Where it sits. At Meridian Bank the environmental products desk is part of Global Markets, inside the commodities business, next to the power and gas desk and the metals desk. It shares a sales force with the rest of commodities: the corporate solutions team, which covers industrial clients, utilities and airlines, and the institutional sales team, which covers funds and other banks. Its products are emission allowances of the EU Emissions Trading System (EUAs) and of the UK system (UKAs), their futures and options, guarantees of origin, and, in small size and under strict policy, voluntary carbon credits. The power desk next door provides the electricity hedges and the expertise for power purchase agreements (PPAs). The desk is a flow business: most of its revenue comes from clients who need to hedge, not from proprietary bets, which the bank’s market-risk limits keep small.
Clients. Four groups bring the business. Compliance buyers are industrial companies and utilities covered by the ETS that must surrender allowances every year: cement, steel, chemicals, refining, airlines and shipping companies, power generators. Renewable developers and their lenders need long-term price hedges and buyers for their output. Corporates without ETS obligations buy PPAs and guarantees of origin to decarbonise their electricity, and sometimes voluntary credits for their climate claims. Financial investors (commodity funds, hedge funds, some pension funds through index products) take positions in EUAs as an asset class; they bring liquidity and, at times, volatility.
How the desk earns money. Revenue comes from four sources. The first is the bid-offer spread on client trades: on a liquid EUA future it is a few cents per tonne for a fund, more for a corporate whose trade must be booked over the counter and carries credit risk. The second is the credit and funding charge embedded in uncollateralised hedges: a BBB cement producer that will not post margin pays, in its forward price, for the bank’s capital and for the liquidity the bank uses to margin its own exchange hedge. The third is structuring: options, collars, averaging forwards, PPAs and shape products, where the desk’s skill in pricing is paid. The fourth is advisory and origination fees on PPAs and on carbon-linked financing. In this module Meridian’s environmental products desk targets EUR 40m to EUR 60m of revenue a year (case assumption), a modest line in a commodities business, but one that opens doors to industrial clients that the rest of the bank wants to cover.
The team. A head of desk, two or three traders (EUAs and UKAs, options, guarantees of origin), a structurer shared with power, two corporate sales people specialised in compliance buyers, and a PPA origination team of three that sits between the power desk and the energy and infrastructure bankers of the corporate bank (see B06 and B07). Adjacent functions matter as much as the desk: market risk sets the value-at-risk and stress limits; counterparty credit risk approves the trading lines of each corporate client; the derivatives documentation team negotiates ISDA master agreements and credit support annexes; the regulatory reporting team handles EMIR trade reporting and position reporting under MiFID II; compliance monitors market abuse under MAR, which applies to emission allowances; and the registry operations team holds the bank’s accounts in the Union Registry.
A realistic week on the desk. On Monday the trader reads the weekly Commitment of Traders report published by the exchange and the auction calendar: the common auction platform sells allowances on most business days, and the volume falls each year once the Market Stability Reserve intake is deducted. On Tuesday the corporate salesperson meets Castellan Cement’s treasurer to discuss a three-year hedging programme; the structurer prices forwards, a collar and a call option, each with a credit charge computed by the XVA desk. On Wednesday the PPA originator, the power trader and the structurer review the term sheet of a virtual PPA between Castellan and a Spanish solar park; the power desk models the capture rate of solar generation over ten years. On Thursday the counterparty risk officer asks for a stress scenario: if the EUA price fell by 40%, how much would Castellan owe Meridian under the forwards, and how much margin would Meridian pay out on its futures hedge in the meantime? On Friday the head of desk joins a call with the bank’s sustainability team on whether Meridian may sell voluntary credits to a retail chain that wants to claim “carbon neutral” products, a claim that EU consumer law now prohibits.
WHO DOES WHAT — The salesperson owns the client relationship and the term sheet; the trader owns the price and the hedge; the structurer owns the model and the documentation of anything non-standard; credit risk owns the line; market risk owns the limits; registry operations owns the delivery of allowances. A carbon hedge for a corporate touches all six.
Spot. A commodity bought spot is delivered within two days. For electricity, spot means the day-ahead auction, which sets an hourly (and since October 2025, quarter-hourly) price for the next day in each bidding zone. For an allowance, spot means a transfer between two accounts in the Union Registry, which the exchange arranges through its clearing house.
Forward. A forward is a bilateral agreement to buy a fixed quantity at a fixed price on a future date. It is negotiated over the counter under an ISDA master agreement, with a commodity annex for physically settled trades. Nothing is paid at signing. At maturity the buyer pays the agreed price and receives the commodity (physical settlement), or the parties exchange the difference between the agreed price and a reference price (financial settlement).
Futures. A futures contract is a standardised forward traded on an exchange and cleared by a central counterparty. Each side posts an initial margin, a deposit sized to cover a few days of adverse price moves, and settles daily gains and losses through variation margin. Credit risk between the parties disappears, replaced by the liquidity risk of daily margin calls.
IN ONE SENTENCE — A future fixes today the price of a delivery tomorrow; the price of that promise is the spot price plus the cost of carrying the commodity until delivery, minus any benefit of holding it.
INTUITION — Buying an allowance for delivery in December next year is like reserving a holiday flat and paying on arrival: the owner wants compensation for the money he does not receive today, nothing more, because the flat needs no storage and does not spoil. Allowances are that kind of good, which is why their forward curve is almost a pure interest-rate curve.
FORMULA
is the futures price today for delivery at ; the spot price; the annual funding rate; the time to delivery in years; the storage and insurance cost carried to ; the convenience yield, the benefit of holding the physical commodity. For an EUA, is close to zero (an account in a registry) and is usually small, so the futures curve rises with interest rates. For gas or power, and dominate and curves have strong seasonal shapes.
The EUA forward curve. Most EUA trading is in the December contract of each year, listed on ICE Endex and EEX; the front December is the market’s benchmark price. The spread between two consecutive Decembers is the implied financing rate. When that implied rate is above money-market rates, holders of allowances can sell spot, buy the December and earn the difference: the carry trade that keeps the curve in line. Compliance buyers who need allowances only at the surrender date therefore buy futures rather than spot: they do not tie up cash, but they post margin.
Margin. Initial margin on EUA futures is set by the clearing house according to volatility, and is large compared with financial futures: in this module we assume 15% of notional (case assumption). Variation margin flows every day. A client long 1 million tonnes who sees the price fall by EUR 10 pays EUR 10m in cash that day, even if its economic position (a future need for allowances) has improved by the same amount. This mismatch between economic hedge and cash flow is the main reason why corporate clients prefer to hedge with a bank over the counter.
INTERACTIVE LAB — The EUA futures curve by cost of carry, and the margin it consumes
Build December futures prices from spot and the funding rate, and compute initial margin and the variation margin paid after a price fall.
| Parameter you can move | Range | Default |
|---|---|---|
| EUA spot price | 40 to 160 EUR/t | 85 EUR/t |
| Funding rate | 0 to 6 % | 2.5 % |
| Convenience yield | 0 to 3 % a year | 0 % a year |
| Quantity hedged | 0.1 to 5 Mt | 1 Mt |
| Initial margin | 5 to 30 % of notional | 15 % of notional |
| Price fall in a stress | 0 to 60 % | 40 % |
| Result at default settings | Value |
|---|---|
| Dec-27 future (T = 1.1 years) | 87.34 EUR/t |
| Dec-28 future (T = 2.1 years) | 89.52 EUR/t |
| Dec-29 future (T = 3.1 years) | 91.76 EUR/t |
| Dec-27 / Dec-28 spread | 2.18 EUR/t |
| Initial margin on Dec-28 position | 13.43 EUR m |
| Variation margin paid if the Dec-28 future falls by the stress | 35.81 EUR m |
Try it. Set the funding rate to 0%: the curve is flat. EUA curves were almost flat when euro rates were negative, which is why the carry trade disappeared between 2015 and 2022.
An option gives the right, not the obligation, to buy (call) or sell (put) at a fixed strike. On EUAs, options are listed on the December futures and are European-style: they can only be exercised at expiry, a few days before the futures delivery. The market prices them with the Black-76 model, the version of Black-Scholes for options on futures.
FORMULA
and are the call and put premiums per tonne; the futures price; the strike; the continuously compounded rate; the time to expiry in years; the annual implied volatility; the standard normal distribution function. , discounted, is the delta of the call: the number of futures that hedge one option.
INTUITION — A call on carbon is fire insurance for a compliance buyer: it pays only if the price burns through the strike. A collar is insurance financed by giving up part of the benefit of a fall: the client buys the call and sells a put, and the premium it receives on the put pays for the call.
EUA volatility has been high by commodity standards since the price rise of 2021; we use an implied volatility of 45% as a case assumption. High volatility makes options expensive and explains why compliance buyers mostly use forwards, and why collars are the usual compromise.
INTERACTIVE LAB — Pricing an EUA call, put and collar with Black-76
Price options on the Dec-28 EUA future and see the payoff of a collar against the forward.
| Parameter you can move | Range | Default |
|---|---|---|
| Dec-28 futures price | 40 to 160 EUR/t | 89.52 EUR/t |
| Call strike | 50 to 180 EUR/t | 100 EUR/t |
| Put strike | 30 to 120 EUR/t | 75 EUR/t |
| Implied volatility | 15 to 80 % | 45 % |
| Time to expiry | 0.25 to 4 years | 2.1 years |
| Rate (continuous) | 0 to 6 % | 2.5 % |
| Result at default settings | Value |
|---|---|
| Call premium | 18.33 EUR/t |
| Put premium | 13.77 EUR/t |
| Net collar cost (call bought, put sold) | 4.56 EUR/t |
| Delta of the call | 0.533 |
Try it. Raise the put strike until the collar costs nothing: the client then buys carbon between that strike and EUR 100, and gives up any fall below it.
