Debt capital markets (DCM) helps issuers raise money by selling bonds to investors. Module C01 followed a corporate issuer, Helios Renewables; this module covers the public sector and banks themselves. Both are repeat issuers. A sovereign debt management office borrows every week of the year, a supranational such as the European Investment Bank (EIB) prints a benchmark most months, and a large bank’s treasury issues ten to twenty times a year across currencies and seniorities. The relationship is therefore not a one-off mandate but a permanent dialogue about funding plans, curve points, investor demand and timing.
Where it sits. At Meridian Bank, DCM is a team within the Global Banking division of the CIB, working back to back with the Syndicate desk, which sits on the trading floor next to Credit and Rates sales. DCM is split by client type:
How it earns money. DCM is a fee business with no balance sheet in the normal case. The fee is a gross spread deducted from the proceeds paid to the issuer and split between the bookrunners. Fees in public sector and financial institution DCM are small per deal and large in aggregate. A sovereign syndication carries a fee of a few basis points, and the bank’s real reward is its standing as a primary dealer, which gives it flows in the secondary market, repo and derivatives. A bank senior bond pays more, and subordinated capital more again. For this module the case assumptions are 5 bp for a sovereign syndication, 10 bp for an SSA benchmark, 20 bp for a bank senior non-preferred benchmark and 30 to 40 bp for Tier 2. A EUR 5bn sovereign syndication with five bookrunners therefore pays each about EUR 0.5m; a EUR 1bn bank deal with five bookrunners pays each about EUR 0.4m. Ranking in the league tables matters as much as the fee, because the next mandate is decided partly on it.
The team. A DCM origination team in FIG or SSA has a managing director who owns the senior relationships, two or three directors and vice-presidents who run execution, and associates and analysts who build the pricing comparables, the issuer presentation and the term sheets. The syndicate desk (three to five people in EUR) runs the order book, talks to investors’ portfolio managers through the sales force, recommends price guidance and allocations, and stabilises the deal if needed. Adjacent functions: Legal and transaction management, Credit and Rates sales, Credit research, Compliance (wall-crossing, market soundings, conflicts), and on the issuer side the bank’s Treasury or the State’s debt management office.
A realistic week. On Monday morning the FIG team publishes its “issuance window” note: no central bank meeting this week, Wednesday is a quiet day for supply, and five banks are expected after their results blackouts. A head of Treasury calls at 10:00: could the bank print a EUR 1bn green senior non-preferred bond before year-end? The team runs comparables and fair value by noon. On Tuesday the SSA team takes part in the mandate call of a regional development agency and, in the afternoon, the syndicate desk submits bids for its client at the German green federal securities auction through the Bundesbank auction system. Wednesday is execution day for an EIB EUR 3bn ten-year: mandate announced at 09:00, books open, final terms at noon, priced by 15:00. Thursday is spent on allocation and the post-deal report. Friday is the monthly call with Meridian’s own Treasury on its funding plan and its green asset pool. The pattern repeats: market reading, pricing, execution, reporting.
WHO DOES WHAT — The sentence you hear most often on a FIG or SSA desk is “where would we come?”: the estimated reoffer spread for a new issue, today, at a given tenor and seniority. Everything in section 5 is the construction and the defence of that number.
IN ONE SENTENCE — A sovereign borrows by selling bonds in a regular calendar, mostly by auction to a closed group of primary dealers, and uses syndications for new lines, long tenors and new formats.
Euro-area sovereigns publish an annual funding programme in December and quarterly issuance calendars. Germany, for example, announced in December 2025 a federal securities programme for 2026 that included EUR 16bn to 19bn of green federal securities, one green syndication for a new 15-year green Bund maturing on 15 May 2041, and one green auction date per month from February to October.
In an auction the debt management office announces a line and a target amount, and the primary dealers (in France the spécialistes en valeurs du Trésor, in Germany the members of the Bund Issues Auction Group) submit bids within a short window. The format varies: multiple-price, where each successful bidder pays its own bid, or uniform price, where all pay the cut-off price. The DMO can keep part of the issue on its own books for later market operations. An auction is cheap (no fee), predictable and repeated: the same line is “tapped” until it reaches a benchmark size. Its weakness is distribution: the issuer does not know who ends up holding the bonds, and a new line with no reference price is risky to auction.
In a syndication the DMO mandates a group of bookrunners, typically four to six primary dealers, who open an order book and build demand from investors over a few hours. Price is set by the bookrunners and the issuer together, using the book’s quality. Syndication costs a fee but gives a known size on day one, a diversified investor base, and price discovery for a line with no comparable. That is why sovereigns syndicate new long-dated lines, inflation-linked bonds and, almost always, their first green bond: France launched its first green OAT in January 2017 by syndication, then tapped it at regular auctions.
INTUITION — An auction is a supermarket shelf restocked every week: prices are known, buyers are regulars, nobody needs to be persuaded. A syndication is a product launch: a sales team phones the buyers, the launch price is set once the order list is known, and the launch costs more.
SSA curves. Supranationals and agencies are priced against two references at once: mid-swaps, since many of their investors (central banks, bank treasuries) swap the bond to floating, and the sovereign curve of their main shareholder. KfW, whose obligations are guaranteed by the Federal Republic, trades a few basis points over Bunds; the EIB and the EU trade wider than Bunds and close to or inside France. The EU has borrowed through a “unified funding approach” combining syndications and auctions since 2023, and its NextGenerationEU (NGEU) green bonds form one of the largest green curves in the world.
A bank funds its loans with deposits, wholesale funding and capital. Wholesale funding is a ladder of instruments that differ by ranking in insolvency or resolution, and therefore by spread.
| Instrument | Ranking | Regulatory role | Typical tenor |
|---|---|---|---|
| Covered bond | Secured on a cover pool, plus claim on the bank | Funding; not MREL | 3 to 10 years |
| Senior preferred (SP) | Ordinary senior unsecured | Funding; MREL if eligible | 2 to 7 years |
| Senior non-preferred (SNP) | Below SP, above Tier 2 | Subordinated MREL | 4 to 10 years, often callable one year before maturity |
| Tier 2 | Below SNP | Own funds and MREL | 10NC5 typical |
| Additional Tier 1 | Below Tier 2 | Own funds; perpetual | Perpetual, callable after 5 years or more |
Covered bonds are governed in the EU by the Covered Bond Directive (EU) 2019/2162, applicable since 8 July 2022. Investors have a claim on the bank and, if the bank fails, a priority claim on a segregated cover pool of mortgages or public-sector loans, with overcollateralisation. They are the cheapest wholesale funding and are excluded from bail-in.
Senior non-preferred debt was created by Directive (EU) 2017/2399, which amended Article 108 of the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD) to add a class of senior debt ranking below other senior claims. It exists to let banks meet the subordination requirement of MREL without issuing more expensive Tier 2. The prospectus must say the bond ranks below senior preferred; the original maturity must be at least one year; the bond carries no derivative features.
MREL, the minimum requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities, is set by the resolution authority (the Single Resolution Board for significant euro-area banks) under Article 45 of the BRRD. It ensures that, if the bank fails, enough instruments can be written down or converted into equity to absorb losses and recapitalise the bank without public money. Eligibility criteria are in Articles 72a to 72l of the CRR: fully paid, not secured or guaranteed, residual maturity of at least one year, no set-off rights, no acceleration rights except in insolvency or liquidation, and a clear subordination for instruments counted against the subordination requirement. The combined buffer requirement (conservation, countercyclical, systemic buffers) must be met with CET1 that is not already counted towards MREL.
FORMULA
is the reoffer spread over mid-swaps of a new bond of seniority ; the issuer’s senior preferred spread for the same tenor, read from its secondary curve; the premium for seniority relative to SP (negative for covered bonds, positive for SNP and Tier 2).
The premium of SNP over SP, the “SNP-SP basis”, is the price of being bailed in before senior preferred creditors.
INTERACTIVE LAB — What each layer of the liability stack costs Meridian per year
Compare the annual spread cost of EUR 1bn raised at each seniority, and read the cost of subordination as the gap between layers.
| Parameter you can move | Range | Default |
|---|---|---|
| Amount raised | 250 to 3000 EUR m | 1000 EUR m |
| Senior preferred spread, 5 years | 30 to 200 bp over mid-swaps | 78 bp over mid-swaps |
| Covered bond discount to SP | 0 to 80 bp | 40 bp |
| SNP premium over SP | 0 to 100 bp | 34 bp |
| Tier 2 premium over SNP | 20 to 200 bp | 80 bp |
| Result at default settings | Value |
|---|---|
| Covered bond spread | 38 bp |
| SNP spread | 112 bp |
| Tier 2 spread | 192 bp |
| Annual spread cost of SNP | 11.20 EUR m |
| Annual cost of subordination: SNP versus SP | 3.40 EUR m |
Try it. Raise the SNP premium to 60 bp, which is where it traded for weaker banks in stressed markets: the case for issuing Tier 2 instead of SNP becomes closer.
The defaults are Meridian’s indicative secondary levels for a 5-year tenor (case assumptions): covered 38 bp over mid-swaps, SP 78 bp, SNP 112 bp, Tier 2 192 bp. Raising EUR 1bn of SNP rather than SP costs EUR 3.4m a year more. That is the order of magnitude against which a greenium of a few basis points has to be judged.
