Equity capital markets (ECM) is the part of Meridian Bank’s investment bank that helps companies and their shareholders sell shares to investors. It runs initial public offerings (IPOs), capital increases of listed companies (rights issues and placements), sales of large blocks of existing shares by shareholders, and equity-linked issues such as convertible bonds. Like debt capital markets (see C01), it is a fee business: the bank advises, prepares, markets and places the securities, and for a short time stands behind the placement. The difference with DCM is the nature of the risk sold. A bond investor buys a promise of fixed payments; a share buyer buys a residual claim whose value depends on a story about the future. ECM bankers therefore spend most of their time on that story, on its valuation and on which investors will believe it.
The clients are of three kinds. Companies that list or raise new equity: growth companies, privatisations, carve-outs, and, since the late 2010s, a large population of energy-transition companies (renewable producers, storage developers, grid suppliers, hydrogen and battery makers) whose investment plans need equity before they can carry debt. Shareholders who sell: private equity and infrastructure funds exiting an investment, founders, governments. Issuers of equity-linked paper that want cheaper funding than straight debt in exchange for potential dilution. The case company of this module, Voltaris, is a battery energy storage developer owned by an infrastructure fund that wants to list it on Euronext Paris in November 2026.
How the desk earns money. On an IPO or a marketed capital increase, the issuer and the selling shareholders pay a gross fee as a percentage of the amount raised, usually split into a base fee and a discretionary “incentive” fee that they award after the deal according to each bank’s performance. The pool is divided between the global coordinators, the bookrunners and the co-lead managers according to an agreed economics table. European fees are a fraction of the 7% common on mid-sized US IPOs; the academic work of Abrahamson, Jenkinson and Jones (2011) documented that gap. In our case, Voltaris and its owner pay 2.0% base plus up to 0.75% incentive, and Meridian, as one of two joint global coordinators, takes 30% of the pool: about EUR 5m on a EUR 665m deal (section 5.6). On a rights issue, banks also earn an underwriting commission for taking real price risk for two to three weeks. On a convertible, the fee is lower in percentage and the equity-linked desk also earns from the hedging flows of the investors. On overnight block trades, the bank often buys the shares at a fixed price and earns the difference between that price and the price at which it resells them.
WHO DOES WHAT — The ECM originator covers a sector and pitches the IPO; on a mandate, the global coordinators run the process. The equity syndicate desk reads investor demand, recommends the price range, runs the book, recommends the price and the allocation, and manages stabilisation. Equity-linked bankers structure convertibles. Corporate finance coverage owns the client and its loans (see B01). The connected research analyst, separated by information barriers, writes the pre-deal research report on which investors form their valuation. Equity sales take investor orders. Transaction management, legal and external counsel run the prospectus, the due diligence and the underwriting agreement; Compliance controls wall-crossings, research and the publicity of the offer.
Adjacent functions matter. Sustainable finance advisory reviews the sustainability content of the equity story and the prospectus and, for green convertibles, the framework (see C01). Market risk sets the limits on underwriting and stabilisation positions. Finance books the fees and the trading results and measures the facilitated emissions. Leveraged finance and project finance (see B05, B06) often already lend to the company; an IPO usually comes with a refinancing of its bank debt.
A realistic week in mid-November 2026. Monday: Voltaris books open at 9:00 and the price range is published. Tuesday: a pre-mandate meeting with a heat-pump manufacturer whose sponsor wants to know whether its “green” positioning will lower its IPO discount; the honest answer is in section 5.2. Wednesday: an overnight accelerated bookbuild of a 4% stake in a listed utility for a state shareholder, bought at a fixed discount, resold before 7:00 on Thursday. Thursday: Voltaris pricing call at 18:00. Friday: first day of trading, stabilisation desk on alert, and an equity-linked pitch to a wind-turbine supplier considering a green convertible. The numbers of this module are those of that week.
IN ONE SENTENCE — An IPO is the first sale of a company’s shares to the public together with their admission to trading on a stock exchange; it can combine new shares issued by the company and existing shares sold by its owners.
INTUITION — Think of a house that a family owns outright and wants to share with new co-owners. If the family builds a new wing and sells shares in the enlarged house, the money goes to the house (primary). If the family sells part of its own share, the money goes to the family (secondary). The new co-owners care about both: the first finances the plan, the second tells them that the family is cashing out.
The primary tranche is new shares; the cash goes to the company, which uses it for the purposes stated in the prospectus (here, battery projects and debt reduction). It dilutes existing shareholders. The secondary tranche is existing shares sold by shareholders; the cash goes to them, and the company’s capital does not change. An over-allotment option, or greenshoe, allows the banks to sell up to 15% more shares than the base offer and to buy them back from the issuer or seller at the offer price within 30 days; it is the tool of stabilisation (section 2.4). The free float is the share of the capital held by investors who are not insiders; exchanges and index providers require a minimum.
FORMULA
is the primary amount the company wants to raise, in euros; the offer price per share; the number of new shares; and the shares outstanding before and after the IPO; the existing shares sold in the base offer; the greenshoe shares, equal to a percentage (at most 15%) of the base offer ; the free float immediately after the IPO if the greenshoe is exercised in full; the dilution of pre-IPO shareholders.
Term by term. Because the company targets an amount in euros, the number of new shares depends on the price: a lower price issues more shares and dilutes more. The secondary tranche, by contrast, is usually fixed in number of shares, so the sellers’ proceeds move with the price. The free float combines both tranches and the greenshoe. Market capitalisation at the offer price is , and it is the figure in the headlines.
CASE — Voltaris has 100m shares before the IPO, owned 80% by the infrastructure fund Northgate Infrastructure Partners and 20% by the founders and management. At an offer price of EUR 12.00 the company raises EUR 450m by issuing 37.5m new shares; Northgate sells 15m shares (EUR 180m); the base offer is 52.5m shares, EUR 630m; the greenshoe adds 7.875m shares, EUR 94.5m, for a maximum offer of 60.375m shares, EUR 724.5m. After the IPO there are 137.5m shares, the market capitalisation is EUR 1,650m, the free float with full greenshoe is 43.9% and the pre-IPO shareholders are diluted by 27.3%. At a 2.5% fee, the fees on the primary tranche are EUR 11.25m; with EUR 8m of other costs, Voltaris receives EUR 430.75m net.
INTERACTIVE LAB — Offer structure: shares issued, market capitalisation, free float and net proceeds
See how the offer price, the primary amount, the secondary shares and the greenshoe determine the size of the offering, the free float, the dilution and the cash the company keeps.
| Parameter you can move | Range | Default |
|---|---|---|
| Offer price | 9 to 15 EUR | 12 EUR |
| Primary amount raised | 0 to 800 EUR m | 450 EUR m |
| Existing shares sold in the base offer | 0 to 40 m shares | 15 m shares |
| Greenshoe as share of the base offer | 0 to 15 % | 15 % |
| Shares outstanding before the IPO | 50 to 200 m | 100 m |
| Total fee (base and incentive) | 1 to 4 % | 2.5 % |
| Other IPO costs borne by the company | 0 to 20 EUR m | 8 EUR m |
| Result at default settings | Value |
|---|---|
| New shares issued | 37.500 m |
| Base offer | 630.0 EUR m |
| Greenshoe shares | 7.875 m |
| Maximum offer with greenshoe | 724.5 EUR m |
| Shares outstanding after the IPO | 137.50 m |
| Market capitalisation at the offer price | 1,650.0 EUR m |
| Free float with full greenshoe | 43.9 % |
| Dilution of pre-IPO shareholders | 27.3 % |
| Fees on the primary tranche | 11.25 EUR m |
| Net primary proceeds to the company | 430.75 EUR m |
Try it. Lower the price to EUR 10: the company still raises EUR 450m but issues 45m shares instead of 37.5m, and the founders’ dilution rises to 31%. A lower price is paid in shares, not in cash.
PITFALL — Do not confuse the money raised with the money the company receives. Of the EUR 724.5m maximum offer, only EUR 450m goes to Voltaris; the rest goes to Northgate. Investors read the split as a signal: a large secondary tranche tells them the seller thinks the price is full.
ECM valuation uses the same tools as M&A (see C06), with a market twist. The bankers build a discounted cash flow (DCF) valuation and a trading comparables valuation, the connected analysts publish their own, and investors form theirs in the pre-deal investor education (PDIE) meetings. The DCF discounts the free cash flow to the firm at the weighted average cost of capital (WACC); the cost of equity inside the WACC usually comes from the capital asset pricing model (CAPM).
FORMULA
is the cost of equity; the risk-free rate; the sensitivity of the share’s return to the market; the equity risk premium, the extra return expected from the market over the risk-free rate; and the market values (or target weights) of equity and debt; the pre-tax cost of debt; the tax rate.
The IPO discount is the gap between the bankers’ estimate of fair value and the price at which they recommend selling. It exists because a new share has no trading history, because investors bear the cost of analysing it, and because a share that trades up after listing makes the next deal easier for everyone. Price ranges in Europe are typically set 10% to 20% below the fair value that the syndicate desk believes in; the academic literature on “underpricing” measures the first-day return that results, and it is persistent across markets and decades. The issuer resents the discount as money left on the table; the syndicate defends it as the cost of a stable aftermarket. Both are right.
In a bookbuilt offering, the price is discovered by collecting orders. After the intention to float (ITF) announcement, the connected analysts’ research is distributed and the bankers run two weeks of PDIE meetings, after which the price range is set and the prospectus approved. During the bookbuilding period, often six to ten working days, institutional investors place orders with a size and, if they wish, a price limit; retail investors subscribe through a public offer (in France, an offre à prix ouvert). The syndicate desk updates the book in real time and reports coverage to the issuer. At pricing, the global coordinators recommend a price and an allocation; the issuer and the seller decide.
