Every bond a trader holds overnight has to be financed, every short sale has to be covered by borrowed securities, and every hedge fund that buys more than its equity has to borrow the difference. Securities financing is the business that does all three. It sits in Global Markets, usually inside a “Financing” or “Global Financing and Futures” division next to the rates and equity trading floors, and it runs three product families: repo (cash borrowed or lent against bonds), securities lending (securities lent against collateral, for a fee) and prime services (margin loans, securities borrowing and synthetic financing for hedge funds). Banks sometimes call the whole thing “the plumbing”: little seen, essential, and a source of damage when it bursts.
Clients. On the cash-rich side: money market funds, central bank reserve managers, corporate treasurers, and the bank’s own Treasury with surplus liquidity. On the cash-poor side: hedge funds, dealers, asset managers running leveraged strategies, and pension funds and insurers running liability-driven investment (LDI), which need cash to pay variation margin on their interest-rate swaps. On the securities side: long-term holders with large inventories (pension funds, insurers, sovereign wealth funds, index funds) who lend them, and short sellers and market-makers who borrow them. The bank stands between the two sides as principal: it takes collateral from one client and passes it on to another, earning a spread, which is why the core book is called the matched book.
How it earns money. Spreads are small and volumes huge. A matched-book repo may earn 5 to 20 bp a year on the cash lent; on a book of EUR 50bn that is EUR 25m to EUR 100m of revenue. Securities lending earns a fee of a few basis points a year on liquid “general collateral” securities and up to several percent on “specials” that many short sellers want. Prime brokerage earns the spread on margin loans to hedge funds, the fee on borrowed stock, and commissions on execution and clearing, plus a share of the funding cost of synthetic positions. The constraint is not credit risk, which collateral keeps low, but balance sheet: every euro of cash lent increases the bank’s leverage exposure, so the leverage ratio, more than RWA, decides how much business the desk can do (section 6).
The team and its neighbours. A repo desk at a large European bank has a head of financing, traders by currency and collateral type (euro government bonds, credit, equities), and a “collateral optimisation” team that decides which asset to deliver where. The securities lending desk has traders who source stock from lenders, often through agent lenders (custodian banks, see D08), and who lend it to prime brokerage and trading desks. Prime services has a sales and capital-introduction team that wins hedge fund mandates, a margin team that sets and calls collateral, a stock loan team, and a synthetic desk running total return swaps. Around them: Treasury, which charges the desk for funding and liquidity (FTP) and allocates the balance sheet; counterparty credit risk, which sets limits and haircuts by client; collateral operations, which moves securities through Euroclear, Clearstream and the tri-party agents; legal, which negotiates the master agreements; regulatory reporting, which sends each trade to a trade repository under SFTR; and the sustainable finance team when a client asks for a green repo or an ESG collateral schedule.
A realistic week. On Monday at 7:00 the repo traders check overnight funding: how much cash the money market funds rolled, which bonds turned “special” (scarce, so cash lent against them earns a lower rate) and the overnight €STR fixing. At 8:30 the collateral team runs the optimiser: the cheapest bond to deliver for each obligation. On Tuesday a hedge fund client in prime brokerage shorts EUR 40m of a European utility; the stock loan trader sources the shares from an agent lender at 25 bp a year. On Wednesday the Treasury reminds the desk that the quarter-end is close: balance sheet will be expensive for the last two weeks of the quarter, because some banks’ reported leverage ratios are measured at the quarter-end date, and the price of term repo across the date rises. On Thursday a pension fund asks for a one-year green repo programme and an ESG collateral schedule for its equity lending; sales calls the sustainable finance team and credit risk. On Friday the margin team runs the weekly stress test on hedge fund portfolios and sends two margin calls. The rest of this module follows the pension fund request: it is the case of section 5.
IN ONE SENTENCE — A repo is a sale of securities for cash with a simultaneous agreement to buy them back later at a fixed higher price; economically it is a loan secured by the securities.
INTUITION — A repo is a pawn shop for bonds. You hand over the watch, receive cash, and come back next month to pay a little more and take your watch back. The difference is that the pawnbroker owns the watch in the meantime and may lend it on, as long as he gives you back an identical one.
The party that sells the securities and receives cash is the repo party (cash taker, collateral giver); the other side does a reverse repo (cash provider, collateral taker). Legally, title passes to the buyer: under the GMRA (Global Master Repurchase Agreement, published by ICMA, current version 2011, with annexes added since), the collateral taker becomes the owner and may sell or re-use the securities, subject only to the obligation to return equivalent securities at maturity. Coupons paid during the repo are passed back to the seller as “manufactured” payments, so the seller keeps the economic exposure to the bond. That is why, in accounting, the seller does not derecognise the bond (section 6.4).
FORMULA
is the purchase price (cash paid at the start); the repurchase price; the repo rate (annual, simple, act/360 in euro); the number of days; the market value of the collateral including accrued interest; the haircut, the share of collateral value not lent.
Term by term. The repo rate is the price of secured cash; in euro it is quoted against €STR, the overnight unsecured rate published by the ECB, or against the rates of the main electronic platforms. General collateral (GC) repo accepts any security from a defined basket; special repo targets one ISIN that is in demand, and the cash provider accepts a lower rate to obtain it. The haircut protects the cash provider against a fall in collateral value; an equivalent convention is the initial margin ratio , with equal to that ratio. A 2% haircut corresponds to an initial margin of 102.04%.
Margining. The collateral is revalued every day. If its value falls below the amount required (cash plus accrued repo interest, grossed up for the haircut), the cash provider makes a margin call: the cash taker delivers more securities or cash. If it rises, the collateral giver can call some back. Collateral may also be substituted during the trade if the agreement allows it: the seller can ask for a bond back and replace it with another of equal value.
INTERACTIVE LAB — A repo from start to finish: cash, interest and margin call
Compute the cash lent against a bond, the repurchase price, and the margin call when the bond price moves.
| Parameter you can move | Range | Default |
|---|---|---|
| Market value of the collateral at the start | 10 to 2000 EUR m | 100 EUR m |
| Haircut | 0 to 30 % | 2 % |
| Repo rate | 0 to 6 % | 2.5 % |
| Term | 1 to 365 days | 91 days |
| Price change of the collateral | -20 to 10 % | -3 % |
| Result at default settings | Value |
|---|---|
| Cash lent (purchase price) | 98.000 EUR m |
| Equivalent initial margin ratio | 102.04 % |
| Repo interest over the term | 0.6193 EUR m |
| Repurchase price | 98.6193 EUR m |
| Margin call after the price change (positive = taker must deliver) | 3.000 EUR m |
Try it. Set the haircut to 10% (a typical level for an equity repo) and the shock to -8%: the cash provider is still over-collateralised before any call, which is the purpose of the haircut. The call shown ignores accrued repo interest, which a real margin engine adds.
Forms of repo. In a bilateral repo the two parties settle delivery-versus-payment in a central securities depository. In tri-party repo an agent (Euroclear, Clearstream, BNY, JPMorgan in the US) selects the collateral from the seller’s account against an eligibility schedule agreed by the buyer, revalues it and substitutes it daily; this is where collateral schedules, and ESG schedules, are applied at scale. In CCP-cleared repo (Eurex Repo, LCH RepoClear, and in Italy and Spain MTS-linked clearing) both legs face the central counterparty, which allows netting of opposite trades. Sponsored models let buy-side firms (money market funds, pension funds) clear through a bank sponsor that guarantees their obligations to the CCP.
Size. The ICMA European Repo and Collateral Council’s 50th survey, conducted on 10 December 2025 and published on 26 March 2026, counted EUR 13.7 trillion of repo and reverse repo outstanding at the 59 participants, up 24.6% year on year. ICMA treats this as a minimum, because the survey covers only a sample.
IN ONE SENTENCE — Securities lending is the temporary transfer of a security to a borrower, who pays a fee and posts collateral, and who must return equivalent securities on demand or at term.
The economics mirror repo, with the motive reversed: in repo, the cash taker wants cash and the security is collateral; in securities lending, the borrower wants the specific security (to cover a short sale, to deliver into a settlement, to vote is not a legitimate motive) and the cash or other securities are collateral. Loans are documented under the GMSLA (Global Master Securities Lending Agreement, published by ISLA, 2010 version and the 2018 security-interest version); like the GMRA it transfers title, and the borrower manufactures dividends and coupons back to the lender. The lender therefore keeps the economic exposure but loses the voting right while the stock is on loan, unless it recalls the shares before the record date.
Collateral and fee. In Europe most loans are collateralised with non-cash collateral (government bonds, equities from main indices) delivered through tri-party, at a margin of typically 102% to 105% of the loan value, more when the collateral is in another currency or riskier than the loan. The borrower pays an annual fee on the loan value. In the US, cash collateral dominates: the lender reinvests the cash and pays the borrower a rebate rate, and the fee is the difference between the reinvestment yield and the rebate. Large institutional lenders usually lend through an agent lender (often their custodian), which runs the programme, indemnifies them against borrower default and keeps a share of revenue, often 10% to 30%, a matter covered in D08.
Who earns what. The ISLA Securities Lending Market Report published on 27 February 2026 put global securities lending revenue for 2025 at nearly USD 15bn, a record and 22% higher than in 2024. Most of that comes from a small share of securities on loan at high fees (“specials”); the bulk of the lendable universe earns a few basis points.