PITFALL — Do not compare a bank’s green SNP with another bank’s conventional SP and call the difference a greenium. Seniority, tenor and issuer must match before any label effect can be read. A 3 bp greenium is less than a tenth of the SNP-SP basis.
A FIG syndicate prices a new bond in four steps. First, the fair value: the issuer’s own secondary curve for the same seniority, interpolated to the new maturity, and cross-checked against peers of the same rating and country. Second, the new issue concession (NIC): the extra spread new bonds usually pay over fair value to attract enough orders, typically 0 to 10 bp in normal markets and more in volatile ones. Third, the initial price thoughts (IPTs), published when books open, deliberately wide (20 to 30 bp above the expected landing) to collect orders. Fourth, the tightening through guidance to the final spread as the book grows, while the syndicate watches for price-sensitive orders that drop out.
The reoffer yield is mid-swap plus spread; the coupon is that yield rounded down to the nearest eighth of a percent; the reoffer price is the price at which the coupon gives the reoffer yield. For callable SNP (the usual 6NC5: six-year final maturity, callable at par after five years), the market prices to the call date because investors assume the bank will call when the bond loses MREL eligibility in its last year.
A bank issues off a Euro Medium Term Note (EMTN) programme: a base prospectus approved once a year by the home regulator under the Prospectus Regulation (EU) 2017/1129, plus short final terms for each bond. The subscription agreement binds the bookrunners to buy the bonds at the reoffer price minus fees on the settlement date (T+5 typically). Bonds sold in denominations of EUR 100,000 or more to professional investors need no PRIIPs key information document. The MiFID II product governance legend states the target market. SNP and Tier 2 documentation contains the bail-in acknowledgement (Article 55 BRRD when governed by non-EU law) and the clauses required for MREL eligibility.
Sovereign bonds need no prospectus: the Prospectus Regulation does not apply to securities issued by a Member State (Article 1(2)(b)).
Execution follows market abuse rules: market soundings before announcement are logged under Article 11 of the Market Abuse Regulation; any stabilisation by the stabilising manager is disclosed. The syndicate allocates the book according to its allocation policy, which favours “real money” (asset managers, insurers, central banks) over fast money (hedge funds) for a repeat issuer that wants its bonds to trade well afterwards.
For the bookrunners, risks are underwriting risk (in a bought deal, or if the book is short and the banks must keep bonds), reputation (a deal that trades poorly marks the bookrunners), and conduct risk (allocation conflicts, market soundings). For the issuer, the risks are execution risk (the window closes), refinancing risk concentrated around large maturities, and spread risk: a bank that misjudges its NIC overpays for five years. The green label adds a fifth: label risk, the risk that the bond is later called greenwashing, which is the subject of section 7.
IN ONE SENTENCE — A green bond from a sovereign or a bank is the same debt instrument as its conventional sibling, with a promise about how an equal amount of money will be spent or which assets it is matched against.
Nothing in the cash flows changes. A green Bund pays the same coupon from the same federal budget as a conventional Bund; a green SNP of Meridian Bank ranks exactly like any other SNP and is bailed in on the same day. What changes is a set of documents (framework, second-party opinion, allocation and impact reports), an obligation to track eligible expenditures or assets, and the investor base. The standard that governs this is the same as in C01: the ICMA Green Bond Principles, last updated in June 2025 (with a reference to the Green Enabling Projects guidance and a definition of green projects extended to “activities”), and, for issuers who choose it, the European Green Bond Standard (EuGBS). What differs for sovereigns and banks is how the use of proceeds is defined, matched and verified.
A State’s green bond is matched against eligible budget expenditures: investment grants, tax expenditures, subsidies for renovation or clean transport, research, sometimes rail maintenance. A working group of ministries selects the budget lines each year, and the allocation report states the amounts spent. Money is fungible inside the budget; the promise is that green bonds do not exceed green expenditure, without double counting.
Three features are specific to sovereigns:
IN ONE SENTENCE — A twin bond is a green bond with exactly the same coupon, maturity and payment dates as an existing conventional bond of the same issuer, so that any difference in yield can only come from the label and from liquidity.
Germany introduced the concept with its first green Bund in September 2020: each green federal security is paired with a conventional twin. The Finance Agency retains part of each green issue for secondary market operations and allows holders of green bonds to switch into the conventional twin, which supports the green bond’s liquidity. Nine green federal securities were issued under the first framework between 2020 and 2025. A second framework, published on 15 January 2026, replaced the 2020 version and kept the core features of the programme. On 3 March 2026 the Finance Agency syndicated a new EUR 4bn 15-year green Bund (2.60%, 15 May 2041, of which EUR 1bn retained), at a reoffer yield of 3.140%, from a book of more than EUR 22bn; the Finance Agency’s own transaction review records a greenium of 1 bp against the conventional twin.
Denmark copied the model: on 23 September 2025 it issued, by syndication, a DKK 7bn ten-year green bond maturing on 15 November 2035, the first sovereign bond under the EuGBS, as a twin of the conventional 2.25% 2035, with a greenium of 1.5 bp reported by Danmarks Nationalbank.
FORMULA
is the greenium in bp (negative when the green bond is more expensive); the yield of the green bond; the yield of the conventional bond with identical cash flows. With twins, credit risk, coupon effect and maturity are identical by construction; only liquidity and the label remain.
Twin sovereign bonds remove most of the control problems (issuer, tenor, coupon) that dominate the academic greenium literature. They show a greenium that is real but small, around 1 to 5 bp in the German series (see Roncalli, notebook Box 4.6, for the German twin data to end 2023 and the Pástor and co-authors study). For a bank there is no twin. Section 5.4 shows what that does to the measurement.
The SSA sector created the green bond market: the EIB issued the first “Climate Awareness Bond” in 2007, and KfW, the World Bank and others followed with programmes run like their conventional ones.
The EU’s NGEU green bond programme is the largest single green programme. Launched in October 2021 under a framework aligned with the ICMA principles, it was designed to fund the climate-relevant expenditure of national Recovery and Resilience Plans, with an initial ambition of up to EUR 250bn. By September 2026, NGEU green bonds outstanding amounted to EUR 84.3bn out of about EUR 849bn of total EU debt, according to the Commission’s funding releases. The gap with the original ambition reflects the eligible expenditure actually reported by Member States, the binding constraint of any use-of-proceeds programme. The programme stayed outside the EuGBS, and NGEU borrowing ends in 2026.
The EIB issued its first European Green Bond, EUR 3bn maturing in 2037, in April 2025: SSA lenders are natural EuGBS adopters because their lending is project-based and already screened against the Taxonomy.
IN ONE SENTENCE — A bank green bond is matched against a register of green loans already on the bank’s balance sheet, the eligible green portfolio, which must at all times be larger than the green bonds outstanding.
A bank cannot point to one project. It lends to thousands of borrowers, and it issues green bonds to refinance a pool of them. The green bond framework of a bank (Meridian’s is on its website) states:
The supply of eligible assets is the bottleneck. A bank can only issue as many green bonds as it has green loans, and the same loan cannot be counted twice: once in a green bond and once in a green covered bond, or by two different green bonds.
All seniorities can be green. Green covered bonds combine the double recourse of the covered bond with a green cover pool, usually energy-efficient mortgages, so the eligible green portfolio and the cover pool are partly the same assets. Green SP and SNP are matched against the general green portfolio. Green Tier 2 exists but is rarer.
The debate specific to banks is the use-of-proceeds versus loss-absorption question. A green SNP must absorb losses on all assets of the bank, green or not, to count as MREL. The EBA examined this in its 2020 MREL and TLAC monitoring report: it found that in the green MREL bonds it reviewed the green commitment appears only in the use-of-proceeds section, that failure to allocate is not an event of default, that payments come from general funds with no link to the performance of the green assets, and that proceeds are not segregated. It flagged risks: investors could believe the green assets are ring-fenced for them, which could feed “no creditor worse off” claims if they are bailed in while the green loans perform; and the bank could face reputational and conduct risk if green assets are disqualified and investors have no right to redeem. It gave no recommendation and said it would keep monitoring. Market practice since then is a set of standard disclaimers in the prospectus: the green designation creates no right or claim, non-allocation is not a default, and the bond is fully subject to bail-in.
Regulation (EU) 2023/2631 has applied since 21 December 2024. It is voluntary, but anyone using the “European Green Bond” or “EuGB” designation must comply. The key rules for banks:
For a bank, the Taxonomy test is mostly a test of its mortgage book. For buildings built before 2021, the acquisition and ownership criteria require an energy performance certificate of class A or a place in the top 15% of the national or regional building stock by primary energy demand; for newer buildings, energy demand at least 10% below the nearly-zero-energy building threshold. DNSH requires a physical climate risk assessment of the property. Retail exposures are exempt from minimum safeguards verification. Missing EPCs, missing top-15% studies and incomplete climate-risk data explain why a bank’s ICMA-eligible pool is larger than its Taxonomy-aligned pool. Revised building criteria, consulted on in March 2026, are expected to apply from 1 January 2027.
