same.
The client is the group treasurer and his or her team: the cash manager who runs the daily position, the payment factory that executes supplier payments for all subsidiaries, the treasury systems analyst who maintains the treasury management system (TMS) and its bank connections. A large European group has a handful of cash management banks, often one “overlay” bank that concentrates the cash of the group plus local banks in countries where the overlay bank is absent. Being the overlay bank is a prize: the bank sees every euro the company earns and spends, holds its liquidity and is the natural first call for everything else.
How the desk earns money. Two engines run side by side.
In the Vireo Pharma case of section 5, a pharmaceutical group with EUR 450m of average balances at Meridian and EUR 0.70m of annual fees, the deposit margin brings about three quarters of the revenue. That proportion is typical of a positive-rate environment and is the first thing a student should remember: in cash management, the balance sheet comes from the liability side.
WHO DOES WHAT — The transaction banking sales banker (also called cash management sales or TB coverage) owns the mandate and works alongside the corporate coverage banker (see B01). The cash management product team designs the structures: pooling, sweeps, payment formats. Implementation (onboarding) opens accounts, runs know-your-customer checks, connects the client’s TMS and tests files. Liquidity and deposits product managers set client rates under the guidance of Treasury, whose asset and liability management (ALM) team sets the FTP and models deposit behaviour. Payments operations executes and investigates payments; financial crime compliance screens them. The sustainable finance solutions team owns the green deposit framework and its reporting.
A week on the desk. On Monday the sales banker and the product manager present a pooling proposal to Vireo’s treasury: twelve subsidiaries, nine countries, a single euro header account. On Tuesday Treasury publishes the new FTP grid after a change in the ECB deposit facility rate; the deposits product manager decides which client rates follow and by how much (the “pass-through” or deposit beta). On Wednesday the implementation team runs test files in the ISO 20022 format with the client’s TMS. On Thursday the sustainable finance team checks that the pool of green loans earmarked against green deposits still exceeds the deposits outstanding after two loans were repaid early. On Friday the desk reviews its monthly profit and loss: deposit volumes, margins, fee income, and the LCR contribution of each client segment, which Treasury now reports desk by desk.
Why sustainability enters here. Treasurers increasingly ask that their cash, while it sits at the bank, finance something they can report. The bank’s answers are three: a green deposit, where the bank commits to hold eligible green assets at least equal to the deposit; an ESG-linked deposit or cash pool, where the rate paid depends on the client’s own sustainability performance; and data services that estimate the carbon footprint of the client’s payments and card spend. Each answer is less solid than it looks, because a deposit is a liability of the bank: the money does not go anywhere in particular. This module teaches the plumbing first, then the label, then what the label really changes for the client, the bank and the climate.
A cash management mandate is a bundle of five services. Each is simple; the value lies in combining them so that the treasurer sees and controls all the group’s cash every day.
Accounts. Each legal entity of the group holds current accounts, usually one per currency per entity, with the overlay bank or with local banks. The account is the ledger on which every flow is booked. The bank charges a monthly maintenance fee per account and, in a positive-rate world, pays credit interest on balances according to a rate schedule agreed with the treasurer.
Payments and collections. Outgoing flows are supplier payments, salaries, taxes and intra-group transfers. In the euro area they run on the SEPA schemes: SEPA Credit Transfer (SCT, settled the same or next business day), SEPA Instant Credit Transfer (SCT Inst, settled in seconds, around the clock) and SEPA Direct Debit for collections. Cross-border and non-euro payments go through correspondent banks over the SWIFT network, now in the ISO 20022 message format. Large groups send payment files from their TMS or from a central payment factory that pays on behalf of all subsidiaries, through a bank channel (EBICS in Germany and France, SWIFT FileAct, a direct host-to-host link or an application programming interface). Incoming flows are matched to invoices with the remittance information the bank returns in its statements (camt.053 end-of-day, camt.052 intraday).
Cash concentration. A group with 40 accounts in 12 countries does not want 40 small balances, some positive and some overdrawn. Pooling brings them together in two ways.
Liquidity investment. What the group does not need for operations it places: overnight on the header account, in term deposits (one week to twelve months), in notice deposits (the client must give, for example, 31, 60 or 90 days’ notice before withdrawing), in money market funds, or in short-term securities. The bank competes here with money market funds and with its own treasury, which may prefer some types of deposit to others for liquidity reasons explained below.
Short-term credit. Intraday overdrafts (to pay before collections arrive), overnight overdrafts on participant accounts and the credit exposure created by notional pooling. These are usually uncommitted lines, approved by the credit function and small relative to deposits.
Fees are the visible part. A large corporate pays a monthly fee per account, a price per payment (a few cents for a bulk SEPA payment, more for an urgent or cross-border payment, plus charges for investigations and returns), a fee for the pooling structure, a fee for the electronic banking channel and for data services. Since January 2025 the EU Instant Payments Regulation requires banks in the euro area to charge no more for an instant euro credit transfer than for a standard one, which has removed one source of fee income and pushed volumes to instant payments.
The deposit margin is the larger part when interest rates are positive. Treasury buys every euro deposited at a transfer price; the desk pays the client less. The margin depends on what the deposit is worth to the bank, and that is a matter of behaviour: how long the money will stay, and how much of it would leave in a crisis.
IN ONE SENTENCE — The deposit margin is the difference between the funds transfer price that Treasury credits for a deposit and the rate the bank pays the client; the transfer price itself depends on how stable the deposit is.
INTUITION — A bank values deposits like a landlord values tenants. A tenant who signs a three-year lease and whose business depends on the premises (the operational deposit) is worth more than a tenant who may leave next week (the overnight surplus). The landlord charges the first a little less rent because it does not need to keep a reserve for the empty flat.
FORMULA
is the market rate for very short funding (2.50% in the course universe, which happens to equal the ECB deposit facility rate in November 2026). is the LCR outflow rate of the deposit: the share the regulation assumes will leave within 30 days of stress. is the carry cost of holding high-quality liquid assets (HQLA) against that outflow, 40 bp at Meridian: the bank must invest of the deposit in liquid securities or central bank reserves that yield less than . is the “core” share of the balance that Treasury’s behavioural model expects to remain for a long time, and the liquidity premium for funding of tenor (about 6 bp per year at Meridian). is the deposit margin and the rate paid to the client.
The two regulatory parameters come from the LCR delegated regulation. A deposit kept by a non-financial corporate as part of an established operational relationship (clearing, custody or cash management) is an operational deposit, with an outflow rate of 25%. Other deposits of non-financial corporates carry 40%. Only the portion actually needed for the operational services qualifies; the surplus is non-operational. A deposit that cannot be withdrawn within the next 30 days, such as a term deposit with more than 30 days to run or a notice deposit on which no notice has been given, does not enter the outflows at all, because the LCR counts only liabilities that can fall due within 30 days.
The case of section 5 applies the formula. Vireo Pharma’s operational balances have ; Treasury’s model treats 70% of them as core with a three-year behavioural tenor. The FTP is . Vireo is paid 1.80%, so the margin is 72.6 bp, or EUR 1.60m a year on EUR 220m.
INTERACTIVE LAB — What a corporate deposit is worth to the bank
Derive the funds transfer price and the margin of a deposit from its LCR outflow rate, its core share and the client rate, and see how the margin moves with the level of interest rates.
| Parameter you can move | Range | Default |
|---|---|---|
| Short-term market rate | 0 to 5 % | 2.5 % |
| Deposit beta (client rate as share of market rate) | 0 to 100 % | 72 % |
| LCR outflow rate | 0 / 25 / 40 / 100 | 25 % |
| Core (stable) share | 0 to 100 % | 70 % |
| Behavioural tenor of the core | 0 to 5 years | 3 years |
| HQLA carry cost | 0 to 100 bp | 40 bp |
| Average balance | 10 to 1000 EUR m | 220 EUR m |
| Result at default settings | Value |
|---|---|
| Funds transfer price | 2.526 % |
| Client rate | 1.800 % |
| Deposit margin | 72.6 bp |
| Annual net interest income | 1.5972 EUR m |
Try it. Set the market rate to 0%: the margin collapses to 2.6 bp. This is why deposits were nearly worthless to banks between 2014 and 2022, and why a rise in rates lifts transaction banking revenue faster than any sales effort.