Electricity cannot be stored at scale, so its price is set hour by hour (quarter-hour by quarter-hour since the day-ahead market moved to 15-minute products) by the most expensive plant needed to meet demand, the marginal plant. When gas plants are marginal, the power price is roughly the gas price divided by the plant’s efficiency plus the carbon cost of about 0.37 tonne of CO2 per MWh, which is the channel by which EUA prices reach electricity bills. When solar and wind cover demand, the marginal cost falls to almost zero and prices can turn negative.
Two numbers describe a power position. Baseload is a constant flow over all hours; peak covers the working-day hours. A solar park produces a bell-shaped profile around midday, more in summer. The average price the park receives, weighted by its output, is its capture price; the ratio of the capture price to the baseload average is its capture rate. When many parks produce at the same time, they depress the very hours in which they sell: this is cannibalisation, and it is the dominant risk in solar revenue in Spain, Germany and the Netherlands.
FORMULA
is the capture price; the park’s output in hour ; the spot price of hour ; the simple average of all hourly prices; the capture rate.
Market risk. A bank that sells a forward to a client buys the equivalent future on the exchange: its price risk is flat, but it keeps basis risk (different dates or delivery points), shape risk on power, and volume risk when the client’s quantity is uncertain. The desk’s residual risk is measured by value-at-risk and stressed value-at-risk, and capitalised under the market-risk framework.
Counterparty risk. The client hedge is uncollateralised unless a credit support annex (CSA) is signed. If the price falls, the client owes the bank the difference between the forward price and the market; if the client defaults, the bank loses that amount and must still honour its exchange hedge. This exposure is measured by the standardised approach for counterparty credit risk (SA-CCR) for capital, and by potential future exposure for limits.
Liquidity risk. The bank pays and receives variation margin on its futures daily, while the client pays nothing until maturity. When prices fall, the bank funds the variation margin until the client settles: a funding valuation adjustment (FVA) prices it.
Documentation. The ISDA 2002 Master Agreement governs the OTC relationship; the EU emissions allowance annex (ISDA has published a dedicated annex for physically settled allowance trades) covers delivery into registry accounts, settlement disruption and the consequences of a registry suspension. On exchange, the clearing member agreement and the clearing house rules apply. For PPAs, the European Federation of Energy Traders (EFET) publishes master agreements and a corporate PPA template; virtual PPAs are usually documented under ISDA as a contract for difference. Members of ISDA and EFET have access to the full texts; this module relies on their public summaries.
IN ONE SENTENCE — The EU ETS caps the emissions of power, industry, aviation and maritime transport, issues one allowance per tonne under that cap, and lets the market find the price at which the cap is respected.
INTUITION — An allowance is a ticket to emit one tonne. The number of tickets falls every year; whoever can cut emissions for less than the price of a ticket does so and sells the ticket, whoever cannot buys it. The price is the cost of the last tonne the economy needs to cut to fit under the cap.
Legal basis. Directive 2003/87/EC, deeply revised by Directive (EU) 2023/959 as part of the Fit for 55 package. The revision raised the 2030 target for ETS sectors to a 62% reduction from 2005 levels. The cap falls each year by a linear reduction factor of 4.3% of the 2021 reference between 2024 and 2027, and 4.4% from 2028 to 2030, after one-off reductions (“rebasing”) in 2024 and 2026. Maritime transport entered in 2024 with a phase-in of surrender obligations.
Supply: auctions and free allocation. Most allowances are auctioned on the common auction platform operated by EEX. Industrial installations at risk of carbon leakage receive part of their allowances free, according to product benchmarks (allowances per tonne of product of the 10% most efficient installations) multiplied by historical activity levels, and adjusted when activity changes by more than 15%. Since the 2023 revision, free allocation is also conditional: installations that do not implement the recommendations of their energy audits, and the least efficient ones that do not adopt climate-neutrality plans, can lose 20% of it.
Compliance cycle. Each operator monitors its emissions under the Monitoring and Reporting Regulation, has them verified by an accredited verifier, and surrenders one allowance per tonne for the previous year by 30 September; free allocation is issued by 30 June. The 2023 revision moved both dates later in the year. The penalty for each missing allowance is EUR 100 per tonne, indexed, on top of the obligation to surrender it.
The Market Stability Reserve (MSR). Decision (EU) 2015/1814 created a reserve that withdraws allowances from auctions when the surplus is large and releases them when it is small. The surplus indicator is the total number of allowances in circulation (TNAC), published by 1 June each year.
FORMULA
is the number of allowances withheld from auctions over the twelve months from September; the published surplus. Below 400m, 100m allowances are released from the reserve. The 24% rate applies until 2030; the middle band (“buffer”) avoids a cliff effect at the upper threshold.
The TNAC published in 2026 was 1,023 million allowances, about 11% lower than a year earlier. It falls in the buffer band, so the intake from September 2026 to August 2027 is about 190 million allowances, deducted from auction volumes. Allowances held in the reserve above 400 million are invalidated each year; in April 2026 the Commission proposed to stop this invalidation, and on 20 October 2026 Parliament and Council reached a provisional agreement that keeps it but raises the threshold to 700 million.
INTERACTIVE LAB — Market Stability Reserve: from the published surplus to the auction cut
Apply the MSR rule to a TNAC figure and see the share of auction volume withheld.
| Parameter you can move | Range | Default |
|---|---|---|
| TNAC published in the year | 200 to 2000 m allowances | 1023 m allowances |
| Intake rate above the upper threshold | 12 to 24 % | 24 % |
| Auction volume before the MSR over twelve months | 200 to 800 m allowances | 500 m allowances |
| Result at default settings | Value |
|---|---|
| Allowances withheld (negative: released) | 190 m |
| Auction volume after the MSR | 310 m |
| Share of auction volume withheld | 38.0 % |
Try it. Set the TNAC to 1,100m and then 1,096m: thanks to the buffer band, the intake moves smoothly from 264m to 263m instead of jumping.
The auction volume of 500 million is an illustrative input, not an official figure. A separate safety valve, Article 29a of the Directive, releases 75 million allowances from the reserve if the average price over six months exceeds 2.4 times the average of the two previous years.
ETS2. A second, separate system covers fuels for buildings and road transport, with the obligation on fuel suppliers rather than on households. Its start was postponed by one year to 2028 by the amendment of the European Climate Law that the Council adopted on 5 March 2026, which also set the 2040 target at a 90% net reduction from 1990. ETS2 has its own reserve, strengthened by Decision (EU) 2026/2402, published on 28 October 2026. For a commodities desk ETS2 is a future market: fuel distributors will need hedges, and banks are preparing the products.
Market data. The front December EUA future traded around EUR 82 to EUR 86 between August and October 2026; S&P Global Platts assessed it at EUR 86.69 on 6 November 2026. The Commission’s carbon market report of November 2026 indicates that emissions covered by the ETS fell by 2% in 2025 and that auction revenues reached EUR 43.2bn.
IN ONE SENTENCE — The Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism charges importers of cement, steel, aluminium, fertilisers, hydrogen and electricity the carbon price of their embedded emissions, so that free allocation to EU producers of the same goods can be phased out.
Law in force. Regulation (EU) 2023/956 established CBAM; its transitional period (reporting only) ran from October 2023 to the end of 2025, and the definitive period began on 1 January 2026. Regulation (EU) 2025/2083 simplified it: importers of less than 50 tonnes of covered goods a year are exempt, which removes most small importers while keeping almost all embedded emissions. Authorised declarants buy CBAM certificates from national authorities; sales open on 1 February 2027, and the first annual declaration and surrender, for goods imported in 2026, is due by 30 September 2027. The certificate price for 2026 imports is the quarterly average of EUA auction prices, and from 2027 the weekly average. Implementing Regulations (EU) 2025/2547 and 2025/2548 set the embedded-emission rules and the price calculation.
The phase-out schedule. Free allocation to CBAM sectors is multiplied by a “CBAM factor” that declines under Article 10a(1a) of the ETS Directive, a schedule mirrored in Article 31 of Regulation (EU) 2023/956. This is the law in force in November 2026.
| Year | CBAM factor in force | COM(2026) 616 proposal |
|---|---|---|
| 2026 | 97.5% | 97.5% |
| 2027 | 95% | 95% |
| 2028 | 90% | 91.5% |
| 2029 | 77.5% | 81% |
| 2030 | 51.5% | 59% |
| 2031 | 39% | 48% |
| 2032 | 26.5% | 37.5% |
| 2033 | 14% | 27% |
| 2034 to 2037 | 0% | 15% |
| From 2038 | 0% | 0% |
A proposal, not law. On 17 July 2026 the Commission adopted COM(2026) 616, a proposal for a directive amending the ETS for the period after 2030 (procedure 2026/0212(COD)). It would slow the phase-out as in the right-hand column, reintroducing 15% of the free allocation removed by CBAM from 2028 and ending it in 2038; make free allocation from 2031 conditional on verified decarbonisation investment plans; set the linear reduction factor at 3.7% for 2031 to 2035 and 1.7% for 2036 to 2040; halve the MSR intake rate to 12%; and allow up to 260 million international credits for 2036 to 2040. Parliament and Council must agree; political agreement is targeted for the first quarter of 2027. Until then, a bank that models a client’s carbon cost uses the law in force as its base case and the proposal as a scenario.
Other CBAM files. A December 2025 proposal (COM(2025) 989) would extend CBAM downstream to about 180 steel- and aluminium-intensive products from 2028 and tighten anti-circumvention rules; the Council and the Parliament adopted their positions in June and September 2026.
WHY IT MATTERS ON THE DESK — For a cement producer, CBAM turns a free-allocation schedule into the main driver of its carbon cost for eight years. The difference between the two columns above is worth hundreds of millions of euros for a large producer, and every hedge the desk sells must be sized on a position that depends on a negotiation in Brussels.
