IN ONE SENTENCE — A depositary is the bank that holds a fund’s assets, watches every euro of its cash, and checks, on behalf of the investors, that the management company runs the fund within the law and within its own rules.
Where it sits. At Meridian Bank the depositary is one of the product lines of Securities Services, alongside custody and clearing (see D01), fund administration (see D02), asset servicing (see D04), data and analytics (see D05) and issuer services (see D06). It is legally a function of the bank itself: European law requires that the depositary of a UCITS be a credit institution, a national central bank or another entity authorised for that purpose, and in practice almost all depositaries of European funds are banks or bank subsidiaries. The legal entity matters because the depositary’s liability falls on the balance sheet of that entity.
Clients. The direct client is the fund, represented by its management company (in France a société de gestion de portefeuille; in Luxembourg a ManCo or AIFM). Every UCITS must have one depositary, and so must every AIF managed by an authorised AIFM. The scale is large. At the end of June 2026 EU UCITS managed about EUR 15,265bn according to ESMA’s Green Finance Dashboard (EUR 9,103bn in Article 8 funds, EUR 337bn in Article 9 funds and EUR 5,825bn in the rest). Every one of those euros has a depositary checking it. Clients range from the in-house asset manager of the banking group to independent boutiques, insurers’ asset managers and private-equity and real-estate AIFMs.
How it earns money. Depositary is a fee business. The bank charges a depositary (oversight) fee in basis points of net asset value, a safekeeping fee on assets held in custody, a fee per transaction settled, and earns a margin on the fund’s cash deposited with it. Revenues on a large equity UCITS are a few basis points of assets a year; on a EUR 1.2bn fund, the case of this module, the total is about EUR 0.56m (section 5.8). The business makes its money on volume and automation: once the control platform exists, adding a fund costs little, which is why the market is concentrated in a few large banks per country.
The team. A depositary department is organised around the three duties.
| Team | Main task | Typical documents |
|---|---|---|
| Depositary control | Oversight of the management company | Control plan, exception log |
| Investment compliance | Investment rules and ratios | Daily or weekly breach report |
| Custody | Safekeeping, sub-custodian network | Holdings statements, reconciliations |
| Cash monitoring | All cash flows of the fund | Cash reconciliation, alerts |
| Client service | Onboarding, fees, escalations | Depositary agreement, SLA |
Around it work operational risk (loss data, scenarios, capital), legal (depositary agreements, liability), compliance (the bank’s own conduct), the sub-custody network management team (see D01) and, crucially, the management company’s own teams: its compliance officer, its risk manager and its portfolio managers.
A realistic week. On Monday the investment compliance team reviews the weekend batch: about 150 rules for each of 400 funds, run on Friday’s positions. Most alerts are false positives (stale prices, a corporate action not yet booked). Tuesday is onboarding day: a new Article 8 fund launches in December and the controller translates its pre-contractual annex into rules in the monitoring engine. On Wednesday the cash team chases an unexplained outflow from a real-estate AIF’s account held at another bank. Thursday brings the quarterly meeting with a management company’s compliance officer, where open breaches are reviewed one by one. On Friday afternoon a new ESG data file arrives from the vendor; one issuer has lost its “sustainable investment” flag, and three funds now sit closer to their minimum than on Monday. That is where the case of this module begins.
WHY IT MATTERS ON THE DESK — The depositary is the only actor in the fund chain that is independent of the manager, sees the assets and the cash directly, and is legally obliged to act on irregularities. When a fund promises “at least 40% sustainable investments”, the depositary is the first party outside the management company able to notice that the promise is no longer kept.
Depositary and trustee. In common-law jurisdictions (United Kingdom, Ireland for unit trusts, Hong Kong) the same role is often called trustee, because the assets of a unit trust are legally owned by the trustee for the benefit of the unitholders. The duties are close to those of an EU depositary; the legal basis differs. Corporate trustees of bond issues, which represent bondholders against an issuer, are a different job, covered in D06.
The UCITS Directive (Directive 2009/65/EC as amended by UCITS V, Directive 2014/91/EU, applicable since March 2016) and the AIFM Directive (Directive 2011/61/EU) give the depositary three duties. Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2016/438 for UCITS and Delegated Regulation (EU) No 231/2013 for AIFs set out the details.