PITFALL — Reading the deposit margin as risk-free profit. It is earned only as long as clients do not move their money to a competitor or a money market fund, and it shrinks when rates fall. The FTP also embeds a model: if Treasury overestimates the core share, the desk is credited for stability that will not be there in a crisis, as the outflows of 2023 at several US regional banks showed.
WHY IT MATTERS ON THE DESK — The deposit beta is the most negotiated number in transaction banking. Each basis point of client rate on EUR 220m is EUR 22,000 a year. When the ECB moves, Treasury moves the FTP the same day; the desk decides how much of the move to pass to clients, and treasurers compare offers across their banks within the week.
Credit risk is small: it comes from intraday and overnight overdrafts and from the debit balances of a notional pool. The main risks are operational: a payment sent twice or to the wrong beneficiary, a fraud through a compromised client channel, a sanctions breach, an outage of the payment platform. They are covered by operational risk capital, by controls (four-eyes validation, payment screening, Verification of Payee checks on euro credit transfers since October 2025) and by the account terms, which allocate liability between bank and client.
Liquidity risk is the bank’s own risk on the deposit: corporate deposits are less sticky than household deposits and are not covered, beyond the first EUR 100,000 per depositor, by the deposit guarantee scheme. Interest rate risk arises because non-maturity deposits have no contractual repricing date; Treasury models their behaviour and hedges the core with swaps, which is why the core share carries a term premium in the FTP.
The documents are the account opening mandate and signatory list, the know-your-customer file for every entity, the bank’s general terms for accounts and payments, a cash pooling agreement (participants, sweep rules, interest allocation, cross-guarantees for notional pools), the electronic banking agreement with its security procedures, a rate letter for credit interest, and the fee schedule. None of it is syndicated or rated; it is standard, bilateral and long-lived. A cash management relationship typically lasts many years once the client’s systems are connected, because switching banks means re-testing every file and every connection.
The green (or sustainable) deposit. The client places cash, usually a term or notice deposit with a minimum size, and the bank commits to hold an amount of eligible green assets at least equal to the green deposits outstanding. The eligible assets are defined in the bank’s green financing framework, typically the same one used for its own green bonds: renewable energy loans, green buildings, clean transport, water. The deposit itself is an ordinary deposit: same ranking, same deposit guarantee (or lack of it), same rate grid in most cases. What the client receives is the commitment, an annual allocation report and, sometimes, an impact report expressed in tonnes of CO2 avoided per million euros.
Market practice is well documented. Deutsche Bank launched green deposits for corporates in March 2021 as term deposits under twelve months, matched by an equal amount in a green asset pool selected under its green financing framework and verified externally. Citi launched sustainable time deposits in May 2022, referencing its green and social bond frameworks, and states that their return is not linked to the underlying assets. Nordea extended its “Deposit with Climate Focus” to Finland in April 2025: fixed-rate deposits of 31 to 180 days, minimum EUR 2m, against which it intends to allocate an equal amount to its green bond asset portfolio. MUFG brought its green deposit product to EU clients in October 2026, with a framework developed with support from an ESG research provider.
The ESG-linked deposit or cash account. The rate paid on the client’s balances depends on the client’s own sustainability performance against key performance indicators (KPIs) and targets, in the spirit of a sustainability-linked loan (see B03) but on the liability side. Standard Chartered launched an ESG-linked cash account in Hong Kong and Singapore in September 2024: client and bank agree KPIs and targets, for example a 5% annual reduction in Scope 1 and 2 emissions, and the bank pays pre-agreed bonus interest when an audited certificate shows the target was met. The money is not earmarked; the link is only in the price.
Payment and card data services. Banks and card schemes offer estimates of the carbon footprint of the client’s card spend and supplier payments. Mastercard launched its Carbon Calculator for issuing banks in 2021 with the Swedish fintech Doconomy, whose method applies emission factors per unit of currency spent by merchant category. For a corporate, the same idea applied to purchasing cards and supplier payments produces a spend-based estimate of part of its Scope 3 emissions.
There is no market standard for green deposits comparable to the Green Bond Principles or the Green Loan Principles. Banks build their frameworks by analogy with the four core components of the ICMA Green Bond Principles: use (here, allocation) of proceeds, process for project evaluation and selection, management of proceeds, reporting; plus an external review. The EU Green Bond Standard (Regulation (EU) 2023/2631) applies only to bonds. ESG-linked deposits borrow the five components of the Sustainability-Linked Loan Principles of the LMA, APLMA and LSTA (KPI selection, target calibration, product characteristics, reporting, verification), without being subject to them. The absence of a standard is the first thing a student should say about this product line, and the first thing an auditor will ask about.
For spend-based footprints, the reference is the GHG Protocol Scope 3 Standard, which accepts spend-based methods for purchased goods and services and business travel while ranking them below supplier-specific and activity-based data. PCAF’s methods cover financed and facilitated emissions, not the emissions of payments a bank processes for its clients.
No regulation is written for green deposits. Several touch them.
The label changes the bank’s obligations: it must maintain a ring-fenced register of eligible assets, avoid allocating the same asset to two labelled liabilities, report annually and have the process reviewed. It changes the client’s reporting: the treasurer can tell the board that the group’s cash is matched by green assets. It does not change where the money goes. Money is fungible on a bank’s balance sheet, and the green loans existed before the deposit and would exist without it, unless the bank is constrained in funding them, which in a liquid euro-area bank is rarely the case. The honest description is therefore “a deposit referenced to a pool of green assets”, not “a deposit that finances green projects”. Section 5 quantifies what each party gains and section 7 turns the gap into red flags.
A cash management mandate is won through a request for proposal (RFP), implemented over several months and then run for years. A green deposit or an ESG-linked feature is added inside this cycle, usually at the RFP or at an annual review. The flow below follows the Vireo case.
INTERACTIVE LAB — From RFP to annual allocation report: a cash management mandate with a green deposit
Follow the roles, documents and controls from the treasurer’s request for proposal to the first annual green deposit report.
| # | Who | Does what | Deliverable |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Client treasurer | Issues an RFP for euro cash pooling and liquidity, asking for green investment options | RFP with account list, volumes and questionnaire |
| 2 | Transaction banking sales and coverage banker | Qualify the opportunity, estimate the wallet and assemble the bid team | Bid plan and pricing request |
| 3 | Cash management product | Designs the pooling structure, channels and payment formats | Solution design and fee schedule |
| 4 | Treasury ALM | Classifies expected balances (operational, non-operational, notice) and sets the FTP | Deposit FTP sheet and rate proposal |
| 5 | Sustainable finance solutions | Checks green asset headroom and the eligibility of the client under the green deposit framework | Allocation headroom memo |
| 6 | Pricing committee | Approves fees, credit interest rates and the ESG-linked step-up | Signed pricing approval |
| 7 | Credit risk | Approves intraday and overnight limits on participant accounts | Uncommitted limit approval |
| 8 | Implementation and KYC teams | Open accounts, complete know-your-customer files, connect the TMS and test files | Account opening pack and test sign-off |
| 9 | Legal | Finalises the cash pooling agreement, green deposit terms and ESG rate letter | Signed agreements |
| 10 | Payments operations | Goes live: daily sweeps, payments, statements | First end-of-day statements |
| 11 | Treasury and sustainable finance | Book the green deposit and tag matching assets in the allocation register | Updated green asset register |
| 12 | Client and external verifier | Client submits its audited KPI certificate for the ESG step-up | Sustainability compliance certificate |
| 13 | Sustainable finance and external reviewer | Produce and review the annual allocation and impact report | Green deposit allocation report with limited assurance |
RFP and bid (weeks 1 to 6). The treasurer’s RFP lists entities, accounts, currencies, payment volumes by type and average balances. It now routinely contains an ESG section: the bank’s own climate targets, its green products for liquidity, its ability to report on the footprint of payments. The coverage banker (see B01) checks that the mandate fits the relationship plan; the sales banker leads the bid.
