IN ONE SENTENCE — A restructuring desk takes over a client whose debt no longer fits its cash flows, and negotiates new terms that give the bank back more than a liquidation would, while the debt advisory side sells the same skill to clients as a fee service.
Where it sits. In most European banks the restructuring unit (also called workout, special situations, financial restructuring or, in French banks, affaires spéciales) belongs to the risk function or to a dedicated “special credit” line that reports jointly to the Chief Risk Officer and the head of Corporate Banking. A loan moves there when it is put on the watchlist with a “transfer” flag: the relationship manager keeps the client relationship, but decisions on waivers, amendments and new money pass to the workout banker. The separation is deliberate. The front office that originated the loan has an incentive to believe in it; the workout banker is paid to maximise recovery. Supervisors expect it: the EBA guidelines on management of non-performing and forborne exposures (EBA/GL/2018/06) ask banks with material non-performing exposures to run dedicated workout units separated from origination.
Beside it sits debt advisory, which at Meridian Bank belongs to the investment bank. Debt advisers do not lend. They are mandated by a company, sometimes by a creditor group, to design and negotiate a refinancing or a restructuring, and they earn a fee. In a large restructuring the company typically hires an adviser and a law firm, and the lenders’ coordinating committee hires its own financial adviser and counsel, paid by the company. A bank that is a lender cannot advise the company on the same deal; conflicts are cleared by Compliance before any mandate.
Clients. Large and mid-sized corporates whose leverage has drifted out of covenant range: cyclical industrials, retailers, real estate, and, more and more, companies whose business model is hit by the transition. A coal-heavy utility, a cement maker facing the end of free allocation under the EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS), a car-parts supplier built around the combustion engine, a ski resort with a shrinking season: these are the files that combine finance and sustainability, and this module is about them.
How the bank earns money, or limits losses. For the workout unit the measure is not revenue but loss avoided. A typical file of EUR 300m of Meridian exposure can move the bank’s provisions by tens of millions of euros. Restructured loans also re-price: amendment fees of 25 to 100 bp of the commitment, margin increases of 100 to 300 bp, sometimes payment-in-kind interest or equity upside. Debt advisory fees on a large European restructuring commonly run into several million euros, often a monthly retainer plus a success fee; we treat precise levels as deal-specific and do not quote a market average. The real economics are in avoided losses and in the capital that is freed or consumed, which section 6 works out.
The team. A workout file at Meridian involves:
| Role | What they do |
|---|---|
| Workout banker | Leads the file, negotiates, writes the credit papers |
| Relationship manager | Keeps the client dialogue, knows the history |
| Credit risk officer | Rates the client, approves waivers and new terms |
| IFRS 9 / provisioning analyst | Stages the loan, computes expected credit loss |
| Legal (internal and external) | Standstill, amendment, intercreditor, insolvency law |
| Loan agent | Circulates waiver requests, counts votes, implements |
| ESG risk team | Reviews transition plan, KPIs, reputational exposure |
A realistic week. On Monday the client’s CFO calls: the half-year accounts will show leverage above the covenant. On Tuesday the workout banker reviews the facility agreement, the intercreditor agreement and the sustainability-linked schedules, and the credit officer downgrades the internal rating by two notches. On Wednesday the IFRS 9 analyst asks whether the downgrade triggers a stage transfer; the ESG risk team flags that the client’s sustainability-linked bond has a step-up test in December. On Thursday the agent bank circulates the company’s request for a six-month standstill and a covenant waiver; Meridian must answer within ten business days. On Friday the workout banker presents to the credit committee: accept the standstill, appoint a lenders’ adviser, ask the company for an independent business review. None of this involves new money yet. The new money, the haircut and the equity come later.
WHY IT MATTERS ON THE DESK — In distressed situations the biggest decisions are made in the first fortnight: who signs a standstill, who joins the coordinating committee, who pays for the business review. A junior who can read a facility agreement and compute covenant headroom on day one is useful immediately.
A loan does not jump from healthy to defaulted. It passes through stages that every bank formalises in an early-warning system. Triggers are both quantitative (a covenant ratio within 10% of its limit, a rating downgrade of two notches or more, a bond trading below 85, a credit default swap spread doubling, a delayed financial statement) and qualitative (a change of auditor, the loss of a key contract, a plant closure ordered by a regulator, a heat wave that stops a factory). When a trigger fires, the relationship manager and the credit officer must decide within days whether to put the client on the watchlist. Watchlist status means more frequent reviews, a fresh rating, a cash-flow forecast and, in many banks, a freeze on new limits without credit committee approval.
From the watchlist a file is either cured or transferred to the restructuring unit. The transfer is the moment the bank changes posture: the question is no longer “how do we grow this relationship?” but “what is the recovery-maximising path?”.
IN ONE SENTENCE — A covenant is a tripwire that hands the lenders a seat at the table before the company runs out of cash, not after.
Most corporate facilities carry two financial covenants, tested on each semi-annual or quarterly test date on the last twelve months:
Investment-grade bonds usually carry no financial covenants; loans and Schuldschein usually do. That asymmetry is why, in a restructuring, banks are typically first to the table: their documents give them the trigger.
INTUITION — Headroom is the distance between your car and the edge of the road. A 15% headroom means EBITDA can fall by 15% before the wheels leave the tarmac. A company drives fast and close to the edge when times are good; a carbon shock is a gust of wind.
FORMULA
is the EBITDA headroom (the share by which EBITDA can fall before breach); net debt as defined in the facility agreement; the leverage covenant; the covenant EBITDA of the last twelve months. Debt headroom is , the additional debt the company could carry at constant EBITDA.
INTERACTIVE LAB — Covenant headroom: how far EBITDA can fall
See how leverage moves when EBITDA falls, and where the leverage covenant is breached.
| Parameter you can move | Range | Default |
|---|---|---|
| Net debt (covenant definition) | 500 to 6000 EUR m | 2000 EUR m |
| EBITDA, last twelve months | 100 to 1500 EUR m | 500 EUR m |
| Leverage covenant | 2.5 to 7 x | 4.5 x |
| EBITDA decline tested | 0 to 60 % | 20 % |
| Result at default settings | Value |
|---|---|
| Leverage today | 4.00 x |
| EBITDA headroom before breach | 11.1 % |
| Debt headroom at today’s EBITDA | 250 EUR m |
| Leverage after the tested decline | 5.00 x |
Try it. Set the decline to 10%: leverage reaches 4.44x, just inside the covenant. The curve is convex: each further point of EBITDA lost pushes leverage up faster.
With net debt of EUR 2,000m and EBITDA of EUR 500m, leverage is 4.0x and EBITDA can fall by 11.1% before a 4.5x covenant is breached. The convexity of the curve matters: a 20% fall brings leverage to 5.0x, a 40% fall to 6.67x. Companies in transition-exposed sectors often run with headroom of 10 to 20%, which a single carbon or weather shock can consume.
PITFALL — “Net debt” and “EBITDA” are defined terms in the facility agreement, not the figures of the annual report. The definitions add back exceptional items, exclude hybrid capital (often treated as equity), and sometimes allow pro forma synergies. A breach can be cured or created by a definition. The first job of a workout banker is to recompute the covenant from the agreement, line by line.
Waiver and amendment. The company asks lenders to waive a breach or reset a covenant. Under Loan Market Association (LMA) style documentation, most amendments need “Majority Lenders”, usually 66⅔% of commitments. Changes to pricing, maturity, principal or the currency are “all-lender” matters requiring unanimity; changes to security often require a super-majority. The lenders charge a waiver or amendment fee, typically tens of basis points of commitments, and usually a margin increase.
Standstill. Lenders agree not to accelerate or enforce for a fixed period (three to nine months is common) while the company prepares a plan. The company in exchange accepts information covenants (13-week cash-flow forecasts, weekly calls), sometimes a cash sweep, and pays the advisers. A standstill does not cure anything; it buys time.
Amend-and-extend (A&E). Maturities are pushed out, typically by two to four years, in exchange for a higher margin, an amendment fee, tighter documentation and sometimes partial repayment. A&E is the workhorse of European corporate restructuring because it requires no insolvency court and keeps the company trading. Because maturity is an all-lender matter, hold-outs can block it; extension is then often offered only to consenting lenders, leaving the hold-out with the original, earlier maturity.
New money. Fresh liquidity, usually with priority: super-senior ranking, new security, or a structurally senior position in a ring-fenced vehicle. New-money providers are paid for the risk with high margins, fees and sometimes equity.
Asset disposals and carve-outs. Selling a division or moving assets into a separate vehicle that can raise its own finance. This is how managed phase-outs are structured (section 3.4).
Debt-for-equity swap. Creditors convert part of their claims into shares, reducing debt to a level the business can carry. Existing shareholders are diluted, often massively. The class of creditors whose claims straddle the enterprise value (the “fulcrum”) is the natural recipient of the equity.
Formal processes. When consent cannot be reached, a court-supervised process imposes a plan on dissenting creditors. Since Directive (EU) 2019/1023 on preventive restructuring frameworks, every EU member state offers a pre-insolvency procedure with classes of affected parties and cross-class cram-down: the German StaRUG (in force since 2021), the French sauvegarde accélérée with classes of affected parties (since the 2021 reform), the Dutch WHOA. A plan can bind a dissenting class if it is no worse off than in the best alternative, typically liquidation (the “best-interest test”), and if absolute or relative priority rules are respected.
INTUITION — Restructuring is a negotiation in the shadow of the court. Every creditor compares what it is offered with what it would get if the company went into a formal process. The recovery waterfall is the common currency of that negotiation.
Enterprise value (EV) is distributed by rank: secured creditors on their collateral, then super-senior, then senior unsecured (pari passu among themselves, unless structural subordination intervenes), then subordinated and hybrid capital, then shareholders. The recovery rate of a class is what it receives divided by its claim.