The UK left the EU ETS at the end of 2020 and runs its own system, with UK allowances (UKAs) that traded at a large discount to EUAs: around GBP 60 (about EUR 71) for the December 2026 contract at the end of September 2026. The UK introduces its own CBAM on 1 January 2027. The EU and the UK agreed in May 2025 to work towards linking their systems; in early November 2026 the press reported a draft summit statement welcoming the conclusion of the linking negotiations, with an announcement expected at the EU-UK summit of 20 November 2026. A link would make allowances mutually recognised and exempt goods from each side’s CBAM. Until a linking agreement is signed and in force, EUAs and UKAs remain separate products, and the spread between them is a trade that the desk’s clients watch closely.
IN ONE SENTENCE — A carbon credit certifies that one tonne of CO2 equivalent was avoided or removed by a project outside any cap, and can be bought by a company that wants to make a climate claim beyond its regulatory obligations.
Why it is different. An EUA is a legal right created by a regulator inside a cap; its “quality” is not in question. A voluntary credit is a claim about a counterfactual: what would have happened without the project. Its value depends on additionality (the project would not have happened anyway), permanence (the carbon stays out of the atmosphere), robust quantification, no double counting, and social and environmental safeguards. Investigations into forest-protection credits in 2023 showed that many credits overstated their effect, and the market shrank: Ecosystem Marketplace reported that transaction value fell 29% to about USD 535m in 2024, far below its 2021 peak of about USD 2bn.
Integrity standards.
| Body | What it does | Status |
|---|---|---|
| ICVCM | Core Carbon Principles; labels methodologies “CCP-approved” | Labels issued since 2024; grid renewable-energy methods rejected |
| VCMI | Claims Code: what a company may claim when it buys credits | Requires science-based targets and progress first |
| Article 6.2 Paris Agreement | Bilateral transfers between countries (ITMOs) with corresponding adjustments | Operational |
| Article 6.4 (PACM) | UN-supervised crediting mechanism succeeding the CDM | First credits issued in February 2026 |
| CORSIA (ICAO) | Airlines’ offsetting scheme; demands authorised units | First phase 2024 to 2026 |
EU law. Regulation (EU) 2024/3012 creates an EU certification framework for permanent carbon removals, carbon farming and storage in products (CRCF). Directive (EU) 2024/825 on empowering consumers bans, from 27 September 2026, claims that a product has a neutral, reduced or positive climate impact when the claim rests on offsetting. The EU ETS does not accept voluntary credits; COM(2026) 616 would allow international credits only from 2036, under strict conditions.
Bank roles and risks. Banks act as traders and market makers in credits, as financiers of project developers (pre-payment for future credits, streaming agreements, loans secured on offtake contracts), as custodians of registry accounts, and as advisers to corporate buyers. The risks are unusual for a bank: a credit can be cancelled or discounted by its registry if the project is found to over-issue (invalidation risk), its price depends on labels and ratings that can change, the legal nature of a credit varies by jurisdiction, and the reputational risk is high because the bank’s name sits next to the buyer’s claim. Most large European banks restrict voluntary credit activity to CCP-labelled or Article 6-authorised credits and require the buyer to show a credible reduction plan first.
IN ONE SENTENCE — A PPA is a long-term contract, typically ten to fifteen years, in which a company buys the electricity of a renewable plant at a fixed price, giving the developer the revenue certainty its lenders need and the buyer a price hedge and a green-electricity claim.
Physical and virtual. In a physical PPA, the electricity is delivered through the grid to the buyer’s balancing perimeter, which requires both to be in the same bidding zone and a utility to manage the balancing. In a virtual (financial) PPA, nothing is delivered: the developer sells its output on the spot market, the buyer keeps buying from its usual supplier, and the two settle the difference between the spot price and the strike, a contract for difference (CfD). The buyer receives the guarantees of origin of the plant.
FORMULA
is the settlement received by the buyer in period (paid by the buyer if negative); the plant’s output in hour (pay-as-produced) or a fixed profile (baseload or shaped PPA); the spot price; the strike.
Guarantees of origin (GOs). Under the Renewable Energy Directive (Directive (EU) 2018/2001, revised by Directive (EU) 2023/2413), a GO is the only instrument that proves to a final customer that 1 MWh was produced from a renewable source. GOs are issued per MWh by national registries, traded across Europe through the Association of Issuing Bodies hub, and cancelled when the claim is made. Prices fell sharply during 2024 because supply grew faster than demand. The GHG Protocol’s scope 2 guidance lets a company use cancelled GOs to report “market-based” scope 2 emissions, while its “location-based” figure, computed with the average emission factor of the grid, does not change. The GHG Protocol is revising this guidance, with proposals for hourly matching and deliverability requirements under consultation since late 2025.
Regulation that bites. The electricity market design reform (Regulation (EU) 2024/1747 and Directive (EU) 2024/1711) asks Member States to remove barriers to PPAs and promote guarantee schemes for buyers, and makes two-way CfDs the standard form of public support for new plants. REMIT (Regulation (EU) No 1227/2011, revised in 2024) applies market-abuse and reporting rules to wholesale energy contracts, including PPAs. Emission allowances and their derivatives are financial instruments under MiFID II, so the full MiFID, MAR and EMIR rulebook applies to them, including position reporting.
Market practice. Pexapark recorded 6.08 GW of European PPAs in 124 deals in the first half of 2025, down 26% from a year earlier, with solar at 4.2 GW and utilities doubling their share of buyers; battery storage tolling agreements more than tripled. Prices have moved towards risk-adjusted values as buyers learned to price cannibalisation. Hybrid PPAs (solar plus battery) and baseload-shaped products are the response.
PITFALL — “A virtual PPA greens the buyer’s electricity.” It does not change a single electron in the buyer’s plant, and its location-based scope 2 is unchanged. What it does is finance a new plant (if the PPA is what made the plant bankable, the buyer can argue additionality) and transfer GOs that support a market-based claim. Saying which of these the buyer may claim is part of the structuring.
The lifecycle below follows Castellan Cement’s carbon hedging programme and its virtual PPA, from the coverage banker’s first conversation to the annual surrender of allowances. The two transactions share the early steps and diverge at documentation.
INTERACTIVE LAB — From the account plan to the surrender: a corporate carbon hedge and a virtual PPA
Show the sequence of roles, decisions and documents in a corporate carbon hedge and a virtual PPA.
| # | Who | Does what | Deliverable |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Coverage banker (corporate bank) | Identifies the carbon-cost exposure in the account plan and introduces the commodities sales team | Call report and client brief |
| 2 | Commodities sales and structurer | Map the client’s allowance position by year and its hedging policy; propose forwards, options or collars | Position analysis and indicative term sheet |
| 3 | Client treasury and board | Approve a hedging policy: instruments, hedge ratios by year, counterparties, limits | Board-approved hedging policy |
| 4 | Counterparty credit risk | Approves a trading line sized on potential future exposure, with or without CSA | Credit approval and PFE limit |
| 5 | KYC, compliance and documentation | Complete client onboarding, MiFID classification, ISDA Master Agreement, allowance annex, CSA if any | Signed ISDA and onboarding file |
| 6 | Trader and XVA desk | Price forwards off the futures curve, add credit, funding and capital charges | Executable price |
| 7 | Sales and trader | Execute the client trades and buy the matching futures on the exchange | Trade confirmations and exchange fills |
| 8 | Operations and regulatory reporting | Confirm trades, report under EMIR, book initial margin with the clearing house | EMIR reports and margin statements |
| 9 | PPA originator and power desk | Screen solar projects, model capture price and cannibalisation, negotiate the virtual PPA term sheet with the developer | vPPA term sheet and valuation |
| 10 | Client accounting and auditors | Assess own-use, derivative status and hedge accounting of the forwards and the vPPA under IFRS 9 | Accounting memo |
| 11 | Market risk and product control | Monitor VaR, stress, daily P&L and independent price verification | Daily risk and P&L reports |
| 12 | Registry operations | Deliver allowances into the client’s Union Registry account at each maturity against payment | Registry transfer confirmation |
| 13 | Client environment team and verifier | Verify annual emissions and surrender allowances by 30 September | Verified emissions report and surrender record |
1. Origination. The opportunity comes from coverage. In the account plan for Castellan (see B01), the senior banker identified carbon as the largest variable cost in the client’s budget and noted that Castellan bought allowances in the spot market each summer. She introduces Meridian’s corporate commodities salesperson, who meets the treasurer with the structurer. The first document is a call report; the second, after a data request, is a position analysis: emissions forecast, free allocation by year, the resulting short, and the budget price.
2. Hedging policy. A treasury cannot hedge without a policy approved by its board. The policy states which exposures may be hedged (here the net allowance short of EU plants), the instruments allowed (forwards, futures, bought options, zero-cost collars; never sold options alone), the hedge ratio by horizon, the authorised counterparties and their limits, and who signs each trade. A layered policy (high hedge ratio for next year, lower further out) is standard because the volume to hedge becomes less certain with time.
3. Credit approval. Meridian’s counterparty credit officer sizes a trading line for Castellan. The figure that matters is the potential future exposure: what Castellan could owe Meridian if prices fell sharply before maturity. Without a CSA, the line consumes credit capacity like a loan, and Castellan’s overall limit in the credit file (see B01) must accommodate it. The officer also checks that Castellan’s RCF documentation allows hedging liabilities to rank pari passu with lenders.
4. Documentation. Onboarding includes KYC, a MiFID II client classification (a large corporate is usually a professional client), an EMIR status check (Castellan is a non-financial counterparty below the clearing thresholds, so its trades are not subject to mandatory clearing or margining), the ISDA 2002 Master Agreement with a schedule, the annex for physically settled allowance transactions, and possibly a CSA. Negotiating an ISDA with a new corporate client takes weeks; that is why the salesperson starts it in parallel with the credit approval.
5. Pricing and execution. On execution day the trader quotes from the live December futures, adds the sales margin and the XVA charges, and the salesperson presents an all-in price to the treasurer. On acceptance the trader buys the matching futures on the exchange within seconds. Confirmations are exchanged the same day; Meridian reports the trades under EMIR (the bank reports for both sides when the counterparty is a small NFC) and books the initial margin it posts to the clearing house.