Solution and pricing (weeks 3 to 8). The product team designs the pool and writes the fee schedule. Treasury’s ALM team tells the desk what each type of balance is worth: here it classifies the expected EUR 220m of operational balances, EUR 230m of surplus and the planned notice deposit. The sustainable finance team checks that the green asset pool can absorb the new green deposit without double allocation, and that the client passes the framework’s exclusion list (a group active in excluded sectors cannot receive a green deposit at many banks). The pricing committee approves rates below the FTP and any deviation from the standard fee grid; the ESG-linked step-up is approved as a pricing concession, with its maximum annual cost.
Credit and legal (weeks 6 to 12). Credit risk approves uncommitted intraday and overnight limits for participants. Legal negotiates the cash pooling agreement and adds two documents for the sustainable layer: the green deposit terms (the bank’s allocation commitment, the client’s right to information, what happens if the pool falls short) and the ESG rate letter (KPIs, targets, verification, step-up, consequences of a missing certificate).
Implementation (months 3 to 6). The longest phase. Each account needs a mandate and a KYC file; the TMS must exchange payment files and statements with the bank in the agreed formats; test cycles run until the first live payment. Errors here, not pricing, are why mandates are lost at renewal.
Run and report (every day, every year). Sweeps run every evening. Treasury tags assets to the green deposit in the allocation register and monitors headroom monthly. Once a year the client sends its KPI certificate; the bank applies or withdraws the step-up from the next interest period. The sustainable finance team publishes the allocation report, reviewed by an external provider with limited assurance, and the desk reviews whether the relationship still earns its hurdle.
WHO DOES WHAT — The control that matters most is the allocation register. It is owned by Treasury or the sustainable finance team, not by the sales desk, and every labelled liability of the bank (green bonds, green covered bonds, green deposits) draws on the same register. The internal audit question is always the same: show me, on a given date, the list of assets behind each labelled liability, and prove that none appears twice.
Question. What does Meridian earn today on Vireo’s cash, and what exactly is the treasurer asking for?
Data (case assumptions). Vireo Pharma is a fictional European pharmaceutical group with revenue of about EUR 6bn, rated A-, headquartered in the euro area, with twelve operating subsidiaries in nine countries. Meridian has been its euro overlay bank for four years: a physical zero-balancing pool sweeps all euro participant accounts every evening into a header account of Vireo Treasury. Average balances at Meridian over the last twelve months:
| Balance type | Average balance | Client rate | LCR outflow |
|---|---|---|---|
| Operational balances in the pool | EUR 220m | 1.80% | 25% |
| Surplus cash, overnight on the header | EUR 230m | 2.10% | 40% |
| Total | EUR 450m |
Treasury’s ALM model treats 70% of the operational balances as core, with a three-year behavioural tenor, and none of the overnight surplus. Annual fees are EUR 0.70m: EUR 0.25m for accounts and pooling, EUR 0.35m for payments and EUR 0.10m for cards and data services. Market rate 2.50%, HQLA carry cost 40 bp.
Vireo’s new treasurer has received a board instruction: by year-end, the group’s cash must “support its climate strategy”. Vireo has a validated near-term science-based target to cut Scope 1 and 2 emissions by 42% by 2030 from a 2022 base, which it translates into a 7% annual reduction milestone. The treasurer asks Meridian for two things: a green investment option for surplus cash, and a link between the pool’s credit interest and Vireo’s emissions milestone, “as we have on our RCF”. He also asks whether Meridian can measure the carbon footprint of the group’s card and supplier payments.
Calculation. Applying the formula of section 2.2 to each balance type:
Result. Net interest income of EUR 2.1492m a year, plus EUR 0.70m of fees: EUR 2.85m of revenue, three quarters of it from deposits.
Reading. The overnight surplus is the weak part of the relationship. It is the most expensive cash for Meridian to hold in liquidity terms (40% outflow, no core) and the one most likely to leave: a money market fund pays close to the market rate and the treasurer can move it in a day. Any green product should be judged first on what it does to this EUR 230m.
WHO DOES WHAT — The meeting with Vireo is prepared by three people. The transaction banking sales banker owns the proposal and the pricing request. The deposits product manager brings Treasury’s FTP sheet for each balance type and the conventional rate grid. The sustainable finance solutions analyst brings the register headroom and the framework’s client eligibility checklist: Vireo is a pharmaceutical group, outside the excluded sectors, with a published transition plan and a validated target, so it passes. The coverage banker joins for the last half hour, because the treasurer’s request will be discussed again at the annual relationship review with the chief financial officer.
The treasurer’s own constraints shape the answer as much as the bank’s. His investment policy, approved by the board, limits deposits with any single bank to a share of group cash, requires a minimum rating of the bank and, for anything placed beyond overnight, a maximum maturity or notice period that keeps the cash classified as a cash equivalent. His alternatives for the surplus are a constant net asset value or low-volatility money market fund, which pays close to the market rate with same-day liquidity, and term deposits with his other relationship banks. A green investment option that fails these tests will be declined however attractive its label.
Question. If Vireo moves EUR 150m of its overnight surplus into a 90-day notice deposit, what changes for the bank’s liquidity, for its net interest income and for Vireo?
Data. Meridian’s standard 90-day notice deposit pays 2.25% to a client of Vireo’s size. As long as no notice has been served, the deposit cannot leave within 30 days, so its LCR outflow is zero; Treasury credits the 3-month point of its liquidity curve, 1.5 bp. The NSFR treats all deposits of non-financial corporates with a residual maturity under one year, operational or not, with a 50% available stable funding factor.
Calculation.
LCR outflows fall from to , so EUR 60m less HQLA is needed. At 40 bp of carry, that is EUR 0.24m a year saved by Treasury. Vireo earns 15 bp more on EUR 150m, EUR 0.225m. Meridian also gains the 1.5 bp term credit on EUR 150m, EUR 0.0225m. Net for Meridian: .
INTERACTIVE LAB — From overnight to notice: who gains from the liquidity value
Measure how moving surplus cash from overnight into a notice deposit changes LCR outflows, the HQLA buffer, the NSFR and the net interest income of the bank and the client.
| Parameter you can move | Range | Default |
|---|---|---|
| Operational balances | 0 to 500 EUR m | 220 EUR m |
| Overnight surplus before the switch | 0 to 500 EUR m | 230 EUR m |
| Amount moved to the notice deposit | 0 to 230 EUR m | 150 EUR m |
| Client rate on operational balances | 0 to 3 % | 1.8 % |
| Client rate overnight | 0 to 3 % | 2.1 % |
| Client rate on the notice deposit | 0 to 3 % | 2.25 % |
| HQLA carry cost | 0 to 100 bp | 40 bp |
| Term credit for the notice deposit | 0 to 10 bp | 1.5 bp |
| Result at default settings | Value |
|---|---|
| FTP overnight surplus | 2.340 % |
| FTP notice deposit | 2.515 % |
| Margin on the notice deposit | 26.5 bp |
| LCR outflows before | 147.0 EUR m |
| LCR outflows after | 87.0 EUR m |
| HQLA no longer needed | 60.0 EUR m |
| Carry saved by Treasury | 0.2400 EUR m |
| Extra interest earned by the client | 0.2250 EUR m |
| Bank NII on deposits before | 2.1492 EUR m |
| Bank NII on deposits after | 2.1867 EUR m |
| Change in bank NII | 0.0375 EUR m |
| Bank NII on the notice deposit | 0.3975 EUR m |
| Bank NII on the remaining overnight cash | 0.1920 EUR m |
| NSFR available stable funding before | 225.0 EUR m |
| NSFR available stable funding after | 225.0 EUR m |
Try it. Raise the notice rate to 2.40%: the bank now loses EUR 187,500 a year on the switch. The break-even client rate is 2.275%, the overnight rate plus the 16 bp of carry and the 1.5 bp of term credit.