FORMULA
is the recovery rate of class ; the distributable enterprise value net of process costs; the claims of the classes ranking ahead of ; the claim of class . The fulcrum class is the first class with .
Two enterprise values matter: the going-concern value under the restructuring plan, and the value in the alternative (disorderly insolvency or liquidation). The gap between them is the value a consensual deal preserves; the negotiation is about who gets it.
Under IFRS 9 a loan sits in one of three stages. Stage 1: performing, provision equal to 12-month expected credit loss (ECL). Stage 2: significant increase in credit risk (SICR) since origination, provision equal to lifetime ECL; 30 days past due is a rebuttable backstop, and in practice a rating downgrade of several notches, watchlist status or forbearance trigger the transfer. Stage 3: credit-impaired, lifetime ECL, interest recognised on the net carrying amount.
Prudential vocabulary runs in parallel. Forbearance is a concession (waiver, extension, reduced margin, haircut) granted to a borrower in financial difficulty. A forborne exposure can be performing or non-performing. A non-performing exposure (NPE) is one more than 90 days past due or one where the borrower is unlikely to pay; distressed restructuring that reduces the net present value of the obligation by more than 1% (the “diminished financial obligation” test of the EBA guidelines on the definition of default) is an unlikeliness-to-pay trigger and leads to default. The EBA’s amending guidelines of 7 May 2026 kept the 1% threshold. Exit rules are strict: a non-performing forborne exposure needs at least one year of cure before returning to performing, and then a two-year probation as performing forborne.
WHY IT MATTERS ON THE DESK — The same amendment can be presented as “commercial renegotiation” or as “forbearance”. The classification drives provisions, capital, disclosure and supervisory scrutiny. Workout bankers spend real time with the provisioning team arguing exactly which it is, and supervisors look for banks that under-classify.
Restructuring bankers have always dealt with shocks: a recession, a lost contract, a fraud. Climate adds three channels that behave differently.
Transition shocks hit the cost base or the revenue line through policy, prices and technology. For a European emitter the clearest channel is the EU ETS. The benchmark December-2026 allowance (EUA) traded around EUR 90 per tonne in early November 2026, according to ABN AMRO’s carbon research of 5 November 2026. The Commission published its review of the ETS on 17 July 2026; the Council position was targeted for December 2026 and a compromise not before 2027, so the policy path beyond 2030 is still open. For heavy industry the parallel channel is the phase-out of free allocation alongside the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism, whose certificates go on sale in February 2027. A coal plant emitting about one tonne of CO2 per MWh sees its cost per MWh move almost one-for-one with the EUA price; whether it can pass that cost on depends on who sets the marginal price in the power market.
Physical shocks hit assets and operations: drought lowering hydro output, low river levels interrupting coal barges and limiting cooling water, heat waves forcing thermal plants to curtail, floods damaging networks. They are lumpy, local and often uninsured in their business-interruption component.
Policy-closure and liability shocks change the life of the asset itself: a law fixes a closure date, a grid operator designates a plant as system-relevant and forbids its closure, a court orders tighter permits. Germany illustrates the uncertainty: the coal exit law keeps 2038 as the latest end date, but the progress review due by 15 August 2026 was postponed to late spring or early summer 2027 (Clean Energy Wire, 11 August 2026), with open questions on whether the final exit moves to 2035 and whether western lignite closes in 2030 or moves into reserve.
IN ONE SENTENCE — A stranded asset is an asset whose remaining economic life, under the policies and prices now expected, is too short or too unprofitable to recover its carrying value and the debt that financed it.
INTUITION — Think of a long lease on a shop in a street that the city has just decided to pedestrianise and close to traffic in four years. The shop is still open, but its value is now what it can earn in four years, not in fifteen. The bank that lent against fifteen years is the one with the problem.
For the credit analyst, stranding shows up in three places: an impairment under IAS 36 when the recoverable amount of a cash-generating unit falls below its carrying amount; an increase in provisions for decommissioning and site rehabilitation when closure is brought forward (the same cost discounted over fewer years); and a shorter cash-flow tail to repay debt. The impairment is non-cash and leaves leverage covenants untouched, but it erodes equity, gearing covenants and rating-agency metrics, and it signals to everyone that the business plan has changed.
Module B03 taught how sustainability-linked loans (SLLs) and their margin ratchets are designed; module C02 does the same for sustainability-linked bonds (SLBs). In a distressed company these instruments raise three questions.
What does the miss cost? In a loan, the margin ratchet moves a few basis points: missing a target raises the margin by the premium agreed in the grid. In a bond, the usual consequence is a coupon step-up (25 bp a year is a common figure) from the coupon date after the target observation date until maturity, sometimes a higher redemption amount. The ICMA Sustainability-Linked Bond Principles require that the financial or structural characteristics vary with the outcome, but do not fix the size. The financial cost is small next to the cash-flow problem that usually causes the miss.
Can the target be reset? The March 2025 edition of the Sustainability-Linked Loan Principles (SLLP) made targets that go beyond business as usual and regulatory requirements mandatory, required at least annual reporting, and introduced “structural” outcomes alongside financial ones. In the loan market the documentation does the work. The LMA’s revised draft sustainability-linked provisions (August 2026) keep KPIs and targets fixed for the life of the loan but add renegotiation triggers: an acquisition, disposal or merger reasonably expected to affect a KPI or target materially, or a change of KPI, methodology, baseline or target with that effect. A restructuring that carves out the coal fleet is exactly such an event. In a bond, changing a target requires a bondholder vote under the terms and conditions (often 75% of those voting at a quorate meeting, or a written resolution), and a step-up already triggered cannot be cancelled without consent.
When is the label lost? The August 2026 LMA provisions add declassification triggers beyond a serious breach: sustainability breaches continuing for a prolonged period defined by the parties, repeated failure to deliver a sustainability compliance certificate, and failure to agree amendments after a “Sustainability Amendment Event”. Declassification removes the ratchet and the right to call the facility sustainability-linked; it is not an event of default. The same LMA update confirms that a sustainability breach or misrepresentation alone does not trigger an event of default under the general clauses.
PITFALL — Students often assume that a missed KPI is a credit event. It is not, and should not be: making a sustainability target an event of default would turn every climate ambition into a refinancing risk and push borrowers to set weak targets. The consequence of a miss is price and label, not acceleration.
EBA Guidelines on the management of ESG risks (EBA/GL/2025/01, final report 9 January 2025) apply from 11 January 2026 to all institutions except small and non-complex ones, which follow from 11 January 2027. They require banks to assess ESG risks in credit decisions, to monitor clients’ transition, and to prepare plans under Article 76(2) of the Capital Requirements Directive (CRD6) addressing the financial risks of the transition to climate neutrality by 2050. Two features matter in a workout: a bank must document how it treats counterparties with high transition risk (engage, restructure, exit), and it must be able to explain how a restructuring fits its own transition plan.
ECB supervision. The ECB’s expectations on climate-related and environmental risks are enforced. In November 2025 it imposed periodic penalty payments of EUR 187,650 on ABANCA for failing to complete a materiality assessment of these risks, and in February 2026 it was reported that Crédit Agricole was fined about EUR 7.6m for a 75-day delay in its materiality assessment. The ECB has also reviewed how banks capture “novel risks” in IFRS 9 provisions, including through post-model adjustments (overlays) for climate risk (ECB report on IFRS 9 overlays and model improvements for novel risks, July 2024).
Credit-risk rules. The forbearance, non-performing and default definitions of section 2.5 apply with no climate exemption: a utility restructured because of a carbon shock is treated like any other forborne borrower. The NPE prudential backstop of Article 47c of the Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR), added by Regulation (EU) 2019/630, forces a minimum coverage of non-performing loans originated since April 2019: for the unsecured part, 35% from the end of the first year as non-performing to the end of the third year, and 100% from the first day of the fourth year, any shortfall being deducted from CET1.
Disclosure. The EU Taxonomy treats solid fossil-fuel power generation as not eligible, so a coal utility contributes nothing to a bank’s Green Asset Ratio (GAR). Pillar 3 ESG Template 1 shows exposures to companies excluded from EU Paris-aligned benchmarks, which includes companies deriving 1% or more of revenues from hard coal and lignite, or 50% or more from power generation with an intensity above 100 gCO2e/kWh. The EBA’s final draft implementing standards on revised Pillar 3 ESG disclosures (22 June 2026) cut the data points and, for large institutions, stop the Taxonomy-related templates in Pillar 3; they are expected to apply from 31 December 2026, subject to adoption by the Commission, which had not happened in November 2026. On the Taxonomy side, the Commission’s simplification delegated act of July 2025 applies from 1 January 2026 and changes how banks compute the GAR, for example by removing exposures to undertakings outside the CSRD scope from the denominator.
Selling a coal plant to a less scrutinised owner reduces the seller’s reported emissions but not the world’s; it often extends the plant’s life. The idea of managed phase-out is the opposite: finance the early, contractually committed closure of a high-emitting asset, and count the finance as transition finance. The Commission Recommendation (EU) 2023/1425 on facilitating finance for the transition recognises that transition finance can cover the phase-out of harmful activities, and GFANZ published guidance in 2023 on the managed phase-out of coal power in Asia-Pacific.
The standard structure is a phase-out vehicle: the plants move into a separate company with a binding closure schedule, its own revenues (power sales, capacity or reserve payments, sometimes state compensation for early closure) and its own debt, sized on the cash flows to closure. Because the vehicle’s equity value at closure is close to zero, the debt must amortise fully before the last plant shuts.