Safekeeping. For financial instruments that can be held in custody (securities that can be registered in an account), the depositary holds them in segregated accounts in the name of the fund, directly or through sub-custodians. For other assets (real estate, private-company shares, OTC derivatives), it verifies ownership and keeps an up-to-date record. The distinction is fundamental because the liability regime differs.
Cash monitoring. The depositary must see every cash flow of the fund, including cash held at other banks, reconcile the cash accounts and investigate any flow it cannot explain. Cash monitoring is the defence against the simplest fraud: money leaving the fund for an account it should not reach.
Oversight. Under Article 22(3) of the UCITS Directive the depositary ensures that subscriptions and redemptions, the calculation of the net asset value, the application of income and the settlement of transactions comply with the law and the fund rules, and it carries out the instructions of the management company unless they conflict with the law or the fund rules. Delegated Regulation 2016/438 turns this into practice: at appointment the depositary assesses the risks of the fund’s strategy and of the management company’s organisation and builds proportionate oversight procedures; it performs ex-post verifications; it monitors investment restrictions and leverage limits; and it must have a clear and comprehensive escalation procedure for discrepancies.
INTUITION — The depositary is a combination of a safe, a bank statement and an auditor who visits every week. The safe protects the securities, the statement shows every euro that moves, and the auditor checks that what the manager did is what the fund documents allow.
Liability. Here the depositary differs from every other service provider in the fund chain.
FORMULA
is the amount the depositary must pay the fund; is the value of financial instruments held in custody that have been lost, by the depositary or by a sub-custodian, which the depositary must restore with identical instruments or the corresponding amount without undue delay; it escapes only by proving an external event beyond its reasonable control whose consequences were unavoidable. covers all other losses caused by the depositary’s negligent or intentional failure to fulfil its obligations, for example a failure of oversight.
For a UCITS this liability cannot be excluded or limited by contract, and delegating custody to a sub-custodian does not transfer it. Under the AIFM Directive a contractual transfer of liability to a sub-custodian is possible under strict conditions. The first term is strict liability: no fault is needed. The second is classic fault-based liability. The ESG oversight of this module sits entirely in the second term: if a fund breaches its sustainability commitment, the depositary owes nothing because the breach occurred; it may owe something if it failed to detect or escalate it properly.
PITFALL — Students often say that the depositary “guarantees” the fund. It guarantees only the restitution of custody assets. It does not guarantee performance, compliance or the absence of errors by the manager. Its oversight is ex post and based on samples and rules, and the manager remains responsible for compliance.
Investment compliance is the part of oversight that this module develops. Each fund has rules from three sources: the law (for a UCITS, the 5/10/40 diversification rule, the 20% limit on deposits with one bank, eligible assets), the fund rules and prospectus (investment policy, permitted instruments, sector limits), and, for Article 8 and 9 funds, the binding elements of the SFDR pre-contractual annex.
The depositary codes each rule in a monitoring engine as a test on positions:
FORMULA
is the share of the fund in the set of assets that the rule targets (for example sustainable investments) at date ; is the quantity of asset held; its price; equals one if the asset belongs to the set and zero otherwise; is the net asset value; the limit, a minimum (sustainable share at least 40%) or a maximum (one issuer at most 10%).
Three things can move : prices (a market move), quantities (a trade or a subscription), and the indicator itself (a reclassification by a data provider or by the manager’s methodology). The first and the third are not decisions of the manager; the second usually is. That is the root of the distinction between passive and active breaches, which section 5 applies.
The monitoring is ex post: the depositary tests positions after trades, typically on a T+1 basis using the fund administrator’s positions. The manager’s own compliance system works pre-trade, blocking orders that would breach a limit. The two systems should agree; when they do not, the difference is itself a finding.
The fee schedule is set in the depositary agreement and disclosed, in aggregate, in the fund’s ongoing charges.