Result. LCR outflows fall from EUR 147m to EUR 87m; Meridian’s net interest income on Vireo’s deposits rises from EUR 2.1492m to EUR 2.1867m, by EUR 37,500; Vireo earns EUR 225,000 more; the NSFR does not move (EUR 225m of available stable funding before and after).
Reading. This is the most important result of the case, and it has nothing green in it. The value is created by the 90-day notice clause, which turns a 40% LCR outflow into zero, and it is shared: most of it goes to the client as a higher rate, a little to the bank. A conventional 90-day notice deposit would create exactly the same value. The green label can help the treasurer accept the notice period (his board wants the cash “to support the climate strategy”), which is a real commercial benefit, but the economics belong to the notice clause. The break-even client rate is 2.275%, the overnight rate of 2.10% plus 16 bp of carry ( bp) and 1.5 bp of term credit: if Meridian paid a “green premium” of more than 2.5 bp above its conventional notice rate, it would destroy value on the switch.
From Vireo’s side the trade-off is different. The treasurer gives up same-day access to EUR 150m and gains 15 bp, EUR 225,000 a year. His cash forecast shows that the group’s minimum surplus over the last two years never fell below EUR 180m, so a 90-day notice on EUR 150m does not threaten operations; the remaining EUR 80m overnight and the EUR 220m of operational balances cover daily needs. A 90-day notice also keeps the deposit within the usual three-month limit for cash equivalents, so the group’s reported cash does not change. The case for him is therefore yield plus a board-friendly label, at a liquidity cost he can absorb.
The result is also sensitive to rates. If the ECB cut by 100 bp and Meridian moved all client rates by the same amount, the carry cost of HQLA and therefore the liquidity value of the notice clause would be roughly unchanged, because it depends on the spread between HQLA yields and the market rate rather than on the level. The overnight margin, however, would be squeezed if client rates could not fall below zero, as the chart in section 2.2 shows. The notice product is a structural improvement, not a bet on rates.
PITFALL — Treating the NSFR as a reason to prefer notice deposits. Under the CRR all non-financial corporate deposits under one year receive the same 50% available stable funding factor, operational or not, overnight or 90-day. The notice deposit helps the LCR, not the NSFR. Only deposits with more than one year to run would improve the NSFR, and corporates rarely place cash that long.
Question. Can Meridian label Vireo’s EUR 150m notice deposit as a green deposit under its framework, and what must it hold on the asset side?
Data (Meridian’s register, case assumptions). Meridian’s green financing framework, reviewed by an external provider, defines eligible assets: loans to renewable energy projects, energy-efficient buildings, clean transport and water infrastructure. On the last reporting date the register shows:
| Item | Amount |
|---|---|
| Eligible green assets in the register | EUR 6,400m |
| Green bonds outstanding (senior and covered) | EUR 4,500m |
| Green deposits outstanding (all clients) | EUR 1,250m |
| Internal over-collateralisation buffer | 10% |
| Pipeline of new eligible loans, validated by the green committee | EUR 250m |
| Share of the register that is Taxonomy-aligned | 55% |
The framework requires eligible assets to exceed all labelled liabilities by 10%, so that prepayments do not immediately leave a green liability unmatched.
Calculation. The allocation capacity is the pool divided by 1.10, minus what is already allocated:
is the stock of eligible green assets, the buffer, the green bonds outstanding and the green deposits outstanding. Today : there is room for EUR 68m only. Vireo’s EUR 150m would leave a shortfall of EUR 81.82m against the buffer. With the EUR 250m pipeline tagged into the register, capacity becomes , and EUR 145.45m remains after Vireo. Coverage of labelled liabilities by eligible assets is then .
INTERACTIVE LAB — Can the bank take one more green deposit?
Check the allocation capacity of the green asset register against all labelled liabilities, with an over-collateralisation buffer, and see how much of the cover is Taxonomy-aligned.
| Parameter you can move | Range | Default |
|---|---|---|
| Eligible green assets in the register | 0 to 12000 EUR m | 6400 EUR m |
| New eligible assets tagged | 0 to 1000 EUR m | 250 EUR m |
| Green bonds outstanding | 0 to 10000 EUR m | 4500 EUR m |
| Green deposits outstanding | 0 to 5000 EUR m | 1250 EUR m |
| Over-collateralisation buffer | 0 to 30 % | 10 % |
| New green deposit requested | 0 to 1000 EUR m | 150 EUR m |
| Taxonomy-aligned share of the register | 0 to 100 % | 55 % |
| Result at default settings | Value |
|---|---|
| Capacity before the new deposit | 295.45 EUR m |
| Headroom after the new deposit | 145.45 EUR m |
| Eligible assets / labelled liabilities | 112.71 % |
| Taxonomy-aligned assets / labelled liabilities | 61.99 % |
Try it. Set the buffer to 0%: capacity jumps, but one large prepayment would then leave a labelled liability without assets. Set the aligned share to 40% to see how little of the cover may meet the EU Taxonomy.
Result. Without the pipeline, Meridian cannot take the deposit within its own buffer rule (capacity EUR 68.18m against EUR 150m requested). With EUR 250m of validated new loans tagged, it can, leaving EUR 145.45m of headroom and a coverage of 112.71%. Only 61.99% of the labelled liabilities are matched by Taxonomy-aligned assets, because the framework’s eligibility criteria are broader than the Taxonomy’s technical screening criteria.
Reading. Three lessons. First, green deposits compete with the bank’s own green bonds for the same assets: every euro of green deposit reduces Treasury’s capacity to issue green bonds (see C15). Inside Meridian this is a real negotiation, settled by the asset and liability committee (ALCO). Second, the constraint is the register, not demand: banks that sell green deposits aggressively run out of eligible assets, which is why most programmes have minimum sizes and limited capacity. Third, “green” in the framework is not “Taxonomy-aligned”: the marketing documents must say which one they mean. Meridian’s term sheet will state “eligible under Meridian’s Green Financing Framework” and give the aligned share in the annual report, not claim alignment for the deposit.
CASE — Meridian’s offer to Vireo: a EUR 150m green notice deposit, 90-day notice, 2.25%, the same rate as the conventional notice deposit. The allocation commitment is “at all times, eligible assets at least equal to the green deposit”, with the 10% buffer as an internal policy, not a contractual promise. Vireo receives an annual allocation report and an impact estimate by category.
The term sheet is short, and every word is reviewed by compliance. It names the product (“Green Notice Deposit”), the amount, the notice period, the rate and its reset rules, then a paragraph on the allocation commitment: Meridian will maintain eligible assets under its published Green Financing Framework in an amount at least equal to all green deposits outstanding, will not allocate those assets to any other labelled liability, and will publish an annual allocation report reviewed by an external provider. It states what the product is not: the deposit is an unsecured obligation of Meridian, it ranks like any other deposit, its return is not linked to the performance of the eligible assets, and it does not give the depositor any right over them. It also says what happens if the commitment cannot be met: Meridian informs the depositor and the depositor may, at its option, withdraw without notice. That last clause is commercially generous and prudentially awkward, because it means the deposit could leave within 30 days; Treasury accepts it only because the trigger is under Meridian’s control.
Question. Vireo wants the credit interest on its operational balances to rise if it meets its annual emissions milestone. What does it cost Meridian, and does it create any incentive for Vireo?
Data (case assumptions). KPI: Scope 1 and 2 emissions (market-based), verified by Vireo’s statutory sustainability auditor under limited assurance. Sustainability performance target: a 7% reduction in the year, consistent with the validated 2030 target. Mechanism: two-way, plus 5 bp on the operational balances’ credit rate if the target is met, minus 5 bp if it is missed, applied for the following twelve months; a missing certificate counts as a miss. Meridian’s sustainable finance team estimates an 80% probability that Vireo meets each annual milestone, because the reductions come mainly from renewable power purchase agreements already signed. The milestone represents about 12,000 tonnes of CO2e a year. Vireo applies an internal carbon price of EUR 100 per tonne to its investment decisions.