Allocation in Europe is discretionary: the banks do not fill orders pro rata but favour investors expected to hold the shares and to buy more in the aftermarket (long-only funds that did their work early, cornerstones) over those expected to sell quickly (some hedge funds, inflated orders). The issuer usually reviews the allocation line by line. Cornerstone investors commit before launch to buy a fixed amount at the final price, which de-risks the book; they are named in the prospectus.
In a European IPO the underwriting agreement is signed at pricing, after the book is known. This soft underwriting means that the banks commit to pay for the shares only once investors have ordered them; their risk is that an allocated investor fails to pay between pricing and settlement two working days later. In a rights issue, by contrast, the banks sign a hard underwriting commitment at launch and are exposed to a fall in the share price during the whole subscription period. In an accelerated bookbuild (ABB) or a bought deal, the bank may buy a block outright at a fixed price before reselling it overnight: real risk for hours.
Stabilisation is the only legal form of price support. It is a safe harbour from the market manipulation prohibition of the Market Abuse Regulation (MAR, Regulation (EU) No 596/2014, Article 5(4)), with conditions set by Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2016/1052. For shares, stabilisation may last no longer than 30 calendar days from the start of trading in an IPO, may never be carried out above the offer price, and is disclosed before and after. The mechanism is simple. The stabilisation manager allocates up to 115% of the base offer, the extra 15% being borrowed from the seller (the over-allotment). The syndicate is then short. If the share trades below the offer price, the stabilisation manager buys shares in the market, which supports the price and closes the short. If it trades above, the manager exercises the greenshoe and buys the shares from the seller at the offer price. The over-allotment not covered by the greenshoe may not exceed 5% of the original offer, and the greenshoe itself may not exceed 15%.
INTUITION — The greenshoe is an insurance policy that pays in both states of the world. If the price falls, the syndicate buys cheap in the market to return the borrowed shares and makes a small profit while supporting the price. If the price rises, it buys from the seller at the offer price under the option and loses nothing.
A rights issue offers new shares to existing shareholders in proportion to their holdings, at a discount, with tradable subscription rights so that a shareholder who does not subscribe can sell the right instead of losing value. The key number is the theoretical ex-rights price (TERP), the average of the old price and the subscription price weighted by the number of shares. A placement or ABB sells new or existing shares to institutions in a few hours, without rights, and is limited by shareholder authorisations, typically 10% to 20% of the capital. A convertible bond is a bond that the holder may exchange for a fixed number of shares; its value is a bond floor plus a call option on the share, which allows a lower coupon. Convertibles are bought mainly by specialised funds and by hedge funds that buy the bond and sell the share short to hedge the option (convertible arbitrage).
The prospectus, approved by the competent authority (in France the AMF), is the legal basis of the offer: business description, risk factors, financial information, use of proceeds, capitalisation, the offer terms and, since the Listing Act reforms, a fixed format. The issuer and the persons who take responsibility for it are liable for misleading statements under national law; the banks’ own exposure depends on the jurisdiction and is highest in the US private placement (Rule 144A), where they defend themselves by due diligence, the 10b-5 disclosure letter from counsel and the auditors’ comfort letter. The underwriting agreement sets the commitments, the fees, the representations and warranties, the lock-up undertakings (180 days for the company, often 180 to 365 days for the seller and management) and the conditions precedent. The research guidelines keep analysts’ reports factual and consistent with the prospectus. The stabilisation notice and the post-stabilisation disclosure close the file.
There is no label for a share in the way there is for a bond. A green bond ring-fences its proceeds (see C01); a share is a claim on the whole company, and its proceeds are fungible by nature. What changes in an IPO of a transition company is therefore not the instrument but four other things: the equity story, which presents the company’s contribution to decarbonisation as a growth driver; the investor base, which includes funds with sustainability objectives and constraints; the disclosure, which must back every sustainability claim with information and risk factors; and the liability that attaches to those claims.
IN ONE SENTENCE — In an equity offering, “green” is a property of the issuer’s activities, measured by its revenue, capital expenditure and emissions, and not a property of the security or of its proceeds.
For a few products the instrument does carry a label. Green convertible bonds apply the ICMA Green Bond Principles to an equity-linked bond: the proceeds are allocated to eligible projects and reported on, while the conversion option is unchanged. The first European example was Neoen’s EUR 170m green convertible of June 2020. Green equity designations exist at some exchanges: the Nasdaq Green Equity Designation, used on Nasdaq’s Nordic and Baltic markets, requires that more than 50% of turnover and more than 50% of investments come from activities considered green and that less than 5% of turnover comes from fossil-fuel activities, on the basis of an external review. Some issuers also publish a “use of proceeds” section in a capital increase prospectus listing transition projects, which investors read as an intention, not a covenant.
Most of the long-only money in a European IPO book is managed by funds subject to the Sustainable Finance Disclosure Regulation (SFDR, Regulation (EU) 2019/2088). In November 2026 the categories that matter are still the current ones. Article 9 funds have sustainable investment as their objective; every holding must be a “sustainable investment” in the sense of Article 2(17): it contributes to an environmental or social objective, does no significant harm to the others, and the company follows good governance practices. Article 8 funds promote environmental or social characteristics and many commit to a minimum share of sustainable investments. The fund manager, not the issuer, decides whether a share qualifies; the ECM team’s job is to give it the data to decide.
Two other rules shape demand. ESMA’s guidelines on funds’ names (ESMA34-1592494965-657), applicable since 21 November 2024 for new funds and from 21 May 2025 for existing ones, require funds using sustainability-related terms in their names to invest at least 80% in assets meeting their environmental or social characteristics and to apply the exclusions of the Paris-aligned benchmarks (PAB) set by Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2020/1818: no companies with 1% or more of revenue from hard coal and lignite, 10% or more from oil fuels, 50% or more from gaseous fuels, or 50% or more from electricity generation with an intensity above 100 gCO2e per kWh, plus controversial weapons, tobacco and companies in breach of the UN Global Compact or the OECD Guidelines. Funds using “transition” or “social” terms apply the lighter climate transition benchmark exclusions. A storage developer passes these exclusions; a utility with gas-fired plants may not, which changes its book. Second, index inclusion determines the demand of passive funds and of the active funds benchmarked to those indices. A new listing enters general indices according to each provider’s rules on size and free float, sometimes quickly for large IPOs; it enters ESG and climate indices only once ESG rating agencies cover it, which can take months. This is a real gap in the first weeks of trading.
SFDR reform. The Commission proposed on 20 November 2025 to replace the Article 8 and 9 logic with three voluntary categories, “sustainable”, “transition” and “ESG basics”, each requiring at least 70% of the portfolio to follow the strategy, with exclusions. The Council agreed its negotiating mandate on 24 June 2026; the Parliament’s ECON committee adopted its report on 10 September 2026 and the plenary its mandate on 5 October 2026; the first trilogue was scheduled for 22 October 2026, no agreement had been reached by mid-November 2026, and application is expected around 2029. For an IPO in late 2026, the current regime applies; for the pitch book of 2028, the categories may have changed.
The number that investors ask for first is the share of revenue from sustainable activities, and the most credible version is the Taxonomy-aligned turnover defined by the Taxonomy Regulation (EU) 2020/852 and its Disclosures Delegated Act: the share of turnover from activities that are eligible (listed in the Climate Delegated Act), make a substantial contribution under the technical screening criteria, do no significant harm, and meet the minimum safeguards. Battery storage falls under activity 4.10, “Storage of electricity”, in the climate change mitigation objective. An issuer in scope of the Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive publishes these figures in its sustainability statement; after the Omnibus I Directive (Directive (EU) 2026/470, in force since 18 March 2026), the CSRD applies only to undertakings with more than 1,000 employees and EUR 450m of net turnover, so many IPO candidates, including Voltaris, are below the thresholds and disclose voluntarily. The ECM team then has to make sure that voluntary figures are computed on the same basis as those of listed peers, and that the prospectus says so.
The EU Listing Act package (Regulation (EU) 2024/2809 amending the Prospectus Regulation, the Market Abuse Regulation and MiFIR, and Directive (EU) 2024/2811) changes ECM practice in stages. Since 4 December 2024: the prospectus must be available at least three working days before the end of an IPO offer, instead of six; issuers can admit fungible shares up to 30% of the existing class over twelve months without a prospectus (previously 20%), and offer them to the public with a short document of at most 11 pages. Since 5 March 2026: the EU Follow-on prospectus, available to issuers listed for at least 18 months, replaces the simplified secondary-issuance regime. Since 5 June 2026: a standardised format and sequence of the prospectus, a 300-page limit for share prospectuses (with exceptions), two years of historical financial information, and the delayed disclosure regime for inside information in protracted processes under MAR. The free-float minimum for admission falls from 25% to 10%, through the amended MiFID II, which member states had to transpose by 5 June 2026.
On sustainability, the Listing Act gives the Commission power to specify the sustainability information required in prospectuses; the delegated act amending Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/980 was adopted in May 2026. According to the AMF, an equity issuer subject to Article 8 of the Taxonomy Regulation must state in its prospectus whether its activities are associated with environmentally sustainable activities, and the summary may warn that the issuer has identified environmental issues as a material risk factor. Before these rules, ESMA’s public statement of July 2023 on sustainability disclosure in prospectuses (ESMA32-1399193447-441) had already set the supervisory expectation: sustainability information in a prospectus must be consistent with the rest of the document and with other public communications, and risk factors must be specific, not boilerplate.
Everything the equity story says about the green character of the company is a statement in the prospectus or in marketing material that must be consistent with it. If a claim is misleading and the share falls when the truth emerges, investors can sue under the national prospectus liability regime (Article 11 of the Prospectus Regulation requires member states to provide one), and the supervisor can sanction the issuer under the Prospectus Regulation and MAR. The risk concentrates on three types of statement: quantified impact claims (avoided emissions, “enables X GW of renewables”), Taxonomy alignment claims that rest on unverified technical criteria, and forward-looking targets (net zero by a date) without a plan. Banks protect themselves through due diligence on the sustainability data, a specific section in the auditors’ or consultants’ comfort process, and representations in the underwriting agreement. For a desk in London, the FCA’s anti-greenwashing rule, in force since 31 May 2024, adds a direct obligation on authorised firms that make sustainability references to clients. The EU Regulation on ESG rating activities (Regulation (EU) 2024/3005), applicable since 2 July 2026, now supervises the rating providers whose coverage determines ESG index inclusion.