Transition credits add a revenue line: carbon credits issued for emissions avoided by early closure. Verra launched methodology VM0052, Accelerated Retirement of Coal-Fired Power Plants Using a Just Transition, on 6 May 2025, developed by the Coal to Clean Credit Initiative with support from The Rockefeller Foundation. It compares post-retirement emissions with the plant’s historical baseline over its expected life, requires new renewable capacity paired with the retirement, and imposes just-transition requirements for workers and communities. Practice is still thin and contested. The flagship Asian Development Bank Energy Transition Mechanism deal, the early retirement of the 660 MW Cirebon-1 plant in Indonesia, was cancelled by the Indonesian government in December 2025, with funds to be redirected to an older plant. Integrity bodies question the baseline (would the plant have run that long anyway?) and additionality.
PITFALL — In the EU a power plant sits under the ETS cap. Closing it releases allowances that someone else can use unless they are cancelled; Member States may cancel allowances when they close capacity under the ETS Directive (Article 12(4)). Selling transition credits for the same avoided tonnes would count them twice. Transition credits are designed for jurisdictions without a binding cap; a banker who puts them in a European phase-out model without this caveat is greenwashing the credit paper.
The alliance landscape changed fast. GFANZ restructured in January 2025, opening participation to any institution mobilising transition capital without a net-zero commitment, and the Net-Zero Banking Alliance voted to cease operations in October 2025. Banks’ own sector policies remain: most large European banks have thermal-coal policies with exit dates and bans on new coal clients. A restructuring desk meets these policies head on. Rolling over a coal utility’s facility can look like financing coal; refusing may push the plants into the hands of an owner with no closure commitment. Many banks therefore carve out “managed phase-out with a credible, contractual closure date” in their policies, which must be applied with evidence, not as a loophole.
A consensual restructuring of a large European corporate with syndicated loans and bonds typically takes six to twelve months from the first breach to completion. The sequence below is the one Meridian Bank follows when it is both a lender and the facility agent.
INTERACTIVE LAB — From early warning to completion: a consensual restructuring
Follow the documents and decisions from the first warning signal to the closing of an amend-and-extend with a carve-out.
| # | Who | Does what | Deliverable |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Relationship manager and credit officer | Early-warning trigger reviewed (covenant forecast, downgrade, climate event); client placed on watchlist | Watchlist memo, updated internal rating |
| 2 | Credit committee | Transfer to the restructuring unit approved; IFRS 9 team asked to reassess staging | Transfer decision, stage 2 assessment |
| 3 | Company CFO and its debt adviser | Company requests standstill and covenant waiver from lenders | Waiver and standstill request letter |
| 4 | Facility agent | Circulates the request, sets the voting deadline, counts consents | Agent notice, consent tally |
| 5 | Coordinating committee of lenders | Formed; appoints lenders’ financial adviser and legal counsel at the company’s cost | Engagement letters, NDA, standstill agreement |
| 6 | Independent business reviewer | Tests the business plan, carbon-price and closure scenarios, liquidity | Independent business review (IBR), 13-week cash flow |
| 7 | Company and its adviser | Present restructuring plan: carve-out, A&E, new money, debt-for-equity | Restructuring proposal and term sheet |
| 8 | Workout banker with ESG risk team | Credit paper: recovery waterfall, KPI reset, coal-policy check, reputational review | Credit application with ESG annex |
| 9 | Credit committee and reputational risk committee | Approve participation, new money, fees, forbearance classification | Approval with conditions |
| 10 | Lawyers for company and lenders | Draft amendment and restatement, intercreditor, vehicle facility, bond consent solicitation | Lock-up agreement, then signing documents |
| 11 | Bondholders and lenders | Vote: majority or unanimous consents; court plan if hold-outs block | Consent results or court sanction |
| 12 | Facility agent and loan operations | Closing: conditions precedent checked, fees paid, new terms booked, KPI schedule replaced | Closing notice, updated booking |
| 13 | Restructuring unit and IFRS 9 team | Post-closing monitoring: probation period, covenant tests, closure milestones | Quarterly monitoring reports |
Step 1: early warning and watchlist. The relationship manager sees the covenant forecast in the quarterly compliance certificate projection, the market sees the bond spread widen, the credit officer sees the rating model react. The watchlist memo is short: what happened, the covenant forecast, liquidity runway, and a proposed action. For a climate-driven case it should also state which channel bites (carbon price, physical event, closure policy) and whether the shock is temporary or structural. A temporary drought argues for a waiver; a structural carbon cost argues for a business-model change.
Step 2: transfer and staging. The credit committee decides the transfer to the restructuring unit. From that day the IFRS 9 team considers whether credit risk has increased significantly since origination. In most bank policies a transfer to workout or a watchlist “red” status is a qualitative SICR indicator that moves the exposure to stage 2.
Step 3: the request. The company, usually advised by a debt adviser, sends a request for a temporary waiver of the covenant test and a standstill. Timing is tactical: the request lands before the test date, so that the breach never becomes an event of default.
Step 4: the agent. The facility agent, an administrative role with no discretion, circulates the request to all lenders, sets a deadline and counts votes against the Majority Lender threshold. The agent bank also has a lender hat; internally, the agency team is separated from the workout team.
Step 5: organising the creditors. Lenders with the largest holdings form a coordinating committee (CoCo). The CoCo negotiates on behalf of all, under a confidentiality agreement, and appoints a financial adviser and counsel whose fees the company pays. Bondholders may organise in an ad hoc group with their own advisers. Members of the CoCo become “restricted” and cannot trade the company’s securities while they hold inside information.
Step 6: independent business review. An accounting or consulting firm tests the plan. In a climate case the IBR must cover carbon-price scenarios, closure-law scenarios and physical-risk events. Weak IBRs take the company’s carbon-price assumption as given; a good one shows the plan under the EUA forward curve and a stress scenario.
Step 7: the plan. The company presents a term sheet. In transition cases the plan typically combines a carve-out of the stranded assets into a phase-out vehicle, an amend-and-extend of bank debt, new money, an equity contribution, and a reset of the sustainability-linked terms.
Step 8: the credit paper. The workout banker writes the credit application: recovery waterfall in the plan and in the alternative, the bank’s position, provisions, capital, and the ESG annex. The ESG risk team checks the new KPIs and targets, the closure commitments, the fit with the bank’s coal policy and its transition plan, and flags reputational issues.
Step 9: approvals. Credit committee approves the terms and the forbearance classification; the reputational risk committee approves the coal-related participation, sometimes with conditions such as a publicly disclosed closure schedule.
Step 10: documentation. Parties sign a lock-up agreement committing them to support the deal, then the amendment and restatement agreement, the vehicle facility agreement, the intercreditor agreement and, for bonds, the consent solicitation memorandum.
Step 11: the votes. Lender consents are collected through the agent; bond consents through a consent solicitation with a meeting or written resolution. If hold-outs block an all-lender matter, the parties may use a court process (StaRUG, sauvegarde accélérée, a Dutch WHOA plan) to bind them.
Step 12: closing. Loan operations check the conditions precedent, collect fees, book the new terms and replace the KPI schedule in the system (see B17 for the agency mechanics).
Step 13: monitoring. The restructured loan sits in a probation period. Covenant tests, closure milestones of the vehicle and KPI reports are monitored quarterly. A new breach during probation sends the exposure straight back to non-performing.
WHO DOES WHAT — The workout banker owns the file and the credit paper. The facility agent owns the process (notices, votes, closing). The IFRS 9 analyst owns staging and provisions. The ESG risk team owns the opinion on the transition credibility, not the credit decision. Legal owns the documents. Compliance clears conflicts and controls inside information.
CASE — Nordhalde Energie AG is a fictional, listed, mid-sized utility in a euro-area country with a coal exit law. Its largest shareholder (35%) is a consortium of municipalities. All company figures below are case assumptions; regulations and market references are real and dated. Meridian Bank is mandated lead arranger and facility agent of Nordhalde’s bank debt and holds 20% of it.
Question. How did a utility with 3.9x leverage, comfortable inside its covenant, come to breach it within a year?
Data. Nordhalde has three businesses. Networks and district heating (regulated, stable) earn EBITDA of EUR 380m. Renewables (wind, solar, run-of-river hydro) earn EUR 200m in a normal year. The coal fleet, 3.6 GW of hard-coal and lignite units, earns its gross margin on the clean dark spread, the power price minus fuel minus carbon cost per MWh.
| Debt instrument | Amount (EUR m) | Terms |
|---|---|---|
| Sustainability-linked RCF | 1,000 committed, 500 drawn | E + 120 bp, ±5 bp ratchet, 2029 |
| Term loan | 700 | E + 150 bp, 2028 |
| Senior bonds | 1,500 | 3.00%, 2028 and 2031 |
| Sustainability-linked bond | 750 | 3.25%, 2030, +25 bp step-up |
| Schuldschein | 250 | 3.50%, 2029 |
| Hybrid bond | 500 | 5.00%, subordinated, deferrable |
| Cash | 300 |
The facility agreement defines net debt as senior debt minus cash and treats the hybrid as equity: EUR 3,700m minus EUR 300m, that is EUR 3,400m. The leverage covenant is 4.5x, the interest-cover covenant 3.0x. Meridian’s share is 20% of the RCF (EUR 200m commitment, EUR 100m drawn) and 20% of the term loan (EUR 140m).
The plan when the debt was signed (2024). Captured power price EUR 120/MWh (including hedges), fuel EUR 20/MWh, carbon EUR 70/t at an average emission factor of 0.95 tCO2/MWh, output 12 TWh, fixed costs EUR 100m.
FY2026, the year of the shock. Hedges rolled off and the captured price fell to EUR 108/MWh. The EUA rose to EUR 90/t, in line with the market in November 2026. A dry summer cut output twice: coal units ran 9 TWh because low river levels interrupted barge deliveries and limited cooling water, and run-of-river hydro lost EUR 30m of EBITDA.