Take-up by banks is limited. ING’s research of 27 May 2026 counted only 8 of almost 160 bank sustainable bond issuers using the EuGBS since 2025, with EUR 4.25bn of EuGBS issuance in 2026 to that date, 11% of bank green supply, against EUR 4bn and 6% in 2025. All bank EuGBs so far used the portfolio approach and refinanced Taxonomy-aligned assets, mostly buildings. Sovereigns are split: Denmark issues EuGBs, while France and Germany said in 2025 that they had no plans to do so.
The lifecycle below is that of a bank’s own green benchmark, from the funding plan to the first allocation report. A sovereign green syndication follows the same steps with a debt management office in place of Treasury and a ministry working group in place of the Green Bond Committee.
INTERACTIVE LAB — A bank green SNP from funding plan to allocation report
Follow the eleven steps of Meridian’s green senior non-preferred issue, with who acts, what is produced and which control applies.
| # | Who | Does what | Deliverable |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Treasury (ALM and funding) | Sets the annual funding plan from the balance sheet forecast, the MREL decision of the SRB and the maturity profile; reserves EUR 1bn of SNP for the fourth quarter | Funding plan approved by ALCO |
| 2 | Sustainability team and Green Bond Committee | Extracts the eligible green portfolio from the loan systems, removes repaid or disqualified loans, checks capacity against green bonds outstanding | Green asset register and capacity note |
| 3 | Second-party opinion provider | Confirms the framework is still aligned with the ICMA Green Bond Principles of June 2025; no new review needed if criteria are unchanged | Second-party opinion (framework level) |
| 4 | Treasury and DCM FIG (Meridian and four external banks) | Mandate of five joint bookrunners; Meridian’s own syndicate is one of them | Mandate letter and fee letter |
| 5 | Legal, Treasury and external counsel | Update the EMTN base prospectus supplement; draft final terms with the green use-of-proceeds wording and the MREL and bail-in language | Final terms, prospectus supplement, legal opinions |
| 6 | Syndicate and Compliance | Pre-sounding of a few investors under market soundings rules; logs kept; issuance window chosen | Sounding log and go/no-go memo |
| 7 | Syndicate desk | Announces the mandate and opens books at IPTs; updates the book every 30 to 60 minutes; revises guidance | Order book and guidance messages |
| 8 | Treasury with syndicate | Sets final spread and size; allocation to investors under the allocation policy | Pricing and allocation sheet |
| 9 | Back office and paying agent | Settles on T+5 against payment; bonds admitted to trading on a regulated market | Global note, ISIN, listing |
| 10 | Finance (accounting) and Treasury (hedging) | Book the bond at amortised cost; designate a pay-floating swap in a fair value hedge | Accounting entries and hedge documentation |
| 11 | Sustainability team and auditor | Within twelve months, publish the allocation and impact report with limited assurance | Allocation and impact report |
Step 1: the funding plan. Treasury owns Meridian’s funding. Each autumn it projects the balance sheet, deposits and RWA for the next year and derives the wholesale need by instrument. The SRB’s annual MREL decision says how much loss-absorbing capacity Meridian must hold and how much must be subordinated; this fixes the SNP volume. The Asset and Liability Committee (ALCO) approves the plan. The green share is not a target in itself: it is a ceiling set by the eligible pool.
Step 2: the green asset register. The sustainability team, with data from the mortgage, corporate and project finance systems, maintains a register of eligible loans: loan identifier, category, outstanding, EPC class or installed capacity, Taxonomy flag, origination date, country. Each quarter the Green Bond Committee approves the register. The capacity note answers one question: how many more euros of green bonds can be issued without breaching the internal buffer?
Step 3: second-party opinion. Meridian’s framework received a second-party opinion when it was last updated. An issue under an unchanged framework does not need a new opinion, but if the framework is to be used for an EuGB, a factsheet must be prepared and reviewed by an ESMA-registered external reviewer before issue.
Step 4: mandate. Treasury picks the bookrunners from its panel by recent performance, secondary market support and distribution. Meridian’s own syndicate desk is a joint bookrunner, which is common for large banks; the fee is paid to the four external banks only.
Step 5: documentation. Meridian’s EMTN programme already contains the green bond language: the “Use of Proceeds” paragraph refers to the framework, and the risk factors state that a failure to allocate does not entitle investors to accelerate or redeem, and that the bonds are subject to bail-in regardless of the performance of the green assets. The final terms specify the ranking (senior non-preferred within the meaning of Article 108(2) of the BRRD as transposed), the call option one year before maturity with prior permission of the resolution authority, and waiver of set-off.
Step 6: sounding and window. The syndicate tests appetite with a handful of investors after wall-crossing them; Compliance keeps the logs required by the Market Abuse Regulation. The window is chosen to avoid supply clashes and macro data.
Steps 7 and 8: bookbuilding and pricing. Section 5.3 replays the day. The syndicate publishes initial price thoughts, revises to guidance, and Treasury chooses the trade-off between size and spread. Allocation favours long-term holders; dedicated green funds are often given a slightly higher fill to reward their support.
Step 9: settlement and listing. Settlement is five business days later through the international central securities depositories; the bond is listed so that it qualifies for investors who can only hold listed securities and for Eurosystem collateral.
Step 10: accounting and hedging. Meridian’s Finance function records the bond at amortised cost and its ALM desk swaps the fixed coupon into floating rate (see section 6).
Step 11: reporting. The allocation report is published within twelve months. If the bond had been an EuGB, Article 11 of Regulation (EU) 2023/2631 would require an allocation report for each twelve-month period, published within 270 days, with a post-issuance review whenever the portfolio has changed.
NOTE — For a sovereign, steps 1 and 2 are the debt management office’s issuance plan and the inter-ministerial working group that selects green budget lines; step 3 is the second-party opinion on the sovereign framework; step 9 is settlement through the national central securities depository; step 11 includes a public audit body.
The case follows Meridian Bank’s Treasury and its DCM FIG team from the funding plan to the pricing of a EUR 1bn green SNP in November 2026, then compares the label effect with the cleanest available benchmark, a sovereign twin. All Meridian figures are case assumptions consistent with module A02 (RWA of EUR 118bn at end-2025, CET1 of EUR 16.52bn). Market references for sovereigns are real and dated.
Question. Does Meridian need subordinated MREL in 2027, and how much does EUR 1bn of SNP close the gap?
Data (case assumptions). Treasury projects RWA (the “total risk exposure amount”, TREA) of EUR 124bn at end-2027. The SRB has set Meridian’s MREL at 21.0% of TREA and its subordination requirement at 19.5% of TREA, each to be met in addition to the combined buffer requirement of 4.3% (conservation 2.5%, countercyclical 0.8%, O-SII 1.0%). Meridian’s policy adds a management buffer of 100 bp. Eligible resources expected at end-2027: CET1 EUR 16.52bn (held flat for prudence), AT1 EUR 1.77bn, Tier 2 EUR 2.95bn, SNP EUR 8.25bn (after a EUR 1.25bn SNP is called in January 2027 and stops counting a year before its call date), and senior preferred with more than one year to run EUR 3.0bn.
FORMULA
The subordinated ratio removes from the numerator and uses instead of . is the MREL requirement; the subordination requirement; the combined buffer requirement; the management buffer.
INTERACTIVE LAB — Meridian’s MREL and subordination position at end-2027
Compute the total and subordinated MREL ratios against target, and see how much SNP is needed to close the subordination gap.
| Parameter you can move | Range | Default |
|---|---|---|
| TREA (RWA) at end-2027 | 100 to 150 EUR bn | 124 EUR bn |
| CET1 | 12 to 22 EUR bn | 16.52 EUR bn |
| AT1 | 0 to 4 EUR bn | 1.77 EUR bn |
| Tier 2 | 0 to 6 EUR bn | 2.95 EUR bn |
| SNP outstanding (eligible) | 0 to 15 EUR bn | 8.25 EUR bn |
| Eligible senior preferred | 0 to 8 EUR bn | 3 EUR bn |
| MREL requirement | 15 to 30 % TREA | 21 % TREA |
| Subordination requirement | 8 to 25 % TREA | 19.5 % TREA |
| Combined buffer requirement | 2.5 to 7 % TREA | 4.3 % TREA |
| Management buffer | 0 to 3 % TREA | 1 % TREA |
| New SNP issued | 0 to 3 EUR bn | 1 EUR bn |
| Result at default settings | Value |
|---|---|
| Total MREL ratio before the issue | 26.20 % TREA |
| Subordinated MREL ratio before the issue | 23.78 % TREA |
| Subordination target (requirement + CBR + buffer) | 24.80 % TREA |
| Subordination shortfall before the issue | 1.262 EUR bn |
| Total MREL shortfall before the issue | 0.122 EUR bn |
| Subordinated MREL ratio after the issue | 24.59 % TREA |
| Subordination shortfall after the issue | 0.262 EUR bn |
| Total MREL ratio after the issue | 27.01 % TREA |
Try it. Raise TREA to 130bn, as if a large corporate loan book is added: the subordination gap almost doubles, which is why Treasury asks the business lines for RWA forecasts before it sets the funding plan.
Result. Before the issue, Meridian’s total MREL ratio is 26.20% and its subordinated ratio 23.78% of TREA. The subordination target is 24.80% (19.5% + 4.3% + 1.0%), so the shortfall is EUR 1.262bn; the total MREL shortfall is only EUR 0.122bn. EUR 1bn of new SNP lifts the subordinated ratio to 24.59% and leaves EUR 0.262bn to find later in 2027, for example in a Tier 2 or a second SNP.