This is the question every transition issuer asks, and the honest answer has three parts. Empirically, a large literature finds that firms with better ESG or environmental scores have a lower implied cost of equity: El Ghoul and co-authors (2011) estimated a difference of about 56 bp between high and low CSR-score firms in US data, and later studies broadly confirm a negative relationship for the environmental and governance pillars, less so for the social pillar (see the review in Roncalli’s handbook, section 3.3.1). Theoretically, Pástor, Stambaugh and Taylor (2021) show that if investors derive utility from holding green assets, green firms have lower expected returns in equilibrium, and therefore a lower cost of capital; Bolton and Kacperczyk (2021) find the mirror image, a premium on the returns of high-emission firms. Quantitatively, the effect of investor preferences alone can be tiny: Berk and van Binsbergen, in the Journal of Financial Economics, estimate that divestment by socially conscious investors, who hold under 2% of US stock market wealth, changes the cost of capital by about 0.44 bp. The empirical correlations also mix cause and effect: well-managed, less risky firms have better ESG scores and lower betas.
WHY IT MATTERS ON THE DESK — A banker who promises a transition client a lower IPO discount because the company is green is promising something the evidence does not support at the size that matters. What the green profile does change is the depth of the book: more funds can buy it, and demand at a given price is larger. Section 5.2 quantifies the first effect and section 5.4 the second.
An IPO takes four to six months from mandate to the end of stabilisation, most of it in preparation. The flow below follows the Voltaris IPO; the dates are those of the case.
INTERACTIVE LAB — The Voltaris IPO from mandate to the end of stabilisation
Follow the sequence of actors, decisions and documents of a European IPO with a sustainability-centred equity story.
| # | Who | Does what | Deliverable |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Northgate Infrastructure Partners and Voltaris CFO | Run a beauty parade and appoint two joint global coordinators (Meridian and a peer), two bookrunners and two co-leads; agree the fee and the economics table | Engagement letter (June 2026) |
| 2 | ECM origination with the sustainable finance team | Draft the equity story: storage as the enabler of renewables, contracted revenue share, Taxonomy-aligned revenue, growth pipeline | Equity story and early-look presentation |
| 3 | Legal counsel, auditors, technical and sustainability advisers | Business, legal, financial and sustainability due diligence; vendor reports on the technology and the market | Due diligence reports, draft prospectus, draft comfort letters |
| 4 | Connected research analysts (behind information barriers) | Meet management, build their models, write the pre-deal research reports | Pre-deal research (published at ITF) |
| 5 | Equity syndicate and Compliance | Early-look and pilot-fishing meetings with selected investors under market-sounding procedures; wall-cross cornerstone candidates | Investor feedback log, cornerstone term sheets |
| 6 | Voltaris board and Northgate | Announce the intention to float on Euronext Paris | ITF press release (20 October 2026) |
| 7 | Equity sales and analysts | Pre-deal investor education: two weeks of meetings in which analysts present their views to investors | PDIE feedback: valuation ranges by investor |
| 8 | Global coordinators, syndicate, issuer and seller | Set the price range from PDIE feedback; finalise the prospectus; obtain AMF approval | Price range EUR 11.50 to 13.00, approved prospectus (13 November 2026) |
| 9 | Management with syndicate and sales | Roadshow and bookbuilding; daily book updates to the issuer | Order book by investor, size and price limit |
| 10 | Syndicate, issuer and seller | Pricing call: choose the price and approve the allocation; sign the underwriting agreement | Pricing statement, allocation file, underwriting agreement (19 November 2026) |
| 11 | Euronext, settlement agent and stabilisation manager (Meridian) | First day of trading; settlement two working days later against payment; stabilisation notice | Shares admitted (20 November), settlement (23 November) |
| 12 | Stabilisation manager and Compliance | Buy shares in the market if the price is below the offer price, exercise the greenshoe for the rest; report to the AMF and the public | Stabilisation report and greenshoe exercise notice (by 19 December 2026) |
| 13 | Finance, ECM and sustainable finance | Collect and distribute fees; book stabilisation result; record league-table credit and facilitated emissions | Deal closing file, fee invoice, PCAF entry |
Mandate. The selling shareholder usually controls the process, because it owns the company and pays part of the fees. Northgate holds a beauty parade in which each bank presents its valuation, its view of the investor base and its distribution in sustainability-focused funds. The engagement letter sets the roles, the fee and the economics table. Meridian is chosen as joint global coordinator partly because it is already a lender to Voltaris’s project companies (see B06) and partly for its sustainable investor coverage. A bank that lends to the company has a conflict of interest that the prospectus must disclose, especially when IPO proceeds repay its loans.
Equity story and due diligence. The equity story is the one-sentence reason to own the share, here “the contracted battery platform that makes Europe’s renewable build-out work”. Every element must be supported in the prospectus. The due diligence covers the business plan, contracts, permits, litigation, accounts, and, for a transition company, the data behind every sustainability claim: the method of the Taxonomy alignment, the emission inventory, the supply chain of the battery cells (forced labour risk in the mineral supply chain is a standard question), and the end-of-life and recycling commitments. The sustainable finance team reviews the story with the same standard of proof as the financial team.
Research and early look. The connected analysts, separated from the deal team by information barriers, publish pre-deal research at the ITF. Their models anchor investors’ valuation, and the Listing Act’s reform of research payments, applicable since June 2026, aims to increase coverage of small and mid-cap issuers. Pilot fishing and early-look meetings test the story with selected investors; under MAR the sounding of investors on a possible deal follows the market-sounding procedure, which the Listing Act confirmed as a safe harbour rather than an obligation.
Price range and prospectus. PDIE feedback gives each investor’s view of value. Syndicate aggregates it into a demand-weighted range and recommends a price range, which the issuer and seller accept or negotiate. The prospectus is approved by the AMF, passported if needed, and published; the offer opens.
Bookbuilding and pricing. The book is reported daily. At pricing, syndicate presents the demand at each price, its quality (long-only versus hedge funds, size of orders, early versus late), and recommends a price and an allocation. The underwriting agreement is signed after pricing, which makes the commitment soft.
Trading, settlement and stabilisation. The share starts trading the next morning; settlement occurs two working days after pricing against payment, before the EU moves to a one-day settlement cycle in October 2027. The stabilisation manager then has 30 calendar days to support the price. At the end, it announces whether and how much it bought, and the greenshoe is exercised for the balance. Controls at this stage are the stabilisation log, Compliance’s monitoring and the public disclosure required by MAR.
The case follows Meridian’s team through the Voltaris IPO, from valuation to stabilisation and the bank’s economics, then through the two follow-on financings that a transition company typically needs within three years: a green convertible and a rights issue. All company data are case assumptions; regulations and market conventions are real.
Question. Why does Voltaris need equity, and why now?
Data. Voltaris, founded in 2017 in Lyon, develops, builds and operates grid-scale battery energy storage systems (BESS) in France, Germany, Italy and Spain. At the end of 2026 it operates 1.4 GW of power and 2.9 GWh of energy capacity, with 6 GW in its development pipeline. A battery earns money in four ways: ancillary services sold to grid operators (frequency containment and restoration reserves), energy arbitrage (charging when prices are low, discharging when they are high), capacity and tolling contracts in which a utility or a capacity mechanism pays a fixed fee per MW for the right to use the battery, and services to third-party owners. Contracted revenue (tolling and capacity) is valued like infrastructure; merchant revenue (arbitrage and part of the ancillary services) is volatile and has fallen in markets where storage has been built fast, which is the central risk of the equity story.
| Item (EUR m) | 2026E | 2027E |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue | 210 | 300 |
| of which ancillary / arbitrage / contracted / services | 90 / 70 / 40 / 10 | n/a |
| EBITDA | 120 | 175 |
| Capex | 480 | 520 |
| Net debt before IPO (mostly project debt) | 900 | n/a |
Free cash flow to the firm, after tax and capex, is forecast at EUR -320m in 2027, -180m in 2028, +60m in 2029, +180m in 2030 and +220m in 2031, with growth of 1.5% a year thereafter. Ownership: Northgate 80m shares, founders and management 20m. Voltaris needs EUR 450m of new equity to fund the equity share of its 2027-2028 projects without breaching its holding-company leverage covenant; Northgate, which invested in 2021, wants a partial exit.
Reading. This is a typical transition IPO: high growth, negative free cash flow for two years, a value that rests on cash flows after 2030, and a sustainability profile that is genuine but not automatic (batteries enable renewables but are charged from a grid that still burns gas). The mandate went to Meridian and a peer as joint global coordinators with 30% of the economics each; two bookrunners have 15% each and two co-lead managers 5% each.
The equity story. Meridian’s draft rests on three pillars, each with the evidence that must back it: growth (the pipeline, with grid-connection agreements for 2.1 GW already signed), visibility (the share of contracted revenue, which the company plans to raise from 19% to 40% by 2029 through tolling contracts with utilities), and sustainability (the Taxonomy-aligned share of revenue and the company’s role in absorbing solar and wind output). The early-look meetings in September 2026 gave a clear signal: investors liked the growth and the sustainability profile but asked first about merchant revenue risk. The story was rebalanced accordingly; a storage IPO sold only on its green credentials would have been priced on its weakest pillar.
Question. What is Voltaris worth per share, what price range follows, and how much would a lower cost of equity attributed to its green profile add?