FORMULA
is output (TWh, so that EUR/MWh times TWh gives EUR m); the captured power price; fuel cost per MWh; the emission factor (tCO2/MWh); the EUA price (EUR/t); fixed operating costs (EUR m). The bracket is the clean dark spread.
INTERACTIVE LAB — Nordhalde: from carbon price and drought to covenant breach
Rebuild the group EBITDA from the clean dark spread and see at which EUA price the leverage covenant breaks.
| Parameter you can move | Range | Default |
|---|---|---|
| EUA price | 40 to 150 EUR/t | 90 EUR/t |
| Captured power price | 70 to 160 EUR/MWh | 108 EUR/MWh |
| Coal output | 4 to 14 TWh | 9 TWh |
| Drought loss in renewables | 0 to 80 EUR m | 30 EUR m |
| Result at default settings | Value |
|---|---|
| Coal EBITDA in the 2024 plan | 302.0 EUR m |
| Coal EBITDA, FY2026 | -77.5 EUR m |
| Group EBITDA in the plan | 882.0 EUR m |
| Group EBITDA, FY2026 | 472.5 EUR m |
| Leverage in the plan | 3.85 x |
| Leverage, FY2026 | 7.20 x |
| EBITDA headroom in the plan | 14.3 % |
| EBITDA needed to meet 4.5x | 755.6 EUR m |
| EUA that breaks the covenant, plan conditions | 81.1 EUR/t |
| Senior cash interest | 124.6 EUR m |
| Interest cover, FY2026 | 3.79 x |
Try it. Restore the plan price (120) and output (12 TWh) and set the EUA to 85: the covenant is already breached without any drought. Then set output to 12 TWh but keep the price at 108: the carbon price alone does most of the damage.
Calculation and result. In the plan the clean dark spread was 120 − 20 − 0.95 × 70 = EUR 33.5/MWh; on 12 TWh with EUR 100m of fixed costs, coal EBITDA was EUR 302m and group EBITDA EUR 882m. Leverage was 3,400 / 882 = 3.85x with 14.3% EBITDA headroom. In FY2026 the spread collapsed to 108 − 20 − 0.95 × 90 = EUR 2.5/MWh; on 9 TWh it earns EUR 22.5m, less than the fixed costs, so coal EBITDA is −EUR 77.5m. With the drought loss in hydro, group EBITDA falls to EUR 472.5m and leverage jumps to 7.20x. Interest cover stays at 3.79x, above its 3.0x floor, because senior cash interest is only EUR 124.6m.
Reading. Three lessons. First, the covenant was fragile against carbon alone: at plan price and plan output, any EUA above EUR 81.1/t breaks 4.5x, and the market was trading around EUR 90 in November 2026. The shock that looked exceptional in the credit paper of 2024 was the forward curve of 2026. Second, the company is not illiquid: interest is covered and the RCF still has EUR 500m undrawn. The problem is solvency on a five-year view and the refinancing wall of 2028 (the EUR 700m term loan and a EUR 750m bond tranche), which a coal-heavy issuer in breach cannot refinance in the market. Third, the drought is temporary, the carbon price is not. A waiver alone would treat a structural problem as a weather event.
PITFALL — Analysts often stress one variable at a time. Here the carbon price, the captured power price and output moved together, and they are correlated: in a market where gas sets the price, a high carbon price raises the power price too, partially offsetting the cost for coal plants. Nordhalde’s spread collapsed because its hedges had locked in a high price that rolled off just as carbon rose. A credible stress test uses consistent scenarios, not independent sliders.
Question. If the IBR concludes that the coal fleet should close by the end of 2030 instead of 2034, what is the fleet worth, and what happens to the balance sheet?
Data. Carrying amount of the coal cash-generating unit: EUR 1,400m. Discount rate for value in use (pre-tax): 8%. In the 2024 plan, annual cash flow was coal EBITDA minus sustaining capex of EUR 30m, to closure at end-2034. The IBR’s new base case, built on the EUA forward curve and the expected merit order: average clean dark spread EUR 25/MWh, output 10 TWh, fixed costs EUR 100m, sustaining capex cut to EUR 20m, closure at end-2030. Decommissioning and mine rehabilitation will cost EUR 600m at closure, discounted at 2.5%.
FORMULA
is value in use; the clean dark spread; sustaining capital expenditure; the pre-tax discount rate; the number of years to closure counted from end-2026; the closure cost; the provision discount rate; and the old and new closure horizons. The impairment is the carrying amount minus the recoverable amount when positive.
INTERACTIVE LAB — Stranding the coal fleet: value in use, impairment and closure provision
Compute the value in use of the coal fleet under the old and new closure dates and the extra provision for earlier closure.
| Parameter you can move | Range | Default |
|---|---|---|
| Average clean dark spread to closure | 5 to 45 EUR/MWh | 25 EUR/MWh |
| Average annual output | 4 to 14 TWh | 10 TWh |
| Closure year (end of) | 2028 / 2029 / 2030 / 2031 / 2032 / 2033 / 2034 / 2036 / 2038 | 2030 |
| Pre-tax discount rate | 5 to 12 % | 8 % |
| Result at default settings | Value |
|---|---|
| Annual cash flow, new case | 130.0 EUR m |
| Value in use, 2024 plan (closure 2034) | 1,563.1 EUR m |
| Value in use, new case | 430.6 EUR m |
| Impairment on EUR 1,400m carrying amount | 969.4 EUR m |
| Closure provision, closure 2034 | 492.4 EUR m |
| Closure provision, new date | 543.6 EUR m |
| Increase in closure provision | 51.1 EUR m |
| Total pre-tax hit to equity | 1,020.5 EUR m |
Try it. Move closure to 2038 at the new spread: value in use rises to about EUR 980m and the fleet is still impaired. The impairment comes mostly from the spread, not the date.
Calculation and result. In the 2024 plan the fleet generated EUR 272m a year (302 − 30) for eight years; discounted at 8% its value in use was EUR 1,563m, above the EUR 1,400m carrying amount: no impairment. In the new case the fleet generates 10 × 25 − 100 − 20 = EUR 130m a year for four years, worth EUR 430.6m. The impairment is 1,400 − 430.6 = EUR 969.4m. Bringing closure forward also raises the present value of the EUR 600m closure cost from EUR 492.4m to EUR 543.6m, an extra provision of EUR 51.1m. The total pre-tax hit to equity is EUR 1,020.5m.
Reading. The impairment is non-cash and leaves the leverage covenant untouched. It matters for three other reasons. The rating agencies will treat the closure provision as debt-like, so their adjusted leverage rises. Shareholders’ equity takes a hit of about EUR 1bn, which makes a debt-for-equity swap or a capital increase more likely. And the auditors will ask whether the 2030 closure is a decision or a scenario: IAS 36 requires management’s best estimate, so the plan the lenders approve becomes an accounting fact. The chart shows the trap in negotiations: delaying closure adds value only slowly when the spread is thin, while it adds emissions linearly.
WHY IT MATTERS ON THE DESK — On the desk this stage settles who pays for stranding. The equity already absorbs EUR 1bn. The question for lenders is whether the remaining enterprise value covers the senior debt, which is the waterfall of stage 5.4.
Question. Nordhalde will miss the targets of both its sustainability-linked instruments at the FY2026 test. What does it cost, and should the KPIs be reset, kept or dropped in the restructuring?
Data. The RCF has two KPIs tested on FY2026, each worth ±2.5 bp of margin: installed coal capacity of at most 2.4 GW at 31 December 2026, and a scope 1 emission intensity of generation of at most 0.40 tCO2/MWh. The commitment fee is 35% of the applicable margin. The SLB has one target, the same intensity of at most 0.40 tCO2/MWh for FY2026; if missed, the coupon steps up by 25 bp from the 2027 coupon to maturity in 2030, that is four coupons. Renewables produced 6 TWh in the dry year.
What happened: Nordhalde had notified the closure of two units (1.2 GW) for end-2026, but the transmission system operator designated them as system-relevant and prohibited their closure, a power that grid operators have under national security-of-supply rules. Capacity stays at 3.6 GW. Intensity is 9 × 0.95 / (9 + 6) tCO2/MWh.
FORMULA
is the scope 1 emission intensity of generation; and coal and renewable output (TWh); the emission factor; the margin adjustment; drawn and undrawn amounts of the RCF; 0.35 the commitment-fee ratio.
INTERACTIVE LAB — Nordhalde: the price of missing sustainability performance targets
Test the two RCF KPIs and the SLB target, and compare the cost of failure with the EBITDA lost in the shock.
| Parameter you can move | Range | Default |
|---|---|---|
| Coal output FY2026 | 4 to 14 TWh | 9 TWh |
| Renewable output FY2026 | 4 to 12 TWh | 6 TWh |
| Installed coal capacity at 31 Dec 2026 | 2.4 / 3.0 / 3.6 | 3.6 GW |
| RCF ratchet per KPI | 0 to 7.5 bp | 2.5 bp |
| SLB coupon step-up | 0 to 75 bp | 25 bp |
| Result at default settings | Value |
|---|---|
| Scope 1 intensity of generation | 0.570 tCO2/MWh |
| RCF KPIs missed | 2 of 2 |
| RCF margin adjustment | 5.0 bp |
| Extra RCF cost per year (500 drawn, 500 undrawn) | 0.3375 EUR m |
| Extra SLB coupon per year | 1.875 EUR m |
| Total extra cost per year | 2.2125 EUR m |
| Total to maturity (RCF 3 years, SLB 4 coupons) | 8.5125 EUR m |
| Annual cost as share of EBITDA lost in the shock | 0.54 % |
| Meridian’s 20% share of the RCF premium per year | 0.0675 EUR m |
Try it. Set coal output to 4 TWh and capacity to 2.4 GW: both KPIs are met and the margin falls by 5 bp. Then put capacity back to 3.6 GW: the regulator’s decision alone costs one KPI.