INTERACTIVE LAB — What a depositary mandate earns, and why scale matters
Build the annual revenue of a depositary mandate from its fee lines and compare it with a cost base that has a fixed and a variable part.
| Parameter you can move | Range | Default |
|---|---|---|
| Fund net asset value | 100 to 5000 EUR m | 1200 EUR m |
| Depositary (oversight) fee | 0.5 to 5 bp of NAV | 2.5 bp of NAV |
| Safekeeping fee | 0.2 to 3 bp of assets | 1.0 bp of assets |
| Transactions settled a year | 500 to 20000 number | 3000 number |
| Fee per transaction | 5 to 40 EUR | 15 EUR |
| Cash held at the depositary | 0 to 10 % of NAV | 2 % of NAV |
| Margin on that cash after FTP | 0 to 50 bp | 20 bp |
| Fixed cost of serving the fund | 50 to 500 EUR k | 150 EUR k |
| Result at default settings | Value |
|---|---|
| Annual revenue | 513.0 EUR k |
| Revenue in bp of NAV | 4.275 bp |
| Annual cost (fixed + 30% of revenue) | 303.9 EUR k |
| Cost-income ratio | 59.2 % |
Try it. Divide the NAV by three: revenue falls almost proportionally but the fixed cost does not, and the cost-income ratio rises above 100%. That is why small funds pay minimum fees.
At the default values the core mandate earns EUR 513k a year, 4.275 bp of NAV, before any ESG service; with a fixed cost of EUR 150k and variable costs at 30% of revenue the cost-income ratio is about 59%, close to the 60% that Meridian uses for fee businesses. Two features dominate the economics. Revenue is proportional to assets, so it moves with markets: a 20% fall in equity prices cuts the fees of an equity fund by about 20% with no change in the work. Costs are largely fixed per fund and per rule, so small funds are unprofitable without a minimum fee, and the industry consolidates.
WHO DOES WHAT — When a management company tenders its depositary mandate, the bid is assessed on the fee grid, the quality of the control reports, the escalation culture and the sub-custody network. Depositaries rarely lose a mandate on price alone; they lose it after a dispute about a breach that was escalated badly, too late or too loudly.
The depositary agreement (in France the convention dépositaire) is a legal requirement: it sets the information flows between the management company and the depositary, the control plan, the escalation procedure, the fees and the liability provisions within the limits of the law. The service level agreement fixes timings (positions by 10:00 on T+1, breach notices within one business day). The control plan lists every rule tested, its source, its frequency and the data used. The onboarding due diligence on the management company assesses its organisation, its compliance function and its risk management. The annual depositary report to the management company, and in some jurisdictions to the board of the fund or to the supervisor, summarises controls and exceptions. In France the AMF’s instruction DOC-2016-01 sets the information that depositaries provide to the AMF, including the reporting of anomalies and irregularities.
Nothing in the depositary’s legal duties mentions sustainability. What changed is the content of the fund rules. Since SFDR (Regulation (EU) 2019/2088) applied in March 2021, and especially since the regulatory technical standards (Delegated Regulation (EU) 2022/1288) introduced mandatory pre-contractual templates from January 2023, an Article 8 or 9 fund publishes an annex to its prospectus with binding elements: minimum proportions (of investments aligned with the promoted characteristics, of sustainable investments, of taxonomy-aligned investments), exclusions, rating thresholds, and sometimes carbon-intensity targets relative to a benchmark. These annexes are part of the prospectus, therefore part of the fund documentation that the depositary must check the manager respects.
The industry reading, which Meridian follows, is that the binding elements of the annex are investment restrictions like any other and are therefore within the scope of oversight under Article 22(3) and Delegated Regulation 2016/438. No text says so expressly. The depositary agreement therefore spells out which ESG elements are monitored, with which data, at which frequency, and what the depositary cannot verify (for example the quality of the manager’s own assessment of “do no significant harm”).
IN ONE SENTENCE — ESG monitoring by a depositary is an ex-post test of the fund’s binding ESG commitments, using the manager’s classification or an independent data source, with the same escalation rules as any other investment restriction.
| Rule family | Source | Example | Data needed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Minimum proportions | SFDR annex | At least 40% sustainable investments | Issuer-level SI flag |
| Exclusions | Annex, fund-name guidelines | No coal revenue at or above 1% | Revenue breakdown by activity |
| Scores and ratings | Annex | No issuer rated CCC | Vendor ESG rating |
| Portfolio metrics | Annex | Carbon intensity 30% below index | Emissions, revenue, index data |
Each family has its own difficulty. Proportions depend on a flag that the manager defines (SFDR leaves the methodology for sustainable investments to the manager, within the Article 2(17) definition: contribution to an environmental or social objective, no significant harm, good governance). Exclusions depend on revenue data that are often one year old. Scores differ between vendors. Portfolio metrics depend on emissions data with gaps and estimates (see A03).