6. The PPA track. The virtual PPA follows a longer path: screening of projects, valuation by the power desk, negotiation of the term sheet with the developer, credit assessment of the developer by Castellan and of Castellan by the developer’s lenders, an accounting memo, and approval by Castellan’s board. Meridian’s role here is structuring adviser: it is paid a fee, does not take the contract on its balance sheet, and gives its valuation to Castellan.
7. Life of the trades. Product control revalues the bank’s positions daily against exchange settlement prices; market risk monitors the residual risk and the stress exposure to Castellan. At each December maturity, registry operations transfer allowances from Meridian’s account to Castellan’s account against payment, using the delivery from the exchange future. Castellan’s environment team surrenders allowances for the previous year’s verified emissions by 30 September.
PITFALL — A registry transfer is not a payment instruction. Union Registry transfers need authorised representatives on both sides, can be delayed by security checks, and cannot be reversed by the sender. Banks set cut-offs several days before the exchange delivery date and the surrender deadline, and corporate clients that open their first registry account a month before maturity create settlement failures.
Castellan Cement is the fictional listed European cement group that Meridian covers (see B01 and C02). In November 2026, after the account plan, Castellan’s treasurer asks Meridian two questions: how to stop the carbon price from deciding the group’s EBITDA each year, and whether a renewable PPA for its Iberian plants makes sense. This case answers both.
Question. How many allowances will Castellan have to buy each year from 2027 to 2030, under the law in force and under the Commission’s July 2026 proposal?
Data (case assumptions, as in B01). Production of cementitious material: 20 Mt a year, all in the EU. Clinker output on which free allocation is based: 14.8 Mt. Clinker benchmark: 0.656 allowance per tonne of clinker. Scope 1 intensity: 590 kg CO2 per tonne in 2025, falling in a straight line to 480 kg in 2030 under the transition plan reviewed in B01 (568 kg in 2026, 546 in 2027, 524 in 2028, 502 in 2029). Allowance price: EUR 85, in line with the December 2026 future in October and November 2026. As in B01, allocation is held on the historical clinker output because the plan does not move activity by more than 15%.
FORMULA
is the net short in allowances for year (Mt); the scope 1 intensity (t CO2 per t); the production (20 Mt); the clinker benchmark (0.656); the historical clinker output (14.8 Mt); the CBAM factor of year (table in section 3.2).
Calculation. Free allocation before the CBAM factor: Mt. For 2027: emissions Mt, free allocation Mt, short 1.697 Mt. For 2028: Mt. For 2029: Mt. For 2030: Mt, the figure of B01.
INTERACTIVE LAB — Castellan’s net allowance short: law in force against the July 2026 proposal
Compute Castellan’s net short and its carbon bill each year from 2026 to 2030 under both CBAM schedules.
| Parameter you can move | Range | Default |
|---|---|---|
| Allowance price | 40 to 160 EUR/t | 85 EUR/t |
| 2030 scope 1 intensity on the plan | 400 to 590 kg/t | 480 kg/t |
| Clinker benchmark | 0.6 to 0.7 t/t | 0.656 t/t |
| Year shown | 2026 / 2027 / 2028 / 2029 / 2030 | 2030 |
| Result at default settings | Value |
|---|---|
| Free allocation before CBAM factor | 9.709 Mt |
| Scope 1 emissions in the year | 9.60 Mt |
| Net short, law in force | 4.600 Mt |
| Net short, COM(2026) 616 | 3.872 Mt |
| Carbon bill, law in force | 391.0 EUR m |
| Carbon bill, proposal | 329.1 EUR m |
| Total short 2027 to 2029, law in force | 5.954 Mt |
| Reduction of the 2030 short under the proposal | 15.8 % |
| Allowances saved 2028 to 2030 if the proposal is adopted | 1.214 Mt |
| Value of that saving at the price | 103.2 EUR m |
Try it. Set the 2030 intensity to 590 kg (no plan): the 2030 short jumps to 6.8 Mt, the B01 figure. Then compare the two schedules: the proposal is worth more to a producer that does not decarbonise.
Result. Under the law in force Castellan must buy 1.697 Mt for 2027, 1.742 Mt for 2028, 2.516 Mt for 2029 and 4.600 Mt for 2030; the three years 2027 to 2029 total 5.954 Mt. At EUR 85 the 2030 bill is EUR 391.0m. If COM(2026) 616 were adopted as proposed, the short would be 1.596 Mt in 2028, 2.176 Mt in 2029 and 3.872 Mt in 2030 (bill EUR 329.1m): 1.214 Mt fewer over 2028 to 2030, worth EUR 103.2m at EUR 85.
Reading. Three features of this position shape the hedge. It is growing: even with the plan, the short almost triples between 2027 and 2030 because the CBAM factor falls faster than intensity. It is uncertain in volume, from the plan (intensity), from activity (a recession cuts emissions) and from policy (the proposal). And the 2027 position is almost certain: the schedule for 2027 is identical in both columns and the plan’s levers for 2027 are already approved. A sound policy hedges the certain part heavily and the uncertain part lightly.
PITFALL — Hedging the proposal rather than the law is a bet. A treasurer who sizes the 2029 hedge on 2.176 Mt because “Brussels will soften the schedule” is under-hedged by 0.34 Mt if the Parliament and the Council do not follow the Commission. The base case is the law in force; the proposal is a scenario that argues for a lower hedge ratio in the outer years, not for a different base.
Question. Which volumes should Castellan hedge, at which prices, and what does the hedge change in its carbon bill?
Data (case assumptions). Castellan’s board approves a layered policy: 80% of the next year’s short under the law in force, 60% of the year after, 40% of the third year. The instruments are OTC forwards with Meridian, physically settled in December of each compliance year, so that allowances are in Castellan’s registry account well before the surrender of the following September. Trade date 16 November 2026. EUA spot EUR 85, funding rate 2.50%, no convenience yield; times to delivery 1.1, 2.1 and 3.1 years. Meridian’s all-in sales margin over the futures price: EUR 0.50 per tonne, covering bid-offer, credit, funding and capital charges. The first pricing assumes no CSA; section 5.6 shows why one was added before execution.
IN ONE SENTENCE — A layered hedge buys certainty on the volumes you are sure of and keeps flexibility on those you are not.
FORMULA
is the volume hedged for year ; the hedge ratio of the policy; the net short of section 5.1; the forward price paid by Castellan; the December future of section 2.1; Meridian’s margin per tonne.
Calculation. Volumes: Mt for 2027, Mt for 2028 and Mt for 2029, in all 3.409 Mt, or 57.2% of the three-year short. Futures prices: EUR 87.34, EUR 89.52 and EUR 91.76 (section 2.1); client prices EUR 0.50 higher. The notional at futures prices is EUR 304.5m. Meridian’s total sales margin is $0.50 = $ EUR 1.704m.
INTERACTIVE LAB — Castellan’s layered hedge: volumes, prices and the carbon bill in every price scenario
Size the three forward tranches, price them, and compare the 2027-2029 carbon bill with and without the hedge across delivery prices.
| Parameter you can move | Range | Default |
|---|---|---|
| EUA spot at trade date | 40 to 160 EUR/t | 85 EUR/t |
| Funding rate | 0 to 6 % | 2.5 % |
| Hedge ratio 2027 | 0 to 100 % | 80 % |
| Hedge ratio 2028 | 0 to 100 % | 60 % |
| Hedge ratio 2029 | 0 to 100 % | 40 % |
| Meridian margin over futures | 0 to 2 EUR/t | 0.5 EUR/t |
| EUA price at each delivery (scenario) | 40 to 160 EUR/t | 85 EUR/t |
| Result at default settings | Value |
|---|---|
| Volume hedged 2027 | 1.357 Mt |
| Volume hedged 2028 | 1.045 Mt |
| Volume hedged 2029 | 1.006 Mt |
| Total hedged | 3.409 Mt |
| Share of the 2027-2029 short hedged | 57.2 % |
| Notional at futures prices | 304.5 EUR m |
| Meridian sales margin | 1.704 EUR m |
| Average price of hedged tonnes | 89.82 EUR/t |
| 2027-2029 bill unhedged in the scenario | 506.1 EUR m |
| 2027-2029 bill hedged in the scenario | 522.5 EUR m |
| Bill sensitivity, unhedged | 5.954 EUR m per EUR 1 |
| Bill sensitivity, hedged | 2.546 EUR m per EUR 1 |
| Hedged minus unhedged bill in the scenario | 16.4 EUR m |
| Part of that difference due to carry (at unchanged spot) | 14.7 EUR m |
| Effect of a EUR 30 swing, unhedged | 178.6 EUR m |
| Effect of a EUR 30 swing, hedged | 76.4 EUR m |
Try it. Move the delivery price from EUR 60 to EUR 120: the unhedged bill moves by EUR 357m, the hedged one by EUR 153m. Then set all hedge ratios to 100%: the line becomes flat, and so does any benefit of a fall.
Result. The hedged tonnes cost on average EUR 89.81. If the price at each delivery is still EUR 85, the hedged bill for 2027 to 2029 is EUR 522.5m against EUR 506.1m unhedged: the hedge “costs” EUR 16.4m, which is the carry built into the forward curve plus Meridian’s margin. If the price rises to EUR 120, the hedge saves EUR 102.9m (bill EUR 611.6m against EUR 714.5m); if it falls to EUR 60, it costs EUR 101.6m (EUR 458.9m against EUR 357.3m). The sensitivity of the three-year bill to a EUR 1 move in the price falls from EUR 5.954m to EUR 2.546m.
Reading. The purpose of the hedge is the second number, not the first. The treasurer is not trying to buy cheaper than the market; she is trying to make the budget reliable. A EUR 30 swing in the carbon price, ordinary for this market, now moves Castellan’s three-year bill by EUR 76m instead of EUR 179m, which matters for a company whose EBITDA is EUR 900m and whose covenant headroom is discussed in B01. The “cost” of EUR 16.4m at an unchanged spot is not a loss either: EUR 14.7m of it is the carry, the interest the market charges for deferring payment, which Castellan would otherwise pay by buying spot and holding allowances.