INTERACTIVE LAB — What a beneficial owner earns from lending a portfolio
Compute the annual revenue of a lending programme, split between beneficial owner and agent, with non-cash collateral (fee) and with cash collateral (reinvestment spread).
| Parameter you can move | Range | Default |
|---|---|---|
| Lendable portfolio | 100 to 20000 EUR m | 5000 EUR m |
| Share of the portfolio on loan | 0 to 60 % | 10 % |
| Average fee on non-cash collateral loans | 1 to 300 bp p.a. | 20 bp p.a. |
| Share of loans against cash collateral | 0 to 100 % | 0 % |
| Reinvestment yield minus rebate on cash loans | 0 to 100 bp p.a. | 15 bp p.a. |
| Agent lender share of revenue | 0 to 40 % | 20 % |
| Result at default settings | Value |
|---|---|
| Value on loan | 500.0 EUR m |
| Gross programme revenue | 1.000 EUR m |
| Beneficial owner’s net revenue | 0.800 EUR m |
| Owner’s revenue on the whole lendable portfolio | 1.60 bp |
Try it. Raise utilisation from 10% to 30% with the same fee: revenue triples, but in practice the average fee falls as you lend less wanted securities. Revenue on the whole portfolio is a few basis points: lending pays for custody, not for a pension.
IN ONE SENTENCE — A prime broker is the bank that finances, borrows securities for, holds the assets of and clears for a hedge fund, earning spreads and fees on each service.
Margin lending. A hedge fund buys EUR 100m of shares with EUR 30m of its own money; the prime broker lends the remaining EUR 70m and holds all the shares as collateral, with the right to rehypothecate them, that is, to re-use them to fund itself or to deliver them to other clients. The prime broker charges a spread over €STR on the debit balance and applies a margin requirement by stock, by portfolio concentration and by stress scenario. Short selling: the fund sells shares it does not own; the prime broker borrows them (from its own inventory, other clients’ rehypothecable assets or agent lenders), charges the fund a borrow fee and holds the sale proceeds as collateral, paying the fund a rebate on them.
Synthetic prime. The same exposure can be given through a total return swap (TRS): the bank buys the shares as a hedge and pays the fund their total return (price change and dividends), while the fund pays the bank a floating financing leg (€STR plus a spread) on the notional and posts an independent amount (initial margin). For the fund the economics are those of a leveraged long position; for the bank the position sits in its equity derivatives books, which changes capital, netting and the treatment of dividends and voting rights. In a TRS the hedge shares belong to the bank, which may vote them or not according to its own policy: this is one of the stewardship questions of section 3.5.
FORMULA
is the fund’s annual return on its own equity; the market value of the position; the fund’s equity (margin or independent amount); the price return and the dividend yield of the shares; the reference rate (€STR); the financing spread charged by the prime broker.
INTERACTIVE LAB — Margin loan or total return swap: the hedge fund’s leveraged return
Compare the fund’s return on equity under a margin loan and a TRS for the same position, and see how leverage magnifies the share price move.
| Parameter you can move | Range | Default |
|---|---|---|
| Position size | 10 to 500 EUR m | 100 EUR m |
| Equity required: margin loan | 10 to 100 % of position | 30 % of position |
| Equity required: TRS independent amount | 5 to 100 % of position | 20 % of position |
| €STR | 0 to 5 % | 2.4 % |
| Spread on margin loan | 0 to 200 bp | 50 bp |
| Spread on TRS financing leg | 0 to 200 bp | 60 bp |
| Share price return over the year | -40 to 40 % | 8 % |
| Dividend yield | 0 to 8 % | 3 % |
| Result at default settings | Value |
|---|---|
| Annual financing cost, margin loan | 2.030 EUR m |
| Annual financing cost, TRS | 2.400 EUR m |
| Return on equity, margin loan | 29.90 % |
| Return on equity, TRS | 43.00 % |
Try it. Set the share price return to -20%: with a TRS at 20% independent amount the fund loses almost all its equity. Archegos, in March 2021, ran this structure with several prime brokers who did not see each other’s exposure.
The three products share a risk structure. Counterparty risk is the risk that the client defaults when the collateral is worth less than the claim; it is mitigated by haircuts, daily margining and close-out netting under the master agreement. Wrong-way risk arises when the collateral and the counterparty are correlated (a bank repoing its own covered bonds, a fund concentrated in one stock). Liquidity risk arises from the maturity mismatch of a matched book that lends at term and borrows overnight, and from the “run” risk of short-term funding. Operational and settlement risk: fails, recall failures and corporate actions mishandled; the EU settlement discipline regime under CSDR imposes cash penalties for settlement fails, and the EU moves to T+1 settlement on 11 October 2027, which compresses the time to recall lent securities. Concentration and model risk dominate prime brokerage: Archegos Capital lost its equity in March 2021 through TRS positions spread over several banks, and Credit Suisse alone lost about USD 5.5bn, according to the independent report it published in July 2021.
The documents: GMRA for repo, GMSLA for securities lending, ISDA Master Agreement with Credit Support Annex for TRS, a prime brokerage agreement with margin rules and rehypothecation consent, tri-party service agreements with eligibility schedules, and, for each counterparty, the netting and collateral legal opinions that the bank needs to recognise netting in capital. ICMA updates GMRA legal opinions each year (the 2026 update was published on 14 April 2026).
IN ONE SENTENCE — A securities financing trade can be “sustainable” through its collateral, its counterparty, the use of the cash, or a price linked to sustainability targets, and these are not equivalent.
The ICMA European Repo and Collateral Council (ERCC) organised the debate in three papers: a consultation in April 2021, a summary of responses in September 2021, and a paper of October 2022 that sets the categories still used today; a market survey on repo and sustainability followed in February and March 2024, with a summary published in August 2024. The October 2022 paper distinguishes:
| Category | What is “green” | Direct new financing? |
|---|---|---|
| Repo against sustainable collateral | The bonds delivered (green bonds, ESG-screened baskets) | No |
| Repo with sustainable counterparties | The counterparty’s profile | No |
| Use-of-proceeds (UoP) repo | The cash raised, allocated to eligible assets | Yes, if allocation is real |
| Sustainability-linked (SL) repo | Repo rate linked to KPIs of the seller | Indirect (incentive) |
The paper’s central warning is that a repo against green collateral does not by itself create additional sustainable financing, so the cash provider should not claim a sustainable investment on that basis alone. It also notes that green collateral was then a tiny share of volume (green bonds under 1% of traded volume on Eurex in April 2022 data) and that there was no market standard for ESG-screened collateral or for the step-up of an SL repo. In the 2021 consultation, greenwashing (double counting, lack of additionality) was the top concern and green-collateral repo the simplest structure to implement; use-of-proceeds repo was judged costly to verify and ill-suited to short-term funding. As of November 2026 ICMA has not published green repo principles comparable to the Green Bond Principles: market practice relies on bespoke documentation, usually a side letter or annex to the GMRA rather than changes to the master agreement.
INTUITION — Pawning a bicycle instead of a car does not make the loan green. What the pawnbroker’s cash is used for might.
Green-collateral repo. The cash taker delivers green bonds. The benefit is real but indirect: a liquid repo market in green bonds makes them cheaper to hold for dealers and investors, because they can be financed, which supports secondary liquidity and possibly a small greenium (see C01, C08). The bond’s proceeds were allocated by the issuer when it was issued; repoing it neither adds nor subtracts a euro of green capex. Market infrastructure has followed: Eurex launched a GC Pooling Green Bond Basket on 29 April 2024, a subset of its GC Pooling ECB basket containing about 80 green bonds of sovereign and supranational issuers from seven EEA countries, rated at least A-/A3, against which cash can be borrowed in EUR, USD, GBP or CHF.
Use-of-proceeds repo. The cash taker commits to allocate an amount equal to the cash raised to eligible green assets, under a framework aligned with the Green Bond Principles and often with an external review. The early transactions were bank-to-bank: for example, a USD 50m UoP repo between the Singapore branch of Agricultural Bank of China and BNP Paribas in December 2020, and a green repo in February 2022 in which HSBC borrowed cash from Qatar National Bank against green bonds and allocated an equal amount to eligible projects. The difficulty is maturity: green assets live for years, repos for weeks. A rolling programme with a committed amount bridges the gap, but the allocation then has to be tracked across rolls.
Sustainability-linked repo. The repo rate steps down or up according to the seller’s performance against KPIs (an example cited by ICMA is a repo of August 2021 between Deutsche Bank and Akbank). The issues are those of SLLs and SLBs (see B03, C02): ambition of the targets, size of the step (a few basis points on a short-term trade is worth very little), and verification.
Who counts the green asset? Because the collateral giver keeps the economic exposure and the asset on its balance sheet, it is the one that holds the green bond for disclosure purposes; the cash provider holds a secured receivable on the counterparty. If both counted the green bond, it would be counted twice. This is the double-counting risk flagged in the 2021 consultation.
A collateral schedule (or eligibility schedule) lists what the collateral taker accepts, with a haircut or margin for each class: for example G10 government bonds at 102%, main-index equities at 105% to 110%, with concentration limits by issuer and by sector. An ESG collateral schedule adds one or more of:
Why does a lender care about collateral it will hold only if the borrower defaults? Three reasons. Reputational: a fund marketed as excluding coal does not want to appear, even for a day, as owner of a coal miner’s shares after a default. Regulatory: an Article 8 or 9 fund under SFDR, or a fund whose name falls under ESMA’s guidelines on fund names (applied since 21 November 2024 to new funds and since 21 May 2025 to existing ones), must be consistent with its binding exclusions; holding excluded collateral after a borrower default could breach them. Risk: transition-exposed collateral may be worth less precisely in a stress scenario. In tri-party, schedules are coded as eligibility filters fed by ESG data vendors; the tri-party agent applies them daily. The cost falls on the borrower, which must deliver other, often more expensive, collateral (section 5.4).