The ESMA Guidelines on funds’ names using ESG or sustainability-related terms (final report of 14 May 2024, published in all languages on 21 August 2024) apply to new funds from 21 November 2024 and to existing funds from 21 May 2025. They convert a name into quantitative rules that a depositary can test.
ESMA’s analysis published in December 2025 found that among 924 funds of the 25 largest EU managers whose investor notices referred to the guidelines, 65% (600) changed name, and 61% of those removed all ESG terms; 475 funds added exclusions, mostly the PAB list. The Green Finance Dashboard counts 4,034 EU funds with an ESG term in their name in June 2026, 13.4% of the population; in the second quarter of 2026, 35 funds removed an ESG term and 9 added one.
PITFALL — The 80% threshold is not a sustainable-investment threshold. A “Sustainable” fund can meet the 80% test with investments that merely promote characteristics, provided it also invests “meaningfully” in sustainable investments. The two tests are different rules in the monitoring engine and can be breached separately.
ESMA coordinates. Its Common Supervisory Action on sustainability risks and disclosures, launched in 2023 with the national authorities, closed with a final report on 30 June 2025: compliance was described as overall satisfactory, with recurring weaknesses such as generic claims, inconsistencies between pre-contractual, periodic, website and marketing documents, and unclear criteria for sustainable investments. A thematic note of 1 July 2025 set four principles for sustainability claims (accurate, accessible, substantiated, up to date); two further notes on impact claims and on climate transition claims followed on 12 October 2026.
National authorities enforce. In France the AMF supervises management companies and depositaries; it applies the ESMA guidelines alongside its own doctrine on the information provided by funds with non-financial approaches (DOC-2020-03). On 24 September 2026 it updated its depositary doctrine (instruction DOC-2016-01 and its guide for depositaries of UCITS and AIFs): depositaries must have procedures for detected irregularities, including reporting to the competent authority when a situation cannot be rectified, and report to the AMF each quarter the significant anomalies and irregularities, using a table annexed to the instruction. In Luxembourg, CSSF Circular 24/856, applicable since 1 January 2025, governs NAV calculation errors and breaches of investment rules, with the distinction between active and passive breaches and investor compensation.
Enforcement shows the stakes, although on the manager’s side. In September 2023 the US SEC fined DWS USD 19m for misstatements about its ESG process; in April 2025 DWS accepted a EUR 25m fine from the Frankfurt public prosecutor’s office to close the German greenwashing investigation. Both cases concern a manager, not a depositary. The question nonetheless reaches the depositary whenever a manager is sanctioned: what did it see, and what did it do?
AIFMD II (Directive (EU) 2024/927) had to be transposed by 16 April 2026. For depositaries it allows Member States, by derogation and with prior approval of the fund’s authority, to let an AIF appoint a depositary established in another Member State where local depositary services are lacking (the home market’s depositary assets must not exceed EUR 50bn); it does not apply to UCITS. It also clarifies the position of central securities depositories in the custody chain.
SFDR 2.0. The Commission’s proposal of 20 November 2025 replaces the de facto Article 8/9 labels with three categories: Transition (Article 7), ESG Basics (Article 8) and Sustainable (Article 9), each with at least 70% of assets meeting the category’s objective and with exclusions. The Council adopted its negotiating mandate on 24 June 2026, the Parliament’s ECON committee its report on 10 September 2026 and the plenary its mandate on 5 October 2026; the first trilogue was scheduled for 22 October 2026, no agreement had been reached by mid-November 2026, and application is expected around 2029. For the depositary the reform is good news and bad news: category thresholds will be legal rules, easier to test than self-defined commitments, but every Article 8 and 9 fund in the book will have to be re-mapped, and the minimum sustainable-investment commitments that this module’s case relies on will be replaced by category tests.