PITFALL — Judging a hedge by its mark-to-market is the classic error of boards. If prices fall, the forwards show a loss and someone asks why the treasurer “lost money”. The answer is that the carbon bill fell by more than the hedge lost, and that the hedge did what the policy said: fix part of the cost. Policies that are not explained to the board in advance are often abandoned at the worst moment.
Question. What happens if Castellan’s emissions fall below the hedged volume, and would options have been a better instrument for the outer years?
Data (case assumptions). Scenario for 2028: a construction downturn cuts cement output by 12%. Because the fall is below the 15% threshold for adjusting allocation, free allocation is unchanged at 8.738 Mt (90% of 9.709 Mt). In a recession the EUA price falls too, as it did in 2009 and in early 2020: we assume EUR 60 at the December 2028 delivery. Alternatives priced on the trade date with Black-76 (section 2.2): a call struck at EUR 100 on the Dec-28 future at EUR 89.52, volatility 45%, and a zero-cost collar with the same cap.
Calculation. Emissions become Mt, so the 2028 short falls to Mt, against 1.045 Mt hedged. The excess, 0.561 Mt, is no longer a hedge: it is a long position that Castellan must sell back at EUR 60 after buying it at EUR 90.02.
INTERACTIVE LAB — A recession in 2028: forward, call or collar on an uncertain volume
Compare the cost of meeting a reduced 2028 obligation with the forward, a bought call and a zero-cost collar.
| Parameter you can move | Range | Default |
|---|---|---|
| Fall in 2028 output | 0 to 30 % | 12 % |
| EUA price at December 2028 | 30 to 160 EUR/t | 60 EUR/t |
| Call strike (cap) | 80 to 140 EUR/t | 100 EUR/t |
| Implied volatility | 20 to 70 % | 45 % |
| Meridian margin on the forward | 0 to 2 EUR/t | 0.5 EUR/t |
| Result at default settings | Value |
|---|---|
| Actual 2028 short | 0.484 Mt |
| Volume hedged in excess | 0.561 Mt |
| Loss on the excess forward volume | 16.84 EUR m |
| Call premium | 18.33 EUR/t |
| Premium paid for calls on the hedged volume | 19.16 EUR m |
| Put strike of the zero-cost collar | 83.66 EUR/t |
| 2028 cost, no hedge | 29.07 EUR m |
| 2028 cost with the forward | 60.45 EUR m |
| 2028 cost with calls (premium included) | 48.23 EUR m |
| 2028 cost with the zero-cost collar | 53.80 EUR m |
Try it. Set the output fall to 0% and the price to EUR 120: the forward is now the cheapest route and the call costs its premium for nothing more than the cap. No instrument wins in every state of the world.
Result. The excess forward volume loses EUR 16.84m in cash. The total 2028 carbon cost is EUR 60.45m with the forward, against EUR 29.07m without hedge. A call struck at EUR 100 would have cost EUR 18.33 per tonne, EUR 19.16m on the 2028 volume, paid in November 2026; the 2028 cost would have been EUR 48.23m. A zero-cost collar with a EUR 100 cap requires selling a put struck at EUR 83.66, very close to the forward, and leads to EUR 53.80m.
Reading. The forward is the cheapest hedge when the volume is certain, and the most expensive when it is not, because the volume risk and the price risk are correlated: emissions and prices fall together in a recession. The call protects against both, but its premium is high when volatility is 45%. The zero-cost collar looks free but, with a cap at EUR 100, gives up almost all of the downside. Meridian’s recommendation is therefore to keep forwards on 2027, where volume is nearly certain, and to offer calls or a collar with a wider band on part of 2029, where both the plan and the policy are uncertain. The proposal COM(2026) 616 adds a third source of over-hedging risk in 2028 and 2029, but a small one: with 60% and 40% hedge ratios, Castellan’s hedges stay below the short of the proposal in both years.
PITFALL — An over-hedge turns a treasury into a trader. Under IFRS 9 the excess also loses its hedge-accounting or own-use status, which brings the mark-to-market of that volume into profit or loss (section 6.4). Policies must set a maximum hedge ratio and a rule for unwinding the excess when the forecast falls.
Question. Castellan’s Iberian plants consume electricity around the clock. Does a pay-as-produced virtual PPA with a Spanish solar park hedge that consumption, and what does it do to scope 2?
Data (case assumptions). Solar park of 150 MW in Spain, built by an independent developer, capacity factor 20%. Developer’s proposed strike: EUR 35 per MWh, pay-as-produced, ten years from 2027, with the guarantees of origin transferred to Castellan. Spanish baseload forward for 2027: EUR 60 per MWh. Expected solar capture rate in 2027: 60%. Consumption of Castellan’s Iberian plants: 550 GWh a year, flat. Residual-mix emission factor used for market-based scope 2 in Spain: 0.30 t per MWh. Castellan’s group scope 2: 0.9 Mt (B01).
Calculation. Annual output: MWh. Capture price: EUR per MWh. Settlement: $262{,}800 (36 - 35) = $ EUR 0.263m received by Castellan.
INTERACTIVE LAB — One year of a pay-as-produced virtual PPA: settlement, shape and scope 2
Compute the annual CfD settlement of the vPPA, its sensitivity to the capture rate, the midday over-hedge and the GOs’ effect on market-based scope 2.
| Parameter you can move | Range | Default |
|---|---|---|
| Solar park capacity | 20 to 400 MW | 150 MW |
| Capacity factor | 10 to 30 % | 20 % |
| Strike | 20 to 70 EUR/MWh | 35 EUR/MWh |
| Baseload price | 20 to 150 EUR/MWh | 60 EUR/MWh |
| Solar capture rate | 30 to 100 % | 60 % |
| Consumption of the Iberian plants | 100 to 1500 GWh/year | 550 GWh/year |
| Residual-mix emission factor | 0.1 to 0.6 t/MWh | 0.3 t/MWh |
| Result at default settings | Value |
|---|---|
| Annual output | 262,800 MWh |
| Capture price | 36.00 EUR/MWh |
| Settlement received by Castellan (negative: paid) | 0.263 EUR m |
| Output as share of consumption | 47.8 % |
| Average load of the plants | 62.8 MW |
| Excess of peak output over average consumption | 87.2 MW |
| Market-based scope 2 reduction from GOs | 78,840 tCO2 |
| Reduction as share of group scope 2 | 8.76 % |
| Same tonnes as share of scope 1 (11.8 Mt) | 0.67 % |
| Capture rate at which settlement is zero | 58.3 % |
Try it. Lower the capture rate from 60% to 50%: a small change in the solar shape turns a EUR 0.26m receipt into a EUR 1.31m payment. Cannibalisation, not the baseload level, decides the economics of a solar PPA.
Result. In 2027 Castellan receives EUR 0.263m. The output covers 47.8% of the plants’ annual consumption, but not the same hours: at midday in summer the park produces up to 150 MW while the plants draw 62.8 MW on average, an excess of 87.2 MW, and at night the vPPA covers nothing. The break-even capture rate is 58.3%; at 50% Castellan would pay EUR 1.314m. The 262,800 GOs reduce market-based scope 2 by 78,840 t, 8.76% of the group’s scope 2.
Reading. A pay-as-produced vPPA is not a hedge of baseload consumption; it is a hedge of solar-hour prices plus a source of GOs. It works as a partial hedge because, when gas sets the price, power prices rise with gas and carbon prices, and the settlement rises with them, offsetting part of Castellan’s higher electricity bill. It fails in the hours of cannibalisation, when Spanish spot prices collapse at midday, and it does nothing for the night. For the carbon accounts, it touches scope 2 only: the 78,840 t are 0.67% of Castellan’s scope 1. A cement producer that presented a PPA as its decarbonisation strategy would be greenwashing by proportion.
Question. Is EUR 35 per MWh a fair strike over ten years, and what will the contract do to Castellan’s income statement?
Data (case assumptions, from Meridian’s power desk). Spanish baseload forward: EUR 60 per MWh for 2027 to 2029, EUR 55 from 2030 (long-term fundamental view beyond the liquid horizon). Solar capture rate: 60% in 2027, falling by 1.5 points a year as more solar is built (to 46.5% in 2036). Output degradation: 0.4% a year. Discount rate: 3.70%, close to Castellan’s seven-year bond yield (see C02).
FORMULA
is the value of the vPPA to the buyer at signing; the expected output of year ; the capture rate; the baseload forward; the strike; the discount rate; the fair strike, at which .
INTERACTIVE LAB — Ten years of a solar vPPA: annual settlements, fair strike and the cost of intermediation
Value the vPPA for the buyer with a declining capture rate, find the fair strike, and see the counterparty exposure a bank would take by intermediating it.
| Parameter you can move | Range | Default |
|---|---|---|
| Strike | 20 to 60 EUR/MWh | 35 EUR/MWh |
| Baseload forward 2027-2029 | 30 to 120 EUR/MWh | 60 EUR/MWh |
| Baseload view from 2030 | 30 to 120 EUR/MWh | 55 EUR/MWh |
| Capture rate in 2027 | 40 to 100 % | 60 % |
| Annual fall in capture rate | 0 to 4 points | 1.5 points |
| Discount rate | 1 to 8 % | 3.7 % |
| Result at default settings | Value |
|---|---|
| Settlement 2027 | 0.263 EUR m |
| Settlement 2036 | -2.389 EUR m |
| Value to Castellan at signing | -9.43 EUR m |
| Fair strike | 30.57 EUR/MWh |
| Ten-year output | 2,581 GWh |
| SA-CCR exposure if a bank intermediated, per counterparty | 50.6 EUR m |
Try it. Set the annual fall in capture rate to 0: the fair strike jumps to EUR 34.03. Then set it to 3 points: the developer’s EUR 35 becomes very expensive. The negotiation is a negotiation about solar cannibalisation.