The largest collateral schedule in Europe is the Eurosystem’s. On 29 July 2025 the ECB announced a climate factor for its collateral framework: a reduction of the collateral value of marketable assets issued by non-financial corporations, based on their exposure to transition risk, calibrated on the sector results of the 2024 Eurosystem climate stress test, the issuer’s climate score from the corporate sector purchase programme and the asset’s residual maturity. The ECB introduced the factor on 15 June 2026. It multiplies the value after the normal haircut. The ECB’s own illustration, in a blog post of 7 July 2026: a bond worth EUR 100 with a 10% haircut and a climate factor of 0.978 is valued at EUR 88 instead of EUR 90. Higher-exposure sectors (utilities, materials, transport) and longer maturities receive larger reductions. The ECB expects a limited immediate effect, because Eurosystem borrowing is low and corporate bonds are a small share of pledged collateral; the extension to corporate credit claims is planned for later.
FORMULA
is the collateral value credited by the central bank; the market value; the haircut of the Eurosystem schedule; the climate factor of the asset.
INTERACTIVE LAB — The ECB climate factor: collateral value after haircut and climate adjustment
Reproduce the ECB’s illustration and see how much collateral value a bank loses on a pool of corporate bonds as the climate factor falls.
| Parameter you can move | Range | Default |
|---|---|---|
| Market value of the corporate bond pool | 1 to 5000 EUR m | 100 EUR m |
| Eurosystem haircut | 0 to 40 % | 10 % |
| Climate factor | 0.9 to 1 | 0.978 |
| Result at default settings | Value |
|---|---|
| Collateral value without climate factor | 90.00 EUR m |
| Collateral value with climate factor | 88.02 EUR m |
| Collateral value lost to the climate factor | 1.98 EUR m |
Try it. Set the pool to EUR 1,000m and the factor to 0.95: the bank loses EUR 45m of central bank borrowing capacity, which its Treasury must replace with other collateral.
The Bank of England followed with a market notice of 11 June 2026: from 31 October 2026, bonds of corporates that derive revenue from thermal coal mining are no longer eligible in the Sterling Monetary Framework, and haircut add-ons may be applied to issuers in sectors exposed to transition risk, without published amounts. For a bank, this matters in two ways: the value of its own pool of central bank collateral, and the signal it sends to private collateral takers, which increasingly mirror central bank practice.
Securities lending raises three sustainability questions for long-term owners.
Votes. Shares on loan cannot be voted by the lender. A borrower who borrows shares to vote, without economic interest, practises “empty voting”; industry guidance, notably the voting guide of the Global Alliance of Securities Lending Associations (GASLA, November 2021), says shares should not be borrowed for the purpose of voting. Lenders that take stewardship seriously adopt a recall policy: recall all or part of lent shares before the record date of meetings where they intend to vote, especially on climate resolutions or contested items. The Shareholder Rights Directive II (Directive (EU) 2017/828) requires asset managers and institutional investors to disclose their engagement policy, which in practice covers how lending interacts with voting.
Voting itself runs through a chain of intermediaries (custodian, proxy adviser, the issuer’s agent), described in Roncalli’s notebook, section 6.2; a lent share simply drops out of the lender’s side of that chain until it is returned.
Short selling. Lending enables short selling, which some see as at odds with long-term ownership. The evidence is more nuanced: short sellers improve price discovery and have exposed corporate fraud and some greenwashing. Under the EU Short Selling Regulation (Regulation (EU) No 236/2012) net short positions in shares must be notified to the national authority from 0.1% of issued capital and published from 0.5%. A lender can restrict lending of specific names, but cannot know the final use of most loans.
Policy. The Japanese Government Pension Investment Fund suspended its foreign stock lending in December 2019 on governance grounds, then resumed it (announced in March 2024) with criteria for agents including the ability to recall shares and efforts to prevent empty voting. Such debates show that the question is not lending or not, but lending under conditions: recall, transparency on borrowers, collateral schedule.
| Text | What it requires | Effect on the desk |
|---|---|---|
| SFTR, Regulation (EU) 2015/2365 | Trade reporting to a trade repository; disclosure and consent before re-use (Art. 15) | Every repo and loan reported; re-use of green collateral traceable |
| CRR3, Regulation (EU) 2024/1623 | Capital for counterparty risk; leverage ratio; NSFR | Balance sheet is the binding constraint (section 6) |
| SFDR, Regulation (EU) 2019/2088, and ESMA fund-name guidelines | Consistency of fund holdings with promoted characteristics | Lenders’ ESG collateral schedules |
| Delegated Regulation (EU) 2020/1818, Art. 12 | Paris-aligned Benchmark exclusions | Template for exclusions |
| SRD II, Directive (EU) 2017/828 | Engagement policy and voting disclosure | Recall policies |
| Short Selling Regulation (EU) No 236/2012 | Notification and disclosure of net short positions | Borrow demand transparency |
| CSDR and EU T+1 (11 October 2027) | Settlement discipline, shorter settlement cycle | Faster recalls and substitutions |
The NSFR treatment of short-term SFTs with financial customers deserves a word. The Basel standard applies a 10% required stable funding factor to reverse repos with financial counterparties under six months secured by Level 1 assets, and 15% to others. The EU applied 0% and 5% as transitional values that were to end on 28 June 2025; Regulation (EU) 2025/1215 of 17 June 2025 maintained them beyond that date, with an EBA report due by 31 January 2029. This keeps short-term euro repo cheaper to run in the EU than the Basel text implies (section 6.3). The Basel minimum haircut floors for non-centrally cleared SFTs between banks and non-banks have not been implemented in the EU.
Green and sustainability-linked repo remain niche: a few dozen public transactions since 2020, mostly between banks or with central bank reserve managers, and programmes with large institutions. Green-collateral baskets exist at CCPs and tri-party agents, but volumes are small relative to a market of EUR 13.7 trillion. The areas where sustainability has real traction in securities financing are elsewhere: ESG collateral schedules for lenders (now standard options at major tri-party agents and agent lenders), recall policies tied to stewardship, and central bank climate adjustments that push transition risk into collateral pricing. The honest summary for a student: on this desk, sustainability is mostly about collateral and stewardship, and only marginally about new green financing.
A financing programme for an institutional client is not a single trade but a relationship set up once and traded every day. The flow below follows the Lyra Pension Fund request of section 5, from first call to the annual review.
INTERACTIVE LAB — From client request to daily operation: a green repo programme and an ESG lending schedule
Show who does what, with which document, when a pension fund sets up a green repo programme and an ESG collateral schedule with a bank.
| # | Who | Does what | Deliverable |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Financing sales (Meridian) | Receives Lyra’s request for a one-year green repo programme and an ESG schedule for its equity lending; qualifies needs, sizes and collateral | Call report and term sheet request |
| 2 | KYC and onboarding | Refreshes client due diligence, legal entity data and SFTR identifiers (LEI) for the fund and its manager | KYC approval |
| 3 | Counterparty credit risk | Rates Lyra, sets limits for repo and securities borrowing, approves haircuts and wrong-way-risk rules | Credit approval with limits and haircut grid |
| 4 | Legal | Negotiates GMRA 2011 and GMSLA with annexes; drafts the green repo annex (eligible collateral, allocation commitment, reporting, no-default clause for green breaches) | Signed master agreements and green annex |
| 5 | Sustainable finance team | Reviews Lyra’s allocation framework and the ESG exclusion list; checks consistency with the bank’s labelling policy | Internal opinion and labelling decision |
| 6 | Repo trader and Treasury | Price the term repo against €STR, agree the FTP charge and the balance-sheet allocation, choose bilateral or sponsored clearing | Pricing memo and balance-sheet approval |
| 7 | Collateral management and tri-party agent | Code the eligibility schedules: green-bond list for the repo, ESG exclusions and add-on margins for the lending collateral | Tri-party eligibility profiles in production |
| 8 | Repo trader | Executes the first three-month repo; collateral settles delivery-versus-payment | Trade confirmation and SFTR report (T+1) |
| 9 | Margin operations | Revalues collateral daily, issues and answers margin calls, processes substitutions | Daily margin statements |
| 10 | Securities lending desk | Borrows Lyra’s equities for prime brokerage clients; posts collateral filtered by the ESG schedule | Loan confirmations, collateral reports |
| 11 | Lyra’s stewardship team and lending desk | Lyra sends recall notices before record dates of targeted meetings; Meridian returns or sources replacement shares | Recall log, buy-in avoided |
| 12 | Product control and regulatory reporting | Book P&L, FTP and capital usage; report leverage and NSFR contributions | Monthly desk P&L and balance-sheet report |
| 13 | Sales, sustainable finance team and Lyra | Annual review: allocation report on the green repo, exceptions to the ESG schedule, recall statistics; renew or amend | Annual programme review |
Origination and onboarding (week 1). Financing sales owns the client relationship, often jointly with the rates and LDI sales team that already trades swaps with the fund. The request goes into a term sheet: size, tenor, collateral, pricing basis, green features. KYC refreshes the file; for SFTR reporting, every counterparty needs a legal entity identifier and each trade will carry a unique transaction identifier shared with the other side.
Credit approval (weeks 1 to 2). Counterparty credit risk rates the pension fund (pension funds are usually strong credits, but leveraged LDI funds showed their fragility in the UK gilt crisis of September 2022), sets a potential future exposure limit for the repo and the securities borrowing, and approves the haircut grid. The credit memo addresses wrong-way risk (a fund repoing bonds of its sponsor would be refused) and concentration.
Documentation (weeks 2 to 6). Legal negotiates the GMRA and the GMSLA, or checks existing ones, and the annexes. The green annex is the delicate document. It defines eligible green collateral (by reference to a list or to ICMA-aligned or EU Green Bond labels), the allocation commitment of the cash taker if any, the reporting, and crucially says that a breach of a green undertaking is not an event of default: no bank wants to close out a secured financing because an allocation report was late. It usually provides for a step-up in rate or the loss of the label instead.