WHY IT MATTERS ON THE DESK — The sustainable layer adds rules, not a new duty. A depositary that monitors “at least 40% sustainable investments” uses the same engine, the same escalation and the same liability as for “at most 10% per issuer”. What differs is data: the depositary cannot see sustainability in a holdings file, and the classification it tests is produced by the party it is supposed to control.
The “deal” of a depositary is a mandate that lasts for the life of the fund, usually many years. Its lifecycle has two loops: the onboarding of the fund, done once, and the control cycle, repeated every day, week and month. The flow below follows a new Article 8 fund from tender to its first ESG breach.
INTERACTIVE LAB — From tender to breach: the life of a depositary mandate with ESG rules
Follow who does what, and which document comes out, from the selection of the depositary to the escalation of an ESG breach.
| # | Who | Does what | Deliverable |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Management company (COO, legal) | Issues a request for proposal for depositary, custody and fund administration of a new Article 8 fund | RFP and draft prospectus with SFDR annex |
| 2 | Depositary client service and pricing | Answers the RFP with fee grid, control approach and sub-custody coverage | Proposal and fee schedule |
| 3 | Depositary onboarding and compliance | Performs due diligence on the management company: organisation, compliance, risk, ESG methodology | Onboarding due-diligence report |
| 4 | Depositary control (oversight) | Assesses the risks of the strategy and maps every binding element of the prospectus and SFDR annex to a testable rule | Control plan and rule matrix |
| 5 | Legal (both sides) | Negotiate the depositary agreement and the SLA, including ESG data flows and what the depositary cannot verify | Signed depositary agreement and SLA |
| 6 | Investment compliance analyst | Codes the rules in the monitoring engine and tests them on the launch portfolio | Rule set validated on a test run |
| 7 | Management company | Launches the fund; the depositary issues its attestation and starts safekeeping and cash monitoring | First NAV and custody statements |
| 8 | Investment compliance analyst | Runs the weekly ESG rules on positions and the manager’s sustainable-investment flags | Weekly exception report |
| 9 | Investment compliance analyst | Investigates an alert, rules out data errors and notifies the manager’s compliance officer | Breach notice with evidence |
| 10 | Manager’s compliance officer and portfolio manager | Explain the cause and propose a remediation plan with deadline | Breach qualification and remediation plan |
| 11 | Depositary control head | Agrees or challenges the qualification, follows the remediation and checks any compensation paid to the fund | Breach file closed or escalated |
| 12 | Depositary management and legal | Escalates a breach not remedied in time to the management company’s senior management and to the AMF | Formal letter and AMF notification |
| 13 | Depositary control | Reports significant anomalies of the quarter to the AMF and includes the case in the annual depositary report | Quarterly AMF table and annual report |
Tender and onboarding. The management company selects its depositary, usually within a package with custody and fund administration. The depositary’s onboarding team performs due diligence on the management company. The AMF has repeatedly asked depositaries to strengthen this step, because an under-resourced manager is the main predictor of later breaches. For an Article 8 or 9 fund the due diligence includes the ESG methodology: who defines a sustainable investment, with which data, and who validates changes.
Mapping the rules. The control plan is the core document. Every binding element is transcribed into a rule with five attributes: the text it comes from, the formula, the data source, the frequency and the limit. The pre-contractual annex of the case fund contains four binding elements; the control plan has six rules, because the “sustainable” name adds the ESMA tests. Ambiguities (“predominantly”, “at least two thirds of the equity portion”) are resolved here, in writing, with the manager. A rule that is ambiguous at onboarding will be disputed at the first breach.
Agreement and SLA. The depositary agreement fixes what the manager sends (positions, the list of sustainable investments with its methodology, changes in methodology), when, and what the depositary does with it. A key clause is the data reliance provision: the depositary tests the manager’s classification for consistency and spot-checks it against an independent vendor, but does not re-perform the manager’s assessment of sustainability. This clause draws the boundary of the depositary’s fault-based liability.
The control cycle. The analyst runs the rules, investigates alerts and sends breach notices. The manager qualifies the breach and remedies it. The depositary agrees or challenges, follows the remediation, checks the compensation and, if the situation cannot be corrected, escalates to the authority. Each step leaves a document, because the depositary’s defence in any later claim will be its file.