Result. At EUR 35 the vPPA is worth minus EUR 9.43m to Castellan at signing: it receives EUR 0.263m in 2027, but pays EUR 2.389m in 2036 as the capture rate declines. The fair strike on Meridian’s assumptions is EUR 30.57 per MWh. Meridian advised Castellan to counter at EUR 30.50 and accept no more than EUR 32; the contract was signed at EUR 32 with a clause suspending settlement in hours of negative prices. At EUR 32 the expected value is minus EUR 3.05m, which Castellan accepts as the price of the GOs, of the additionality of a new plant and of a ten-year partial hedge.
Reading. The developer’s lenders (see B06) want a fixed price on a large share of output for the tenor of the debt; Castellan wants a hedge and a claim. The strike is set between the developer’s cost of energy and the buyer’s view of capture prices, and the gap between EUR 35 and EUR 30.57 is the whole negotiation. Two clauses matter as much as the strike: the negative-price clause (no settlement when the spot is below zero, which protects the buyer from paying the strike plus the negative price) and the change-in-law clause.
Accounting at Castellan. A vPPA is net-settled and Castellan never takes delivery, so the own-use exemption does not apply: it is a derivative measured at fair value through profit or loss under IFRS 9. Without hedge accounting, the swings of the Spanish forward curve would go through Castellan’s income statement every quarter. The amendments to IFRS 9 and IFRS 7 on contracts referencing nature-dependent electricity, issued by the IASB in December 2024, endorsed in the EU by Regulation (EU) 2025/1266 and effective from 1 January 2026, allow a buyer to designate a variable, production-dependent volume of forecast purchases as the hedged item, which makes cash-flow hedge accounting workable for a pay-as-produced vPPA. Because most of the valuation rests on unobservable inputs beyond the liquid horizon (capture rates, prices after 2029), the contract is a Level 3 fair value under IFRS 13, and any day-one difference between the contract price and the model value is deferred.
Why Meridian does not intermediate it. Castellan asked whether Meridian could stand between it and the developer. On SA-CCR, an electricity derivative carries a supervisory factor of 40%; over ten years and 2,581 GWh, the exposure would be about EUR 50.6m on each side, uncollateralised, one of them on a single-asset project company. Meridian stays adviser, for a fee of EUR 0.25m (case assumption), and offers instead to hedge the first three years of Castellan’s residual baseload consumption with standard power swaps.
Question. Does the carbon hedge programme meet Meridian’s 12% RAROC hurdle, and what would a CSA change?
Data (case assumptions). Castellan’s internal rating: BBB, PD 0.20%, F-IRB LGD 40%. Counterparty exposure measured under SA-CCR (CRR Articles 274 to 280e): replacement cost equal to the trade value in Meridian’s favour at inception (the sales margin, EUR 1.704m), plus the potential future exposure, with the 18% supervisory factor of commodities other than electricity, a maturity factor of 1 for unmargined trades longer than a year, and the alpha of 1.4. Effective maturity for the IRB risk weight: the notional-weighted maturity of the three trades. Operational risk: EUR 2.5 of RWA per euro of revenue. Costs: 60% of revenues. Initial margin on Meridian’s futures hedge: 15% of notional, funded at a liquidity premium of 12 bp (two-year tenor). Transactions with non-financial counterparties are exempt from the own-funds requirement for CVA risk under CRR Article 382(4). The sales margin is booked at inception; for RAROC it is spread over the effective maturity, which gives an annual revenue. With a CSA: daily variation margin with a threshold of EUR 10m, a margin period of risk of ten business days, and an effective maturity of one year.
FORMULA
is the exposure at default; ; the replacement cost; the supervisory factor (18%); the delta of trade (1 in absolute value for a forward); the adjusted notional (quantity times price); the maturity factor, 1 unmargined, under a CSA with ten-day margin period of risk. With a CSA, is the threshold.
INTERACTIVE LAB — RAROC of the Castellan carbon hedge: uncollateralised against CSA
Compute the SA-CCR exposure, capital and RAROC of the three-year hedge programme, and the spread needed to reach the hurdle.
| Parameter you can move | Range | Default |
|---|---|---|
| Sales margin | 0.1 to 2 EUR/t | 0.5 EUR/t |
| Credit support annex | no / yes | no |
| CSA threshold | 0 to 50 EUR m | 10 EUR m |
| Castellan PD | 0.03 to 4 % | 0.2 % |
| Initial margin on Meridian’s futures | 5 to 30 % of notional | 15 % of notional |
| Liquidity premium on margin funding | 0 to 50 bp | 12 bp |
| Price fall in stress | 0 to 60 % | 40 % |
| Result at default settings | Value |
|---|---|
| Notional at futures prices | 304.5 EUR m |
| Effective maturity | 2.01 years |
| Exposure at default | 79.11 EUR m |
| IRB risk weight | 35.02 % |
| Total RWA (credit + operational) | 29.82 EUR m |
| Allocated capital (13%) | 3.88 EUR m |
| Annualised revenue | 0.846 EUR m |
| Operating costs (60%) | 0.508 EUR m |
| Expected loss | 0.063 EUR m |
| Funding of initial margin | 0.055 EUR m |
| RAROC after tax | 4.26 % |
| Sales margin for a 12% RAROC | 1.23 EUR/t |
| Variation margin Meridian pays in the stress (unsecured if no CSA) | 121.8 EUR m |
| Initial margin Meridian posts | 45.7 EUR m |
| Price fall that exhausts the CSA threshold | 2.93 EUR/t |
Try it. Switch the CSA on: the exposure halves, the maturity drops to one year, and the same 50 cents a tonne clears the hurdle. Then raise Castellan’s PD to 1% (BB) with no CSA and watch the margin needed to reach 12%.
Result. Uncollateralised, the programme has a notional of EUR 304.46m, an effective maturity of 2.01 years and an exposure at default of EUR 79.11m. At a risk weight of 35.02%, credit and operational RWA total EUR 29.82m and allocated capital EUR 3.88m. The annualised revenue of EUR 0.846m, less costs of EUR 0.508m, expected loss of EUR 0.063m and margin funding of EUR 0.055m, gives a RAROC of 4.26%, far below the hurdle. Meridian would need EUR 1.23 per tonne to reach 12%, and EUR 3.21 if Castellan were rated BB. With a CSA, the exposure falls to EUR 37.02m, RWA to EUR 12.00m, and the same EUR 0.50 margin returns 12.22%. In the 40% stress, Meridian pays EUR 121.8m of variation margin on its futures, and without a CSA it recovers that cash from Castellan only at the December maturities.
Reading. The commodities desk faces the same arithmetic as the lending desk in B01: an investment-grade industrial client does not pay for uncollateralised risk at the hurdle on a standalone basis. Three answers exist, and the salesperson presents all three to the treasurer. The first is a CSA with a threshold: Castellan posts cash only when the forwards are more than EUR 10m out of the money, which in practice means a price fall of about EUR 2.93 a tonne across the 3.409 Mt; this is the solution Castellan finally chose. The second is a higher margin, which Castellan can compare with other banks’ quotes. The third is the relationship view: the hedge is part of a wallet in which Meridian earns on credit, cash management and capital markets (see B01), and the client committee may accept a hedge below the hurdle if the relationship as a whole clears it. The stress figure explains why the liquidity function insists on the CSA too: EUR 121.8m of cash paid out and not recovered for up to a year is a funding need, not just a credit risk.
WHY IT MATTERS ON THE DESK — On a corporate hedging desk, the price a client sees is mostly XVA: credit, funding and capital. Two banks with the same futures price can quote very different forwards because one has a CSA and a good internal rating of the client, and the other does not. Knowing how to move the client from “no CSA” to “CSA with threshold” is worth more than a few cents of margin.
Question. How is the programme executed without moving the market, and what happens on each date until the 2027 allowances are surrendered?
Execution. Castellan’s board approved the policy on 12 November 2026; the CSA with a EUR 10m threshold was signed on 13 November, two days after the credit officer approved a hedge line sized on the exposure of section 5.6. On 16 November the salesperson and the trader agree with the treasurer to execute in three slices over three days rather than in one block. The three tranches are large compared with the daily volume of a single December contract outside the front year, and a single order would push the price up against the client. Each slice is priced at the volume-weighted average of the Meridian futures fills plus the EUR 0.50 margin, a structure called an averaging forward, which the treasurer can audit against exchange data. Volumes are rounded to whole contracts of 1,000 tonnes. The trader avoids buying in the minutes around the daily auction on the common auction platform, when liquidity is thin, and the compliance officer records the client order and the hedge times for the MAR surveillance file.
Confirmation and reporting. Each forward is confirmed under the ISDA schedule and the allowance annex the same day. Meridian reports the three trades to its trade repository under EMIR on Castellan’s behalf. Product control checks that the client price, the futures fills and the margin reconcile, and books the EUR 1.704m sales margin as day-one revenue, net of the CVA computed by the XVA desk.
Life of the hedge. Between November 2026 and December 2027 the futures are margined daily. If the price rises, Meridian receives variation margin from the clearing house and owes Castellan the gain under the CSA once the threshold is crossed; if it falls, the flows reverse. Each quarter Castellan’s treasury reports the hedge to its audit committee, showing the forward volumes against the updated emissions forecast. The forecast is updated after the verified emissions report in March and after any change in the plan or in the law; if the trilogue on COM(2026) 616 concludes in 2027, the policy’s hedge ratios for 2029 are reviewed.
Delivery and surrender. In mid-December 2027 the Dec-27 futures expire and Meridian receives the allowances from the clearing house into its Union Registry account. Two business days later, against Castellan’s payment, registry operations transfer the 2027 tranche into Castellan’s account. Castellan’s free allocation for 2027 has already been issued by 30 June 2027. In March 2028 the verifier signs Castellan’s 2027 emissions report, and by 30 September 2028 Castellan surrenders allowances equal to its verified emissions: the free allocation, the hedged tranche, and the unhedged balance bought in the market during 2028. Any surplus is banked for the following year, which, under the ETS, carries no loss of value.