Reading. The binding constraint is subordination, not total MREL. Senior preferred would fill the small total gap but does nothing for the subordinated one; hence SNP. The green label does not enter this calculation. It is a choice about how to sell a bond Meridian must issue anyway, which is the first message for anyone who thinks a bank “issues a green bond to finance green loans”. It issues SNP to meet MREL, and labels it green if it has enough green assets to match.
The format discussion. At the funding meeting of 2 November 2026, Treasury, DCM FIG and the sustainability team settle four choices. Size: EUR 1bn is the benchmark size that qualifies for the main euro credit indices and attracts index-tracking investors; EUR 1.25bn would close more of the gap but would sit uncomfortably close to the pool’s headroom (section 5.2). Tenor: 6NC5, because Meridian’s maturity profile is light in 2031 and because SNP with a call one year before maturity keeps the bond MREL-eligible until the call. Currency: euros, since the green investor base in euros is the deepest and Meridian’s green assets are in euros. Label: green rather than conventional, because the pool can carry it, two Meridian green bonds trade well, and the syndicate expects a broader book. A social or sustainability label was considered and rejected: Meridian’s social loan data are not yet audited.
Question. Is Meridian’s eligible green portfolio large enough, and would it support a European Green Bond?
Data (case assumptions, from the register approved by the Green Bond Committee on 30 September 2026).
| Category | Eligible under framework (EUR m) | Share Taxonomy-aligned | Main reason for non-alignment |
|---|---|---|---|
| Green residential mortgages | 2,600 | 62% | No physical climate risk assessment; no top-15% study in two countries |
| Renewable energy loans | 1,400 | 90% | Non-EU projects without DNSH evidence |
| Clean transport | 500 | 70% | Fleet loans without vehicle-level data |
| Green commercial real estate | 600 | 45% | BREEAM or LEED certificate without EPC A |
Green bonds outstanding: EUR 2.5bn (green SP EUR 1.0bn issued 2023 and EUR 0.75bn 2024, green SNP EUR 0.75bn 2025), all under the ICMA-aligned framework. Meridian’s internal policy requires the pool to cover green bonds outstanding at 115% at least. EUR 1.75bn of the pool was originated more than 36 months ago.
FORMULA
is the eligible outstanding in category ; green bonds outstanding after the new issue; the buffer (115%); the Taxonomy-aligned share of category ; the Taxonomy-aligned pool.
INTERACTIVE LAB — Meridian’s eligible green portfolio: coverage, headroom and Taxonomy alignment
Test whether the pool covers green bonds outstanding after the new issue, how much more could be issued, and whether the Taxonomy-aligned part could support a European Green Bond.
| Parameter you can move | Range | Default |
|---|---|---|
| Green mortgages | 0 to 6000 EUR m | 2600 EUR m |
| Mortgages Taxonomy-aligned | 0 to 100 % | 62 % |
| Renewable energy loans | 0 to 4000 EUR m | 1400 EUR m |
| Renewables Taxonomy-aligned | 0 to 100 % | 90 % |
| Clean transport loans | 0 to 2000 EUR m | 500 EUR m |
| Transport Taxonomy-aligned | 0 to 100 % | 70 % |
| Green commercial real estate | 0 to 2000 EUR m | 600 EUR m |
| CRE Taxonomy-aligned | 0 to 100 % | 45 % |
| Green bonds outstanding before the issue | 0 to 6000 EUR m | 2500 EUR m |
| New green bond | 0 to 2000 EUR m | 1000 EUR m |
| Internal coverage buffer | 100 to 150 % | 115 % |
| Pool originated more than 36 months ago | 0 to 5000 EUR m | 1750 EUR m |
| Result at default settings | Value |
|---|---|
| Eligible pool | 5,100 EUR m |
| Coverage of green bonds after the issue | 145.71 % |
| Further green issuance possible at the buffer | 934.8 EUR m |
| Taxonomy-aligned pool | 3,492 EUR m |
| Taxonomy-aligned share of the pool | 68.47 % |
| Aligned pool over all green bonds (if all were EuGBs) | 99.77 % |
| Coverage using only loans of 36 months or less | 95.71 % |
Try it. Raise the Taxonomy-aligned share of mortgages from 62% to 80%, as if Meridian had bought climate-risk data for its whole book: the aligned pool alone would then cover the entire green programme.
Result. The pool is EUR 5,100m. After the new bond, green bonds outstanding are EUR 3,500m and coverage is 145.71%, above the 115% buffer; Meridian could issue another EUR 934.8m before hitting the buffer. The Taxonomy-aligned pool is EUR 3,492m, or 68.47% of the pool.
Reading. Three conclusions follow, each discussed at the Green Bond Committee.
The bond can be issued under the ICMA framework. Coverage is comfortable, and the pool grows by about EUR 400m a year at current origination.
It could be an EuGB on its own, but not the whole programme. The EuGBS portfolio test compares the aligned portfolio with EuGBs outstanding only. Meridian has none, so a EUR 1bn EuGB would be covered three times. But if Meridian moved its whole green programme to the EuGBS, the aligned pool would cover only 99.77% of EUR 3.5bn. In addition, the same aligned assets back the ICMA bonds, so Meridian would have to earmark assets per programme to avoid double counting. The fix is not financial but a data project: physical climate risk assessments for the mortgage book would lift alignment of mortgages to about 80% and the aligned coverage to 113.14%.
A strict look-back would kill the bond. Using only loans originated in the last 36 months, coverage falls to 95.71%. This is why bank frameworks use the portfolio approach and disclose the age profile instead of limiting it. Investors who want new financing should read the “new versus refinanced” line of the allocation report, which in a portfolio approach is close to 100% refinancing at issue.
How the pool moves. The register is not static. Each year about EUR 600m of green mortgages and loans amortise or prepay, and about EUR 1bn of new eligible loans are booked, so the pool grows by about EUR 400m net. Two events can make it shrink suddenly: a portfolio sale (a securitisation of green mortgages or a sale of renewable loans to an insurer, see B16), and a methodology change, such as a new national EPC method that downgrades part of the stock. The Green Bond Committee therefore looks at the pool on a forward basis: projected coverage over the next three years, with and without planned asset sales. Treasury’s rule is that no green bond is issued if projected coverage falls below 115% in any of those years.
Who owns the data. The mortgage EPC classes come from the retail bank’s origination systems, partly from public registers; the renewable loan data come from the project finance and corporate credit files; the Taxonomy flags are set by the sustainability team after a documented test of each category. Internal audit reviewed the register in 2026 and asked for one change: a field recording whether each EPC is actual or estimated, since estimated EPCs are not acceptable for the Taxonomy test.
PITFALL — “Eligible under our framework” and “EU Taxonomy-aligned” are different statements. In Meridian’s register they differ by EUR 1.6bn. A sales note that calls the bond “Taxonomy-aligned” because the framework “follows the Taxonomy” is a greenwashing risk for the bank and for the bookrunners who distribute it.
Question. At what spread, coupon and price can Meridian issue, and what does the money cost once fees are paid?
Data (case assumptions, market on Tuesday 17 November 2026). Five-year mid-swap rate 2.50% (the flat curve used across the course). Meridian’s SP secondary curve: 78 bp over mid-swaps at the five-year call date. SNP-SP basis for Meridian’s peers: 34 bp. Expected NIC: 5 bp for a conventional SNP. Format 6NC5, priced to the call. Fee: 20 bp to the bookrunners; other costs (legal, listing, rating agencies, paying agent) EUR 0.3m.
The day.
The arithmetic follows the build-up of section 2: fair value of a conventional SNP is 78 + 34 = 112 bp; with a 5 bp NIC, a conventional bond would land at 117 bp. The green bond lands 3 bp inside, at 114 bp.
FORMULA
is the reoffer yield; the mid-swap rate; the reoffer spread; the coupon in %, rounded down to an eighth; the reoffer price per 100; the years to call; the nominal; the net proceeds per unit of nominal after fees and costs; the all-in cost of funds, the yield that equates net proceeds with the cash flows paid.
INTERACTIVE LAB — From mid-swaps to all-in cost: pricing Meridian’s green SNP
Build the reoffer spread, coupon and price of the green SNP, then compute net proceeds and the all-in cost of funds after fees.
| Parameter you can move | Range | Default |
|---|---|---|
| Mid-swap rate, 5 years | 0 to 5 % | 2.5 % |
| Meridian SP secondary spread | 30 to 200 bp | 78 bp |
| SNP-SP basis | 0 to 100 bp | 34 bp |
| New issue concession (conventional) | 0 to 20 bp | 5 bp |
| Green pricing advantage at launch | 0 to 10 bp | 3 bp |
| Years to call | 3 to 10 years | 5 years |
| Size | 500 to 2000 EUR m | 1000 EUR m |
| Bookrunners’ fee | 0 to 50 bp | 20 bp |
| Other issuance costs | 0 to 1 EUR m | 0.3 EUR m |
| Result at default settings | Value |
|---|---|
| Fair value spread of a conventional SNP | 112 bp |
| Expected conventional reoffer spread | 117 bp |
| Green reoffer spread | 114 bp |
| Reoffer yield | 3.640 % |
| Coupon | 3.625 % |
| Reoffer price | 99.933 per 100 |
| Gross proceeds from investors | 999.33 EUR m |
| Annual spread cost over mid-swaps | 11.40 EUR m |
| Fee paid to bookrunners | 2.00 EUR m |
| Net proceeds | 997.025 EUR m |
| All-in cost of funds | 3.691 % |
| All-in spread over mid-swaps | 119.1 bp |
Try it. Set the NIC to 15 bp, a volatile-market level: the green advantage of 3 bp is then worth one fifth of what Meridian pays to bring the deal at all.