Calculation.
is the operational balance, the step in the client rate, the probability of meeting the target; is the expected annual cost for the bank of a two-way step. , so EUR 110,000 if met. . Per tonne of the milestone: euros. Against Vireo’s internal carbon price, the step-up is worth of the value Vireo already places on the abatement.
INTERACTIVE LAB — What an ESG-linked step-up on a cash pool is worth
Compute the cost to the bank of a two-way rate step on operational balances and compare it, per tonne, with the client’s internal carbon price.
| Parameter you can move | Range | Default |
|---|---|---|
| Operational balances | 50 to 1000 EUR m | 220 EUR m |
| Rate step | 0 to 25 bp | 5 bp |
| Probability of meeting the target | 0 to 100 % | 80 % |
| Annual abatement in the milestone | 1000 to 100000 t CO2e | 12000 t CO2e |
| Client’s internal carbon price | 0 to 300 EUR/t | 100 EUR/t |
| Result at default settings | Value |
|---|---|
| Bank cost if the target is met | 0.1100 EUR m |
| Expected annual cost (two-way) | 0.0660 EUR m |
| Step-up per tonne of milestone | 9.17 EUR/t |
| Step-up as share of internal carbon value | 9.17 % |
Try it. Push the step to 25 bp: the bonus reaches EUR 46 per tonne, still below the internal carbon price, while the bank gives up over a third of its 72.6 bp margin on the operational balances.
Result. EUR 110,000 a year if Vireo meets the target, an expected cost of EUR 66,000, or EUR 9.17 per tonne of the milestone: about 9% of the value Vireo already puts on those tonnes.
Reading. The step-up does not change Vireo’s decisions. Its abatement plan is driven by its science-based target, its power purchase agreements and its internal carbon price; EUR 110,000 on a EUR 6bn group is a rounding error. The ESG link is a signal and a reporting convenience, as in sustainability-linked loans (see B03), and its weakness is worse on the liability side: the KPI is already reported, already assured and already committed in a public target, so the bank adds no verification work that the client’s auditor did not already do. Meridian accepts it as a pricing concession inside the relationship, approved by the pricing committee with a ceiling of 5 bp, and it should describe it as such: a rate letter linked to Vireo’s published target, not “a deposit that drives decarbonisation”. Note also that the two-way design matters: a one-way step-up is a pure gift if the target is easy.
PITFALL — Calibrating the KPI on what the client has already contracted. If the milestone is delivered by power purchase agreements signed before the rate letter, the 80% probability is really a near-certainty and the step-up is a discount with a green name. The sustainable finance team should test ambition exactly as for a sustainability-linked loan: against the client’s trajectory, its peers and a science-based benchmark.
Question. What can Meridian tell Vireo about the emissions behind its card spend, and how reliable is it?
Data (case assumptions). Vireo’s purchasing and travel cards, issued by Meridian, carried EUR 33m of spend last year: air travel EUR 9m, hotels and restaurants EUR 4m, laboratory supplies EUR 11m, IT and software EUR 6m, other EUR 3m. The data service applies spend-based emission factors by merchant category, in kilograms of CO2e per euro: air travel 1.10, hotels and restaurants 0.35, laboratory supplies 0.55, IT and software 0.20, other 0.30. These factors are illustrative for the case; a real service uses environmentally extended input-output tables or a commercial database, with factors that differ by country and year. Vireo’s reported Scope 3 is about 600,000 tonnes.
Calculation.
is the estimated emissions, the spend in merchant category and the emission factor of that category. In EUR m times kg per euro, the result is in thousands of tonnes: , so 19,450 tonnes, an average intensity of 0.589 kg per euro and 3.24% of Vireo’s Scope 3.
INTERACTIVE LAB — Spend-based footprint of corporate card payments
Estimate the emissions behind card spend by merchant category with spend-based factors, and see the uncertainty band and the weight of each category.
| Parameter you can move | Range | Default |
|---|---|---|
| Air travel spend | 0 to 30 EUR m | 9 EUR m |
| Hotels and restaurants spend | 0 to 20 EUR m | 4 EUR m |
| Laboratory supplies spend | 0 to 40 EUR m | 11 EUR m |
| IT and software spend | 0 to 20 EUR m | 6 EUR m |
| Other spend | 0 to 20 EUR m | 3 EUR m |
| Uncertainty band on factors (plus or minus) | 0 to 80 % | 40 % |
| Client’s reported Scope 3 | 100000 to 2000000 t CO2e | 600000 t CO2e |
| Result at default settings | Value |
|---|---|
| Estimated emissions | 19,450 t CO2e |
| Low end of band | 11,670 t CO2e |
| High end of band | 27,230 t CO2e |
| Average intensity | 0.589 kg CO2e per EUR |
| Share of reported Scope 3 | 3.24 % |
| Air travel share of spend | 27.3 % |
| Air travel share of emissions | 50.9 % |
Try it. Set air travel to zero: the estimate halves, although air is only 27% of spend. Then imagine Vireo switched to a cheaper airline for the same flights: a spend-based method would report lower emissions for the same kerosene.
Result. About 19,450 tonnes, in a band of 11,670 to 27,230 tonnes with a 40% uncertainty on the factors; 3.24% of Vireo’s reported Scope 3. Air travel is 27% of the spend and 51% of the estimate.
Reading. The service is useful for one thing: showing the treasurer and the travel manager where the hot spots are, quickly and without supplier data. It is weak for everything else. Spend-based factors measure euros, not activity: a price rise raises the footprint, a discount lowers it, and two suppliers of the same product get the same factor. The GHG Protocol ranks the method lowest in data quality, and Vireo’s sustainability team will prefer supplier-specific data for its reported Scope 3. The emissions of the payment processing itself (data centres, card manufacturing) are negligible compared with the goods bought and should not be the headline. Meridian charges EUR 30,000 of the EUR 100,000 cards and data fee line for this service; its value is in the relationship, and its risk is in being quoted as an audited figure, which the service terms must exclude.
Question. Is the package (green notice deposit plus ESG-linked step-up) good business for Meridian, and how should it be measured?
Data. Cost-income ratio 60% on all transaction banking revenue (a platform business, with high IT and operations costs). Green framework running costs allocated to the Vireo deposit: EUR 30,000 a year (register, external review, report). No credit expected loss: the pool is in credit and the uncommitted intraday limits are rarely used; we ignore their small credit RWA. Operational risk: EUR 2.5 of RWA per euro of revenue (course convention). Capital 13% of RWA, tax 25%. For the balance-sheet view, Meridian manages its Tier 1 leverage ratio to 3% of exposure, and EUR 450m of deposits fund EUR 450m of assets.
Calculation, package with the target met. Net interest income: EUR 1.5972m on operational balances, minus the EUR 0.11m step-up, plus EUR 0.192m on the EUR 80m remaining overnight () and EUR 0.3975m on the notice deposit (): EUR 2.0767m. Revenues EUR 2.7767m with fees. Costs . Profit after tax . RWA , capital , RAROC 89.81%.
INTERACTIVE LAB — RAROC of a deposit-led relationship, and the balance-sheet view
Compute the revenue, profit and RAROC of Vireo’s cash management relationship before and after the green deposit and the ESG-linked step-up, and compare with the return on the leverage capital the deposits consume.
| Parameter you can move | Range | Default |
|---|---|---|
| Green notice deposit in place (0 = no, 1 = yes) | 0 / 1 | 1 |
| ESG-linked step-up | none / met / missed | met |
| Annual fees | 0 to 2 EUR m | 0.7 EUR m |
| Cost-income ratio | 30 to 80 % | 60 % |
| Green framework cost | 0 to 0.2 EUR m | 0.03 EUR m |
| Operational-risk RWA per euro of revenue | 0 to 5 EUR | 2.5 EUR |
| Leverage capital per euro of deposits | 0 to 5 % | 3 % |
| Result at default settings | Value |
|---|---|
| Net interest income | 2.0767 EUR m |
| Revenues | 2.7767 EUR m |
| Operating costs | 1.6960 EUR m |
| Profit after tax | 0.8105 EUR m |
| RWA | 6.9417 EUR m |
| Allocated capital (13% of RWA) | 0.9024 EUR m |
| RAROC | 89.81 % |
| Leverage capital on deposits | 13.50 EUR m |
| Return on leverage capital | 6.00 % |
| Change in profit after tax versus before | -0.04425 EUR m |
Try it. Set the leverage capital to 0%: the deposits look free. Set it back to 3% and raise fees to EUR 1.5m: the return on leverage capital approaches the hurdle only when the relationship pays real fees.