CASE — The first annual cycle tests the documentation more than the price. In the first year of a programme, the frequent incidents are an authorised representative missing from the client’s registry account, a delivery date that falls during a registry maintenance window, and a confusion between the compliance year (2027 emissions) and the delivery year of the contract used to cover it.
| Item | Value | Stage |
|---|---|---|
| Free allocation before CBAM factor | 9.709 Mt | 5.1 |
| Net short 2027 / 2028 / 2029 / 2030, law in force | 1.697 / 1.742 / 2.516 / 4.600 Mt | 5.1 |
| Net short 2028 / 2029 / 2030, COM(2026) 616 | 1.596 / 2.176 / 3.872 Mt | 5.1 |
| Allowances saved 2028-2030 if the proposal passes | 1.214 Mt, EUR 103.2m | 5.1 |
| Volumes hedged 2027 / 2028 / 2029 | 1.357 / 1.045 / 1.006 Mt | 5.2 |
| Share of 2027-2029 short hedged | 57.2% | 5.2 |
| Average hedged price | EUR 89.81/t | 5.2 |
| Bill sensitivity per EUR 1, unhedged / hedged | EUR 5.954m / EUR 2.546m | 5.2 |
| Bill at EUR 85: unhedged / hedged | EUR 506.1m / EUR 522.5m | 5.2 |
| Loss on excess volume in the 2028 recession | EUR 16.84m | 5.3 |
| 2028 cost: forward / call / collar / none | EUR 60.45m / 48.23m / 53.80m / 29.07m | 5.3 |
| vPPA output and 2027 settlement | 262,800 MWh, EUR 0.263m | 5.4 |
| Market-based scope 2 reduction | 78,840 t (8.76% of scope 2) | 5.4 |
| vPPA value at EUR 35 / fair strike | minus EUR 9.43m / EUR 30.57 | 5.5 |
| vPPA value at signed strike of EUR 32 | minus EUR 3.05m | 5.5 |
| EAD and RAROC, no CSA | EUR 79.11m, 4.26% | 5.6 |
| EAD and RAROC, CSA | EUR 37.02m, 12.22% | 5.6 |
| Margin needed for 12% without CSA | EUR 1.23/t | 5.6 |
| Variation margin paid in a 40% fall | EUR 121.8m | 5.6 |
A commodities desk consumes capital through three channels, and the Castellan programme illustrates each.
Counterparty credit risk. The client forwards create an exposure measured with SA-CCR, as in section 5.6. The exposure is then risk-weighted with the client’s IRB parameters, exactly like a loan, with the effective maturity of the netting set. Because SA-CCR treats all trades with Castellan under one ISDA as a netting set, a later trade in the opposite direction (Castellan selling surplus allowances forward) reduces the exposure; trades on electricity and on carbon fall in different commodity types within the commodity asset class, with only partial offset.
CVA risk. CRR Article 382(4) exempts transactions with non-financial counterparties established in the Union from the own-funds requirement for CVA risk, an EU-specific exemption kept by CRR3. Meridian still prices a CVA in the client’s forward and books it in fair value: the exemption removes the capital, not the loss.
Market risk. Meridian’s hedge leaves a small residual: the OTC forwards and the exchange futures have slightly different dates, and the desk carries an inventory of allowances to serve clients. Until the end of 2026 this risk is capitalised under the current market-risk rules of the CRR, where commodity positions are treated either by a maturity-ladder or a simplified approach or by internal models. The Fundamental Review of the Trading Book (FRTB) applies in the EU from 1 January 2027, after two one-year postponements; on 4 June 2026 the Commission adopted a delegated act introducing a temporary multiplier for three years to soften its effect, subject to scrutiny by Parliament and Council. Under the FRTB standardised approach, carbon trading sits with electricity in one commodity bucket, carrying a 60% risk weight, among the highest of the commodity buckets. A desk that holds unhedged inventory or unhedged option books will see its capital rise.
Leverage ratio and large exposures. Derivatives enter the leverage ratio exposure measure through SA-CCR, without the benefit of risk weights. The exposure to Castellan from the hedges adds to the group exposure under the large-exposure regime, together with the RCF and the loans of B01.
| Line (annual, EUR m) | No CSA | With CSA |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue (margin of EUR 1.704m over 2.01 years) | 0.846 | 0.846 |
| Operating costs (60%) | 0.508 | 0.508 |
| Expected loss | 0.063 | 0.030 |
| Funding of initial margin | 0.055 | 0.055 |
| RWA (credit and operational) | 29.82 | 12.00 |
| RAROC after tax | 4.26% | 12.22% |
The figures are those of the block in section 5.6; the expected loss under the CSA applies the same PD and LGD to the lower exposure. Three features of the sustainable layer move this calculation, though none is a “green” product feature.
Policy drives volume. The size of the business is a direct function of the CBAM phase-out. Under the law in force, Castellan’s short almost triples between 2027 and 2030; if COM(2026) 616 is adopted, the 2030 short is 15.8% smaller. Revenue and exposure move in proportion, so the RAROC of a given hedge does not change, but the desk’s budget does.
Transition shrinks volume. If Castellan delivers its plan, its short is 2.2 Mt lower in 2030 than without the plan (see B01). A bank that finances the transition through the credit book (see B01 and C02) reduces the future business of its own carbon desk. This is a healthy conflict, but it should be visible in the client strategy.
Policy uncertainty adds volume risk. The over-hedging case of section 5.3 shows that volume uncertainty becomes credit exposure: a client that is over-hedged when prices fall owes more to the bank precisely when its own business is weak. Credit officers stress the hedge line for wrong-way risk in cyclical sectors.
Meridian posts initial margin to the clearing house for its futures hedge (EUR 45.7m, 15% of the notional) and receives nothing from Castellan without a CSA. Treasury charges the desk the liquidity premium on this cash for the life of the trades, as in the RAROC. The larger cost is contingent. In a price fall, Meridian pays variation margin daily and recovers it from Castellan only at maturity; the 40% stress costs EUR 121.8m of cash for up to a year. The liquidity coverage ratio captures this through the outflow for collateral needs from market valuation changes, measured on the largest net 30-day collateral flow of the past 24 months (historical look-back approach under the LCR Delegated Regulation), and the NSFR requires stable funding against initial margin posted and against derivative liabilities. Banks price these effects in the FVA charge and limit uncollateralised hedges with each client.
At Meridian. The client forwards and the exchange futures are derivatives measured at fair value through profit or loss in the trading book; their fair values offset, except for the sales margin, the CVA and FVA adjustments, and the small basis. Because the forwards are valued with observable inputs (Level 2), the sales margin is recognised as day-one profit. Allowances that the desk holds as inventory are not financial instruments under IFRS, although they are financial instruments under MiFID II: no IFRS standard deals with them specifically. A bank acting as a broker-trader measures them under the IAS 2 exception at fair value less costs to sell, with changes in profit or loss. The IASB has a project on pollutant pricing mechanisms but has not issued a standard.
At Castellan. Physically settled forwards bought to cover its own surrender obligation can qualify for the own-use exemption of IFRS 9: they remain executory contracts, off balance sheet until delivery. The exemption is lost if Castellan has a practice of net-settling similar contracts, which is why the excess volume of section 5.3 should be sold in a separate, documented transaction. Allowances held for compliance are usually measured at cost (free allowances at zero), with a provision for emissions to date measured at the carrying amount of allowances held and at market value for the shortfall. The vPPA follows section 5.5.
Green Asset Ratio and BTAR. The trading book and derivatives do not feed the numerator of the Green Asset Ratio; the Castellan hedges have no effect on it. The vPPA, where Meridian is adviser only, has none either.
Pillar 3 ESG. The ESG templates of the Pillar 3 disclosures cover banking-book exposures (loans, debt securities, equity) by sector, maturity and emission intensity. Counterparty exposures on derivatives are outside most templates; a bank with a large carbon-hedging business with cement and steel companies shows little of it in its ESG disclosures.
Financed and facilitated emissions. The PCAF standards cover loans, investments and, since 2023, facilitated emissions in capital-market issuance; derivatives are not covered. The desk’s activity is therefore invisible in Meridian’s financed-emissions figures, although it supports the operations of heavy emitters. Supervisors look at it from a risk angle instead: the EBA guidelines on the management of ESG risks, applicable to large institutions from 11 January 2026, and the prudential transition plans required by CRD6 ask banks to identify concentrations of transition risk in all portfolios, including counterparty exposures.