Result. Fair value 112 bp, conventional landing 117 bp, green reoffer spread 114 bp; reoffer yield 3.64%, coupon 3.625%, reoffer price 99.933. Meridian receives EUR 999.33m from investors, pays EUR 2.0m to the bookrunners and EUR 0.3m of other costs: net proceeds EUR 997.025m. The all-in cost of funds is about 3.691%, or about 119.1 bp over mid-swaps: the fees and costs add about 5.1 bp a year to the reoffer spread.
Reading. The headline is the 114 bp reoffer spread, but Treasury’s funding cost is the all-in spread, which feeds the FTP curve (section 6). Each element of the build-up is a negotiation: the issuer argues for a lower SNP-SP basis (its peers trade tighter), the syndicate for a higher NIC (protect the secondary performance). The 3 bp green advantage is smaller than the NIC, smaller than the fees spread over the life of the bond, and one eleventh of the SNP-SP basis.
Allocation and the own-syndicate question. Meridian’s syndicate desk sits in the same building as Treasury, which raises a conflict: the desk could favour the bank’s own clients or accounts that also trade with Meridian. Two controls apply. The allocation proposal is prepared by the external bookrunners jointly, using the agreed allocation policy, and Treasury, not the syndicate, signs it off. And Compliance reviews a sample of allocations after the deal. In this book, dedicated green funds are filled at 40% against 33% for other real-money accounts; hedge funds at 15%. The higher fill for green funds is disclosed internally as a policy choice: it rewards the investors who are expected to hold the bond to maturity, which supports secondary performance.
The week after. By the following Monday the bond trades at 112 bp bid, 2 bp inside reoffer: a “good performance” that the syndicate reports to Treasury. A conventional SNP from a comparable French bank priced the week before with a 6 bp NIC and widened by 1 bp. Neither observation proves a greenium; both are part of the evidence Treasury will cite to its ALCO.
WHO DOES WHAT — On the day, the syndicate never says “greenium”. It says the green book was “more granular and stickier”: more orders, from more accounts, fewer drop-outs when the spread tightened. That is what allows the issuer to tighten by a few extra basis points. The greenium is an output of the book, not an input to the pricing.
Question. How many euros does the label save Meridian, net of its costs, and how confident can Treasury be in the 3 bp?
Data (case assumptions). Incremental costs attributable to this bond: EUR 60,000 at issue (framework update, legal drafting, register extraction) and EUR 50,000 a year (allocation and impact reporting, limited assurance, data). Discount rate: the reoffer yield, 3.64%.
FORMULA
is the net present value of the label for the issuer; the nominal; the greenium in bp (as a saving, positive); the annuity factor at yield over years; the one-off cost; the annual cost.
The measurement problem. For Meridian, the greenium is not observed: it is the difference between the green reoffer spread (observed, 114 bp) and the spread a conventional SNP would have needed (not observed). The estimate depends on two assumptions: the fair value of the curve (112 bp, interpolated from two Meridian SNP lines and two peers) and the NIC a conventional bond would have paid (5 bp, a syndicate judgement).
INTERACTIVE LAB — The value of the green label to the issuer, and the uncertainty of its measurement
Compute the annual saving and the net present value of a greenium after label costs, and see how the estimated greenium moves with the NIC assumption that cannot be observed.
| Parameter you can move | Range | Default |
|---|---|---|
| Nominal | 250 to 3000 EUR m | 1000 EUR m |
| Greenium (saving) | 0 to 10 bp | 3 bp |
| Years to call | 3 to 10 years | 5 years |
| Discount rate (reoffer yield) | 0 to 6 % | 3.64 % |
| One-off label cost | 0 to 0.5 EUR m | 0.06 EUR m |
| Annual label cost | 0 to 0.3 EUR m | 0.05 EUR m |
| Green reoffer spread (observed) | 50 to 200 bp | 114 bp |
| Fair value of conventional SNP (estimated) | 50 to 200 bp | 112 bp |
| Conventional NIC (assumed) | 0 to 15 bp | 5 bp |
| Result at default settings | Value |
|---|---|
| Annual interest saving | 0.300 EUR m |
| Annuity factor | 4.4972 |
| PV of the saving | 1.349 EUR m |
| PV of label costs | 0.285 EUR m |
| Net value of the label | 1.064 EUR m |
| Net annual saving after running costs | 0.250 EUR m |
| Break-even greenium | 0.63 bp |
| Estimated greenium (negative = green cheaper) | -3.0 bp |
Try it. Set the assumed NIC to 2 bp: the estimated greenium falls to zero. A one-bp error on the fair value curve does the same thing. The bank’s greenium lives inside its measurement error.
Result. A 3 bp greenium on EUR 1bn saves EUR 0.3m a year; over five years, at 3.64%, the annuity factor is 4.4972 and the saving is worth EUR 1.349m. The label costs EUR 0.285m in present value, so its net value is EUR 1.064m, or EUR 0.25m a year after running costs. The break-even greenium is 0.63 bp: below that, the label costs more than it saves.
Reading. The economics are positive but small: EUR 1.06m on a EUR 1bn bond, against EUR 11.4m a year of spread paid (114 bp). And the 3 bp is itself an estimate: with an assumed NIC of 0 bp the same launch implies a green penalty of 2 bp; with 10 bp it implies a greenium of 8 bp. Treasury’s honest statement is “between zero and five basis points, most likely about three”. The real benefits, as with Helios in C01, are elsewhere: a deeper and stickier book, access to dedicated green funds, a second source of demand in a crowded SNP market, and a visible link between the bank’s funding and its lending strategy.
PITFALL — Do not compare the green reoffer spread with the conventional secondary curve and call the gap a greenium: the comparison mixes a primary price, which includes a NIC, with a secondary price, which does not. A green bond landing flat to the curve has probably paid no NIC, which is itself a benefit of the label, but it shows up as a zero greenium.
Question. What does a twin bond show that Meridian’s estimate cannot, and is the label worth more to a sovereign or to a bank?
Data (real, dated). On 3 March 2026 the German Finance Agency syndicated EUR 4bn of a new 15-year green Bund, 2.60% coupon, maturing 15 May 2041 (EUR 1bn retained), at 3.140%, with a greenium of 1 bp against its conventional twin, from a book of more than EUR 22bn. For the calculation we approximate the bond by a 15-year annual-coupon bond on a coupon date (the actual bond had about 15.2 years to run at settlement, so the computed price differs slightly from the actual reoffer price of 93.552).
FORMULA
is the change in value of the issue for a 1 bp change in yield, in EUR; the nominal; the price per 100; the modified duration; the greenium in bp. The product approximates the present value of the yield saving.
INTERACTIVE LAB — Sovereign twin against bank green SNP: what the greenium is worth
Compare the value of a 1 bp twin-measured greenium on a long sovereign green bond with a 3 bp estimated greenium on a five-year bank SNP, in euros and per euro issued.
| Parameter you can move | Range | Default |
|---|---|---|
| Sovereign green issue | 1000 to 10000 EUR m | 4000 EUR m |
| Sovereign coupon | 0 to 5 % | 2.6 % |
| Sovereign reoffer yield | 0 to 5 % | 3.14 % |
| Sovereign maturity | 5 to 30 years | 15 years |
| Sovereign greenium (twin) | 0 to 10 bp | 1 bp |
| Bank green SNP | 250 to 3000 EUR m | 1000 EUR m |
| Bank coupon | 0 to 6 % | 3.625 % |
| Bank reoffer yield | 0 to 6 % | 3.64 % |
| Bank years to call | 3 to 10 years | 5 years |
| Bank greenium (estimated) | 0 to 10 bp | 3 bp |
| Result at default settings | Value |
|---|---|
| Sovereign price (approximation) | 93.618 per 100 |
| Sovereign modified duration | 12.13 years |
| Sovereign DV01 of the issue | 4.543 EUR m |
| Value of the sovereign greenium | 4.54 EUR m |
| Bank DV01 of the issue | 0.4495 EUR m |
| Value of the bank greenium | 1.349 EUR m |
| Sovereign greenium value per euro issued | 11.4 bp of nominal |
| Bank greenium value per euro issued | 13.5 bp of nominal |
Try it. Give the sovereign a 5 bp greenium, the upper end of the German twin series: on a 15-year line the value per euro becomes about four times the bank’s, because duration multiplies every basis point.
Result. The green Bund is worth about EUR 4.54m per basis point (price 93.618 in our approximation, modified duration 12.13). A 1 bp greenium is therefore worth about EUR 4.54m to Germany, or 11.4 bp of nominal. Meridian’s 3 bp on a five-year bond is worth EUR 1.352m by the same DV01 method (close to the EUR 1.349m of the annuity method), or 13.5 bp of nominal.