Result.
| Scenario | Revenues (EUR m) | Profit after tax (EUR m) | RAROC | Return on leverage capital |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Before | 2.8492 | 0.8548 | 92.31% | 6.33% |
| Green only | 2.8867 | 0.8435 | 89.91% | 6.25% |
| Green + ESG met | 2.7767 | 0.8105 | 89.81% | 6.00% |
| Green + ESG missed | 2.9967 | 0.8765 | 90.00% | 6.49% |
Reading. Under the course convention, the RAROC of a business with no credit risk is close to 92% whatever the size of the relationship, because the capital is itself proportional to revenue: , less the effect of fixed costs such as the framework. It tells us that cash management consumes little risk capital; it does not tell us whether the deposits are worth having. Two other measures do. The first is profit in euros: the green deposit, once its framework cost is counted, lowers annual profit after tax by EUR 11,250 (from 0.8548 to 0.8435), and the ESG step-up, if met, by a further EUR 33,000. The second is the balance-sheet view: each euro of deposit funds an asset that counts in the leverage exposure, and a bank whose binding constraint is the leverage ratio must hold Tier 1 capital against it. On that view Vireo’s deposits return about 6%, half the hurdle; the deposits are only worth what the assets they fund earn on top, which belongs to Treasury and the lending desks. Most European banks are bound by risk-based capital rather than leverage, so this view is a sensitivity, not the rule, but it explains why banks with large central bank reserve balances sometimes discourage non-operational corporate deposits.
The package is nevertheless sensible for Meridian. It costs about EUR 44,000 a year in profit, keeps EUR 150m of the most volatile cash in a stickier form, reduces the HQLA buffer by EUR 60m, and answers the treasurer’s board instruction before a competitor does. The case for it is commercial and liquidity-driven. It is not a case that the bank is financing more green assets: the register existed, and the EUR 250m of new loans tagged in 5.3 would have been made anyway.
The coverage banker reads the same numbers through the relationship profit and loss account (see B01). Vireo is also a borrower in a syndicated sustainability-linked RCF where Meridian is a lender, and a hedging client. The relationship return, which is what the annual review discusses, is pulled up by the cash management mandate: the deposits and fees earn much more per unit of capital than the RCF commitment. Losing the mandate to a bank offering a richer green deposit would cost the relationship far more than the EUR 44,000 the package costs. This is how the package is justified internally, and it is the right justification: a relationship decision with a small, quantified cost, not a sustainability investment.
Question. In the second year Vireo misses its milestone (a plant expansion raises Scope 1 emissions) and two large green loans of EUR 400m are prepaid by their borrowers. What happens?
The step-up. Vireo’s certificate shows a 4% reduction against a 7% target. The rate letter applies the step-down: operational balances earn 1.75% instead of 1.80% for twelve months, worth EUR 110,000 to Meridian. The relationship profit rises to EUR 0.8765m (table above), which is uncomfortable: the bank profits from the client’s miss. Meridian’s sustainable finance team proposes, and the pricing committee accepts, to keep the step-down but to disclose it in the annual relationship review, so that no banker is rewarded for a client’s failure.
The register. After the prepayments, eligible assets fall to EUR 6,250m while labelled liabilities stand at EUR 5,900m (EUR 4,500m of bonds and EUR 1,400m of deposits including Vireo’s). Coverage is 105.93% (simulator b14-green-headroom, third test): every green deposit is still matched, but the 10% buffer is breached by EUR 218.18m of capacity. The framework’s remediation clause applies: no new green deposits until the buffer is restored, new eligible assets tagged within six months, and disclosure of the temporary shortfall in the next allocation report. Vireo’s deposit is not affected, because Meridian’s contractual commitment is coverage of at least 100%, not 110%.
WHY IT MATTERS ON THE DESK — This is where a green deposit programme earns or loses its credibility. A bank that quietly tags non-eligible assets to stay above the buffer, or that keeps selling green deposits during a shortfall, has created exactly the gap between claim and reality that supervisors call greenwashing. A bank that stops selling and says so in its report has not.
| Item | Value | Source |
|---|---|---|
| FTP and margin, operational balances | 2.526%, 72.6 bp | b14-deposit-ftp |
| FTP and margin, overnight surplus | 2.34%, 24 bp | b14-notice-switch |
| FTP and margin, 90-day notice deposit | 2.515%, 26.5 bp | b14-notice-switch |
| LCR outflows before and after the switch | EUR 147m, EUR 87m | b14-notice-switch |
| HQLA released, carry saved | EUR 60m, EUR 0.24m | b14-notice-switch |
| Extra interest to Vireo, change in bank NII | EUR 0.225m, +EUR 0.0375m | b14-notice-switch |
| NSFR available stable funding | EUR 225m, unchanged | b14-notice-switch |
| Allocation capacity without and with pipeline | EUR 68.18m, EUR 295.45m | b14-green-headroom |
| Headroom after Vireo, coverage | EUR 145.45m, 112.71% | b14-green-headroom |
| Taxonomy-aligned cover of labelled liabilities | 61.99% | b14-green-headroom |
| ESG step-up cost if met, expected cost | EUR 0.11m, EUR 0.066m | b14-esg-stepup |
| Step-up per tonne, share of internal carbon value | EUR 9.17/t, 9.17% | b14-esg-stepup |
| Card spend footprint, band, share of Scope 3 | 19,450 t (11,670 to 27,230), 3.24% | b14-card-footprint |
| Revenues and profit after tax, before | EUR 2.8492m, EUR 0.8548m | b14-raroc |
| Revenues and profit after tax, package met | EUR 2.7767m, EUR 0.8105m | b14-raroc |
| RAROC before and after | 92.31%, 89.81% | b14-raroc |
| Return on leverage capital before and after | 6.33%, 6.00% | b14-raroc |
| Year-2 coverage after prepayments, capacity | 105.93%, minus EUR 218.18m | b14-green-headroom |
A deposit is a liability: it creates no credit exposure on the client. The capital that transaction banking consumes comes from three places.
Operational risk. Since 1 January 2025, CRR3 (Regulation (EU) 2024/1623) has replaced all previous operational risk approaches with a single standardised approach. Capital is a percentage of the business indicator, a measure of the bank’s size built from its interest, services and financial components; the marginal coefficients rise with size (12% up to EUR 1bn of business indicator, 15% up to EUR 30bn, 18% above), and the EU has neutralised the loss-history multiplier. Transaction banking feeds the business indicator through its net interest income and fee income, which is why the course allocates operational risk RWA in proportion to revenue: EUR 2.5 of RWA per euro of revenue.
Credit risk on overdrafts and pools. Intraday and overnight limits are usually uncommitted and unconditionally cancellable. CRR3 raises the credit conversion factor on such commitments from 0% to 10% in the standardised approach, with a transitional period, so even unused limits now carry a little capital. In a notional pool, the debit balances are loans to the overdrawn entities; they can be netted against credit balances only where the netting is legally enforceable, and for the leverage ratio the CRR (Article 429b) adds conditions on the regular transfer of balances. For Vireo’s physical pool in credit, we ignore this small amount.
Leverage. The Tier 1 leverage ratio of 3% applies to total exposure, and every euro deposited ends up as an asset of the bank: a loan, a security or a central bank reserve, all of which count in the exposure measure. A risk-based RAROC therefore misses the main balance-sheet cost of large non-operational deposits for a bank whose leverage ratio binds.