Calculation and result. Intensity is 8.55 Mt over 15 TWh, 0.570 tCO2/MWh, far above 0.40: both RCF KPIs are missed, so the margin rises by 5 bp. On EUR 500m drawn and EUR 500m undrawn (commitment fee at 35% of the adjustment) the RCF costs EUR 0.3375m more per year. The SLB step-up costs 25 bp on EUR 750m, EUR 1.875m a year. Together, EUR 2.21m a year and EUR 8.51m to maturity, or 0.54% of the EBITDA lost in the shock. Meridian’s share of the RCF premium is EUR 67,500 a year.
Reading. The financial penalty is irrelevant to the credit story, as it should be. Three issues are not.
The cause of the miss. The capacity KPI was missed because a grid operator forbade a closure. The borrower did what it promised; the system kept the plants open. The SLLP and the LMA provisions treat this as a miss unless the agreement contains a carve-out for regulatory events, which this one does not. The lenders can waive the premium; most will not, because a waiver for a “good reason” is precisely what greenwashing critics look for. The honest answer is to keep the premium and reset the KPI.
The reset. The restructuring is a Sustainability Amendment Event in the LMA sense: the coal fleet leaves the group, so a capacity KPI on the group becomes meaningless. Meridian’s sustainable finance team proposes to replace it with (i) a closure schedule of the phase-out vehicle as a binding covenant (not a KPI: closure becomes a legal obligation with an event of default attached) and (ii) a new KPI for the remaining group, the renewable capacity installed, with SPTs consistent with the group’s transition plan. The intensity KPI is dropped: after the carve-out the group’s intensity collapses mechanically, and a target achieved by moving plants into a vehicle the group still partly owns would be “ambitious” only on paper.
The bond. The SLB step-up cannot be removed without bondholders’ consent. Nordhalde could launch a consent solicitation to swap the SPT for a new one, paying a consent fee; the advisers recommend leaving the bond untouched. The step-up is cheap, and asking bondholders to re-open the target in the middle of a restructuring invites them to ask for more. The SLB keeps paying 3.50% to 2030 and will be reported by investors as a missed target.
PITFALL — Recalculation clauses allow a baseline to be restated after a material structural change, such as a disposal. They do not allow the borrower to restate a target it has already missed. Moving the coal fleet out after the FY2026 test does not convert the FY2026 miss into a hit.
Question. Should the lenders support a consensual plan (managed phase-out, amend-and-extend, equity) or let the company enter a formal process? What does each path give each class?
Data (IBR and lenders’ adviser). At a default, the RCF is assumed fully drawn and the cash consumed, so senior claims (RCF, term loan, bonds, SLB, Schuldschein, all pari passu, unsecured) are EUR 4,200m; the hybrid ranks behind with EUR 500m. In the plan, networks are valued at 8.0x EBITDA, renewables at 8.0x, and the coal fleet at −EUR 300m (closure costs in excess of cash flows to 2030). In a disorderly insolvency, networks sell at 7.0x, renewables at 6.5x in a fire sale, the coal fleet is worth −EUR 600m (accelerated closure, contract terminations, environmental liabilities that follow the assets), and process costs take 5% of value.
INTERACTIVE LAB — Nordhalde: who gets what in the plan and in insolvency
Value the group under the consensual plan and in a disorderly insolvency and distribute value by rank.
| Parameter you can move | Range | Default |
|---|---|---|
| Networks multiple, plan | 6 to 11 x EBITDA | 8 x EBITDA |
| Renewables multiple, plan | 5 to 11 x EBITDA | 8 x EBITDA |
| Coal fleet value, plan | -800 to 200 EUR m | -300 EUR m |
| Networks multiple, insolvency | 5 to 10 x EBITDA | 7 x EBITDA |
| Renewables multiple, insolvency | 4 to 10 x EBITDA | 6.5 x EBITDA |
| Coal fleet value, insolvency | -1200 to 0 EUR m | -600 EUR m |
| Insolvency process costs | 0 to 15 % of value | 5 % of value |
| Result at default settings | Value |
|---|---|
| Enterprise value, plan | 4,340.0 EUR m |
| Distributable value, insolvency | 3,192.0 EUR m |
| Senior recovery, plan | 100.0 % |
| Hybrid recovery, plan | 28.0 % |
| Value to the hybrid, plan | 140.0 EUR m |
| Senior recovery, insolvency | 76.0 % |
| Hybrid recovery, insolvency | 0.0 % |
| Value preserved by the plan | 1,148.0 EUR m |
| Meridian loss avoided on EUR 340m claim | 81.6 EUR m |
Try it. Lower the plan networks multiple to 7x and the coal value to −600: seniors are impaired even in the plan, and the fulcrum moves from the hybrid to the senior class. That is the scenario in which senior creditors would ask for equity.
Calculation and result. In the plan, EV is 380 × 8 + 200 × 8 − 300 = EUR 4,340m: seniors are covered in full and the hybrid recovers EUR 140m of EUR 500m, 28%. The hybrid is the fulcrum. In insolvency, value is (380 × 7 + 200 × 6.5 − 600) × 95% = EUR 3,192m: seniors recover 76%, the hybrid nothing. The plan preserves EUR 1,148m of value. For Meridian, whose claim at default would be EUR 340m (fully drawn RCF share plus term loan), the plan avoids a loss of EUR 81.6m.
Reading. The waterfall tells the negotiators three things. The seniors should support the plan, since it is worth 24 points of recovery to them. The hybrid holders are the natural recipients of the equity: they are the fulcrum, and they get nothing in the alternative. The coal fleet’s value is negative in both scenarios but much more so in insolvency, because a disorderly closure triggers contract terminations and leaves environmental liabilities to be funded from the estate. A managed phase-out is not charity to the climate: it is the value-maximising path for creditors. The sensitivity is the uncomfortable part. Lower the networks multiple by one turn and add EUR 300m of closure costs, and the seniors are impaired even in the plan. Restructuring valuations are negotiated numbers, and each side’s adviser has an incentive to push them.
WHY IT MATTERS ON THE DESK — Under a preventive restructuring framework such as the StaRUG, a dissenting class can be crammed down only if it does no worse than in the best alternative. This waterfall is the evidence the court will read; a lender who wants to block must produce a different one.
Question. How much debt can a vehicle holding the coal fleet carry if every plant closes by end-2030, and would transition credits change the answer?
Data. Nordhalde moves the fleet into Nordhalde Kohleausstieg GmbH (“the vehicle”), wholly owned, with a binding closure schedule written into the vehicle’s facility agreement and filed with the regulator. Output falls from 8 TWh in 2027 to 6, 4 and 2 TWh in 2028 to 2030 as units close. The average clean dark spread is EUR 15/MWh, lower than in stage 5.2 because the units that stay longest run at the margin. Fixed costs fall with closures: EUR 90m, 75m, 60m, 45m. The state pays closure compensation of EUR 100m a year under a public-law contract (a case assumption, inspired by the compensation contracts used in coal exit laws and subject to EU State-aid control). The lenders size the debt at a minimum debt service cover ratio (DSCR) of 1.40x with a sculpted repayment profile, at 5.5% (EURIBOR 2.50% plus 300 bp). Without closure, the baseline would have been 12 TWh a year.
FORMULA
is the maximum debt at signing; the cash flow available for debt service in year ; the minimum cover ratio; the all-in interest rate; output; fixed costs; state compensation; transition-credit revenue, equal to with the baseline output and the credit price, if credits are eligible.
INTERACTIVE LAB — Sizing the debt of the managed phase-out vehicle
Size the sculpted debt of the coal phase-out vehicle at a DSCR and test the effect of transition-credit revenue.
| Parameter you can move | Range | Default |
|---|---|---|
| Clean dark spread | 0 to 40 EUR/MWh | 15 EUR/MWh |
| State closure compensation per year | 0 to 200 EUR m | 100 EUR m |
| Minimum DSCR | 1.1 to 2.0 x | 1.4 x |
| All-in interest rate | 3 to 9 % | 5.5 % |
| Transition-credit price (0 if not eligible) | 0 to 40 EUR/t | 0 EUR/t |
| Result at default settings | Value |
|---|---|
| CFADS 2027 | 130.0 EUR m |
| CFADS 2028 | 115.0 EUR m |
| CFADS 2029 | 100.0 EUR m |
| CFADS 2030 | 85.0 EUR m |
| Total CFADS 2027-2030 | 430.0 EUR m |
| Maximum sculpted debt at signing | 271.66 EUR m |
| Debt capacity without state compensation | 29.9 EUR m |
| Avoided emissions vs 12 TWh baseline, 2027-2030 | 26.6 MtCO2 |
| Meridian’s 25% ticket | 67.91 EUR m |
Try it. Set a transition-credit price of EUR 15/t: CFADS nearly doubles and so does debt capacity. Then remember that in the EU ETS the same tonnes sit under a cap: the credits are not eligible here, and the default is zero for that reason.
Calculation and result. CFADS is 8 × 15 − 90 + 100 = EUR 130m in 2027, then 115, 100 and EUR 85m in 2030, EUR 430m in total. At a DSCR of 1.40x and 5.5%, the vehicle can borrow EUR 271.66m, repaid in full by 2030. Without the state compensation, capacity would collapse to about EUR 30m: the plants themselves barely cover their fixed costs. Meridian takes a 25% ticket of EUR 67.91m in the new money, alongside two other banks and a public development bank. The proceeds repay RCF drawings at group level.