Data. Risk-free rate 3.10% (the course’s 8-year OAT); beta 1.20, the median of listed renewable and storage peers relevered to Voltaris’s target structure; equity risk premium 5.5%; pre-tax cost of debt 5.0%; target debt weight 35%; tax 25%. Trading comparables: listed renewable and storage peers trade at about 12.0 times 2027 EBITDA (case assumption). The syndicate’s convention is to set the price range between 15% and 4% below fair value, where fair value is the average of the DCF and comparables values.
Calculation. Cost of equity . After-tax cost of debt . WACC . Discounting the five free cash flows gives EUR -118.0m; the terminal value at the end of 2031 is $220 / (7.6175% - 1.5%) = $ EUR 3,650m, worth EUR 2,528.7m today. Enterprise value (DCF): EUR 2,410.7m; minus net debt of EUR 900m, pre-money equity of EUR 1,510.7m, or EUR 15.11 per share. Comparables: 12.0 times EUR 175m gives EUR 2,100m of enterprise value and EUR 12.00 per share. Fair value: EUR 13.55. Range: EUR 11.52 to 13.01, rounded to EUR 11.50 to 13.00.
INTERACTIVE LAB — Voltaris valuation: CAPM, DCF, comparables, price range and the ESG sensitivity
Rebuild the cost of equity, the WACC and the DCF and comparables values per share, derive the price range, and see how a change in the cost of equity attributed to ESG moves the value.
| Parameter you can move | Range | Default |
|---|---|---|
| Risk-free rate | 1 to 5 % | 3.1 % |
| Beta | 0.6 to 1.8 | 1.2 |
| Equity risk premium | 3 to 8 % | 5.5 % |
| Adjustment to the cost of equity attributed to ESG | -60 to 60 bp | 0 bp |
| Pre-tax cost of debt | 2 to 9 % | 5 % |
| Target debt weight | 0 to 60 % | 35 % |
| Terminal growth after 2031 | 0 to 3 % | 1.5 % |
| Peer EV / 2027 EBITDA | 8 to 16 x | 12 x |
| Offer price tested | 9 to 16 EUR | 12 EUR |
| Result at default settings | Value |
|---|---|
| Cost of equity | 9.70 % |
| WACC | 7.6175 % |
| PV of 2027-2031 free cash flows | -118.0 EUR m |
| Terminal value at end-2031 | 3,650.2 EUR m |
| PV of terminal value | 2,528.7 EUR m |
| Terminal value as share of EV | 104.9 % |
| Enterprise value (DCF) | 2,410.7 EUR m |
| Pre-money equity value (DCF) | 1,510.7 EUR m |
| Value per share (DCF) | 15.11 EUR |
| Value per share (comparables) | 12.00 EUR |
| Fair value per share (average) | 13.55 EUR |
| Bottom of range (15% discount) | 11.52 EUR |
| Top of range (4% discount) | 13.01 EUR |
| IPO discount at the tested price | 11.5 % |
Try it. Set the ESG adjustment to -0.44 bp, the order of magnitude estimated by Berk and van Binsbergen: the value moves by about one euro cent. Then set it to -56 bp, the high-versus-low CSR gap of El Ghoul and co-authors: the DCF value rises by more than two euros. Then move terminal growth by 0.5 point and compare.
Result. The DCF says EUR 15.11, comparables EUR 12.00, fair value EUR 13.55; the range is EUR 11.50 to 13.00; at EUR 12.00 the discount to fair value is 11.5%. The terminal value is 104.9% of the enterprise value, because the explicit cash flows are negative in total.
The ESG question. If one believed that Voltaris’s green profile lowers its cost of equity by 20 bp, the DCF value would rise to EUR 15.82 and fair value to EUR 13.91. With the 0.44 bp effect of Berk and van Binsbergen, the DCF value moves to EUR 15.12, by about one cent. With the 56 bp gap between high- and low-CSR firms of El Ghoul and co-authors, it would reach EUR 17.19. The range of honest answers is therefore wide, and the cross-sectional estimate is not a causal effect that a company can obtain by issuing.
PITFALL — Do not put an “ESG discount rate adjustment” in an IPO valuation as a source of value. The beta of peers already reflects how the market prices their risk, including what investors think about their sustainability. Adding a further reduction counts it twice. The syndicate desk prices with market inputs; the ESG profile appears in the depth of demand, not in the WACC.
Reading. Three points for the desk. The valuation of a transition growth company is almost entirely a terminal value: a 0.25 point change in terminal growth moves it more than any credible ESG effect. The comparables value is lower than the DCF, as is usual for a company whose growth is not yet in its 2027 EBITDA; investors will pay for that growth only partly. And the range is negotiated with Northgate, which wants the top, using the PDIE feedback, which here clustered between EUR 11.50 and 13.50.
Question. Which funds can buy Voltaris, and on what figures?
Data. Revenue 2026E of EUR 210m (stage 5.1). Storage revenues (ancillary, arbitrage, contracted: EUR 200m) are eligible under Taxonomy activity 4.10; the services revenue (EUR 10m) is not. Two Italian sites, generating EUR 16m of revenue, do not yet have the documentation required by the do-no-significant-harm criteria on waste and recycling of batteries, so their revenue is eligible but not aligned. Capex 2027E EUR 520m, all eligible; EUR 20m relate to projects with incomplete documentation. Revenue from fossil fuels: zero.
INTERACTIVE LAB — Voltaris: Taxonomy-eligible and aligned revenue and capex
Compute the Taxonomy-eligible and aligned shares of turnover and capex that the equity story and the prospectus will quote, and test them against a green equity designation.
| Parameter you can move | Range | Default |
|---|---|---|
| Ancillary services revenue | 0 to 300 EUR m | 90 EUR m |
| Energy arbitrage revenue | 0 to 300 EUR m | 70 EUR m |
| Contracted (tolling and capacity) revenue | 0 to 300 EUR m | 40 EUR m |
| Services to third parties (not eligible) | 0 to 100 EUR m | 10 EUR m |
| Eligible revenue failing DNSH documentation | 0 to 100 EUR m | 16 EUR m |
| Capex (all eligible) | 0 to 1000 EUR m | 520 EUR m |
| Capex not yet aligned | 0 to 200 EUR m | 20 EUR m |
| Result at default settings | Value |
|---|---|
| Total revenue | 210.0 EUR m |
| Eligible share of turnover | 95.2 % |
| Aligned share of turnover | 87.6 % |
| Turnover not aligned | 12.4 % |
| Aligned share of capex | 96.2 % |
| Contracted share of revenue | 19.0 % |
| Meets a 50% green turnover and investment test (1 = yes) | 1 |
Try it. Raise the revenue failing DNSH documentation to EUR 100m: the company is still a battery company, but its aligned share falls below 50%. Alignment is a documentation exercise as much as a business fact.
Result. Eligible turnover 95.2%, aligned turnover 87.6%, aligned capex 96.2%; contracted revenue only 19.0% of the total.
Reading. On these figures Voltaris passes the PAB exclusions, would meet the thresholds of a green equity designation of the Nasdaq type (more than 50% of turnover and investment), and is a plausible “sustainable investment” for Article 9 funds, subject to each manager’s own test. Three caveats belong in the prospectus. The figures are voluntary (Voltaris is below the post-Omnibus CSRD thresholds) and have received only limited assurance. Alignment does not mean low emissions in operation: the battery’s carbon intensity depends on the grid it charges from, and arbitrage can, in some hours, shift fossil generation rather than renewable. And no ESG rating agency yet covers Voltaris, so ESG index funds and rating-driven Article 8 funds cannot buy on day one. The equity story uses the aligned share; it does not use avoided-emission claims, which the sustainable finance team rejected as unverifiable.
From the equity story to the prospectus. The drafting sessions in October 2026 turned the marketing claims into prospectus language, claim by claim. Four examples show the method used by Meridian’s transaction team, external counsel and the sustainable finance team.
| Draft claim | Problem | Prospectus wording retained |
|---|---|---|
| “Voltaris is a 100% green company” | Not measurable; 12.4% of turnover is not aligned | “87.6% of 2026E turnover is Taxonomy-aligned (activity 4.10), on a voluntary basis, limited assurance” |
| “Our batteries avoid 400 kt of CO2 a year” | Counterfactual not verifiable | Deleted; qualitative description of grid services |
| “Net zero by 2035” | No transition plan, scope 3 excluded | “Target to reduce scope 1 and 2 intensity by 2030; scope 3 target under development” |
| “Fully recyclable batteries” | Depends on future recycling contracts | “Recycling agreements cover 70% of installed cells” (verified against contracts) |
The risk factors section carries three specific sustainability risks, each with its consequence for investors: that the Taxonomy alignment could fall if technical screening criteria are revised or documentation is incomplete, with a possible loss of eligibility for some funds; that the company’s reputation and access to sustainability-focused investors depend on the supply chain of battery minerals, where audits cover only first-tier suppliers; and that merchant revenues fall as more storage is built, which is the largest financial risk and is quantified in the operating review. ESMA’s 2023 statement asks for exactly this: specific, consistent, not generic.
WHO DOES WHAT — The bring-down due diligence call on the morning of pricing and again before settlement asks management whether anything has changed since the prospectus; since November 2026 Meridian’s checklist includes the sustainability figures. The comfort letter from the auditors covers the financial numbers; for the Taxonomy figures, which are not audited, the banks obtain an agreed-upon procedures letter from the sustainability assurance provider. Without it, the global coordinators’ counsel will not give the disclosure letter needed for the US private placement.
Why it matters. If, a year after listing, a short-seller report shows that the alignment rested on undocumented DNSH assessments, the share falls and investors look for someone to sue. The defence of the issuer and of the banks is the record of what was checked. In ECM the green layer is first of all a liability layer.
Question. At what price should Voltaris be sold?