The line-by-line calculation for the package with the target met, from the b14-raroc simulator:
| Line | Before | Package, target met |
|---|---|---|
| Net interest income on deposits | EUR 2.1492m | EUR 2.0767m |
| Fees | EUR 0.70m | EUR 0.70m |
| Revenues | EUR 2.8492m | EUR 2.7767m |
| Operating costs (60% plus framework) | EUR 1.7095m | EUR 1.6960m |
| Expected loss | 0 | 0 |
| Profit after tax (25%) | EUR 0.8548m | EUR 0.8105m |
| RWA (EUR 2.5 per euro of revenue) | EUR 7.1230m | EUR 6.9418m |
| Allocated capital (13%) | EUR 0.9260m | EUR 0.9024m |
| RAROC | 92.31% | 89.81% |
The sustainable features change three lines. The notice switch raises net interest income by EUR 37,500 through its liquidity value; the green label adds EUR 30,000 of framework cost and nothing to revenue, since the rate is the conventional one; the ESG step-up costs EUR 110,000 if met and earns EUR 110,000 if missed. The net effect on profit after tax is minus EUR 44,000 in the base scenario. RAROC hardly moves, which says more about the metric than about the deal: for a capital-light business, RAROC should be read together with profit in euros, the LCR contribution and the share of wallet that the mandate secures. Meridian’s management information for transaction banking therefore shows four numbers per client: revenue, profit after tax, LCR outflows generated and return on leverage capital.
PITFALL — Celebrating a 90% RAROC. It reflects the convention that capital is proportional to revenue. A business can show a 90% RAROC and destroy value if its deposits are the volatile kind that force the bank to hold expensive liquidity, or if, under a binding leverage ratio, their return on Tier 1 capital is 6%.
Treasury’s FTP for deposits rewards stability and penalises volatility, as derived in section 2.2. Three refinements matter on the desk.
First, behavioural models. The core share and tenor of operational balances come from Treasury’s statistical analysis of balance history by client segment. They also feed the interest rate risk in the banking book (IRRBB): non-maturity deposits are modelled as a portfolio of fixed-rate liabilities with a repricing profile, hedged with receive-fixed swaps. EU supervisory rules limit how long that modelled maturity can be. Changes to these models move the desk’s revenue without any change in client behaviour, which is a frequent source of internal dispute.
Second, the 30-day window. The notice deposit has a zero LCR outflow only until notice is given. Once Vireo serves notice, the full amount falls due within 90 days and enters the LCR outflows when less than 30 days remain. Treasury monitors notices served and some banks apply a small outflow assumption to notice deposits as a buffer against concentration.
Third, ESG in the ILAAP. The EBA guidelines on the management of ESG risks ask banks to consider ESG factors in their internal liquidity adequacy assessment, for example deposit outflows after a climate-related event or a reputational shock. A green deposit programme adds a specific scenario: a public allegation of greenwashing leading depositors to withdraw labelled deposits. With minimum sizes of a few million euros, green deposits are concentrated and their holders are sensitive to reputation.
For Meridian, the deposit is a financial liability at amortised cost under IFRS 9. Interest is recognised with the effective interest method; the ESG-linked step-up is a contractual variation of the interest rate, recognised when the certificate triggers it. Because the KPI is a non-financial variable specific to a party to the contract, it does not meet the IFRS 9 definition of a derivative, so there is no separate fair-valued embedded derivative. Fees are revenue from contracts with customers (IFRS 15), recognised as the services are delivered: monthly for maintenance, per transaction for payments. The green label has no accounting effect.
For Vireo, the notice deposit is a question of classification under IAS 7: a cash equivalent must be short-term, highly liquid and subject to an insignificant risk of changes in value, and practice generally uses a three-month limit from acquisition. A 90-day notice deposit usually qualifies; a 180-day one would not, and the treasurer would then report it as a short-term investment, which affects the “cash” figure that analysts and rating agencies watch. This is one reason why notice periods in corporate green deposits cluster between 31 and 95 days.
Green Asset Ratio and BTAR. Both are asset ratios. Green deposits do not appear in them and do not improve them; the assets in the green register do, whether or not deposits are allocated to them. Cash and central bank balances are excluded from the GAR denominator under the January 2026 simplifying act.
Pillar 3 ESG. Large listed banks disclose exposures to carbon-intensive sectors and financed emissions, and under the current templates GAR and BTAR, which the EBA’s final draft of 22 June 2026 (not yet adopted) removes for large institutions. There is no template for green liabilities; banks report green deposits voluntarily in their green financing reports and sustainability statements.
Financed and facilitated emissions. Under PCAF, a bank’s financed emissions are attributed through its assets: loans and investments. A deposit received from Vireo does not make Meridian responsible for any share of Vireo’s emissions, and a green deposit does not reduce Meridian’s financed emissions. Payment processing is not covered by the PCAF facilitated-emissions standard, which addresses capital markets issuance. The card footprint service of section 5.5 is a data product, not a component of Meridian’s own inventory.
Allocation and impact reporting. The green deposit programme produces its own annual report: deposits outstanding by date, assets allocated by category, unallocated amount (should be zero), Taxonomy-aligned share, estimated avoided emissions, and the external reviewer’s statement. Impact figures are typically computed per euro of asset and apportioned to deposits; adding them to the impact claimed for green bonds on the same assets would be double counting.
| Risk | What goes wrong | Control | Owner |
|---|---|---|---|
| Unmatched green liability | Prepayments or reclassification leave green deposits without eligible assets | Monthly register reconciliation, buffer, stop-sale rule | Treasury, sustainable finance |
| Double allocation | Same asset tagged to a green bond and a green deposit | Single register for all labelled liabilities, unique asset IDs | Treasury |
| Eligibility drift | Assets tagged that fail the framework criteria | Green committee validation, external review | Sustainable finance |
| Misleading marketing | “Your cash finances wind farms” or “Taxonomy-aligned deposit” | Approved wording, legal and compliance sign-off | Compliance, product |
| Weak ESG-linked KPI | Target already contracted or below trajectory | Ambition test against science-based benchmark | Sustainable finance |
| Missing certificate | Step-up applied without verified data | Rate letter: missing certificate counts as a miss | Loan or deposit operations |
| Deposit flight | Labelled deposits withdrawn after a controversy | ILAAP scenario, concentration limits | Treasury ALM |
| Model risk in FTP | Core share overstated, desk overcredited | Model validation, back-testing of outflows | Risk, Treasury |
| Footprint misuse | Spend-based estimate quoted as audited Scope 3 | Service terms, methodology note, uncertainty band | Product, legal |
| Payment fraud and sanctions | Fraudulent or prohibited payment executed | Screening, Verification of Payee, four-eyes | Operations, compliance |
Red-flag checklist for a liability-side label. A reviewer, an auditor or a journalist would stop on any of these:
Products in the market (dated).
Regulatory and market environment (November 2026).
Orders of magnitude. No public statistic measures the total volume of green deposits in Europe. Programmes disclosed by individual banks are small relative to their green bond programmes, typically in the hundreds of millions or low billions of euros, and are capped by the eligible assets left after green bond allocation. Minimum tickets of a few million euros keep the product in the corporate and institutional segment.
Open debates.
INTERACTIVE LAB — Cash management, deposits and green liabilities
Check the mechanics of deposits, the liquidity value of their features and the limits of liability-side labels.
Q1. Under the LCR, what is the 30-day outflow rate on operational deposits of a non-financial corporate (portion not covered by a deposit guarantee scheme)?
Answer: B. Operational deposits carry 25%; other non-financial corporate deposits carry 40%.
Q2. A 90-day notice deposit on which no notice has been served has which LCR outflow?
Answer: C. The LCR counts only liabilities that can fall due, be called or are expected to be repaid within 30 calendar days.
Q3. What NSFR available stable funding factor applies to a non-financial corporate deposit of under one year?