Pricing and balance sheet (weeks 4 to 6). The repo trader prices against €STR and the term structure of repo rates; Treasury sets the FTP charge for any maturity mismatch and, more importantly, allocates balance sheet. Many banks now run an internal balance-sheet charge in basis points of leverage exposure, which is why the choice between bilateral and sponsored clearing is made at this stage (section 5.6).
Set-up and go-live (week 6). Collateral management codes eligibility profiles at the tri-party agent. For the ESG schedule this means a data feed (exclusion list, sector codes) updated at a frequency agreed with the client, and a rule for collateral that becomes ineligible while posted: substitution within a few business days, not an immediate default.
Daily operation. Margin operations run the daily revaluation and calls; the lending desk handles recalls; regulatory reporting sends SFTR reports by the next business day. Monthly and annually, product control reports the desk’s P&L, capital and balance-sheet usage; the annual review checks the green allocation report, ESG schedule exceptions and recall statistics before renewal.
Question. What does the client need, and which parts of it are financing, which are sustainability?
Data (case assumptions). Lyra Pension Fund is a fictional euro-area occupational pension fund with EUR 48bn of assets, rated A-equivalent internally by Meridian. It hedges the interest-rate risk of its liabilities with cleared interest-rate swaps, and since the end of the EMIR clearing exemption for pension schemes in June 2023 it must pay variation margin in cash when rates rise. It keeps a liquidity buffer of government bonds, of which EUR 3.2bn are sovereign and supranational green bonds (green Bunds, green OATs, EU NextGenerationEU green bonds). It also holds EUR 12bn of European equities and lends part of them. Its investment policy excludes, among others, controversial weapons, tobacco and companies above revenue thresholds in thermal coal and unconventional oil and gas, broadly the Paris-aligned Benchmark exclusions.
Lyra’s treasurer and its head of responsible investment call Meridian together with two requests:
| Item | Value (case assumption) |
|---|---|
| €STR (overnight, flat for the year) | 2.40% |
| Repo programme | EUR 1,000m cash, 91-day rolls for one year |
| Collateral | Green Bunds, green OATs, EU green bonds; haircut 2% |
| Equity loan to Meridian | EUR 2,500m, average fee 20 bp p.a. before the ESG schedule |
| Meridian’s on-lending to hedge funds | Average fee 32 bp p.a. |
Who is in the room. On Lyra’s side, the treasurer, who owns the liquidity plan and the swap margin, and the head of responsible investment, who owns the exclusion list and the voting policy; their interests are not identical, and the case shows where they diverge. On Meridian’s side, the financing salesperson who covers pension funds, the euro repo trader, the equity securities lending trader, a counterparty credit officer, a lawyer from the markets legal team and a member of the sustainable finance team. Treasury is not in the first meeting but will decide the balance sheet. The timetable agreed at the meeting is ambitious but usual: term sheet within a week, credit approval and documentation within six weeks, first roll at the start of the next quarter, which Treasury prefers because the quarter-end is when balance sheet is most expensive.
Reading. The first request is a financing trade with a sustainability label on the collateral; the second is a securities lending trade with sustainability conditions on the collateral and on stewardship. Neither finances a new green asset. The team’s job is to price both, decide what can honestly be called green, and check that Meridian earns its hurdle on the balance sheet it uses.
Question. How much cash does Lyra receive, what does it pay, and what does Meridian earn?
Data. Meridian’s term repo price for a pension fund delivering top-rated euro government bonds over a 91-day term is €STR + 20 bp (case assumption: term repo for buy-side clients prices above €STR because the dealer uses balance sheet and takes a term mismatch). Meridian offers a 2 bp discount for green collateral, so Lyra pays €STR + 18 bp, that is 2.58%. Meridian refinances the collateral by repoing it out to a cash-rich money market fund that has a stated preference for green collateral, at €STR + 6 bp for conventional bonds and €STR + 4 bp for green ones: the 2 bp discount to Lyra is funded by a 2 bp lower funding cost, not by Meridian’s margin.
Calculation. The market value of collateral required is = EUR 1,020.408m. Interest per 91-day roll is = EUR 6.522m, and over a year (365 days, act/360) EUR 26.158m. Meridian earns the difference between the rate it receives (€STR + 18 bp) and the rate it pays (€STR + 4 bp), 14 bp, on EUR 1,000m: = EUR 1.419m a year before funding charges and costs. The green discount is worth = EUR 0.203m a year to Lyra, 0.78% of its total repo cost.
INTERACTIVE LAB — Lyra’s green repo programme: client cost and Meridian’s spread
Price the EUR 1bn programme, split the client rate and Meridian’s matched-book spread, and put the green discount in proportion.
| Parameter you can move | Range | Default |
|---|---|---|
| Cash lent to Lyra | 100 to 5000 EUR m | 1000 EUR m |
| Haircut | 0 to 10 % | 2 % |
| €STR | 0 to 5 % | 2.4 % |
| Client spread before green discount | 0 to 60 bp | 20 bp |
| Green discount to the client | 0 to 10 bp | 2 bp |
| Repo-out spread for conventional collateral | -20 to 30 bp | 6 bp |
| Lower repo-out spread for green collateral | 0 to 10 bp | 2 bp |
| Days per roll | 1 to 365 days | 91 days |
| Result at default settings | Value |
|---|---|
| Collateral market value required | 1,020.408 EUR m |
| Repo rate paid by Lyra | 2.58 % |
| Interest per roll | 6.522 EUR m |
| Lyra’s annual repo interest (365 days) | 26.158 EUR m |
| Meridian’s matched-book spread | 14.0 bp |
| Meridian’s annual spread revenue | 1.419 EUR m |
| Annual value of the green discount to Lyra | 0.203 EUR m |
| Green discount as share of Lyra’s repo cost | 0.78 % |
Try it. Set the green funding benefit to zero while keeping the 2 bp discount: Meridian’s spread falls from 14 to 12 bp, a 14% cut in revenue. The green discount is then paid by the desk, not by the market.
Reading. The repo costs Lyra EUR 26.2m a year, almost all of it €STR; the green discount is less than 1% of that cost. Lyra’s real gain from the programme is not the discount but the ability to raise cash against bonds it would otherwise have to sell, possibly at a loss, when rates rise and margin calls arrive. For Meridian, the spread of 14 bp is typical of a client matched book and is only acceptable if the balance sheet it consumes is light enough (section 5.6).
PITFALL — Do not present a repo discount as a “greenium”. In C01 the greenium is a lower cost of long-term capital for the issuer of a green bond. Here the 2 bp is a short-term collateral preference of one cash investor, which can disappear at the next roll. If Meridian keeps paying it without the matching funding benefit, it is a marketing cost of the desk.
Question. Which label is honest, and what has to be documented?
Data. Lyra uses the cash to pay variation margin on its swaps. Its green bonds were issued by sovereigns and the EU; their proceeds were allocated under the issuers’ frameworks years ago. Lyra suggests a use-of-proceeds commitment: for each euro raised, it would “allocate” a euro of its existing green bond holdings.
Calculation and reasoning. Apply the three tests of section 3.1. Collateral: green, verifiable from the issuers’ frameworks and allocation reports. Use of cash: margin payments, not green assets; earmarking existing holdings would count the same green bonds twice, once as collateral and once as “allocation”, and adds no financing. Price link: none. Meridian’s sustainable finance team concludes that the programme can be described as a repo against green collateral, with a disclosure that it does not finance new green assets, but not as a “green repo” or “green financing”, and that neither party should report the cash as a sustainable investment. Lyra keeps the green bonds on its balance sheet and in its own disclosures, since it retains their risks and rewards; Meridian reports a secured receivable on a pension fund.
What remains to document is collateral integrity: the label holds only as long as the collateral is in fact green. Two events break it. A price fall triggers a margin call that Lyra may meet with any eligible bond; and a substitution may replace a green bond with a conventional one. The green annex therefore specifies that top-ups and substitutions are made with green bonds when available, and that Meridian reports monthly the green share of the collateral.
CASE — Suppose the green bonds fall 3% in a rate sell-off, the very scenario in which Lyra also faces swap margin calls. The collateral is worth EUR 989.796m, against EUR 1,020.408m required: Meridian calls EUR 30.612m. If Lyra, short of green paper, delivers conventional Bunds, the green share of the collateral falls to 97.0%.
INTERACTIVE LAB — Margin calls and the green share of the collateral
Compute the margin call after a price fall and the share of the collateral that is still green, depending on how the top-up is made.
| Parameter you can move | Range | Default |
|---|---|---|
| Cash lent | 100 to 5000 EUR m | 1000 EUR m |
| Haircut | 0 to 10 % | 2 % |
| Price change of the green bonds | -15 to 0 % | -3 % |
| Share of the top-up delivered in green bonds | 0 to 100 % | 0 % |
| Result at default settings | Value |
|---|---|
| Collateral required | 1,020.408 EUR m |
| Value of the green collateral after the shock | 989.796 EUR m |
| Margin call | 30.612 EUR m |
| Green share of the collateral after the top-up | 97.00 % |
Try it. Set the shock to -10%: a severe but not extreme move for a long-dated bond. The call is EUR 102m and, without green top-ups, a tenth of the ‘green’ collateral is no longer green.
Reading. The green share falls by exactly the price move when top-ups are conventional, because the original green bonds are worth that much less and the gap is filled with other bonds. The control is simple and cheap: a monthly report and a contractual preference for green top-ups. The broader lesson is the one ICMA drew in 2022: the label describes the collateral, and it is worth what the collateral reporting is worth.