Reading. Four lessons.
Could Meridian build a synthetic twin? In principle, by issuing a green SNP with the same maturity and coupon as an existing conventional SNP. In practice the green line would be smaller, would trade less, and the comparison would still be contaminated by liquidity. Treasury prefers to track the spread of its existing green and conventional SNP lines over time, adjusted for maturity: the difference, between 0 and 4 bp over the last two years in Meridian’s case, is a better guide than any single day.
WHY IT MATTERS ON THE DESK — On the SSA desk you will be asked to estimate the greenium of a new sovereign or agency green line before launch. The answer starts from the twin or from the issuer’s existing green-conventional pairs, then adjusts for size and liquidity. On the FIG desk the same question gets a range, not a number, and you should say so.
Question. If Meridian failed, would holders of the green SNP be treated differently from holders of its conventional SNP?
Data (stress scenario, case assumptions). A severe loss of EUR 15bn wipes out most of CET1. The SRB’s resolution plan is an open-bank bail-in: losses are absorbed, then the bank is recapitalised to a CET1 requirement of 9.81% (module A02) on post-resolution RWA of EUR 110bn. Liability stack before the event: CET1 EUR 16.52bn, AT1 EUR 1.77bn, Tier 2 EUR 2.95bn, SNP EUR 9.25bn (EUR 8.25bn conventional and the new EUR 1bn green), eligible SP EUR 3.0bn. The green loans in the pool are performing.
FORMULA
is the total amount to be absorbed; the loss; the recapitalisation amount; the CET1 requirement; RWA after resolution; the share of each SNP written down or converted, the same for every SNP, green or not.
INTERACTIVE LAB — Bail-in waterfall: who absorbs the loss and the recapitalisation
Allocate a loss and the recapitalisation need through Meridian’s liability stack in creditor order, and read what happens to the green SNP.
| Parameter you can move | Range | Default |
|---|---|---|
| Loss | 0 to 40 EUR bn | 15 EUR bn |
| CET1 requirement after resolution | 4.5 to 14 % RWA | 9.81 % RWA |
| RWA after resolution | 60 to 140 EUR bn | 110 EUR bn |
| CET1 | 10 to 25 EUR bn | 16.52 EUR bn |
| AT1 | 0 to 4 EUR bn | 1.77 EUR bn |
| Tier 2 | 0 to 6 EUR bn | 2.95 EUR bn |
| SNP (all, green included) | 0 to 15 EUR bn | 9.25 EUR bn |
| Senior preferred (eligible) | 0 to 8 EUR bn | 3 EUR bn |
| Green SNP | 0 to 3 EUR bn | 1 EUR bn |
| Result at default settings | Value |
|---|---|
| Recapitalisation amount | 10.791 EUR bn |
| Total to absorb (loss + recapitalisation) | 25.791 EUR bn |
| Absorbed by CET1, AT1 and Tier 2 | 21.240 EUR bn |
| SNP written down or converted | 4.551 EUR bn |
| Share of each SNP bailed in | 49.2 % |
| Green SNP bailed in | 492 EUR m |
| Senior preferred bailed in | 0.000 EUR bn |
Try it. Push the loss to EUR 25bn: all SNP, green and conventional, is converted, and senior preferred starts to absorb. The green loans’ performance is not an input to the waterfall.
Result. The recapitalisation amount is EUR 10.791bn and the total to absorb EUR 25.791bn. CET1, AT1 and Tier 2 take EUR 21.24bn; SNP takes the remaining EUR 4.551bn, which is 49.2% of every SNP. The green SNP loses EUR 492m of principal (converted into new shares), exactly the same proportion as the conventional SNP. Senior preferred is untouched.
Reading. This is the content of the EBA’s concern in section 3.6. The green bond is bailed in while the EUR 5.1bn of green loans still perform. If investors believed they had a claim on those loans, they could argue in court that they were treated worse than in insolvency. They do not, and the prospectus says so. The use-of-proceeds promise is a reporting commitment, not a security interest. A green covered bond is different: there, the cover pool is a legal security, and investors keep a priority claim on it whatever the label.
What would change after the CMDI reform. Once general depositor preference is transposed (by May 2028), senior preferred bonds rank below all deposits. In this scenario SP is untouched, so nothing changes. In a deeper scenario, where losses reach SP, holders of SP would no longer share losses with large corporate deposits, which would raise their expected loss and could narrow the SNP-SP basis. For Meridian’s Treasury this is a pricing question for future issues, not a change in the green bond’s status.
And if the bond had been a green covered bond? A covered bond would have cost about 38 bp plus a small NIC, three times less than the SNP. But it does not count as MREL, so it would not solve the problem of section 5.1. Its cover pool is a legal security, so investors keep a claim on the mortgages whatever happens to Meridian; the label then describes the very assets that protect them. Meridian uses green covered bonds for cheap funding of its mortgage book, and green SNP for resolvability. The two draw on overlapping assets, which is why the register flags each mortgage to one programme only.
Question. What will Meridian publish in a year, and what could go wrong?
In November 2027 Meridian publishes its allocation report for the whole programme: EUR 3.5bn of green bonds, a pool of about EUR 5.5bn after a year of origination and amortisation, coverage by category and country, the share of loans originated in the last 12 and 36 months, and impact indicators: estimated avoided emissions from renewable loans (computed on the bank’s share of each project, see A03), energy savings of the mortgages against the national average. Limited assurance is given by the statutory auditor. Two events would have to be reported: the sale of EUR 300m of renewable loans in a portfolio sale (see B16), which leaves the pool and must be replaced; and the reclassification of mortgages whose new EPC is lower, as national EPC methods change. Neither breaches anything as long as coverage stays above 100%, and the buffer of 115% exists to absorb such events. A third event would be serious: if a large renewable loan defaulted and was restructured, it would leave the pool, and the impact report would have to state the change. The allocation report is not a promise of credit quality.
Who reads the report. Investors’ ESG analysts check coverage, the share of Taxonomy-aligned assets and the methodology of impact figures, and feed their findings into the fund’s SFDR disclosures. Rating agencies do not change the SNP rating for the label. Supervisors read it alongside the GAR. And the next mandate depends on it: if the report is late or weak, the bookrunners will hear in the next roadshow that the green book is thinner.
| Item | Value | Where |
|---|---|---|
| Subordinated MREL before / target / after | 23.78% / 24.80% / 24.59% of TREA | 5.1 |
| Subordination shortfall before / after | EUR 1.262bn / EUR 0.262bn | 5.1 |
| Eligible pool / Taxonomy-aligned pool | EUR 5,100m / EUR 3,492m (68.47%) | 5.2 |
| Coverage after issue / headroom at 115% | 145.71% / EUR 934.8m | 5.2 |
| Aligned coverage if all were EuGBs / 36-month look-back coverage | 99.77% / 95.71% | 5.2 |
| Fair value / conventional / green spread | 112 / 117 / 114 bp | 5.3 |
| Reoffer yield, coupon, price | 3.64%, 3.625%, 99.933 | 5.3 |
| Net proceeds / all-in cost | EUR 997.025m / about 3.691% (MS + 119.1 bp) | 5.3 |
| Greenium saving per year / PV / net of label costs | EUR 0.3m / EUR 1.349m / EUR 1.064m | 5.4 |
| Break-even greenium | 0.63 bp | 5.4 |
| Estimated greenium for NIC of 0 / 5 / 10 bp | +2 / -3 / -8 bp | 5.4 |
| Green Bund 2041: DV01 / value of 1 bp | EUR 4.544m / EUR 4.54m (11.4 bp of nominal) | 5.5 |
| Meridian green SNP: DV01 / value of 3 bp | EUR 0.4506m / EUR 1.352m (13.5 bp of nominal) | 5.5 |
| Bail-in: recapitalisation / share of SNP converted / green SNP converted | EUR 10.791bn / 49.2% / EUR 492m | 5.6 |
Meridian is here on both sides of the trade: as an issuer (Treasury), and as a bookrunner (DCM and syndicate) on its own and on sovereign deals. The economics are therefore those of a liability and of a fee business, plus one asset-side question: what the greenium does to the profitability of the green loans it funds.
The issuer side. A bond issued is a liability: it carries no RWA. The SNP strengthens the bank’s resolvability (MREL), not its capital ratio; only Tier 2 and AT1 count as own funds. The green label changes nothing in CRR3 terms: there is no green supporting factor and no capital benefit for green liabilities.
The bookrunner side. Underwriting a bond creates a short-lived market risk position only if the bank keeps bonds: in a well-covered book it holds none after allocation. Under the CRR3 market risk rules, underwriting positions are subject to own funds requirements, with reduction factors applied in the first working days after issue (Article 345 CRR). Operational risk capital under the CRR3 standardised approach is calculated on the bank’s business indicator, not per deal; Meridian allocates it to DCM in proportion to revenues.
The investor side. Sovereign green bonds bought by Meridian for its liquidity buffer are euro-area central government exposures with a 0% risk weight under the standardised approach and Level 1 HQLA; the label has no effect.