Own operations. If Meridian bought GOs or voluntary credits for its own claims, they would appear in its own sustainability statement under ESRS E1, where credits must be reported separately from reductions and cannot be netted against gross emissions.
| Risk | Example | Control | Owner |
|---|---|---|---|
| Counterparty credit | Client owes the bank after a price fall | PFE limit, CSA, wrong-way stress | Credit risk |
| Liquidity | Variation margin paid before the client settles | FVA pricing, LCR look-back, limits on unsecured hedges | Treasury |
| Volume and policy | Over-hedge after recession or a change in CBAM law | Maximum hedge ratios, policy scenarios in the term sheet | Sales, structurer |
| Market (residual) | Basis, inventory, option books | VaR, stress, FRTB capital | Market risk |
| Registry and settlement | Failed transfer, frozen account | Cut-offs, authorised representatives, dual control | Operations |
| Market abuse | Trading ahead of auction or MSR news | MAR surveillance, insider lists | Compliance |
| Suitability | Complex options sold to an unsophisticated client | MiFID classification, appropriateness test | Sales, compliance |
| Model (PPA) | Capture-rate assumptions too optimistic | Independent price verification, Level 3 reserves | Product control |
| Credit integrity | Voluntary credits invalidated or downgraded | CCP or Article 6 eligibility list, ratings, contractual replacement | Desk head, sustainability |
| Reputational | Bank named next to a misleading claim | Sustainability review of client claims | Sustainability, compliance |
Red-flag checklist.
| Data point | Value | Date and source |
|---|---|---|
| EUA Dec-26 future | EUR 86.69/t | 6 Nov 2026, S&P Global Platts |
| ETS emissions in 2025 | down 2% | Commission carbon market report, Nov 2026 |
| ETS auction revenues 2025 | EUR 43.2bn | Same |
| TNAC published 2026 | 1,023m allowances | June 2026, Commission |
| MSR intake Sep 2026 to Aug 2027 | about 190m | Commission |
| UKA Dec-26 | about GBP 60 | late Sep 2026, market report |
| Voluntary market value 2024 | about USD 535m, down 29% | Ecosystem Marketplace, 2025 |
| European PPAs H1 2025 | 6.08 GW, 124 deals | Pexapark |
| First Article 6.4 credits | February 2026 | UNFCCC registry, reported July 2026 |
What changed recently. CBAM entered its definitive period on 1 January 2026 in a simplified form. ETS2 was postponed to 2028. The Commission proposed in July 2026 to slow the free-allocation phase-out and to make allocation conditional on investment plans. The MSR invalidation threshold is being raised under a provisional agreement of October 2026. The EU and the UK are close to linking their systems, and the UK launches its CBAM on 1 January 2027. The first credits under the Paris Agreement’s crediting mechanism were issued. The IFRS 9 amendments for nature-dependent electricity contracts applied for the first time in 2026.
Open debates. Whether CBAM can work with free allocation still in place, and whether the proposed 15% residual weakens it. Whether international credits should return to EU compliance from 2036. How strict the GHG Protocol will make scope 2 market-based reporting (hourly matching, deliverability), which would change the value of GOs and the design of PPAs. Whether financial investors stabilise or destabilise the EUA market; ESMA’s analyses so far have found the market functioning normally while noting the concentration of positions. How banks should report the climate footprint of their trading and hedging activities, which no standard covers.
INTERACTIVE LAB — Carbon and environmental markets: test yourself
Check the mechanics of the ETS, CBAM, carbon hedging, PPAs and the bank’s economics.
Q1. The EUA futures curve slopes upwards mainly because of:
Answer: B. Allowances cost nothing to store and give no yield, so futures equal spot compounded at the funding rate; expected scarcity is already in the spot price.
Q2. The TNAC published in 2026 was 1,023 million. The MSR intake for September 2026 to August 2027 is:
Answer: C. Between 833 and 1,096 million the buffer rule applies: the intake is the excess over 833 million.
Q3. Under Regulation (EU) 2023/956, the CBAM factor applied to free allocation in 2030 is:
Answer: A. The law in force gives 51.5% in 2030; 59% is the July 2026 proposal, not law.
Q4. Free allocation is based on benchmarks and historical activity. A tonne avoided by Castellan is therefore worth:
Answer: B. An avoided tonne frees an allowance that can be sold or kept, whatever the allocation.
Q5. Why do corporate clients usually hedge EUAs with a bank forward rather than exchange futures?
Answer: B. The bank takes the margin calls and charges for credit and funding in the forward price.
Q6. A layered hedge ratio (80%, 60%, 40%) is used because:
Answer: B. The certain part of the short is hedged heavily, the uncertain part lightly.
Q7. In a recession that cuts output by 12%, Castellan’s over-hedge loses money because:
Answer: B. Volume and price risks are positively correlated; the excess forward is a long position sold back at a lower price.
Q8. The capture rate of a solar park is:
Answer: B. It measures how much less than baseload a solar MWh is worth; cannibalisation lowers it.
Q9. A virtual PPA with GOs changes the buyer’s:
Answer: C. Cancelled GOs support a market-based claim; location-based scope 2 and scope 1 do not change.
Q10. Under SA-CCR, the supervisory factor for an electricity derivative is:
Answer: B. Electricity carries 40%, other commodities 18%; 60% is the FRTB risk weight of the electricity and carbon bucket.
Q11. Why is the CVA capital charge zero on Meridian’s hedges with Castellan?
Answer: B. CRR Article 382(4) exempts NFC trades from CVA own funds; Meridian still prices CVA.
Q12. Emission allowances held by a bank’s trading desk are, under IFRS:
Answer: B. They are financial instruments under MiFID II but not under IFRS, which has no specific standard.
Q13. Since 27 September 2026, an EU retailer may not:
Answer: B. Directive (EU) 2024/825 bans offset-based product climate claims to consumers.
Q14. A CSA with a EUR 10m threshold raises the RAROC of the Castellan hedge from 4.26% to 12.22% mainly because:
Answer: B. The maturity factor falls to 0.3 and the IRB maturity to one year; replacement cost rises to the threshold, but exposure more than halves.
A steel plant emits 2.4 Mt in 2028 and receives free allocation of 2.6 Mt before the CBAM factor. Under the law in force, what is its 2028 short? It hedges 70% with a forward at EUR 92 per tonne. What is its bill at a delivery price of EUR 70, and at EUR 110?
Solution. Free allocation after the factor: Mt. Short: Mt. Hedged volume: Mt at EUR 92, EUR 3.864m. At EUR 70 the unhedged 0.018 Mt cost EUR 1.26m, total EUR 5.124m (unhedged: EUR 4.2m). At EUR 110, EUR 1.98m, total EUR 5.844m (unhedged: EUR 6.6m). Comment: the short is small in 2028, but in 2030 it becomes Mt, almost eighteen times larger; hedging policy must anticipate that the position grows.
Meridian sells an airline (A-rated, PD 0.07%) a single EUA forward: 0.5 Mt for delivery in 1.5 years at EUR 88, margin EUR 0.60 per tonne, no CSA. Compute EAD (replacement cost equal to the margin), and the RAROC with an IRB risk weight of 22% (given), operating costs of 60%, EUR 2.5 of operational RWA per euro of revenue, LGD 40%, and no margin funding cost. Annualise revenue over 1.5 years.
Solution. Adjusted notional $0.5 = $ EUR 44m; add-on ; RC ; EAD $1.4 = $ EUR 11.508m. Annual revenue ; costs 0.12; EL . RWA ; capital 0.394. RAROC . A better rating and a shorter maturity bring the hedge above the hurdle at a similar margin.
A 100 MW wind farm has a capacity factor of 32%. Baseload price EUR 70 per MWh, wind capture rate 85%, strike EUR 55, pay-as-produced. Compute output, capture price and settlement to the buyer. At what capture rate would settlement be zero? How many GOs does the buyer receive, and what market-based scope 2 reduction do they support at 0.40 t per MWh?
Solution. Output MWh. Capture price . Settlement $280{,}320 (59.5 - 55) = $ EUR 1.261m received. Break-even capture rate . GOs: 280,320; reduction t. Wind is less cannibalised than solar because it produces at night and in winter, which is why its capture rates are higher.
1. Walk me through how an EUA future is priced. It is the spot price carried forward at the funding rate, because an allowance has no storage cost and no yield. If the December spread implied a rate above money-market rates, arbitrageurs would sell spot and buy futures. Expectations about future scarcity are already in the spot price, since allowances can be banked from one year to the next. Margin requirements and the convenience of holding allowances for compliance create small deviations.
2. What does CBAM change for a cement client’s carbon cost? It replaces free allocation with a border charge on imports. Free allocation falls under the CBAM factor from 97.5% in 2026 to zero in 2034 under Regulation (EU) 2023/956, so the client’s net short grows every year even if its emissions fall. The Commission proposed in July 2026 to slow the phase-out to 2038, but that is a proposal under negotiation, not law. The client’s cost exposure, and hence the hedging and credit analysis, must use the law in force as base case and the proposal as a scenario.
3. Why would a BBB corporate not want to post margin, and how do you price that? A treasury dislikes daily cash calls that it must fund from its RCF or cash, especially when the hedged exposure moves the other way with no cash effect. Without a CSA the bank carries credit exposure and funds variation margin on its exchange hedge. The forward price therefore includes CVA, FVA and a capital charge. Offering a CSA with a threshold is usually the efficient compromise.
4. What is cannibalisation and how does it affect a PPA? When many solar plants produce at the same hours, they push those hours’ prices down, so the average price received by solar falls relative to baseload. A pay-as-produced vPPA settles at the capture price, so falling capture rates turn a positive settlement into a negative one for the buyer. Pricing a long PPA is mostly forecasting the capture rate. Storage, hybrid plants and shaped products are the market’s responses.
5. A client wants to buy carbon credits to offset its emissions. What do you check? First whether its claim is legal and credible: consumer claims based on offsetting are banned in the EU since September 2026, and VCMI expects a company to reduce its own emissions first. Second the quality of the credits: ICVCM CCP approval, Article 6 authorisation and corresponding adjustment if needed, ratings, and permanence and reversal arrangements. Third the contractual protections against invalidation. Finally whether the bank wants its name on the transaction at all.
6. Is a carbon forward to a cement company a green product? No. It is a hedge that helps a high emitter manage its costs. It can support a transition, because a predictable carbon cost makes investment decisions easier, but it can also reduce the pressure to decarbonise. It is not taxonomy-eligible and does not count in the Green Asset Ratio. Labelling it green would be a red flag.
7. How does the FRTB affect a carbon desk? From January 2027 in the EU, the standardised approach places carbon with electricity in a commodity bucket with a 60% risk weight, much higher than most other commodities. Desks will reduce unhedged inventory and price options more carefully. The temporary multiplier adopted in June 2026 softens the effect for three years. Internal models remain possible but require desk-level approval.
8. How would you explain to a board that its hedge lost money? I would show the hedge and the underlying exposure together: the carbon bill fell by more than the hedge lost, so the budget was protected. I would remind them of the hedging policy they approved and its purpose, which is predictability, not beating the market. If part of the hedge exceeded the actual need, I would separate that part as a speculative position and explain how the policy’s maximum hedge ratio should change.
Regulation and official documents
Standards and market bodies
Market data and analysis
Theory