WHY IT MATTERS ON THE DESK — On the desk, the green annex is negotiated by legal and sustainable finance, but it is executed by margin operations at 10:00 every morning. If the tri-party profile does not distinguish green from conventional bonds, nobody will know that the label has eroded until the annual review.
Question. What does Lyra’s ESG schedule cost Meridian, and who should bear it?
Data (case assumptions). Lyra lends EUR 2,500m of European equities to Meridian. Meridian posts non-cash collateral at a 105% margin, so EUR 2,625m. Under a standard schedule Meridian would post equities from its prime brokerage inventory: shares held as collateral from hedge fund clients, which it is allowed to re-use and which are otherwise expensive to finance. Lyra’s ESG schedule excludes issuers on its exclusion list; screening Meridian’s typical equity collateral pool shows that 15% of it by value fails. Meridian must replace that part with high-grade government bonds, which it could otherwise repo out at close to €STR; the equities it can no longer post would have to be financed in the equity repo market at a spread about 30 bp higher (the funding differential). Lyra also asks for a 3 percentage point margin add-on on equities from high transition-risk sectors that remain eligible, which represent 10% of the loan; the extra collateral is encumbered at an opportunity cost of 45 bp.
FORMULA
is the annual cost of the schedule for the collateral giver; the loan value; the margin (105%); the excluded share of the collateral pool; the funding differential between the excluded collateral and its replacement; the share of the loan subject to the add-on; the add-on; the cost of encumbering the extra collateral.
Calculation. Substituted collateral: = EUR 393.75m, costing = EUR 1.181m a year. Extra collateral from the add-on: = EUR 7.5m, costing EUR 0.034m. Total: EUR 1.215m a year, or 4.86 bp of the loan. Before the schedule Lyra earns 20 bp, EUR 5.0m a year, and Meridian earns its on-lending spread of 12 bp (32 bp minus 20 bp), EUR 3.0m. If Meridian passes the full cost on, Lyra’s fee falls to 15.14 bp: the ESG schedule costs Lyra about a quarter of its lending income.
INTERACTIVE LAB — What an ESG collateral schedule costs the borrower
Quantify the substitution cost of exclusions and the cost of transition-risk margin add-ons, express it as a fee equivalent, and compare with posting cash collateral.
| Parameter you can move | Range | Default |
|---|---|---|
| Value of securities borrowed | 100 to 10000 EUR m | 2500 EUR m |
| Collateral margin | 100 to 115 % | 105 % |
| Share of the collateral pool excluded by the schedule | 0 to 50 % | 15 % |
| Funding differential, excluded collateral versus replacement | 0 to 100 bp | 30 bp |
| Share of the loan subject to a transition-risk add-on | 0 to 50 % | 10 % |
| Margin add-on | 0 to 10 pp | 3 pp |
| Cost of encumbering extra collateral | 0 to 100 bp | 45 bp |
| Fee paid to the lender before the schedule | 1 to 100 bp | 20 bp |
| Fee Meridian charges hedge funds on on-lending | 1 to 150 bp | 32 bp |
| Capital allocated per euro of leverage exposure | 3 to 5 % | 3.5 % |
| Result at default settings | Value |
|---|---|
| Collateral posted | 2,625.00 EUR m |
| Collateral to be substituted | 393.75 EUR m |
| Annual cost of substitution | 1.1812 EUR m |
| Extra collateral from the add-on | 7.50 EUR m |
| Annual cost of the add-on | 0.0338 EUR m |
| Total annual cost of the schedule | 1.2150 EUR m |
| Cost in bp of the loan | 4.86 bp |
| Lender’s fee if the cost is passed on in full | 15.14 bp |
| Lender’s income before the schedule | 5.000 EUR m |
| Share of the lender’s income lost if passed on | 24.3 % |
| Meridian’s on-lending spread revenue | 3.000 EUR m |
| Leverage exposure if cash collateral were posted instead | 2,625.0 EUR m |
| Leverage exposure add-on with non-cash collateral (posted minus received) | 125.0 EUR m |
| Leverage capital if cash collateral is posted | 91.88 EUR m |
| Leverage capital with non-cash collateral | 4.38 EUR m |
Try it. Double the excluded share to 30%: the cost almost doubles to EUR 2.4m. Then set the funding differential to zero: if Meridian had plenty of cheap eligible collateral, exclusions would cost almost nothing. The cost of an ESG schedule depends on the borrower’s inventory, not on the lender’s virtue.
Why not post cash? Meridian could avoid the screen by posting cash collateral. The output above shows why it will not: posting EUR 2,625m of cash puts a receivable of that size on its balance sheet, all of it leverage exposure, whereas with non-cash collateral the borrowed shares and the posted securities stay where they were in accounting terms, and the leverage exposure is only the over-collateralisation of EUR 125m (the counterparty add-on of the leverage ratio for SFTs). At Meridian’s internal leverage allocation of 3.5% (section 5.6), cash collateral would tie up EUR 91.9m of capital against EUR 4.4m. An ESG schedule that pushed the borrower into cash would be far more expensive than one that merely narrows the non-cash pool.
Reading. The negotiation follows from the numbers. Lyra’s responsible investment team wants the full exclusion list and the add-on; its treasurer sees the lending income fall by a quarter. Meridian proposes three adjustments: apply the exclusions but drop the add-on on sovereign bonds (it never applied to them anyway), allow ineligible collateral to be substituted within three business days rather than the same day, and share the cost: Meridian absorbs 1 bp, so Lyra’s fee becomes about 16 bp. The add-on is cheap (EUR 34k) and has a risk rationale; the exclusions are expensive and have a reputational and regulatory rationale. Both are legitimate; neither makes the loan “sustainable”.
PITFALL — Do not confuse an ESG collateral schedule with sustainable lending. It changes what the lender would hold after a borrower default, an event with a probability well below 1% a year. It does not change what the borrower does with the shares, which is usually to cover a short sale.
Question. What does Lyra lose by recalling shares to vote?
Data (case assumptions). Lyra votes actively at the general meetings of its 60 largest European holdings, which represent 35% of the value on loan to Meridian. Its policy is to recall these shares ahead of the record date and to re-lend them after the meeting; on average the shares are off loan for 12 days a year. The alternative policy, used by some funds, is never to lend shares it intends to vote.
Calculation. Fee lost with recalls: = EUR 0.0575m, about EUR 57,500 a year, or 1.15% of the EUR 5.0m lending income. Fee lost if the same shares are never lent: = EUR 1.75m, 35% of the income.
INTERACTIVE LAB — The cost of stewardship: recall before meetings or withhold from lending
Compare the lending income lost under a recall policy and under a no-lending policy for the shares the fund wants to vote.
| Parameter you can move | Range | Default |
|---|---|---|
| Value on loan | 100 to 10000 EUR m | 2500 EUR m |
| Average lending fee | 1 to 100 bp p.a. | 20 bp p.a. |
| Share of the loan in companies the fund votes | 0 to 100 % | 35 % |
| Days off loan per year under the recall policy | 0 to 60 days | 12 days |
| Result at default settings | Value |
|---|---|
| Lending income without any stewardship policy | 5.000 EUR m |
| Income lost under the recall policy | 0.0575 EUR m |
| Share of income lost under recall | 1.15 % |
| Income lost if those shares are never lent | 1.750 EUR m |
Try it. Raise the days off loan to 30: the recall policy still costs less than 3% of income. Then think about what the chart leaves out: fees on wanted shares often spike around record dates, so the true cost can be several times higher for a few names.
Reading. Recalling is cheap; withholding is expensive. The numbers support the GPIF’s eventual position and the industry guidance: lending and stewardship are compatible if recalls work. The real constraints are operational. A recall must reach the borrower in time to return shares before the record date; Meridian, which has on-lent the shares to hedge funds, must either source replacement shares or recall from its own clients; with T+1 settlement in the EU from October 2027, that window shortens by a day. Meridian therefore agrees with Lyra a recall calendar (meetings flagged six weeks ahead) and a service level, and prices the risk of a buy-in into its own on-lending fee. A second point: voting matters most precisely when borrowing demand is highest, for instance in contested meetings, so the recall policy also protects the meeting from empty voting by borrowers.
Question. Does the repo programme earn Meridian’s 12% hurdle, and what decides it?
Data (case assumptions, stated for this business line). Meridian’s net revenue is the matched-book spread of EUR 1.419m minus an FTP charge for the maturity mismatch: Meridian lends for three months but refinances partly at one month, and Treasury charges 1.5 bp a year on the cash lent (consistent with the course’s scale of about 6 bp per year of tenor, applied to a three-month mismatch), so EUR 0.15m. Cost-income on a matched-book repo is set at 30%, lower than the course’s 60% default for markets revenue, because the business is highly automated and has few staff per euro of revenue; we state this as a business-line assumption. Lyra’s ancillary business attributable to the programme (clearing and execution) is EUR 0.8m a year, with the course’s 60% cost-income and EUR 2.5 of RWA per euro of revenue.
Credit exposure. Under the financial collateral comprehensive method of CRR3, the exposure after collateral is
FORMULA
is the exposure (cash lent, EUR 1,000m, for cash); the collateral value (EUR 1,020.408m); the supervisory volatility adjustment for the collateral; the currency mismatch adjustment (zero here). For repo-style transactions with daily margining the 10-day adjustment is scaled to a 5-day liquidation period by .
We take = 4% on a 10-day basis for long-dated top-rated sovereign bonds (case assumption, of the order of the supervisory table), hence 2.828% at five days. Then = EUR 8.453m. Under F-IRB, Lyra is a financial-sector counterparty with LGD 45% and PD 0.07% (grade A); repo-style exposures take an effective maturity of 0.5 years in the foundation approach. We assume that the 1.25 asset-correlation multiplier for large or unregulated financial entities does not apply (Lyra’s assets are below EUR 70bn; its regulatory status would have to be checked). The risk weight is 11.21% and RWA EUR 0.948m.