Data. At the close of the book on 19 November, demand in EUR m at each price, from the syndicate’s book (case assumptions):
| Investor type | 11.50 | 12.00 | 12.50 | 13.00 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cornerstones (two Article 9 transition funds) | 120 | 120 | 120 | 120 |
| Article 9 long-only funds | 260 | 240 | 200 | 140 |
| Article 8 long-only funds | 820 | 760 | 600 | 380 |
| Other long-only funds (Article 6, non-EU) | 520 | 470 | 380 | 250 |
| Hedge funds | 600 | 450 | 300 | 150 |
| Retail (public offer) | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 |
The maximum offer with greenshoe is in EUR m at price . Syndicate’s guidelines for a stable aftermarket: cover of at least 2.5 times the maximum offer, and at least three quarters of institutional demand from long-only investors.
INTERACTIVE LAB — The Voltaris book: demand, cover, quality and allocation
Read the book at each price, compute the cover and the quality of demand, and test an allocation at the chosen price.
| Parameter you can move | Range | Default |
|---|---|---|
| Price tested | 11.5 / 12 / 12.5 / 13 | 12 EUR |
| Allocation to cornerstones | 0 to 120 EUR m | 120 EUR m |
| Allocation to Article 9 funds | 0 to 260 EUR m | 130 EUR m |
| Allocation to Article 8 funds | 0 to 820 EUR m | 285 EUR m |
| Allocation to other long-only funds | 0 to 520 EUR m | 105 EUR m |
| Allocation to hedge funds | 0 to 600 EUR m | 24.5 EUR m |
| Allocation to retail | 0 to 60 EUR m | 60 EUR m |
| Result at default settings | Value |
|---|---|
| Total demand at the price | 2,100 EUR m |
| Maximum offer with greenshoe | 724.5 EUR m |
| Cover of the maximum offer | 2.90 x |
| Long-only share of institutional demand | 77.9 % |
| Article 8 and 9 share of total demand | 53.3 % |
| Total allocated | 724.5 EUR m |
| Fill ratio, Article 9 funds | 54.2 % |
| Fill ratio, Article 8 funds | 37.5 % |
| Fill ratio, other long-only | 22.3 % |
| Fill ratio, hedge funds | 5.4 % |
| Article 8 and 9 share of allocation | 73.8 % |
| Long-only and cornerstone demand left unfilled | 950.0 EUR m |
| Northgate proceeds with full greenshoe at the price | 274.50 EUR m |
| New shares issued for EUR 450m | 37.50 m |
Try it. Switch the price to EUR 12.50: demand still covers the deal 2.3 times and its long-only share even rises, but the cushion of unfilled long-only orders that will buy in the aftermarket shrinks by a third.
Calculation and result. At EUR 12.00: demand EUR 2,100m against a maximum offer of EUR 724.5m, cover 2.90 times; long-only share of institutional demand 77.9%; Article 8 and 9 funds (including the cornerstones) 53.3% of demand. At EUR 12.50: cover 2.26 times, below the 2.5 guideline. At EUR 13.00: 1.48 times. Syndicate recommends EUR 12.00.
Allocation. The allocation approved by Voltaris and Northgate fills cornerstones and retail in full, Article 9 funds at 54.2%, Article 8 funds at 37.5%, other long-only funds at 22.3% and hedge funds at 5.4%. Article 8 and 9 funds receive 73.8% of the shares, against 53.3% of demand.
Reading. The decision between EUR 12.00 and 12.50 is the heart of the job. At EUR 12.50 Northgate would receive EUR 283.1m instead of EUR 274.5m with a full greenshoe, and Voltaris would issue 36m new shares instead of 37.5m. Syndicate argues that the EUR 950m of long-only and cornerstone orders left unfilled at EUR 12.00 is what will buy in the aftermarket. The sustainable profile showed up exactly where section 3.6 said it would: not in the price, but in the depth and stability of demand, with 73.8% of the allocation going to funds that must justify their holding on sustainability grounds and are less likely to flip it. That concentration is also a risk: if Voltaris’s alignment or reputation is challenged, the same funds may have to sell together.
The pricing call. At 18:00 on 19 November the two global coordinators’ heads of syndicate, the Voltaris CEO and CFO, two Northgate partners and counsel are on the line. Syndicate presents the book at each price, the top 30 orders with their price limits and the history of each investor in previous IPOs, then its recommendation. Northgate argues for EUR 12.50, pointing to cover above two times and to the DCF. The Voltaris CFO, who will face the same investors at every results presentation for years, supports EUR 12.00. The compromise is EUR 12.00 with the full greenshoe and a reminder that the incentive fee will reward the aftermarket. The allocation is then reviewed line by line; Northgate asks for two named long-only funds to be filled more and a hedge fund cut further. At 21:00 the underwriting agreement is signed and the pricing press release goes out at 7:00 the next morning.
PITFALL — “Twelve times oversubscribed” in a press release usually counts inflated orders and hedge-fund demand at any price. The syndicate desk looks at demand at the final price, by quality, and at the limit orders that drop out a few cents higher. Allocation fill ratios, not headline cover, tell you how the aftermarket will behave.
Question. Voltaris opens at EUR 12.30 on 20 November, then falls below the offer price after a competitor reports weak arbitrage revenues. What does the stabilisation manager do, and with what result?
Data. Meridian is stabilisation manager. The over-allotment is 15% of the base offer, 7.875m shares, borrowed from Northgate. Over the following two weeks Meridian buys 5.0m shares in the market at an average of EUR 11.40, never above the offer price, and the share closes the stabilisation period at EUR 11.90. Under the case’s underwriting agreement, the stabilisation result is shared among the underwriters in proportion to their economics (practice varies; some agreements give it to the seller).
INTERACTIVE LAB — Stabilisation and greenshoe: shares bought, greenshoe exercised, result and final free float
Compute how a stabilisation manager closes the over-allotment, the greenshoe exercised, the stabilisation result and the final size and free float of the IPO.
| Parameter you can move | Range | Default |
|---|---|---|
| Offer price | 9 to 15 EUR | 12 EUR |
| Over-allotted shares | 0 to 10 m | 7.875 m |
| Shares bought in the market | 0 to 10 m | 5 m |
| Average purchase price | 8 to 15 EUR | 11.4 EUR |
| Meridian’s share of the result | 0 to 100 % | 30 % |
| Result at default settings | Value |
|---|---|
| Value of stabilisation purchases | 57.00 EUR m |
| Shares bought (capped at the over-allotment, zero if above offer price) | 5.000 m |
| Greenshoe exercised | 2.875 m shares |
| Greenshoe proceeds to Northgate | 34.50 EUR m |
| Stabilisation result (syndicate) | 3.000 EUR m |
| Meridian’s share of the result | 0.900 EUR m |
| Final shares sold in the IPO | 55.375 m |
| Final offer size | 664.50 EUR m |
| Final free float | 40.27 % |
| Northgate’s final stake | 45.18 % |
Try it. Set the purchase price at EUR 12.20: stabilisation above the offer price is prohibited, so the manager buys nothing and the greenshoe is exercised in full.
Day by day. Day 1 (20 November): the share opens at EUR 12.30 and trades above the offer price; no purchases. Day 4: a competitor’s warning on arbitrage revenue pushes Voltaris to EUR 11.60; Meridian’s stabilisation trader buys in the market, within limits on volume per day agreed with Compliance, never above EUR 12.00. Days 5 to 12: purchases continue on weak days, at an average of EUR 11.40; each transaction is logged and reported to the AMF within seven trading days, as MAR requires. Day 30 (19 December): the period ends; Meridian publishes the stabilisation report and exercises the greenshoe for the shares it did not buy back.
Result. Meridian closes 5.0m of the 7.875m-share short by purchases and exercises the greenshoe for 2.875m shares, for which Northgate receives EUR 34.5m. The syndicate’s stabilisation result is 5.0m times (12.00 − 11.40) = EUR 3.0m, of which Meridian’s 30% is EUR 0.9m. The final offering is 55.375m shares, EUR 664.5m; the free float is 40.3% and Northgate keeps 45.2%.
Reading. Stabilisation turned a falling market into a profit for the syndicate and a smaller offering for the seller, while about EUR 57m of purchases supported the price. That is the intended design, but it has two uncomfortable sides. Investors who bought at EUR 12.00 have a loss on paper; the issuer’s sustainability narrative does not protect it from the merchant-revenue risk that the prospectus disclosed. And the fall reduces the fees, which are paid on the final size: section 5.6 shows the effect. After 30 days the support ends, and the share finds its level.
Question. What does Meridian earn, what capital does it use, and what is the return if one counts the deals that never reach pricing?
Data. Base fee 2.0% and incentive fee 0.5% (of 0.75% available), both on the final offering of EUR 664.5m, paid by Voltaris on the primary and by Northgate on the secondary. Meridian’s economics 30%; stabilisation result EUR 0.9m. Cost-income ratio 60% (course convention for fee and markets revenue); no expected loss. Operational-risk capital: 15% of revenue under the CRR3 standardised approach (as in C01). Underwriting: Meridian’s commitment is 30% of the base offer, EUR 189m, from signing on 19 November to settlement on 23 November. Under the current market-risk standardised approach, which the EU applies until the end of 2026, equity positions carry 8% for specific risk and 8% for general risk, and Article 345 of the CRR reduces underwriting positions by 100% on day 0, 90% on day 1 and 75% on days 2 and 3. The case treats the commitment as a position for the two working days and annualises the resulting capital over 250 working days. Pipeline: ECM teams prepare more IPOs than they price; we assume that the cost of the team per mandate is the same whether or not the deal is completed.