The bond has no RAROC of its own; its saving accrues to Treasury. The question the business lines ask is: does the green funding make green loans more profitable? Meridian’s policy (module B02) grants a 3 bp FTP rebate to loans in the eligible pool. Here we test that policy against the arithmetic of the programme.
FORMULA
is the self-financing rebate: the rebate Treasury can pay on the whole pool out of the greenium; the average greenium on green bonds outstanding; green bonds outstanding; the eligible pool; revenues before rebate (net margin over FTP plus fees); the rebate granted; the drawn exposure; operating costs; expected loss; the MREL charge allocated to the loan; the tax rate (25%).
Data (case assumptions). A representative green loan in the pool: EUR 100m, five-year term loan to a BBB-rated renewable energy developer (corporate exposure, not project finance), fully drawn. Margin 110 bp over EURIBOR; FTP liquidity premium 30 bp (the course’s five-year FTP); upfront fee 40 bp spread over five years; cost-income ratio 40% applied to revenues before rebate (the rebate creates no extra work); F-IRB with PD 0.20%, LGD 40%, M 2.5 years. MREL charge: Treasury allocates the excess cost of SNP over the FTP curve to businesses per euro of RWA: SNP stock EUR 9.25bn at an excess of 84 bp (114 bp minus 30 bp) over a TREA of EUR 124bn.
INTERACTIVE LAB — RAROC of a green loan funded in part by green bonds
Compute the RAROC of a EUR 100m green loan with no rebate, with the self-financing rebate the greenium can afford, and with the 3 bp policy rebate; include the MREL charge.
| Parameter you can move | Range | Default |
|---|---|---|
| Loan amount | 10 to 300 EUR m | 100 EUR m |
| Margin over EURIBOR | 50 to 300 bp | 110 bp |
| FTP liquidity premium, 5 years | 0 to 80 bp | 30 bp |
| Upfront fee (spread over 5 years) | 0 to 100 bp | 40 bp |
| PD | 0.03 to 4 % | 0.2 % |
| Average greenium on green bonds outstanding | 0 to 10 bp | 3 bp |
| Green bonds outstanding | 0 to 6000 EUR m | 3500 EUR m |
| Eligible green pool | 1000 to 10000 EUR m | 5100 EUR m |
| Policy rebate granted | 0 to 5 bp | 3 bp |
| SNP stock | 0 to 15 EUR bn | 9.25 EUR bn |
| SNP spread over FTP | 0 to 200 bp | 84 bp |
| TREA | 80 to 160 EUR bn | 124 EUR bn |
| Result at default settings | Value |
|---|---|
| F-IRB risk weight | 39.02 % |
| Revenues before rebate | 0.880 EUR m |
| Operating costs (40% of revenues before rebate) | 0.352 EUR m |
| Expected loss | 0.080 EUR m |
| Allocated capital (13% of RWA) | 5.072 EUR m |
| Excess cost of EUR 1bn SNP over FTP, per year | 8.40 EUR m |
| MREL charge per euro of RWA | 6.266 bp |
| MREL charge on this loan | 0.0244 EUR m |
| Self-financing rebate | 2.06 bp |
| RAROC, no rebate, no MREL charge | 6.62 % |
| RAROC, no rebate, with MREL charge | 6.26 % |
| RAROC, self-financing rebate, with MREL charge | 6.57 % |
| RAROC, policy rebate, with MREL charge | 6.71 % |
| Policy rebate above self-financing | 0.94 bp |
| Annual cost to Treasury of policy above self-financing (whole pool) | 0.480 EUR m |
Try it. Find the margin at which the loan reaches the 12% hurdle with the MREL charge and no rebate: about 175 bp. A rebate of 3 bp moves RAROC by less than half a point; the green label does not rescue an unprofitable loan.
Line by line. Revenues: net margin over FTP 80 bp on EUR 100m = EUR 0.80m, plus EUR 0.08m of upfront fee a year: EUR 0.88m. Costs: 40% = EUR 0.352m. Expected loss: 0.20% x 40% x EUR 100m = EUR 0.08m. RWA: 39.02% x EUR 100m = EUR 39.02m; allocated capital EUR 5.072m. RAROC without rebate or MREL charge: 6.62%. The MREL charge is 6.266 bp of RWA, EUR 0.0244m on this loan, which brings RAROC down to 6.26%.
What the green feature changes. The greenium can pay for a rebate of 3 bp x 3,500 / 5,100 = 2.06 bp on the whole pool: RAROC 6.57%. The policy rebate of 3 bp brings it to 6.71%. The difference between the two, 0.94 bp on EUR 5.1bn, is EUR 0.48m a year that Treasury pays out of general funding to subsidise green lending. That may be a legitimate strategic choice, but it should be presented as a subsidy, not as a market benefit. In either case the loan stays well below the 12% hurdle. Its profitability depends on cross-sell and on margin, not on the label (see B01 for the relationship view).
Treasury’s FTP curve is a blended marginal cost of senior funding (deposits, covered bonds, senior preferred): 30 bp at five years in the course’s convention. The SNP costs 114 bp: the 84 bp difference, EUR 8.4m a year on EUR 1bn, is a cost of resolvability that Meridian allocates by RWA (the MREL charge above), not by liquidity use. For the liquidity metrics the bond is a stable long-term liability: it counts fully as available stable funding in the NSFR while its residual maturity exceeds one year, and it is outside the LCR outflows until its last 30 days. The green label has no regulatory liquidity effect.
Unallocated proceeds, if any, are held in the liquidity buffer (cash at the central bank, Level 1 bonds); the framework excludes fossil-fuel issuers from that buffer. The carry cost of holding unallocated proceeds is the difference between the SNP cost and the buffer yield, which is one reason banks prefer to issue only when the pool is already larger than the bond.
Issuer. Under IFRS 9 the bond is a financial liability at amortised cost. The effective interest rate includes the discount to par and the fees paid: Meridian’s interest expense is recognised at the all-in yield of about 3.691%, not at the 3.625% coupon. Meridian hedges the fixed coupon with a pay-floating interest rate swap in a fair value hedge, so the hedged bond is remeasured for changes in the benchmark rate. The green label has no accounting effect: there is no embedded derivative, since the cash flows do not depend on any sustainability outcome. This is the difference from a sustainability-linked bond (C02), whose coupon step-up raises the questions addressed by the IASB’s May 2024 amendments to IFRS 9 on contractual cash flow characteristics, effective from 1 January 2026.
Investor. For a bank buying a green bond (sovereign or bank), the instrument passes the “solely payments of principal and interest” test like its conventional twin; classification follows the business model (hold to collect, hold to collect and sell, or trading).
Bookrunner. Fees are recognised under IFRS 15 when the service is rendered, on settlement.
Green Asset Ratio. Issuing a green bond does not change the GAR, which is computed on assets. The data effort behind the pool (EPCs, climate-risk assessments, Taxonomy flags) is the same effort that feeds the GAR, so the two must agree: a bank that shows a Taxonomy-aligned pool of EUR 3.5bn in its EuGB factsheet but reports a much lower aligned stock in its GAR would face questions from investors and supervisors. With the 2026 simplification of Taxonomy disclosures (section 3.8), a bank that issues EuGBs cannot use the transitional opt-out from the detailed KPIs, because it is claiming Taxonomy alignment.
Pillar 3 ESG. Under the current templates the green pool appears in the Taxonomy-alignment templates (stopped for large institutions under the EBA’s final draft of 22 June 2026, not yet adopted) and, for exposures not aligned but supporting mitigation, in the template on other climate change mitigating actions. The banking book templates on transition risk and financed emissions are unaffected by the liability side.
Financed and facilitated emissions. The green bond itself creates no financed emissions for Meridian; the loans it funds do, and Meridian’s financed emissions include them whether or not they are in the pool (see A03). As bookrunner on corporate bonds Meridian reports facilitated emissions under PCAF Part B (2023), which weights them at 33%. The PCAF Part B method was written for corporate issuers and syndicated loans; Meridian does not report facilitated emissions for sovereign or SSA syndications. For sovereign bonds held in its own portfolio, Meridian applies the PCAF sovereign debt method (Part A), attributing a share of the country’s production emissions by the ratio of exposure to purchasing-power-parity-adjusted GDP.
Double counting. The same mortgage can appear as a green asset in Meridian’s green bond allocation report, in its GAR numerator, and in the impact report of a green covered bond. The allocation rules must make sure that it is used only once across bond programmes, even though it legitimately appears in several disclosures.
| Risk | What it looks like | Control | Owner |
|---|---|---|---|
| Pool shortfall | Coverage falls below 100% after loan sales or EPC downgrades | Quarterly register review; 115% buffer; issuance blocked below buffer | Treasury and Green Bond Committee |
| Double counting | Same mortgage in green SNP pool and green covered bond pool | Unique asset flag per programme in the register | Sustainability team |
| Taxonomy mislabelling | Pool called “Taxonomy-aligned” when only framework-eligible | Separate fields for eligible and aligned; legal review of marketing | Sustainability team and Legal |
| MREL ineligibility | Green wording read as a ring-fence or a redemption right | Standard bail-in and no-default disclaimers; SRB eligibility check | Treasury and Legal |
| Mis-selling | Sales notes overstate impact or greenium | Compliance review of investor materials | DCM, syndicate, Compliance |
| Data quality | Estimated EPCs or proxies treated as actual | Data quality flag; auditor’s limited assurance | Sustainability team and Finance |
| Allocation conflicts | Own syndicate favours related accounts | Allocation policy and audit trail | Syndicate and Compliance |
| Sovereign spending reversal | Eligible subsidy cut after issue | Look-forward limits; replacement expenditure | Debt management office |
Red-flag checklist for a bank or sovereign green bond.