Leverage exposure. The leverage ratio does not recognise collateral: the cash lent counts in full, EUR 1,000m, plus a counterparty add-on equal to , which is zero here because the collateral exceeds the cash. Meridian’s internal rule for financing books allocates capital as the higher of 13% of RWA and 3.5% of leverage exposure (the 3% minimum plus a management buffer; Meridian is not a G-SII). If Lyra trades through a sponsored clearing model and Meridian refinances at the same CCP, the receivable on the CCP can be offset against payables with the same settlement date; we assume this nets 80% of the leverage exposure. We keep RWA unchanged: as sponsor Meridian still guarantees Lyra’s obligations, and we ignore the CCP default fund contribution.
INTERACTIVE LAB — RAROC of the repo programme: RWA view against leverage view
Compute Meridian’s RAROC on the Lyra repo programme with capital driven by RWA and by the leverage ratio, and see how netting through sponsored clearing changes the answer.
| Parameter you can move | Range | Default |
|---|---|---|
| Cash lent | 100 to 5000 EUR m | 1000 EUR m |
| Haircut | 0 to 10 % | 2 % |
| Matched-book spread | 0 to 50 bp | 14 bp |
| FTP charge for maturity mismatch | 0 to 10 bp | 1.5 bp |
| Cost-income ratio of the repo business | 10 to 70 % | 30 % |
| Supervisory haircut on collateral (10-day) | 0 to 15 % | 4 % |
| Counterparty PD | 0.03 to 1 % | 0.07 % |
| Capital allocated per euro of leverage exposure | 3 to 5 % | 3.5 % |
| Share of leverage exposure netted (sponsored clearing) | 0 to 95 % | 0 % |
| Ancillary revenue | 0 to 5 EUR m | 0.8 EUR m |
| Result at default settings | Value |
|---|---|
| Spread revenue | 1.4194 EUR m |
| Net revenue over FTP | 1.2694 EUR m |
| Operating costs (repo) | 0.3808 EUR m |
| Exposure after collateral E* | 8.453 EUR m |
| F-IRB risk weight (LGD 45%, M 0.5) | 11.21 % |
| RWA of the repo | 0.948 EUR m |
| Expected loss | 0.00266 EUR m |
| Ancillary revenue net of costs | 0.320 EUR m |
| Profit before tax, programme and ancillary | 1.2059 EUR m |
| Profit after tax, programme and ancillary | 0.9045 EUR m |
| Capital at 13% of RWA (repo and ancillary) | 0.383 EUR m |
| Capital, higher of RWA and leverage, plus ancillary | 35.260 EUR m |
| Leverage exposure after netting | 1,000.0 EUR m |
| RAROC with capital at 13% of RWA | 236.0 % |
| RAROC with capital at the higher of RWA and leverage | 2.57 % |
Try it. Leave netting at 80% and cut the spread to 12 bp (no green funding benefit): RAROC falls below the hurdle. Then set netting to zero and raise the spread until the bilateral trade reaches 12%: it takes a spread no client would pay.
Calculation, line by line. Spread revenue EUR 1.419m; minus FTP EUR 0.150m gives net revenue EUR 1.269m; operating costs at 30%, EUR 0.381m; expected loss = EUR 0.003m. Ancillary revenue EUR 0.8m less 60% costs adds EUR 0.32m. Profit before tax EUR 1.206m, after tax EUR 0.904m. Capital on the RWA view: = EUR 0.383m, a RAROC of 236%. Capital on the leverage view, bilateral: = EUR 35.26m, a RAROC of 2.57%. With 80% netting through sponsored clearing, leverage exposure is EUR 200m, capital EUR 7.26m, RAROC 12.46%, just above the hurdle.
Reading. The same trade earns 236% or 2.6% depending on which constraint the bank treats as binding. Collateral makes the credit risk almost disappear, so the RWA view flatters the trade; the leverage ratio ignores collateral, so it decides. This is why repo desks live and die by netting, why quarter-end repo rates jump, and why sponsored clearing has grown. The sustainability feature is almost invisible in this calculation: the green discount is neutral as long as Meridian’s repo-out benefit matches it, and if it does not, RAROC falls from 12.5% to 11.0%. Pricing discipline, not the label, decides whether the green feature is sustainable for the bank.
What the desk decides. The repo trader takes three decisions to the head of financing. First, the programme is offered through sponsored clearing as the base case; bilateral trading is accepted only for the first roll while Lyra completes its onboarding with the CCP, and is priced higher if it continues. Second, the green discount is granted only for as long as the green funding benefit exists; the term sheet says that the discount is reviewed at each roll, so that Meridian does not end up paying for a label out of its own margin. Third, the trade is booked in the matched book with a three-month repo-out for at least half of the amount, which reduces the term mismatch and the FTP charge. None of these decisions is about sustainability; all of them determine whether the sustainable features can survive commercially. The head of financing also notes what the RAROC leaves out: the relationship value of being Lyra’s main counterparty for repo, lending and swaps, which shows partly in the ancillary revenue and partly in the information the desk gains about collateral flows.
Question. Counterparty credit risk asks the question that the UK gilt crisis of September 2022 made unavoidable: what happens to Lyra, and to Meridian’s exposure, if rates jump?
Data (case assumptions). Lyra’s receiver swaps have a DV01 of EUR 10m per basis point: a 1 bp rise in swap rates costs it EUR 10m of variation margin. The repo programme was sized to cover a 100 bp rise. The green bonds delivered to Meridian have a modified duration of 8, and Lyra’s unencumbered green and conventional government bonds amount to EUR 2,179.6m (EUR 3,200m of green bonds minus the EUR 1,020.4m delivered, used here as a proxy for its free liquidity buffer), with the same duration.
Calculation. For a parallel rise of , the variation margin is , the repo margin call is approximately , and the free buffer loses , where is the modified duration and the free buffer. For 100 bp: variation margin EUR 1,000m, exactly covered by the repo cash; repo margin call = EUR 81.633m; free buffer after the shock EUR 2,005.2m. Lyra must find EUR 81.6m beyond the repo cash and can do so comfortably. For 200 bp: variation margin EUR 2,000m, repo margin call EUR 163.3m, need beyond the repo cash EUR 1,163.3m, against a free buffer worth EUR 1,830.9m. Lyra survives, but must repo or sell 64% of its remaining bonds in a falling market.
INTERACTIVE LAB — A rate shock: swap margin, repo margin call and the pension fund’s free buffer
Compute the combined liquidity need of a pension fund running LDI swaps and a repo programme when rates rise, and compare it with its unencumbered bonds.
| Parameter you can move | Range | Default |
|---|---|---|
| Parallel rise in rates | 0 to 300 bp | 100 bp |
| Swap DV01 (variation margin per bp) | 1 to 30 EUR m | 10 EUR m |
| Repo cash already raised | 0 to 5000 EUR m | 1000 EUR m |
| Repo haircut | 0 to 10 % | 2 % |
| Modified duration of the bonds | 1 to 20 years | 8 years |
| Unencumbered bonds before the shock | 0 to 10000 EUR m | 2179.6 EUR m |
| Result at default settings | Value |
|---|---|
| Variation margin on swaps | 1,000.0 EUR m |
| Repo margin call | 81.633 EUR m |
| Liquidity need beyond the repo cash | 81.6 EUR m |
| Unencumbered bonds after the shock | 2,005.2 EUR m |
| Share of the free buffer consumed | 4.1 % |
Try it. Push the shock to 300 bp: the need beyond the repo cash exceeds the free buffer. This is the spiral of September 2022 in the UK, where LDI funds sold gilts to meet calls, pushing yields higher and triggering more calls until the Bank of England intervened.
Reading. Meridian is protected by the haircut and daily margining, as long as Lyra pays. Lyra is the one exposed to the spiral: its margin calls rise with rates while the value of its buffer falls. Credit risk draws three conclusions: keep the haircut at 2% but add a contractual right to raise it if Lyra’s free buffer falls below a threshold; monitor Lyra’s liquidity coverage of a 200 bp shock monthly; and avoid relying on green bonds only as top-up collateral, since the green share would fall fast in such a scenario. The green label adds nothing to this analysis, and it should not: a green Bund falls exactly as much as a conventional one when rates rise.
| Figure | Value | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Collateral required for EUR 1,000m at 2% haircut | EUR 1,020.408m | 5.2 |
| Repo rate paid by Lyra | 2.58% (€STR + 18 bp) | 5.2 |
| Interest per 91-day roll / per year | EUR 6.522m / EUR 26.158m | 5.2 |
| Meridian matched-book spread and revenue | 14 bp, EUR 1.419m | 5.2 |
| Green discount: value and share of Lyra’s cost | EUR 0.203m, 0.78% | 5.2 |
| Margin call after a 3% fall | EUR 30.612m | 5.3 |
| Green share after conventional top-up | 97.0% | 5.3 |
| ESG schedule: substituted collateral and cost | EUR 393.75m, EUR 1.181m | 5.4 |
| Add-on: extra collateral and cost | EUR 7.5m, EUR 0.034m | 5.4 |
| Total schedule cost, in bp of the loan | EUR 1.215m, 4.86 bp | 5.4 |
| Lyra’s lending fee if cost passed on | 15.14 bp (from 20 bp) | 5.4 |
| Leverage exposure: cash vs non-cash collateral | EUR 2,625m vs EUR 125m | 5.4 |
| Lending income lost: recall vs withholding | EUR 0.058m vs EUR 1.75m | 5.5 |
| E*, risk weight, RWA of the repo | EUR 8.453m, 11.21%, EUR 0.948m | 5.6 |
| Profit after tax (programme and ancillary) | EUR 0.904m | 5.6 |
| RAROC: RWA view / leverage bilateral / 80% netted | 236% / 2.57% / 12.46% | 5.6 |
| RAROC with 80% netting, no green funding benefit | 10.99% | 5.6 |
| 100 bp shock: repo margin call / free buffer after | EUR 81.633m / EUR 2,005.2m | 5.7 |
| 200 bp shock: need beyond repo cash / buffer used | EUR 1,163.3m / 63.5% | 5.7 |
IN ONE SENTENCE — For a collateralised financing trade, credit capital is computed on the exposure left after collateral and haircuts, which is usually tiny, while the leverage ratio counts the cash lent almost in full.