Reading. Three points are specific to transition structures. The vehicle is a public-policy structure dressed as project finance. Without compensation it is barely bankable; with it, the lenders are taking the state’s payment risk plus operating risk on plants that are closing. The closure schedule is the collateral of the green claim. It must be a covenant with an event of default, and the vehicle’s documents must prevent a sale of the plants to a buyer who would run them longer. Transition credits look tempting and are wrong here. The same 26.6 Mt avoided would, at EUR 15/t, add EUR 399m of revenue; but Nordhalde operates under the EU ETS cap, and the avoided tonnes are not additional unless the allowances freed are cancelled. In an emerging market without a binding cap, VM0052-type credits could legitimately enter the model, with the baseline, additionality and just-transition conditions checked by the lenders’ technical adviser.
PITFALL — A phase-out vehicle can be used to move emissions off a group’s balance sheet while it keeps economic exposure. The group still owns 100% of the vehicle here; its consolidated emissions do not fall until the plants close. Any KPI, label or disclosure that treats the carve-out as a reduction is misleading.
Question. After the carve-out, what does the remaining group look like, and are the new covenants credible?
Data (agreed term sheet, case assumptions). (1) Vehicle debt of EUR 271.66m repays RCF drawings. (2) The municipal shareholders underwrite a EUR 300m rights issue, used to prepay the term loan. (3) The hybrid is exchanged for 30% of the enlarged share capital (debt-for-equity). (4) Amend-and-extend: RCF and term loan extended by three years to 2032 and 2031, margins up 125 bp (RCF to E + 245 bp, term loan to E + 275 bp), amendment fee of 50 bp on bank commitments. (5) Leverage covenant reset to 6.0x for 2027, stepping down to 5.0x in 2029. (6) KPI reset as in stage 5.3. Group EBITDA without coal, in a normal hydro year, is EUR 580m. Bonds, SLB and Schuldschein stay untouched.
INTERACTIVE LAB — Nordhalde after the restructuring: leverage, cover and the equity split
Compute the post-deal capital structure and test how the rights issue, the margin increase and the hybrid’s equity share change the outcome.
| Parameter you can move | Range | Default |
|---|---|---|
| Rights issue | 0 to 600 EUR m | 300 EUR m |
| Bank margin increase | 0 to 300 bp | 125 bp |
| Hybrid holders’ share of equity | 0 to 60 % | 30 % |
| Reset leverage covenant, 2027 | 4.5 to 7 x | 6 x |
| Result at default settings | Value |
|---|---|
| Vehicle debt (from stage 5.5) | 271.66 EUR m |
| Group senior net debt after the deal | 2,828.34 EUR m |
| Leverage after the deal | 4.88 x |
| Senior cash interest after the deal | 112.30 EUR m |
| Interest cover after the deal | 5.16 x |
| EBITDA headroom under the reset covenant | 18.7 % |
| Amendment fee on EUR 1,400m bank commitments | 7.0 EUR m |
| Equity value after the deal (plan EV less all debt) | 1,240.0 EUR m |
| Value of hybrid holders’ stake | 372.0 EUR m |
| Hybrid recovery on EUR 500m claim | 74.4 % |
Try it. Set the rights issue to zero: leverage rises to about 5.4x and headroom under a 6.0x covenant shrinks to about 10%. The municipalities’ cash is what makes the reset covenant credible.
Calculation and result. Senior net debt falls from EUR 3,400m to 3,400 − 271.66 − 300 = EUR 2,828.34m. On EUR 580m of EBITDA, leverage is 4.88x, with 18.7% headroom under the 6.0x reset covenant. Senior interest falls to EUR 112.30m despite the higher bank margins, because drawn bank debt shrinks; interest cover is 5.16x. The amendment fee is EUR 7.0m (50 bp on the EUR 1,000m RCF and the EUR 400m remaining term loan). Valuing the group at the plan EV of EUR 4,340m less all debt, group and vehicle, equity is worth EUR 1,240m; the hybrid holders’ 30% stake is worth EUR 372m, a 74.4% recovery on their EUR 500m claim.
Reading. The equity split breaks absolute priority. In the waterfall the hybrid was entitled to EUR 140m and the old shareholders to nothing; in the deal the hybrid gets EUR 372m and the old shareholders keep 70% of a company worth EUR 1,240m, partly because they bring EUR 300m of new money and partly because the senior creditors, paid in full, have no reason to fight. Consensual deals routinely redistribute value this way; the alternative is a court process where each class would argue its own valuation. The senior lenders accept because the restructuring removes the 2028 refinancing wall, gives them 125 bp more margin and a fee, and brings leverage back below 5x. The risk they keep is that EUR 580m of EBITDA is a normal-hydro number: one more dry year and headroom shrinks.
Question. Is the amend-and-extend a distressed restructuring that sends Meridian’s exposure into default? Where does it sit under IFRS 9, and what is the provision?
Step one: the diminished financial obligation test. The EBA guidelines on the definition of default compare the net present value of cash flows before and after the change, both discounted at the original effective interest rate; a loss above 1% means default. Meridian’s term loan share pays EURIBOR + 150 bp, 4.00% with EURIBOR at 2.50%, and had two years left. After the deal it pays 5.25% for five years and Meridian receives a 50 bp fee.
FORMULA
is the present value of the original remaining cash flows and that of the new cash flows (including fees received and net of any principal forgiven), both discounted at the original effective interest rate. A above 1% is an unlikeliness-to-pay trigger and leads to default.
INTERACTIVE LAB — Is the amend-and-extend a distressed restructuring?
Apply the 1% diminished-financial-obligation test to Meridian’s term loan share for different haircuts, margins and extensions.
| Parameter you can move | Range | Default |
|---|---|---|
| Principal haircut | 0 to 40 % | 0 % |
| New margin | 0 to 400 bp | 275 bp |
| New remaining life | 2 to 8 years | 5 years |
| Upfront amendment fee | 0 to 150 bp | 50 bp |
| Result at default settings | Value |
|---|---|
| NPV of original cash flows per 100 | 100.000 |
| NPV of new cash flows per 100 | 106.065 |
| Diminished financial obligation | -6.06 % |
| Default trigger (1 = yes) | 0 |
Try it. Set the new margin to 100 bp with no fee: extending the loan at a lower rate than the original 4.00% cuts the NPV by more than 1%, and the same amendment becomes a default.
The new terms are worth 106.065 per 100 at the original 4.00% rate, against 100 for the old ones: the DFO is −6.07%, so there is no default trigger. Had the lenders cut the margin to 100 bp to help the company, the extension alone would have crossed the threshold.
Step two: classification. No default, but a concession (three-year extension, covenant reset) granted because the borrower is in financial difficulty: the exposure is forborne performing. It stays in IFRS 9 stage 2 for at least the two-year probation period; a new breach or 30 days past due during probation sends it to non-performing. The internal rating moves from BBB at origination to B.
Step three: the provision. Meridian’s post-deal exposure to the group is EUR 45.67m drawn on the RCF (20% of 228.34), EUR 154.33m undrawn and EUR 80m of term loan. The IFRS 9 model assumes 75% of the undrawn part is drawn before a default. Lifetime ECL uses a cumulative five-year PD at the B grade, LGD of 40% plus a 5-point overlay for climate and closure uncertainty. For comparison, the stage 3 figure uses two scenarios: the plan (60%, LGD 5% for workout costs and time) and insolvency (40%, LGD equal to the 24% loss from stage 5.4 plus 5 points).
INTERACTIVE LAB — Meridian’s expected credit loss on Nordhalde by IFRS 9 stage
Compute 12-month, lifetime and credit-impaired ECL on Meridian’s exposure and compare them with the regulatory expected loss and the NPE backstop.
| Parameter you can move | Range | Default |
|---|---|---|
| Internal grade after downgrade | BB / B | B |
| Remaining life | 1 to 7 years | 5 years |
| Climate overlay on LGD | 0 to 15 pts | 5 pts |
| Weight of insolvency scenario (stage 3) | 0 to 100 % | 40 % |
| Result at default settings | Value |
|---|---|
| Meridian RCF drawn share | 45.67 EUR m |
| Meridian RCF undrawn share | 154.33 EUR m |
| Cumulative PD over remaining life | 18.46 % |
| IFRS 9 exposure at default | 241.42 EUR m |
| Stage 1 ECL at origination grade BBB | 0.193 EUR m |
| Stage 2 lifetime ECL | 20.06 EUR m |
| Scenario-weighted LGD, stage 3 | 14.6 % |
| Stage 3 ECL | 35.25 EUR m |
| P&L charge, stage 1 to stage 2 | 19.86 EUR m |
| Regulatory EAD (CCF 40%) | 187.40 EUR m |
| IRB shortfall vs stage 3 ECL if defaulted | 39.71 EUR m |
| NPE backstop, unsecured, years 2-3 (35% of drawn) | 43.98 EUR m |
Try it. Switch the grade to BB and the overlay to zero: lifetime ECL falls to about EUR 4.7m. The downgrade, not the climate overlay, drives most of the provision.
Result. EAD for IFRS 9 is 45.67 + 80 + 0.75 × 154.33 = EUR 241.42m. At origination, stage 1 ECL was EUR 0.193m. In stage 2 at grade B, the five-year cumulative PD is 18.46% and lifetime ECL EUR 20.06m: the stage transfer costs Meridian a P&L charge of EUR 19.86m. Had the loan defaulted, stage 3 ECL would be EUR 35.25m (scenario-weighted LGD 14.6%). Two prudential figures show why classification matters: under F-IRB a defaulted exposure carries no RWA but an expected loss of 40% of regulatory EAD (EUR 187.40m), so the IRB shortfall against the stage 3 provision would be EUR 39.71m, deducted from CET1; and if the exposure became non-performing, the calendar backstop would require coverage of EUR 43.98m (35% of the drawn amount) from the second year.
Reading. The provision is driven by the downgrade more than by the climate overlay; without it lifetime ECL would be EUR 17.83m, so the overlay adds about EUR 2.2m. The decisive number is the DFO test: a generous lender who had cut the margin would have pushed the loan into default, with a provision almost twice as large and a CET1 deduction. Forbearance done at market terms protects the bank’s capital as well as the borrower.