INTERACTIVE LAB — Meridian’s IPO economics: fees, stabilisation, capital and RAROC, deal by deal and across the pipeline
Compute Meridian’s revenue, cost, operational-risk and underwriting capital and RAROC on the Voltaris IPO, and see how the share of mandates that are completed drives the return of the franchise.
| Parameter you can move | Range | Default |
|---|---|---|
| Final offering | 200 to 2000 EUR m | 664.5 EUR m |
| Base fee | 0.5 to 4 % | 2 % |
| Incentive fee paid | 0 to 1 % | 0.5 % |
| Meridian’s economics | 5 to 50 % | 30 % |
| Meridian’s stabilisation result | -2 to 3 EUR m | 0.9 EUR m |
| Meridian’s underwriting commitment | 0 to 500 EUR m | 189 EUR m |
| Share of mandates completed | 30 to 100 % | 100 % |
| Result at default settings | Value |
|---|---|
| Gross fee pool | 16.6125 EUR m |
| Meridian’s fee | 4.9837 EUR m |
| Revenue (fee and stabilisation) | 5.8838 EUR m |
| Operating costs (60%) | 3.5303 EUR m |
| Result before tax | 2.3535 EUR m |
| Net result after tax | 1.7651 EUR m |
| Total RWA | 11.561 EUR m |
| Operational-risk RWA | 11.032 EUR m |
| Underwriting own funds on day 1 | 3.024 EUR m |
| Underwriting own funds on day 2 | 7.560 EUR m |
| Underwriting RWA, annualised | 0.5292 EUR m |
| Allocated capital | 1.5030 EUR m |
| RAROC of the completed deal | 117.4 % |
| RAROC across the pipeline | 117.4 % |
| Completion rate needed for 12% | 62.6 % |
Try it. Set the share of mandates completed to 60%: the franchise earns nothing after costs. ECM profitability depends less on the fee rate than on the conversion of mandates into priced deals.
Calculation. Fee pool 2.5% times EUR 664.5m: EUR 16.61m. Meridian’s 30%: EUR 4.98m; with the stabilisation result, revenue EUR 5.88m. Costs EUR 3.53m; net result after tax EUR 1.77m. Operational-risk RWA EUR 11.03m. Underwriting: own funds of EUR 3.02m on day 1 and EUR 7.56m on day 2, equivalent to EUR 0.53m of RWA over a year. Allocated capital EUR 1.50m. RAROC 117%.
How the pool is split and paid. The engagement letter fixes the economics table (30/30/15/15/5/5) before any work is done, so that the banks compete on execution, not on the split; the incentive fee, here 0.5% of a possible 0.75%, is the issuer’s and seller’s lever over the syndicate’s behaviour, and it is often allocated unequally, which changes each bank’s real share. Voltaris pays the fees on the primary tranche and Northgate those on the shares it sells, including the greenshoe shares actually exercised; the fees are deducted from the proceeds on settlement by the settlement bank, which then distributes them. Each bank bears its own costs; legal fees of the banks’ counsel and roadshow expenses are usually reimbursed by the issuer up to a cap. League tables credit each of the four bookrunners with one quarter of the deal, whatever its fee share, which is why banks accept junior roles: the credit is part of the product.
Reading. As for DCM, a deal-level RAROC above 100% says that fee businesses consume little capital, not that they are hugely profitable. Two numbers matter more. The day-2 own funds of EUR 7.56m show that the bank is exposed to a large position for a short time: a failed settlement by an allocated investor, or a deal pulled between pricing and settlement, would put EUR 189m of shares on Meridian’s book. And the pipeline: if only 70% of mandates reach pricing, the return falls to 42%; below 62.6% it is under the hurdle, because the team’s cost is paid on every mandate. IPO windows close abruptly, as in 2022 when rising rates shut the European market for most issuers, so the franchise is cyclical in a way the deal RAROC hides.
Question. In May 2028 Voltaris needs EUR 300m for new projects. Its shares trade at EUR 14.00. The equity-linked desk proposes a five-year green convertible. What is it worth, and what does Voltaris gain?
Data. Coupon 1.50% annual, conversion premium 30%, issued at par, green framework under the ICMA Green Bond Principles with allocation to battery projects. Voltaris’s straight five-year debt would cost about 6.00% (swap 2.50% plus a credit spread of 350 bp for an unrated issuer of BB quality, case assumption). Share volatility 35%, no dividend, rate 2.50%.
FORMULA
is the theoretical value per 100 of nominal; the coupon; the issuer’s straight-debt yield; the conversion price; the share price at issue; the conversion premium; the conversion ratio (shares per 100 of nominal); the Black-Scholes value of a European call on one share with spot , strike , maturity , volatility and risk-free rate . The model ignores the issuer’s call, the holder’s put, dividend protection and credit-equity interaction, which a real pricing model includes.
INTERACTIVE LAB — Voltaris green convertible: bond floor, option value and cheapness
Value a convertible as a bond floor plus a call option and see where its value comes from as the share price moves.
| Parameter you can move | Range | Default |
|---|---|---|
| Share price at issue | 6 to 30 EUR | 14 EUR |
| Conversion premium | 10 to 50 % | 30 % |
| Coupon | 0 to 5 % | 1.5 % |
| Straight-debt yield | 2 to 10 % | 6 % |
| Share volatility | 15 to 60 % | 35 % |
| Risk-free rate | 0 to 5 % | 2.5 % |
| Issue size | 100 to 600 EUR m | 300 EUR m |
| Result at default settings | Value |
|---|---|
| Conversion price | 18.20 EUR |
| Bond floor | 81.04 per 100 |
| Option value | 19.84 per 100 |
| Theoretical value | 100.89 per 100 |
| Parity (conversion value) | 76.92 per 100 |
| Delta of the option | 58.5 % |
| Annual coupon saving versus straight debt | 13.50 EUR m |
| Shares issued on full conversion | 16.48 m |
| Conversion shares as share of the 137.5m existing shares | 12.0 % |
| Liability component (bond floor) in euros | 243.1 EUR m |
| Value of the option sold by the issuer | 59.53 EUR m |
Try it. Lower volatility to 25%: the option is worth less and the bond, issued at par, is now expensive for investors. Convertible pricing is a negotiation about volatility.
Execution. The deal is launched after the close of trading on a Tuesday, with indicative terms of a coupon between 1.25% and 1.75% and a premium between 27.5% and 32.5%, and is priced within three hours at the investor-friendly end of the coupon range and the issuer-friendly end of the premium. Alongside the bond, Meridian runs a concurrent placement of shares sold short by hedge funds that buy the bond: this “delta placement” lets them establish their hedge at a known price instead of pressing the share in the market the next morning. The green framework, already reviewed by a second-party opinion provider for Voltaris’s project bonds, is reused; the allocation and impact report will be published annually like any green bond’s (see C01). Shareholders had authorised the board, at the 2028 general meeting, to issue convertible securities without preferential subscription rights up to a ceiling, which is what allows an overnight execution.
Result. Conversion price EUR 18.20; bond floor 81.04; option 19.84; theoretical value 100.89, so investors buy at par something worth about 0.9 point more, the usual new-issue cheapness. Voltaris saves EUR 13.5m of coupon a year against straight debt and would issue 16.48m shares (12% of the capital) on full conversion.
Reading. The coupon saving is not free: Voltaris has sold a call option on its shares worth about EUR 59.5m (19.84% of EUR 300m). The green label changes the use of proceeds and the reporting, not the economics: the buyers who set the price are mostly convertible arbitrage funds that delta-hedge by selling about 58.5% of the underlying shares short, plus a minority of long-only convertible funds for which the label opens an Article 8 or 9 bucket. The delta-hedging flow is also why issuers often pair a convertible with a concurrent share buy-back or a stock-borrow facility, and why Meridian’s equity-linked desk earns trading revenue from the hedging.
Question. Suppose that instead, in 2029, Voltaris raises EUR 330m by a rights issue when its share trades at EUR 15.00. What are the terms, and what does Meridian risk as underwriter?
Data. One new share for every five held, subscription price EUR 12.00 (137.5m shares, so 27.5m new shares). Northgate, with 45.2% after the IPO (stage 5.5), gives an irrevocable undertaking to subscribe; the rest is hard-underwritten by the syndicate for a 2.0% commission, Meridian taking 30%. Stress: the share falls to EUR 11.00 during the subscription period and only 20% of the underwritten shares are taken up. Because Voltaris issues less than 30% of its existing shares, under the Listing Act it can offer them without a full prospectus, using the short document; the follow-on prospectus is the alternative if more disclosure is wanted.
FORMULA
is the number of existing shares per new share; the share price with the right attached; the subscription price; the theoretical value of the right attached to one existing share.
INTERACTIVE LAB — Rights issue: TERP, value of the right and the underwriter’s exposure
Compute the theoretical ex-rights price, the discount, the value of a right, and the underwriting fee and loss in a stress where the share falls below the subscription price.
| Parameter you can move | Range | Default |
|---|---|---|
| Share price cum rights | 8 to 25 EUR | 15 EUR |
| Subscription price | 5 to 20 EUR | 12 EUR |
| Existing shares per new share | 1 to 10 | 5 |
| Existing shares | 50 to 300 m | 137.5 m |
| Stake covered by irrevocable undertakings | 0 to 80 % | 45.18 % |
| Underwriting commission | 0.5 to 4 % | 2 % |
| Take-up of the underwritten shares | 0 to 100 % | 20 % |
| Share price at the end of the subscription | 5 to 20 EUR | 11 EUR |
| Meridian’s share of underwriting | 0 to 100 % | 30 % |
| Result at default settings | Value |
|---|---|
| Amount raised | 330.0 EUR m |
| Theoretical ex-rights price | 14.50 EUR |
| Discount to TERP | 17.24 % |
| Value of the right per existing share | 0.50 EUR |
| New shares | 27.50 m |
| Rump shares left with the underwriters | 12.06 m |
| Amount underwritten | 180.91 EUR m |
| Underwriting commission (syndicate) | 3.618 EUR m |
| Loss on rump shares at the stress price | 12.060 EUR m |
| Meridian’s commission minus loss | -2.533 EUR m |
Try it. Set the stress price at EUR 13: the rump can be placed above the subscription price, the underwriters keep their commission and lose nothing. The deep discount to TERP is what makes that the usual outcome.