Counterparty credit risk. Repo and securities lending exposures are measured with the financial collateral comprehensive method (supervisory or own-estimate haircuts on both legs, as in section 5.6), with a repo VaR approach for netting sets where permitted, or with the internal model method for banks approved for it. Under F-IRB, exposures to financial-sector entities carry an LGD of 45% and repo-style transactions an effective maturity of 0.5 years; large financial-sector entities (total assets of EUR 70bn or more) and unregulated financial entities carry a 1.25 multiplier on asset correlation. Under the standardised approach, an unrated pension fund would be weighted 100% as a corporate, so Lyra’s E* of EUR 8.453m would give RWA of EUR 8.45m instead of EUR 0.95m: still small. Security-for-security trades, such as the equity loan of section 5.4, attract haircuts on both legs, and equities carry much larger supervisory haircuts than government bonds, so their E* is larger relative to the trade size than for a government bond repo. Trades with a qualifying CCP are weighted 2% for trade exposures, plus capital for the default fund contribution.
CVA and market risk. Fair-valued SFTs fall within CVA capital only where the competent authority judges the risk material, under criteria set by EBA technical standards. Prime brokerage’s synthetic book (TRS) is a derivatives book: counterparty risk under SA-CCR, and market risk on the hedge shares under the market-risk framework. In the EU the FRTB was postponed several times; on 4 June 2026 the Commission adopted a delegated act providing for application from 1 January 2027 with a temporary multiplier, for three years, to offset part of the capital impact on EU banks, subject to scrutiny by Parliament and Council (see E09).
Output floor. Where Meridian’s IRB RWA are bound by the output floor (50% of standardised RWA in 2025, 55% in 2026, rising to 72.5% in 2030), the standardised figure, here EUR 8.45m, becomes the reference at the margin. Either way, credit RWA on a well-collateralised repo stay small; the binding constraint is the balance sheet.
The table below repeats the bilateral and netted versions of section 5.6.
| Line (EUR m per year) | Bilateral | 80% netted |
|---|---|---|
| Spread revenue (14 bp) | 1.419 | 1.419 |
| FTP charge (1.5 bp) | -0.150 | -0.150 |
| Operating costs (30%) | -0.381 | -0.381 |
| Expected loss | -0.003 | -0.003 |
| Ancillary revenue net of costs | 0.320 | 0.320 |
| Profit after tax (25%) | 0.904 | 0.904 |
| Allocated capital | 35.26 | 7.26 |
| RAROC | 2.57% | 12.46% |
The sustainable features act on three lines. Revenue: the green discount (2 bp) is neutral if matched by the green funding benefit; otherwise it costs EUR 0.203m and 1.5 points of RAROC in the netted case. Costs: the green annex and monthly green-share reporting require legal time and a tri-party profile; Meridian, like most banks, does not charge them to the trade. Capital: none of the sustainable features changes RWA or leverage exposure, and CRR3 contains no green supporting factor (see E02). The securities lending leg is separate: the ESG schedule costs Meridian EUR 1.215m before any pass-through, which on a 12 bp spread business of EUR 3.0m a year is material; it is why Meridian pushes the cost back to Lyra.
Leverage ratio. The EU minimum is 3% of Tier 1 over total exposure, plus a buffer for G-SIIs. For SFTs the exposure is the gross receivable, with netting of cash payables and receivables with the same counterparty only when strict conditions are met (same explicit final settlement date, legally enforceable right to set off, settlement through a system that achieves net settlement), plus a counterparty add-on equal to the excess of what was given over what was received. Repo matched books are the most leverage-intensive business in a bank per euro of revenue, which explains internal balance-sheet charges, quarter-end window effects and the growth of CCP clearing.
NSFR. A three-month reverse repo with a financial customer secured by Level 1 assets requires 0% stable funding under the EU transitional rule maintained by Regulation (EU) 2025/1215, against 10% in the Basel standard. For non-Level 1 collateral the EU applies 5% instead of 15%.
INTERACTIVE LAB — What the EU NSFR carve-out for short-term repo is worth
Compute the stable funding required by a short-term reverse repo with a financial customer under the EU rule and under the Basel standard, and its annual cost.
| Parameter you can move | Range | Default |
|---|---|---|
| Reverse repo with a financial customer (under 6 months) | 100 to 10000 EUR m | 1000 EUR m |
| Collateral is Level 1 HQLA (1 = yes, 0 = no) | 1 / 0 | 1 |
| Cost of stable funding over short-term funding | 0 to 100 bp | 30 bp |
| Matched-book spread on the trade | 0 to 50 bp | 14 bp |
| Result at default settings | Value |
|---|---|
| Required stable funding, EU rule | 0.0 EUR m |
| Required stable funding, Basel standard | 100.0 EUR m |
| Annual cost, EU rule | 0.000 EUR m |
| Annual cost, Basel standard | 0.300 EUR m |
| Basel cost as share of spread revenue | 21.1 % |
Try it. Switch to non-Level 1 collateral (for example corporate bonds): even the EU rule now costs EUR 0.15m a year, and the Basel rule would absorb about a third of the spread.
Under the Basel standard, the Lyra repo would need EUR 100m of stable funding; at a premium of 30 bp (Meridian’s five-year liquidity premium, used as the cost of stable funding), EUR 0.3m a year, 21% of the spread revenue. The EU carve-out is therefore worth more to this desk than any green feature. LCR: the reverse repo generates an inflow only in its last 30 days, and a repo-out against Level 1 collateral creates no outflow, so a matched book in government bonds is close to neutral for the LCR; a mismatch where Meridian lends against non-HQLA and borrows against HQLA consumes LCR. FTP: Treasury charges the desk for term mismatches (1.5 bp in the case) and, increasingly, for leverage usage directly, in basis points of leverage exposure.
Under IFRS 9 a repo does not derecognise the securities: the seller retains substantially all risks and rewards, because it must buy them back at a fixed price and receives manufactured coupons. Lyra therefore keeps its green bonds on its balance sheet, shows them as pledged, and records the cash received as a liability. Meridian records a receivable (a “reverse repo” asset), at amortised cost if it is held to collect, or at fair value through profit or loss if the matched book is held for trading or managed on a fair value basis, which is common for dealer books. The collateral received is not recognised; if Meridian sells it short, it records a liability to return it. In securities lending, the borrowed shares are not recognised by Meridian and the posted collateral is not derecognised. IAS 32 allows offsetting of repo receivables and payables only with a legally enforceable right and an intention to settle net or simultaneously, which CCP-cleared repo often meets and bilateral repo rarely does; offsetting is the accounting side of the netting that drives the leverage figure. IFRS 7 requires disclosure of transferred assets not derecognised and of collateral pledged and received; the bank’s asset-encumbrance reporting tracks the same flows.
Green Asset Ratio. The GAR measures the taxonomy alignment of the bank’s financing, based on the counterparty and the use of proceeds, not on collateral. A reverse repo with a pension fund is a financing to a financial undertaking; its contribution to the numerator depends on the counterparty’s own taxonomy KPIs, if any, not on the green bonds received, and trading assets are excluded from both the numerator and the denominator. Since Delegated Regulation (EU) 2026/73 (published 8 January 2026, applicable from 1 January 2026), exposures to undertakings outside CSRD scope also leave both; on 29 October 2026 the EBA advised the Commission to simplify the GAR templates further, advice not yet acted on (see E06). In short, the repo programme does not move Meridian’s GAR, and should not.
Pillar 3 ESG. The EBA’s Pillar 3 ESG templates focus on banking-book exposures to non-financial corporates and real estate (the GAR templates are stopped for large institutions under the EBA’s final draft of 22 June 2026, not yet adopted); reverse repos with financial counterparties play little role. Financed emissions (PCAF). The PCAF standard covers asset classes such as listed equity and bonds, loans, project finance, real estate and sovereign debt; to our knowledge it provides no dedicated method for repo or securities lending, and banks generally leave short-term SFTs out of financed emissions or disclose them separately. Attributing the emissions of the collateral issuer to the cash lender would be wrong: the cash lender has a claim on Lyra, not on the issuers. Where sustainability does appear is qualitative: the bank’s report may describe ESG collateral services and green-collateral programmes, and must then avoid presenting them as sustainable financing volumes, which would be double counting with the issuers’ green bonds.
| Risk | Control | Owner |
|---|---|---|
| Counterparty default with collateral shortfall | Haircut grid, daily margining, close-out netting opinions | Counterparty credit risk |
| Client liquidity spiral (LDI-type) | Shock tests of client buffers, haircut step-up clause | Credit risk, sales |
| Wrong-way risk (own or sponsor’s bonds) | Eligibility exclusions, concentration limits | Credit risk |
| Hidden leverage across brokers (Archegos-type) | Concentration and liquidity add-ons, client disclosure of exposures elsewhere | Prime services margin team |
| Recall failure before a record date | Recall calendar, service level, buy-in procedures | Securities lending desk |
| Erosion of green collateral share | Green top-up preference, monthly green-share report | Margin operations, sustainable finance |
| ESG schedule breach (excluded collateral posted) | Data feed controls at tri-party, substitution window | Collateral management |
| Mislabelling (“green repo” for green collateral only) | Labelling policy, review by sustainable finance team | Sustainable finance, compliance |
| Double counting of green assets | Disclosure rule: collateral giver reports the green bond | Finance, sustainability reporting |
| SFTR misreporting, re-use without consent | Reconciliations, Art. 15 consent records | Regulatory reporting, legal |
| Balance-sheet overuse at quarter-end | Internal balance-sheet charge, limits by desk | Treasury |
Red-flag checklist for a “sustainable” financing trade.