PITFALL — Do not stage the vehicle loan with the group. The new money to the phase-out vehicle is a new exposure, originated at its own grade (BB, given the state compensation), in stage 1. Banks that book new money to a distressed group as stage 2 or 3 from day one misstate both their provisions and their new-business margins.
| Item | Value | Stage |
|---|---|---|
| Group EBITDA, plan / FY2026 | EUR 882m / 472.5m | 5.1 |
| Leverage, plan / FY2026 (covenant 4.5x) | 3.85x / 7.20x | 5.1 |
| EUA that breaks the covenant (plan) | EUR 81.1/t | 5.1 |
| Interest cover FY2026 | 3.79x | 5.1 |
| Value in use, old / new | EUR 1,563m / 430.6m | 5.2 |
| Impairment + extra closure provision | EUR 969.4m + 51.1m | 5.2 |
| Scope 1 intensity FY2026 (SPT 0.40) | 0.570 t/MWh | 5.3 |
| Cost of KPI misses per year / to maturity | EUR 2.21m / 8.51m | 5.3 |
| EV plan / insolvency | EUR 4,340m / 3,192m | 5.4 |
| Senior recovery plan / insolvency | 100% / 76% | 5.4 |
| Meridian loss avoided | EUR 81.6m | 5.4 |
| Vehicle debt at DSCR 1.40x | EUR 271.66m | 5.5 |
| Meridian new money | EUR 67.91m | 5.5 |
| Post-deal net debt / leverage / ICR | EUR 2,828m / 4.88x / 5.16x | 5.6 |
| Hybrid recovery through equity | 74.4% | 5.6 |
| DFO of Meridian’s A&E | −6.07% (no default) | 5.7 |
| Stage 2 ECL / P&L charge | EUR 20.06m / 19.86m | 5.7 |
Meridian uses F-IRB for corporates: LGD 40% for senior unsecured, maturity 2.5 years, and since CRR3 the credit conversion factors of the standardised approach for undrawn commitments (40% for an ordinary committed facility). The CRR3 corporate risk-weight function gives 39.0% at grade BBB (PD 0.20%), 82.1% at BB (1.00%) and 124.1% at B (4.00%). The downgrade alone more than triples the risk weight. If the exposure defaults, F-IRB sets the RWA to zero but requires the bank to compare its provisions with an expected loss equal to LGD times EAD; any shortfall is deducted from CET1, which is why a default can cost more capital than a stage 2 loan (stage 5.7). If Meridian took shares in a debt-for-equity swap, it would hold an equity exposure: CRR3 removed the IRB approaches for equity and phases in a 250% risk weight (400% for speculative holdings), so banks generally leave equity to the bondholders and funds.
Assumptions: FTP liquidity premium 30 bp on drawn amounts and term loan (five-year funding after extension), 15 bp on the vehicle loan (average life about two and a half years), HQLA carry of 40 bp on undrawn commitments, cost-income 40%, the amendment fee spread over five years, tax 25%, capital 13% of RWA. Before the shock Meridian held EUR 100m drawn and EUR 100m undrawn on the RCF and EUR 140m of term loan at grade BBB; after the deal it holds EUR 45.67m drawn, EUR 154.33m undrawn and EUR 80m of term loan at grade B, plus EUR 67.91m of vehicle loan at grade BB.
INTERACTIVE LAB — Meridian’s RAROC on Nordhalde before and after the restructuring
Compare the return on capital of the original relationship, the restructured group exposure and the new money to the phase-out vehicle.
| Parameter you can move | Range | Default |
|---|---|---|
| Bank margin increase | 0 to 300 bp | 125 bp |
| Group grade after the deal | BB / B | B |
| Meridian’s share of vehicle debt | 0 to 50 % | 25 % |
| Cost-income ratio | 30 to 70 % | 40 % |
| Result at default settings | Value |
|---|---|
| Net revenue before the shock | 2.600 EUR m |
| RWA before the shock | 109.25 EUR m |
| RAROC before the shock | 7.06 % |
| RAROC before, with the 5 bp KPI premium | 7.27 % |
| Net revenue, restructured group exposure | 3.928 EUR m |
| Expected loss, group exposure | 2.998 EUR m |
| RWA, group exposure | 232.51 EUR m |
| RAROC, group exposure | -1.59 % |
| RAROC, vehicle loan | 9.21 % |
| Operating costs before | 1.040 EUR m |
| Operating costs, group exposure | 1.571 EUR m |
| Net revenue, vehicle loan | 1.936 EUR m |
| Operating costs, vehicle loan | 0.774 EUR m |
| Expected loss before | 0.224 EUR m |
| Expected loss, vehicle loan | 0.272 EUR m |
| RWA, vehicle loan | 55.73 EUR m |
| F-IRB risk weight at BBB | 39.0 % |
| F-IRB risk weight at BB | 82.1 % |
| F-IRB risk weight at B | 124.1 % |
| Allocated capital after the deal | 37.47 EUR m |
| RAROC, total relationship after the deal | 0.50 % |
Try it. Switch the group grade to BB: the same pricing gives a RAROC of about 6.0%, still below the hurdle but positive. Restructured loans earn their return only when the rating recovers, which is why upgrades after a successful plan matter so much to the workout unit.
| Line (EUR m per year) | Before shock | Group after deal | Vehicle loan |
|---|---|---|---|
| Net revenue over FTP, after HQLA carry | 2.600 | 3.928 | 1.936 |
| Operating costs (40%) | 1.040 | 1.571 | 0.774 |
| Expected loss | 0.224 | 2.998 | 0.272 |
| RWA | 109.25 | 232.51 | 55.73 |
| RAROC after tax | 7.06% | −1.59% | 9.21% |
Reading. Before the shock the relationship earned 7.06%, below the 12% hurdle, like most investment-grade relationship lending: the bank was counting on ancillary business. After the deal, revenue rises by half thanks to the extra 125 bp and the fee, but expected loss rises more than tenfold and RWA more than doubles; the group exposure destroys value at −1.59%. The new money to the vehicle, priced at 300 bp with state compensation behind it, earns 9.21%. Together the relationship earns 0.50% on EUR 37.47m of capital.
The point is not that the deal is bad. RAROC is the wrong lens for a workout decision: the relevant comparison is the EUR 81.6m of loss avoided against the insolvency path (stage 5.4), set against the capital held during probation. The sustainable feature itself is a rounding error: the 5 bp KPI premium raised the pre-shock RAROC from 7.06% to 7.27%, which is why no one should think of a margin ratchet as an economic incentive for the bank.
The extension changes funding more than pricing does. A loan due in 2028 was funded with two-year liquidity; extended to 2031, it needs five-year funding at about 30 bp, which Treasury charges from the amendment date. The RCF’s undrawn EUR 154.33m carries a liquidity buffer: under the LCR, committed credit facilities to non-financial corporates assume a 10% outflow, and Meridian charges HQLA carry of 40 bp on the full undrawn amount as an internal convention. A distressed borrower draws its RCF in full precisely when markets are closed, so Treasury watches undrawn lines to watchlist names closely. Restructuring documents often cancel part of the undrawn commitment for this reason.
Under IFRS 9 the amendment is tested for derecognition. If the present value of the new cash flows at the original effective interest rate differs from the old one by 10% or more (the threshold used by IFRS 9 for financial liabilities and widely applied by analogy to assets), or if qualitative terms change substantially, the old loan is derecognised and a new one recognised at fair value; a new loan to a credit-impaired borrower would then be “purchased or originated credit-impaired”. Here the difference is 6.07% and terms are similar, so it is a modification: the gross carrying amount is recalculated at the original rate and the difference goes to profit or loss. The loan remains in stage 2, and SICR is assessed against the original credit risk at initial recognition, not against the post-restructuring situation. On Nordhalde’s side, the hybrid exchanged for shares is extinguished under IFRIC 19: the shares are measured at fair value and the difference with the hybrid’s carrying amount goes to profit or loss.
Green Asset Ratio. Coal generation is not Taxonomy-eligible; the group loan contributes nothing to the numerator. The renewables business is aligned, but the group loan is general-purpose, so it enters the numerator only through Nordhalde’s reported Taxonomy KPIs. The vehicle loan is not green and cannot be presented as such; it is transition finance in the sense of the 2023 Commission Recommendation, a category with no ratio of its own.
Pillar 3 ESG. Nordhalde appears in Template 1 among exposures to companies excluded from Paris-aligned benchmarks, with its stage 2 status and provisions disclosed: the template shows stage 2 and non-performing exposures and accumulated impairment for carbon-related sectors. A restructured coal utility is exactly the line that analysts read.
Financed emissions (PCAF). For a listed company, Meridian’s attribution factor is its outstanding amount over enterprise value including cash (EVIC). Two effects pull in opposite directions. The carve-out does not reduce consolidated emissions while the group owns the vehicle, and the vehicle loan is a new attributable exposure. Meanwhile the collapse of Nordhalde’s market capitalisation reduces EVIC and mechanically raises the share of emissions attributed to each lender. Meridian’s financed emissions on Nordhalde can rise in the year of the restructuring although no additional tonne is emitted. The bank’s transition plan should explain this, and set phase-out financing apart in its sector targets rather than hide it.
| Risk | Control | Owner |
|---|---|---|
| Forbearance not flagged, stage 2 understated | Forbearance checklist at every amendment; DFO test documented | Workout banker, IFRS 9 team |
| Climate overlay arbitrary or double-counted | Overlay methodology approved, back-tested, disclosed | Credit risk modelling |
| Valuation in waterfall biased to the plan | Independent valuation; sensitivity on multiples and closure costs | Lenders’ adviser, credit officer |
| Closure schedule not enforceable | Closure as covenant and event of default; restriction on asset sales | Legal |
| Phase-out loan breaches bank’s coal policy | Policy carve-out with evidence; reputational risk committee | ESG risk team |
| Inside information while restricted | Wall-crossing log, trading restrictions | Compliance |
| KPI reset weakens ambition | Reset assessed against SLLP; second-party opinion | Sustainable finance team |
| Transition credits double-counted | Eligibility review; no credits under a binding cap without cancellation | Technical adviser, ESG risk |
Red-flag checklist for distressed transition deals.