Timetable. A rights issue runs on a fixed calendar: board decision and announcement with the underwriting agreement signed (day 0); record date, after which the shares trade ex-rights; a subscription period of about two weeks during which the rights trade on Euronext; then the placement of the rump, the unsubscribed shares, by the underwriters through an accelerated bookbuild; settlement. The underwriting risk lasts from day 0 to the rump placement, which is why the commission is higher than in an IPO.
Result. TERP EUR 14.50, discount to TERP 17.2%, right worth EUR 0.50 per existing share. Underwritten amount EUR 180.9m, commission EUR 3.62m. In the stress the syndicate buys 12.06m rump shares at EUR 12.00 worth EUR 11.00: loss EUR 12.06m; Meridian’s net result is EUR -2.53m.
Reading. A rights issue is the opposite of an IPO in risk: the underwriters commit at launch, for two to three weeks, and lose if the share falls below the subscription price. The deep discount to TERP is the protection; it costs existing shareholders nothing if they take up or sell their rights. For a transition company, the rights issue has a further advantage: it keeps the existing sustainability-focused shareholders in place, and their take-up is the best evidence that they still believe in the plan.
Question. What does the Voltaris IPO add to Meridian’s facilitated emissions?
Data. PCAF’s Part B standard covers IPOs and follow-on equity issues. Facilitated amount: Meridian’s league-table credit, the final offering divided equally among the four bookrunners (the two global coordinators and the two bookrunners; co-leads receive no credit). EVIC at issue: market capitalisation at the offer price (EUR 1,650m) plus gross debt (EUR 1,000m). Voltaris emissions (case assumptions): scope 1 and 2 of 30,000 tCO2e (mainly grid losses when charging, location-based), scope 3 of 105,000 tCO2e (mostly embodied emissions of the battery cells installed each year). Weighting factor 33%.
INTERACTIVE LAB — Facilitated emissions of Meridian’s role in the Voltaris IPO
Attribute Voltaris’s emissions to Meridian as a bookrunner with the PCAF Part B formula.
| Parameter you can move | Range | Default |
|---|---|---|
| Final offering | 100 to 2000 EUR m | 664.5 EUR m |
| Bookrunners sharing league credit | 1 / 2 / 3 / 4 / 5 / 6 | 4 |
| Market capitalisation at issue | 200 to 10000 EUR m | 1650 EUR m |
| Gross debt | 0 to 5000 EUR m | 1000 EUR m |
| Scope 1 and 2 emissions | 0 to 1000000 tCO2e | 30000 tCO2e |
| Scope 3 emissions | 0 to 1000000 tCO2e | 105000 tCO2e |
| Weighting factor | 33 / 100 | 33 % |
| Result at default settings | Value |
|---|---|
| Facilitated amount (league credit) | 166.125 EUR m |
| EVIC | 2,650 EUR m |
| Attribution after weighting | 2.069 % |
| Facilitated scope 1 and 2 | 621 tCO2e |
| Facilitated scope 3 | 2,172 tCO2e |
Try it. Raise scope 1 and 2 emissions to 3,000,000 tCO2e, the order of a gas-fired utility: the same league credit carries a hundred times the facilitated emissions.
Result. League credit EUR 166.1m; EVIC EUR 2,650m; attribution 2.07%; facilitated scope 1 and 2 emissions 621 tCO2e, scope 3 2,172 tCO2e reported separately. The metric says nothing about the emissions the batteries help avoid, which Meridian does not net off.
Reading. Three methodological choices sit behind the 621 tCO2e and must be disclosed. EVIC is taken at the offer price; at the end of the year, with a different share price, the same deal would give a different attribution, so Meridian fixes the date of measurement in its methodology. The whole offering, primary and secondary, counts as facilitated, although only EUR 450m went to the company and the rest simply changed owners; PCAF treats both as facilitation. And the scope 3 figure is dominated by the embodied emissions of the batteries installed, which grow with the company’s success: a transition company can raise a bank’s facilitated scope 3 while being exactly what a transition requires. The number is a disclosure, not a judgement on the deal.
| Figure | Value | Stage |
|---|---|---|
| Cost of equity; WACC | 9.70%; 7.6175% | 5.2 |
| Value per share: DCF / comparables / fair | EUR 15.11 / 12.00 / 13.55 | 5.2 |
| Terminal value share of EV | 104.9% | 5.2 |
| DCF value with ESG -20 bp / -0.44 bp | EUR 15.82 / 15.12 | 5.2 |
| Price range; offer price; discount | EUR 11.50-13.00; EUR 12.00; 11.5% | 5.2, 5.4 |
| Aligned turnover; aligned capex | 87.6%; 96.2% | 5.3 |
| Demand; cover at EUR 12.00 | EUR 2,100m; 2.90 times | 5.4 |
| Article 8 and 9: share of demand / allocation | 53.3% / 73.8% | 5.4 |
| New shares; post-IPO shares; market cap | 37.5m; 137.5m; EUR 1,650m | 2.1 |
| Net primary proceeds | EUR 430.75m | 2.1 |
| Greenshoe exercised; stabilisation result | 2.875m shares; EUR 3.0m | 5.5 |
| Final offering; free float; Northgate stake | EUR 664.5m; 40.3%; 45.2% | 5.5 |
| Meridian revenue; capital; RAROC | EUR 5.88m; EUR 1.50m; 117% | 5.6 |
| Day-2 underwriting own funds | EUR 7.56m | 5.6 |
| Pipeline RAROC at 70%; break-even for 12% | 42%; 62.6% | 5.6 |
| Green CB: floor / option / value | 81.04 / 19.84 / 100.89 | 5.7 |
| Rights issue: TERP; right; stress result for Meridian | EUR 14.50; EUR 0.50; EUR -2.53m | 5.8 |
| Facilitated emissions, scope 1 and 2 | 621 tCO2e | 5.9 |
ECM has no credit RWA on an IPO: the shares pass to investors at settlement against payment. It consumes three other kinds of capital. Operational risk, under the CRR3 standardised approach applicable since 1 January 2025, through the business indicator that includes fee income averaged over three years; with the EU’s internal loss multiplier set to 1, every euro of fee carries capital whatever happens (stage 5.6 uses 15%). Market risk on underwriting commitments, stabilisation positions and block trades. Until 31 December 2026 the EU applies the pre-FRTB standardised approach to them, with 8% specific and 8% general risk charges on equities and the Article 345 reduction factors for underwriting; from 1 January 2027 the FRTB standardised approach takes over, with its own treatment of underwriting positions, so the same Voltaris commitment signed in 2027 would be measured differently. Counterparty and settlement risk on unsettled trades after the due date (Article 378 of the CRR) and on the stock borrowing behind the over-allotment. Rights issues and bought deals are the products where market-risk capital becomes material, because the commitment lasts weeks or the bank owns the shares.
From stage 5.6, in EUR m: revenue 5.884 (fee 4.984 and stabilisation 0.900), minus operating costs 3.530, minus expected loss 0, gives 2.354 before tax and 1.765 after tax at 25%. RWA: 11.032 for operational risk and 0.529 for the annualised underwriting commitment, 11.561 in total; allocated capital at 13%, 1.503. RAROC 117%. Across a pipeline in which 70% of mandates are completed, 42%; the hurdle of 12% requires at least 62.6% of mandates to reach pricing.
This 117% is not comparable with the RAROC of a loan. A lending RAROC divides a margin by capital that measures the borrower’s risk over the life of the exposure; here the capital is operational-risk capital proportional to the fee itself, plus market-risk capital on an underwriting window of a few days, so the ratio mostly restates the cost-income ratio and says little about risk taken (see E03 for the general treatment of fee businesses).
What the sustainable layer changes is mostly outside these lines. It adds costs that the 60% ratio does not show: the sustainable finance team’s work on the equity story, the extra due diligence and the agreed-upon procedures on Taxonomy figures. It adds no separate fee in an IPO (unlike a green bond framework, see C01), although some issuers pay a structuring fee on a green convertible. It widens the investor base, which supports the price and the completion rate: on the chart of stage 5.6, every additional 5 points of completion rate adds several points of RAROC to the franchise, more than any fee concession. And it adds a liability tail that is not in the RAROC at all: a successful prospectus claim years later.
An IPO needs no funding unless the bank buys shares. Stabilisation purchases (EUR 57m in stage 5.5) are funded intraday and then by the return of the shares to Northgate under the stock-lending agreement, so the position is self-funding. A hard-underwritten rights issue in stress leaves rump shares on the trading book, funded in repo or at the trading desk’s funding rate and subject to its liquidity limits. A bought block trade is funded overnight for the hours between purchase and resale. The settlement agent bank handles large cash flows on settlement day, intraday. The real funding consequences of the relationship lie in the loans to Voltaris’s projects (see B06) and in any margin loan to Northgate secured on its retained shares, which is a separate credit decision.
For Meridian, fees are revenue from contracts with customers under IFRS 15, recognised when the service is delivered, at settlement; the incentive fee is variable consideration recognised when it is highly probable that it will not reverse, in practice when the issuer awards it. Stabilisation purchases and rump shares are held for trading at fair value through profit or loss under IFRS 9. For Voltaris, IAS 32 requires the incremental costs of issuing new shares to be deducted from equity; costs that relate to the listing of existing shares, or to both issuing and listing, are allocated and those for the listing are expensed. The green convertible is a compound instrument if conversion is into a fixed number of shares for a fixed amount: a liability component equal to the bond floor (about EUR 243m on EUR 300m in stage 5.7) and an equity component for the rest. The sustainability label has no accounting effect for either party.