What changed recently. The EuGBS became available (December 2024) and its first sovereign and bank issues came in 2025. Germany refreshed its green framework in January 2026. The CMDI reform (April 2026) introduced general depositor preference, effective after transposition by May 2028. The Taxonomy disclosures were simplified from January 2026, and revised building criteria were proposed for 2027.
Open debates.
INTERACTIVE LAB — Check your understanding: sovereign, SSA and FIG green issuance
Test the mechanics of public sector and bank issuance and the specific features of their green bonds.
Q1. Why do sovereigns usually launch a new green line by syndication rather than auction?
Answer: B. A new line has no secondary price; bookbuilding discovers it and lets the issuer target investors. Auctions are cheaper and used for later taps.
Q2. What makes the German twin bond a clean measure of the greenium?
Answer: A. Identical cash flows and credit remove the usual matching problems; the switch facility and retained amounts limit the liquidity difference.
Q3. A bank needs to close a gap in its subordination requirement. Which instrument is the cheapest that does it?
Answer: C. SNP ranks below senior preferred and counts as subordinated MREL; it is cheaper than Tier 2 or AT1. Covered bonds and SP do not count against subordination.
Q4. Under the EuGBS portfolio approach, what must the allocation report show?
Answer: B. Article 4(2) of Regulation (EU) 2023/2631 requires the total value of the portfolio to exceed the total value of outstanding EuGBs.
Q5. If Meridian’s green SNP is bailed in, how are its holders treated relative to conventional SNP holders?
Answer: C. Use of proceeds creates no security interest and no ranking difference; the bond is in the same insolvency class.
Q6. What did the EBA’s 2020 MREL monitoring report conclude about green MREL bonds?
Answer: C. The EBA described practice, flagged points of attention and said it would keep monitoring, without a recommendation.
Q7. Meridian’s eligible pool is EUR 5,100m and green bonds will be EUR 3,500m. With a 115% buffer, how much more can it issue?
Answer: A. 5,100 / 1.15 = 4,434.8; minus 3,500 gives 934.8.
Q8. Why is the bank’s greenium estimate noisier than the sovereign twin’s?
Answer: B. A one-bp error in the curve or the NIC moves the estimate one-for-one.
Q9. Which statement on the Green Asset Ratio is right?
Answer: C. The GAR counts Taxonomy-aligned assets; the bond pool and the GAR share data and should agree.
Q10. A green bond priced flat to the issuer’s secondary curve shows:
Answer: B. Comparing a primary price to a secondary curve hides the NIC; landing flat means the label saved it.
Q11. How does the CMDI reform published in April 2026 change the creditor hierarchy?
Answer: B. General depositor preference applies after transposition (deadline May 2028); SP bonds rank below all deposits.
Q12. Why can a 1 bp sovereign greenium be worth as much per euro as a 3 bp bank greenium?
Answer: B. Value of a greenium is roughly greenium times DV01; a 15-year bond’s duration (about 12) multiplies each basis point.
Q13. What is the accounting effect of the green label on Meridian’s own bond under IFRS 9?
Answer: C. Cash flows do not depend on sustainability outcomes, unlike a sustainability-linked bond.
Q14. Which feature is specific to sovereign green frameworks?
Answer: A. States allocate to budget lines; the EuGBS lets a State auditor check allocation (Article 13).
Data. Bank Alba, rated A-, wants EUR 750m of green SNP, 5 years to call. Mid-swaps 2.80%; Alba’s SP curve +65 bp; SNP-SP basis 40 bp; expected NIC 4 bp; green advantage 2 bp. Fee 25 bp; other costs EUR 0.25m.
Solution. Spread = 65 + 40 + 4 − 2 = 107 bp. Reoffer yield 2.80% + 1.07% = 3.87%. Coupon rounded down to the eighth: 3.75%. Price of a 3.75% five-year annual bond at 3.87%: 99.464. Gross proceeds EUR 745.98m; fee EUR 1.875m; net proceeds EUR 743.85m. The all-in yield solving the net proceeds is about 3.934%, mid-swaps + 113.4 bp, so costs add about 6.4 bp a year. The 2 bp greenium saves EUR 0.15m a year, worth EUR 0.670m in present value at 3.87% over five years.
Data. Bank Alba’s pool: mortgages EUR 3,000m (70% Taxonomy-aligned), renewables EUR 900m (95%), green CRE EUR 400m (50%). Green bonds outstanding EUR 2,000m; new bond EUR 750m; internal buffer 120%.
Solution. Pool = 3,000 + 900 + 400 = EUR 4,300m. Coverage = 4,300 / 2,750 = 156.4%. Headroom at 120%: 4,300 / 1.2 − 2,750 = EUR 833.3m. Aligned pool = 2,100 + 855 + 200 = EUR 3,155m, or 114.7% of all green bonds: Alba could move its whole programme to the EuGBS, provided aligned assets are earmarked so that none backs two programmes.
Data. A sovereign issues EUR 5bn of a ten-year green twin at par (coupon and yield 3.00%) with a greenium of 2 bp. A bank issues EUR 500m four-year green SP at par (3.50%) with an estimated greenium of 4 bp.
Solution. Sovereign: modified duration of a ten-year 3% par bond = 8.53; DV01 = 5,000 x 1.00 x 8.53 / 10,000 = EUR 4.265m; value of 2 bp = EUR 8.53m, or 17.1 bp of nominal. Bank: modified duration 3.67; DV01 = EUR 0.184m; value of 4 bp = EUR 0.735m, or 14.7 bp of nominal. The sovereign’s greenium is half the bank’s in bp but worth more per euro issued, because of duration; and it is measured, while the bank’s is estimated.
1. Why do banks issue senior non-preferred bonds? To meet the subordination part of MREL at the lowest cost. SNP ranks below senior preferred and above Tier 2, so it absorbs losses before ordinary senior creditors, which the resolution authority requires for a part of MREL. It costs more than SP, typically a few tens of basis points, and much less than Tier 2. A green label does not change any of this; it only changes who buys the bond.
2. Walk me through how you would price a new green SNP. Start from the issuer’s SP secondary curve at the call date, add the SNP-SP basis read from its own SNP lines and peers, and you have fair value. Add a new issue concession for market conditions. Then consider whether the green book will allow a few basis points of tightening. Translate into a reoffer yield over mid-swaps, round the coupon down to an eighth, and compute the reoffer price. Finally, check the all-in cost after fees for Treasury.
3. What is a twin bond and why does it matter? A green bond with the same coupon, maturity and dates as a conventional bond of the same sovereign, introduced by Germany in 2020. The yield difference isolates the label effect from credit and cash flow differences. It shows a greenium of around 1 to 5 bp, which disciplines claims of large greeniums elsewhere. Germany also lets investors switch green into conventional, which supports liquidity.
4. What is the eligible green portfolio of a bank, and what can go wrong with it? A register of green loans, mostly mortgages and renewable energy loans, against which all green bonds are matched under a portfolio approach. It must exceed green bonds outstanding, usually with a buffer. It shrinks when loans are repaid, sold or downgraded, so it is reviewed quarterly. Risks are double counting across programmes, overstating Taxonomy alignment and impact reporting based on whole projects rather than the bank’s share.
5. Is a green MREL bond a contradiction? No, as long as the documentation is clear. The bond absorbs losses on the whole balance sheet like any SNP; the green commitment is about reporting and allocation, not about recourse. The EBA flagged the risk that investors might believe otherwise, which is why prospectuses state that non-allocation is not a default and that the bond is fully bail-inable. The contradiction would arise only if marketing suggested protection.
6. Why do few banks use the EU Green Bond Standard? Because it requires full Taxonomy alignment, including DNSH and minimum safeguards, while most banks’ green pools are only partly aligned, mainly due to missing data on mortgages. ING counted 8 of almost 160 bank issuers using it by May 2026. Banks with large EU mortgage books and good EPC data are the natural users. Revised criteria in 2027 may help at the margin.
7. How would you explain the greenium to a bank treasurer who expects 10 bp? I would show the German twins at about 1 bp and Denmark’s EuGB at 1.5 bp, then the bank’s own estimate with its uncertainty. For a five-year SNP, 3 bp on EUR 1bn is worth about EUR 1.3m, against a label cost of a few hundred thousand euros. The real benefits are a deeper, stickier book and diversification of demand. Promising 10 bp would set up a disappointment and a credibility problem.
8. How does a bank green bond affect the bank’s own sustainability metrics? It does not change the Green Asset Ratio, which is computed on assets, nor financed emissions, which depend on the loans. It relies on the same Taxonomy data as the GAR, so the two must be consistent. If Treasury passes the greenium to the business through an FTP rebate, it should be no larger than the greenium can pay for, otherwise it is a subsidy. Facilitated emissions apply when the bank is bookrunner on corporate issues, not to its own funding.
Regulation and standards
Supervisory and official papers
Issuers and market data
Academic and reference texts