What changed recently. Three shifts matter for the desk. Loan documentation now anticipates KPI resets and declassification, so restructurings no longer have to improvise. Supervisors have moved from guidance to penalties on climate-risk management. And the voluntary net-zero alliances that pushed banks to exit coal have dissolved, leaving bank policies and regulatory transition plans as the binding constraints.
Open debates. Whether financing a phase-out vehicle should count against or towards a bank’s sector decarbonisation target; whether climate overlays in IFRS 9 capture risk or smooth earnings; whether transition credits can ever be credible where a carbon market exists; whether sustainability-linked instruments should include structural consequences (drawstops, mandatory prepayment) instead of small margin changes; and whether consensual deals that let shareholders keep value, as in stage 5.6, are fair to the creditors who bear the transition loss.
INTERACTIVE LAB — Check your understanding: distressed transition and restructuring
Test the key mechanics of covenants, forbearance, waterfalls, phase-out finance and the bank-side treatment.
Q1. Net debt is EUR 2,000m, EBITDA EUR 500m, the leverage covenant 4.5x. By how much can EBITDA fall before breach?
Answer: B. Headroom is 1 − 2,000 / (4.5 × 500) = 11.1%.
Q2. Which change to a syndicated loan normally requires the consent of all lenders under LMA-style documentation?
Answer: C. Maturity, pricing, principal and currency are all-lender matters; waivers usually need Majority Lenders.
Q3. What happens under the August 2026 LMA provisions when a borrower misses a sustainability performance target?
Answer: B. A sustainability breach alone is not an event of default; the margin moves and declassification follows prolonged breaches, repeated missing certificates or failed amendments.
Q4. A restructuring reduces the NPV of a loan at the original effective rate by 2%. Under the EBA definition of default this is:
Answer: B. A diminished financial obligation above 1% is a default trigger; the May 2026 amending guidelines kept the threshold.
Q5. Which creditor class is the ‘fulcrum’?
Answer: C. The fulcrum is the first class not fully covered by enterprise value; it usually receives the equity in a restructuring.
Q6. Why are transition credits for closing a coal plant in the EU problematic?
Answer: B. Under a binding cap, closure frees allowances unless they are cancelled; selling credits for the same tonnes double-counts them.
Q7. Bringing forward the closure of a plant with a fixed closure cost increases the closure provision because:
Answer: A. Same nominal cost, shorter discounting period, higher present value.
Q8. How long is the probation period of a performing forborne exposure before it can exit forbearance?
Answer: C. Two years as performing forborne; a non-performing forborne exposure first needs at least one year of cure.
Q9. Under F-IRB, what is the RWA of a defaulted corporate exposure, and where does the cost go?
Answer: B. The F-IRB formula gives zero capital at PD 100%; the loss is captured through the expected-loss comparison.
Q10. The NPE calendar backstop for the unsecured part of a non-performing loan requires:
Answer: B. Article 47c CRR: 0.35 factor between the first and third year, 1 from the first day of the fourth year; shortfalls are deducted from CET1.
Q11. Why can a bank’s financed emissions on a distressed utility rise without any extra emissions?
Answer: B. Attribution is outstanding over EVIC; a lower EVIC attributes more of the same emissions to each lender.
Q12. In a phase-out vehicle, what protects the climate claim most?
Answer: C. Closure must be an enforceable obligation; a KPI only changes the price of failing.
Q13. Since when do the EBA guidelines on the management of ESG risks apply to large institutions?
Answer: A. They apply from 11 January 2026; small and non-complex institutions follow from 11 January 2027.
A municipal utility has net debt of EUR 1,600m and a leverage covenant of 4.0x. Its non-coal businesses earn EUR 250m of EBITDA. Its coal plant produces 5 TWh at a captured price of EUR 130/MWh, fuel EUR 25/MWh, emission factor 1.0 t/MWh, fixed costs EUR 60m. (a) Find the EUA price that breaks the covenant. (b) Compute leverage at EUR 90/t.
Solution. (a) Minimum EBITDA is 1,600 / 4.0 = EUR 400m, so the plant must earn 400 − 250 = EUR 150m. Then 5 × (130 − 25 − C) − 60 = 150, so 105 − C = 42 and C = EUR 63/t. (b) At EUR 90/t the spread is 130 − 25 − 90 = EUR 15/MWh; coal EBITDA is 5 × 15 − 60 = EUR 15m; group EBITDA EUR 265m; leverage 1,600 / 265 = 6.04x. The covenant is breached by a wide margin at a carbon price close to the November 2026 market.
A EUR 100m loan pays 5.0% (its effective interest rate) with three years left. The borrower asks for an extension to six years. (a) Lenders offer 4.5% with no fee. Apply the DFO test. (b) Lenders instead keep 5.0% and charge a 1% fee. Apply the test again and give the IFRS 9 stage in each case.
Solution. The original cash flows discounted at 5.0% are worth 100. (a) New value: 4.5 × annuity(5%, 6) + 100 / 1.05^6 = 4.5 × 5.0757 + 74.62 = 97.46. DFO = 2.54% > 1%: default, non-performing forborne, stage 3. (b) At 5.0% the coupons and principal are worth exactly 100 and the fee adds 1: NPV 101, DFO −1%. No default: performing forborne, stage 2, two-year probation. The lesson: a concession on price can turn an extension into a default.
A coal plant will close in three years. CFADS is EUR 60m, 50m and 40m. Lenders require a DSCR of 1.30x and charge 6.0%. (a) Size the sculpted debt. (b) What happens at a DSCR of 1.50x?
Solution. (a) Debt service each year is CFADS / 1.30: 46.15, 38.46 and 30.77. Discounted at 6.0%: 46.15 / 1.06 + 38.46 / 1.1236 + 30.77 / 1.1910 = 43.54 + 34.23 + 25.83 = EUR 103.6m. (b) At 1.50x, debt service is 40.00, 33.33 and 26.67 and debt capacity falls to EUR 89.8m. A short-lived asset is very sensitive to the cover ratio because there is no tail to absorb a bad year.
1. Walk me through what you do when a client tells you it will breach its leverage covenant next quarter. I recompute the covenant from the facility agreement definitions, because the reported figure is rarely the covenant figure. I check liquidity: undrawn RCF, cash, the next maturities. I ask whether the cause is temporary or structural, because that decides between a waiver and a business-plan change. Internally I flag the file for watchlist and inform the credit officer and the IFRS 9 team, since a SICR assessment will follow. Externally the company should request a waiver before the test date, through the agent.
2. Why would senior lenders support a plan that gives equity value to shareholders? Because they compare the plan with their alternative, not with an ideal. If seniors are repaid in full in the plan and recover 76% in insolvency, fighting over the residual equity risks the 24 points they gain. Shareholders who inject new money also bring value that would not exist in a court process. Absolute priority is the legal benchmark, but consensual deals price the cost and delay of enforcing it.
3. A client missed its SLL target because the regulator forbade a plant closure. Would you waive the premium? I would not waive it, and I would reset the KPI. The SLLP and the documentation define the consequence of a miss, and waivers “for good reasons” are where the label loses credibility. The premium is a few hundred thousand euros a year; the reputational cost of an ad hoc waiver is larger. The honest response is to record the miss, explain its cause in reporting, and agree a new KPI that the borrower controls.
4. How does climate risk enter an IFRS 9 provision? Through the inputs: forward-looking scenarios that include carbon prices and physical events, ratings that reflect transition exposure, and LGDs that reflect stranded collateral. Where models cannot capture it, banks use post-model overlays, which supervisors expect to be justified, quantified and back-tested. Climate is also a SICR indicator when it changes a borrower’s business model, as in a forced closure. The risk is overlays that move with earnings rather than with risk.
5. Is lending to a coal phase-out vehicle green finance? No. Coal generation is outside the EU Taxonomy, so the loan cannot be green and does not enter the GAR. It can be transition finance if the closure is contractual and enforceable, the plants cannot be sold to extend their life, and the group’s transition plan is credible. The bank should report it in a separate category and explain how it affects its sector targets.
6. What is the DFO test and why does it matter in an amend-and-extend? It compares the NPV of the restructured cash flows with the original ones at the original effective rate; a loss above 1% is a default trigger. An extension with a lower margin can cross the threshold even without any haircut. Crossing it moves the loan to non-performing and stage 3, triggers the NPE backstop and, under F-IRB, an expected-loss comparison against capital. Pricing an extension at or above the original rate avoids that.
7. How would you value a coal fleet in a restructuring? As the present value of cash flows to the closure date the plan commits to, not to the end of technical life. The key inputs are the clean dark spread from the forward curves, output under the expected merit order, fixed and sustaining costs, and the closure and rehabilitation costs at the new date. I would run the closure date and the spread as scenarios and show that value is often negative once closure costs are included. That negative value is why a managed phase-out tends to beat a disorderly insolvency.
8. What changed in 2025 and 2026 that matters for this desk? The loan market updated its sustainability-linked principles in March 2025 and its documentation in August 2026, with explicit renegotiation and declassification triggers. The EBA ESG risk guidelines became applicable in January 2026 and require banks to plan for clients’ transition. The ECB now fines banks on climate-risk management. And the net-zero alliances weakened or closed, so the constraint on financing coal now comes from regulation and each bank’s own policies.
Regulation and supervisory texts
Market standards
Market and news sources (dated)
Academic and reference