Green Asset Ratio and BTAR. An IPO never enters Meridian’s balance sheet and so never enters its Green Asset Ratio. The fees and commissions KPI that would capture ECM activity was postponed to 1 January 2028 by the Commission’s 2025 simplification of Taxonomy disclosures (see C01 and A02). Until then, no regulatory ratio shows how much of Meridian’s ECM fee income comes from Taxonomy-aligned issuers like Voltaris. Pillar 3 ESG. Underwriting appears only qualitatively. Facilitated emissions. Stage 5.9 computed 621 tCO2e for Meridian’s role; Meridian reports it separately from financed emissions, with the 33% weighting disclosed. Sustainable finance targets. Many banks count equity raised for transition companies in their “sustainable finance mobilised” totals. Such counts should use the same league credit as the facilitated emissions and should not count the whole IPO for each bank; the methodology note matters more than the headline.
| Risk | Example | Control | Owner |
|---|---|---|---|
| Market and underwriting | Investor fails to settle; rights issue below subscription price | Soft underwriting, irrevocables, limits, launch criteria | Syndicate head, market risk |
| Mispricing and aftermarket | Book overpriced, share falls 20% | Price discipline, allocation quality, greenshoe | Global coordinators |
| Stabilisation abuse | Purchases above offer price, late reporting | MAR safe harbour procedures, trade log, AMF reports | Stabilisation manager, Compliance |
| Prospectus liability | Misleading Taxonomy or impact claim | Due diligence, comfort and AUP letters, verification notes | Transaction management, counsel |
| Research independence | Analyst pressured to raise valuation | Information barriers, research guidelines, chaperoning | Research management, Compliance |
| Conflicts of interest | Meridian’s loans repaid with IPO proceeds | Disclosure in prospectus, conflicts committee | Compliance, coverage |
| Allocation conflicts | Shares allocated to win other business | Documented allocation policy, issuer review | Syndicate, Compliance |
| Reputational | Supply-chain abuse revealed after listing | Sustainability due diligence, escalation to reputational risk committee | Sustainable finance, risk |
| Operational | Wrong number of shares delivered at settlement | Four-eyes checks, settlement agent reconciliation | Operations |
Red-flag checklist for a sustainability-centred equity story.
INTERACTIVE LAB — ECM and the sustainable layer: self-assessment
Check the mechanics of IPOs, stabilisation and equity-linked issuance and the sustainable layer of ECM.
Q1. In an IPO with a EUR 450m primary tranche, what happens to the number of new shares if the offer price is lower?
Answer: A. The company targets an amount in euros; a lower price means more shares for the same amount, hence more dilution.
Q2. Who receives the proceeds of the secondary tranche?
Answer: C. Secondary shares are existing shares sold by their owners; the company’s capital does not change.
Q3. Under Delegated Regulation (EU) 2016/1052, the greenshoe may not exceed:
Answer: C. The greenshoe is capped at 15% of the original offer; the over-allotment not covered by it may not exceed 5%.
Q4. Stabilisation of shares in an IPO may be carried out:
Answer: D. Article 7 forbids stabilisation above the offering price and Article 5 limits it to 30 calendar days.
Q5. Why is a European IPO underwriting called soft?
Answer: B. The commitment is signed at pricing, when investors’ orders are known; the residual risk is settlement failure.
Q6. A share trades at EUR 20; a 1-for-4 rights issue is priced at EUR 15. The TERP is:
Answer: B. (4 x 20 + 15) / 5 = 19.00.
Q7. Which statement about ESG and the cost of equity is best supported by the evidence?
Answer: C. El Ghoul et al. find about 56 bp between high and low CSR firms; Berk and van Binsbergen estimate about 0.44 bp from divestment.
Q8. Under ESMA’s guidelines on fund names, a fund with ‘sustainable’ in its name must, among other things:
Answer: A. The guidelines combine an 80% threshold with the Paris-aligned benchmark exclusions for sustainability-related terms.
Q9. Battery storage revenue is Taxonomy-eligible under which activity?
Answer: B. Operating storage falls under 4.10; manufacturing batteries is 3.4.
Q10. A convertible’s value is best described as:
Answer: D. The holder owns a bond and a call on the shares, so the value is at least the higher of floor and parity, plus time value.
Q11. In PCAF Part B, the facilitated emissions of a bookrunner on an IPO are weighted at:
Answer: C. Part B applies a 33% weighting factor, with unweighted figures disclosed only separately.
Q12. Since the Listing Act, a listed issuer can admit new fungible shares without a prospectus up to:
Answer: C. The threshold rose from 20% to 30% on 4 December 2024.
Q13. Why can a deal-level RAROC above 100% on an IPO be misleading?
Answer: A. The team’s cost is paid on every mandate; the franchise return depends on the completion rate.
Q14. Which claim is the strongest red flag in an IPO equity story?
Answer: C. Avoided-emission claims depend on an unverifiable baseline and are the first to be challenged.
A company with 60m shares raises EUR 300m in new shares at EUR 20.00; its owner sells 6m existing shares; the greenshoe is 15% of the base offer and is exercised in full. Compute the new shares, the base offer, the greenshoe, the post-IPO shares, the market capitalisation, the free float and the dilution.
Solution. New shares: 300 / 20 = 15m. Base offer: 15 + 6 = 21m shares, EUR 420m. Greenshoe: 15% x 21 = 3.15m shares, EUR 63m. Post-IPO shares: 75m; market capitalisation EUR 1,500m. Free float: (21 + 3.15) / 75 = 32.2%. Dilution: 15 / 75 = 20.0%. Maximum offer: EUR 483m, of which the company receives EUR 300m before fees.
In the same IPO the share falls after listing. The stabilisation manager buys 2.0m shares at an average of EUR 18.80 and exercises the greenshoe for the rest. The fee is 2.25% of the final offering; your bank has 25% of the economics and 25% of the stabilisation result. Compute the greenshoe exercised, the final offering, the stabilisation result, your bank’s revenue, and its RAROC using the course conventions (60% cost-income, operational-risk RWA of 12.5 x 15% of revenue, 13% capital, 25% tax, no underwriting capital).
Solution. Greenshoe exercised: 3.15 − 2.0 = 1.15m shares. Final offering: 22.15m shares x EUR 20 = EUR 443m. Stabilisation result: 2.0m x (20.00 − 18.80) = EUR 2.4m, of which your bank’s share is EUR 0.6m. Fee pool: 2.25% x 443 = EUR 9.9675m; your share EUR 2.4919m. Revenue: EUR 3.0919m. Costs: EUR 1.8551m; after-tax result: (3.0919 − 1.8551) x 0.75 = EUR 0.9276m. RWA: 12.5 x 15% x 3.0919 = EUR 5.7973m; capital EUR 0.7536m. RAROC: 123.1%, the familiar ratio for a pure fee deal under these conventions, since revenue cancels out.
Solution. (a) Conversion price 25 x 1.25 = EUR 31.25; ratio 100 / 31.25 = 3.2 shares; parity 3.2 x 25 = 80.0. Bond floor: 2 x (1 − 1.05^-5) / 0.05 + 100 x 1.05^-5 = 2 x 4.3295 + 78.3526 = 87.01. The convertible is worth 87.01 plus the option; at par, investors pay about 13 points for the option. (b) TERP = (3 x 25 + 18) / 4 = EUR 23.25; discount to TERP 1 − 18 / 23.25 = 22.6%; value of the right (23.25 − 18) / 3 = EUR 1.75 per existing share.
Walk me through an IPO timeline. Mandate and kick-off, then three to four months of due diligence, prospectus drafting and equity story work, with early-look meetings. The intention to float is announced with the connected research, followed by about two weeks of investor education. The price range is set and the prospectus approved, then a bookbuilding period of one to two weeks. Pricing and allocation, first trading the next day, settlement two working days after pricing, and up to 30 days of stabilisation.
What is a greenshoe and why does it exist? It is an option for the underwriters to buy up to 15% more shares from the issuer or seller at the offer price. The syndicate over-allots those shares at pricing, creating a short. If the share falls, it buys in the market to close the short, supporting the price; if it rises, it exercises the option. It gives the banks a legal and financed way to support the aftermarket without taking directional risk.
Why do IPOs come at a discount, and who pays for it? New shares have no trading history and investors must spend time to analyse them; a discount compensates them and helps the share trade up, which makes the next deal easier. The cost falls on the sellers of secondary shares, who receive less, and on existing shareholders through the dilution of a primary tranche at a lower price. Bankers recommend it because a broken deal damages everyone, including future mandates.
Does a company’s ESG profile lower its cost of equity? Studies find lower implied costs of equity for firms with better ESG or environmental scores, of the order of tens of basis points between extremes, but much of it reflects lower risk and better management. Equilibrium models predict an effect from investor preferences, yet calibrations such as Berk and van Binsbergen’s suggest it is under one basis point at current levels. In practice I would not put an ESG reduction in the WACC; I would expect a deeper book and possibly a more stable shareholder base.
How would you check a Taxonomy alignment figure in an IPO? I would ask for the activity mapping, the technical screening criteria applied asset by asset, the DNSH and minimum safeguards evidence, and the reconciliation of turnover to the accounts. I would want an assurance provider to perform agreed-upon procedures. The figure must be computed on the same basis as listed peers and appear identically in the prospectus, the presentation and the research.
Explain the difference between an IPO and a rights issue for the underwriter. In an IPO the underwriting agreement is signed after the book is built, so the risk is mainly settlement failure for two days. In a rights issue the banks commit at launch for two to three weeks and must buy the shares not taken up at the subscription price. The deep discount to TERP protects them; the commission is correspondingly higher.
Why would a transition company issue a green convertible rather than shares? It raises money at a much lower coupon than straight debt and with less immediate dilution than shares, since conversion happens only if the share rises above a premium. The green label allows it to align the instrument with its framework and attract some long-only sustainable buyers. The cost is the option sold, the hedge-fund shorting around the issue, and potential future dilution.
What are facilitated emissions and how would you compute them for an IPO? They are the issuer’s emissions attributed to a bank for helping it raise capital, under PCAF Part B. The attribution is the bank’s facilitated amount, usually its league-table credit, divided by the issuer’s EVIC, multiplied by a 33% weighting factor and by the issuer’s emissions. Scope 3 is shown separately, and the figure is reported apart from financed emissions.
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