Answer: B. Operational deposits and non-financial corporate funding under one year both receive 50%; the notice clause does not help the NSFR.
Q4. In the course FTP formula, why does a higher LCR outflow rate lower the FTP credited for a deposit?
Answer: B. The outflow share must be invested in liquid assets with a carry cost (40 bp at Meridian).
Q5. What does Meridian commit to when it labels a deposit green?
Answer: B. A green deposit is matched by a pool of eligible assets; money remains fungible.
Q6. Which statement about green deposits and the Green Asset Ratio is correct?
Answer: C. The GAR measures Taxonomy-aligned assets; liabilities are outside it.
Q7. In the case, where does most of the value of moving EUR 150m from overnight to a 90-day notice deposit come from?
Answer: B. EUR 60m less HQLA saves EUR 0.24m of carry; a conventional notice deposit would do the same.
Q8. Meridian’s register holds EUR 6,400m of eligible assets, a 10% buffer, EUR 4,500m of green bonds and EUR 1,250m of green deposits. What is the capacity for new green deposits?
Answer: B. 6,400 / 1.10 minus 5,750 equals EUR 68.18m.
Q9. A two-way 5 bp step on EUR 220m, with an 80% probability of meeting the target, has an expected annual cost to the bank of:
Answer: C. 0.11m times (2 x 0.8 minus 1) = EUR 66,000.
Q10. What is the main weakness of a spend-based footprint of card payments?
Answer: B. A discount lowers estimated emissions for the same activity; the GHG Protocol accepts the method but ranks it low in quality.
Q11. Why is the RAROC of a deposit-led cash management relationship close to 90% in the course convention?
Answer: B. With RWA = 2.5 x revenue and 60% cost-income, RAROC = 0.4 x 0.75 / 0.325 = 92.3%, less fixed costs.
Q12. Under IFRS 9, how does Meridian account for the ESG-linked step-up on Vireo’s deposits?
Answer: B. A non-financial variable specific to a party is excluded from the derivative definition; the step-up is part of contractual interest.
Q13. Which practice is the clearest greenwashing red flag for a green deposit programme?
Answer: C. Selling labelled liabilities without matching assets is the gap between claim and reality.
Q14. Since 9 October 2025, euro-area banks offering instant credit transfers must also:
Answer: B. The Instant Payments Regulation requires sending capability and Verification of Payee from 9 October 2025 in the euro area.
Data. Market rate 3.00%, HQLA carry 50 bp, liquidity premium 6 bp per year. A client holds EUR 300m of operational balances (outflow 25%, core 60% with a four-year tenor) paid 2.10%, and EUR 100m of non-operational overnight cash (outflow 40%, no core) paid 2.50%. Compute the FTP, margin and annual net interest income of each.
Solution. Operational: . Margin bp; NII $300 % = $ EUR 2.757m. Non-operational: ; margin 30 bp; NII EUR 0.30m. The operational balance is worth three times as much per euro, because it is stable and needs less HQLA, even though it is paid less.
Data. A client holds EUR 200m overnight at 1.90% (outflow 40%). The bank proposes to move EUR 120m into a 60-day notice deposit (outflow 0%, term credit 1.0 bp) at 2.05%. HQLA carry 40 bp. Compute the HQLA released, the bank’s change in NII, the client’s gain and the break-even notice rate.
Solution. HQLA released $0.40 = $ EUR 48m; carry saved $48 % = $ EUR 0.192m. Client gain $120 % = $ EUR 0.18m. Term credit $120 % = $ EUR 0.012m. Bank change EUR 0.024m. Break-even rate : above it the bank pays away more than the liquidity value. A green label on the notice deposit changes none of these figures.
Data. A bank’s green register holds EUR 3,000m of eligible assets; policy buffer 5%; green bonds EUR 2,000m; green deposits EUR 700m. A client requests a EUR 200m green deposit and a two-way 3 bp step on EUR 400m of operational balances, with a 60% probability of meeting its target. Is there capacity? What is the coverage if the bank accepts anyway? What is the expected cost of the step?
Solution. Capacity $3{,}000 / 1.05 - 2{,}700 = 2{,}857.14 - 2{,}700 = $ EUR 157.14m, short of EUR 200m by EUR 42.86m. Coverage if accepted: , so still fully matched but below the 105% policy; the bank should offer EUR 150m now and the rest once new assets are tagged. Step cost if met $400 % = $ EUR 0.12m; expected cost $0.12 (2 - 1) = $ EUR 0.024m.
1. What is the difference between an operational and a non-operational deposit, and why does the bank care? An operational deposit is held because the client uses the bank’s clearing, custody or cash management services and needs the balance to run them. The LCR assumes 25% of it leaves in a 30-day stress, against 40% for other non-financial corporate deposits. The bank holds less HQLA against it, so Treasury credits it with a higher FTP. Only the portion needed for operations qualifies; a surplus parked on the same account is non-operational. This is why cash management mandates are prized: they bring the stable kind.
2. How does a green deposit work, and what does it not do? The client places a deposit, often a term or notice deposit with a minimum size, and the bank commits to hold eligible green assets at least equal to green deposits outstanding, under a framework with external review and annual reporting. It does not send the client’s money to a specific project: money is fungible and the assets usually exist already. The honest wording is “matched by” or “referenced to” eligible assets. Its real value is commercial and, if it has a notice period, in liquidity.
3. A treasurer asks you to pay 10 bp more on a green notice deposit than on the conventional one. What do you answer? I would first compute the liquidity value of the notice deposit over the overnight balance it replaces: the HQLA carry saved on a 40% outflow plus any term credit. That value is the same with or without the label, and the conventional rate already shares it with the client. A green premium has no funding rationale for the bank unless green deposits are cheaper or stickier, for which there is no evidence. I would offer the conventional rate with the label and the reporting, and escalate any premium to the pricing committee as a relationship concession.
4. Why do green deposits compete with the bank’s green bonds? Both draw on the same register of eligible assets, and the framework forbids allocating an asset twice. Each euro of green deposit reduces the capacity of Treasury to issue green bonds, which may have a funding advantage of a few basis points and visibility with investors. The ALCO arbitrates. In practice the register is the constraint, which is why green deposit programmes are small and capped.
5. What would you check before accepting an ESG-linked step-up on a cash pool? The materiality of the KPI to the client’s business, the ambition of the target against its trajectory, peers and a science-based benchmark, and whether the target is already secured by contracts signed. I would check verification (audited certificate, consequences of a missing one) and prefer a two-way design. I would quantify the cost per year and per tonne and compare it with the client’s own carbon price, to be honest about the incentive. Finally I would agree how a step-down after a miss is disclosed, so that the desk is not rewarded for the client’s failure.
6. Is the RAROC of transaction banking a good measure of its value? Not on its own. With operational-risk capital proportional to revenue and no expected loss, RAROC is nearly constant at a high level. The value of deposits depends on their liquidity profile, on the balance sheet they occupy if the leverage ratio binds, and on the share of wallet they secure. I would show profit in euros, LCR outflows generated, return on leverage capital and relationship revenue alongside RAROC.
7. How reliable is a carbon footprint of corporate card spend? It is a spend-based estimate: euros spent per merchant category multiplied by emission factors per euro. It is quick, covers all transactions and points to hot spots such as air travel. It measures prices rather than activity, so discounts and inflation move it, and factors differ widely between databases. It should be presented with its method and uncertainty and not used as audited Scope 3 data.
8. What happens if the green register falls below the coverage buffer after prepayments? The framework’s remediation clause applies: the bank stops selling new green deposits, tags new eligible assets within a defined period and discloses the temporary shortfall in the allocation report. If coverage remains above 100%, existing depositors are still fully matched. If it fell below 100%, part of the green deposits would be unmatched, which must be disclosed and corrected quickly. What the bank must not do is tag non-eligible assets or keep selling to protect volumes.
Regulation (EUR-Lex)
Supervisory papers and standards
Market practice (pages consulted November 2026)
Textbook