What changed recently. Climate risk moved from voluntary ESG schedules into central bank collateral frameworks in 2026, which gives private schedules a methodological anchor (transition-risk haircuts rather than ethical exclusions only). The NSFR carve-out became durable in the EU. FRTB has a date.
Open debates. Should green collateral receive better regulatory treatment (lower haircuts, HQLA benefits)? Most supervisors and many market participants say no: risk-based haircuts should reflect risk, and a green label does not change price volatility. Is green-collateral repo greenwashing or market plumbing for green bonds? Both views are held; the defensible position is to call it what it is. Should lenders lend at all? The evidence suggests that recall policies give most of the stewardship benefit at a small fraction of the cost.
INTERACTIVE LAB — Repo, securities financing and prime services: self-assessment
Check the mechanics, the sustainable layer and the bank-side economics of the module.
Q1. In a repo under the GMRA, who owns the collateral during the trade?
Answer: B. The GMRA transfers title; the buyer must return equivalent securities at maturity, while coupons are manufactured back to the seller.
Q2. A 2% haircut corresponds to an initial margin ratio of about:
Answer: C. Initial margin = 1/(1 - h) = 1/0.98 = 102.04%.
Q3. Why does the seller in a repo keep the bond on its balance sheet under IFRS 9?
Answer: B. The fixed repurchase price and manufactured coupons leave the risks and rewards with the seller, so derecognition fails.
Q4. According to ICMA’s 2022 paper, a repo against green bonds as collateral:
Answer: B. The bonds’ proceeds were allocated at issuance; repoing them finances the holder, not new green assets.
Q5. When did the ECB introduce its climate factor in the collateral framework?
Answer: C. Announced on 29 July 2025, introduced on 15 June 2026 for non-financial corporate bonds; 31 October 2026 is the Bank of England date.
Q6. In the Lyra case, why would Meridian not post cash collateral to avoid the ESG screen?
Answer: B. Cash posted is a receivable on the balance sheet; with non-cash collateral only the EUR 125m over-collateralisation counts.
Q7. The Lyra repo earns 236% RAROC on RWA and 2.6% on leverage capital. Which statement is right?
Answer: B. Credit RWA after collateral are tiny; the leverage exposure counts the cash in full, so it drives allocated capital.
Q8. Which change most improves the RAROC of the Lyra repo?
Answer: B. Netting cuts leverage capital from EUR 35m to EUR 7m and lifts RAROC from 2.6% to 12.5%.
Q9. What is the EU NSFR factor for a reverse repo under six months with a financial customer secured by Level 1 assets?
Answer: A. The EU kept 0% (5% for other collateral) through Regulation (EU) 2025/1215; Basel sets 10% and 15%.
Q10. In the case, Lyra’s recall policy costs about:
Answer: C. EUR 2,500m x 35% x 20 bp x 12/365 = EUR 57,500, 1.15% of EUR 5.0m; withholding would cost 35%.
Q11. Who should report a green bond used as repo collateral as its green holding?
Answer: C. The seller keeps the asset on balance sheet; counting it at the buyer as well would be double counting.
Q12. Which exclusions do many ESG collateral schedules borrow?
Answer: A. PAB exclusions (controversial weapons, tobacco, UNGC breaches, fossil fuel revenue thresholds) are a ready-made list used by many funds.
Q13. A total return swap gives a hedge fund the economics of a long share position. Who holds the voting rights of the hedge shares?
Answer: B. The bank owns the hedge shares and votes them, or not, under its own policy; the fund has only a contractual exposure.
Q14. In the stress test, why is Lyra exposed to a liquidity spiral when rates rise?
Answer: B. Rising rates create margin needs on both the swaps and the repo and shrink the buffer used to meet them, as in the UK in September 2022.
A hedge fund repos EUR 500m (market value) of investment-grade corporate bonds to a bank for 30 days at €STR + 35 bp, with €STR at 2.00% and a haircut of 5%. Compute the cash received, the repurchase price, and the margin call if the bonds fall 4% (ignore accrued repo interest).
Solution. Cash = EUR 475m. Rate 2.35%; interest = EUR 0.930m; repurchase price EUR 475.930m. After a 4% fall the bonds are worth EUR 480m against EUR 500m required, so the bank calls EUR 20m. The haircut covers a 5% fall before the bank is under-collateralised, which is why corporate bonds carry larger haircuts than government bonds.
An insurer lends EUR 1,000m of bonds to a bank at 12 bp a year and requires collateral at 104% excluding issuers on its fossil-fuel list. 20% of the bank’s usual collateral pool fails the screen; the funding differential is 25 bp; there is no add-on. Compute the annual cost, its fee equivalent, and the leverage exposure if the bank posted cash instead.
Solution. Collateral ; substituted ; cost = EUR 0.52m, or 5.2 bp of the loan. If passed on in full, the insurer’s fee falls from 12 bp to 6.8 bp, a loss of 43% of its income. With cash collateral the bank’s leverage exposure would be EUR 1,040m; with non-cash collateral it is the EUR 40m excess of collateral over the loan.
A bank lends EUR 500m in reverse repo at a spread of 10 bp (act/360, 365 days), with no FTP charge, cost-income of 30%, negligible expected loss, no ancillary revenue, tax of 25% and capital of 3.5% of leverage exposure. Compute the RAROC bilaterally and with 90% netting, and the spread needed to reach 12% bilaterally.
Solution. Revenue = EUR 0.507m; costs EUR 0.152m; profit after tax = EUR 0.266m. Capital = EUR 17.5m: RAROC 1.52%. With 90% netting, capital EUR 1.75m: RAROC 15.2%. For 12% bilaterally, profit after tax must be EUR 2.1m, so revenue EUR 4.0m, a spread of = 78.9 bp. No client pays that for a government bond repo, so bilateral repo of this kind only works for a bank whose leverage ratio is not binding, or with netting.
1. Walk me through a repo. A repo is a sale of securities for cash with an agreement to buy them back at a fixed price on a later date, so economically a secured loan. Title passes to the buyer, who can re-use the securities but must return equivalent ones, and coupons are manufactured back. The cash lent is the market value less a haircut, and both sides margin daily. The repo rate is the price of secured cash, quoted against €STR in euro, and is lower for collateral in demand.
2. Why is a repo book constrained by the leverage ratio rather than by RWA? Collateral and haircuts reduce the counterparty exposure to almost nothing, so credit RWA are small. The leverage ratio counts the cash lent in full and recognises collateral only through a narrow add-on. A matched book therefore uses a lot of balance sheet for a thin spread. That is why desks seek netting through CCPs and why quarter-end rates jump.
3. Is a repo against green bonds a green financing? Not by itself. The bonds’ proceeds were allocated when they were issued; the repo finances the holder for whatever it needs. It supports the liquidity of green bonds, which is useful, but it should be described as a repo against green collateral. A use-of-proceeds commitment on the cash, with tracking across rolls, would be needed to call it green financing.
4. A pension fund asks you for an ESG collateral schedule on its lending programme. What do you tell it? First, what it buys: assurance that it would not end up owning excluded assets after a borrower default, and consistency with its fund rules. Second, what it costs: borrowers must replace excluded collateral, and they pass the cost back through lower fees; I would quantify it from the borrower’s collateral pool. Third, the design choices: exclusion list, refresh frequency, substitution window, and possibly transition-risk add-ons, which have a risk rationale.
5. Does securities lending conflict with stewardship? Partly: lent shares cannot be voted and they enable short selling. But a recall policy before record dates gives most of the voting benefit at a small cost, around 1% of lending income in our case against 35% for not lending. Industry guidance says shares should not be borrowed to vote. The practical issue is operational: recalls must arrive in time, especially with T+1 settlement coming in the EU in October 2027.
6. What has the ECB done on climate and collateral? It announced a climate factor in July 2025 and introduced it on 15 June 2026. The factor reduces the collateral value of non-financial corporate bonds, after the normal haircut, according to transition-risk exposure, issuer climate score and maturity. The immediate effect is limited because corporate bonds are a small share of pledged collateral. For a bank it reduces central bank borrowing capacity on certain bonds and gives private collateral takers a template.
7. What did Archegos teach prime brokers? That leverage given through total return swaps can be concentrated and hidden across several banks, each seeing only its own slice. Margin models based on the bank’s own exposure missed the concentration and the liquidity of exiting very large positions. Prime brokers now apply concentration and liquidity add-ons and ask clients about exposures elsewhere. It is a reminder that collateral protects only if it can be liquidated at the assumed price.
8. How does the EU NSFR treatment of repo affect the desk? Short-term reverse repos with financial customers secured by Level 1 assets need 0% stable funding in the EU, against 10% under Basel, and 5% instead of 15% for other collateral. The EU kept these values beyond June 2025 through Regulation (EU) 2025/1215. For a EUR 1bn trade, the Basel factor would cost about EUR 0.3m a year at a 30 bp funding premium, a fifth of a typical matched-book spread. The carve-out matters more to the desk’s economics than any green feature.
Standards, market bodies and market data
Central banks and supervisors
EU legislation
Further reading