WHO DOES WHAT — The investment compliance analyst’s real skill is triage. Of a hundred alerts, about ninety are data artefacts. The analyst who escalates all of them loses credibility with the manager; the analyst who dismisses the hundredth commits the failure that the depositary’s liability regime punishes.
Question. What exactly has the fund promised, and how does the depositary turn it into numbers it can test?
Data (case assumptions). Aurelia Europe Sustainable Equity is a French SICAV authorised as a UCITS, managed by Aurelia Asset Management, a fictional mid-sized Paris management company. Meridian Bank Securities Services is its depositary, custodian and fund administrator. The fund holds about 85 European equities. On Thursday 10 September 2026 its NAV is EUR 1,200m. It discloses under Article 8 SFDR, and its pre-contractual annex contains four binding elements:
Because the name contains “Sustainable”, the ESMA guidelines add the 80% test (already element 1), the PAB exclusions (already element 3) and the “meaningful” sustainable-investment requirement, which the 40% minimum satisfies. Aurelia’s internal policy keeps a buffer: its pre-trade system should warn the portfolio manager below 42%.
Meridian’s control plan codes six ESG rules: the 80% test, the 40% test, the seven PAB exclusions as one rule set, the rating floor, a consistency check between Aurelia’s sustainable-investment list and the vendor’s controversy flags, and a check that the list of sustainable investments received matches the holdings. The ESG rules run every Friday on Thursday’s positions, with the list of sustainable investments that Aurelia sends each Thursday evening.
Calculation. On 10 September the holdings classified as sustainable investments total EUR 498m and the holdings aligned with the characteristics (#1, which includes #1A) EUR 1,032m.
Result. The fund meets both tests: 1.5 points above the 40% minimum on sustainable investments, 6.0 points above 80% on alignment. It is already below Aurelia’s own 42% buffer, which should have produced a warning to the portfolio manager.
Reading. A headroom of 1.5 points is EUR 18m. One reclassified large holding is enough to break the commitment. The depositary sees that before anyone else outside Aurelia.
INTERACTIVE LAB — The sustainable-investment share, event by event
Recompute the two ESG proportions of the fund after a data reclassification, a trade by the portfolio manager, the unwinding of that trade and a corrective switch, and size the shortfall in euros.
| Parameter you can move | Range | Default |
|---|---|---|
| Fund NAV (assumed constant) | 500 to 3000 EUR m | 1200 EUR m |
| Sustainable investments on 10 September | 300 to 1000 EUR m | 498 EUR m |
| Holdings aligned with E/S characteristics (#1) | 600 to 1500 EUR m | 1032 EUR m |
| Event A: holding that loses its sustainable flag (passive) | 0 to 100 EUR m | 36 EUR m |
| Event B: sustainable holdings sold to buy an unclassified stock (active) | 0 to 100 EUR m | 24 EUR m |
| Minimum sustainable-investment commitment | 10 to 80 % | 40 % |
| Target after correction (minimum plus buffer) | 40 to 50 % | 41 % |
| Result at default settings | Value |
|---|---|
| Sustainable share on 10 September | 41.5 % |
| After event A (data reclassification) | 38.5 % |
| After event B (trade) | 36.5 % |
| Aligned share (#1) after event B | 84.0 % |
| Headroom on the 80% test after event B | 48.0 EUR m |
| Shortfall to the minimum after event B | 42.0 EUR m |
| of which caused by the trade (active) | 24.0 EUR m |
| of which caused by the reclassification (passive) | 18.0 EUR m |
| Switch needed after unwinding to reach the target | 30.0 EUR m |
| Sustainable share after unwinding and switch | 41.0 % |
Try it. Set event A to zero: the trade alone takes the fund to 39.5%, and the whole EUR 6m shortfall is active. Then set the trade to zero: the reclassification alone gives a purely passive EUR 18m shortfall.
Question. What does the depositary see, and when?
Event A, passive. On Tuesday 15 September 2026 the ESG data vendor raises its controversy assessment of Valtera Group, a fictional European building-materials company held at EUR 36m (3.0% of NAV), after allegations of serious environmental damage at a quarry. Aurelia’s methodology treats a severe controversy as a failure of the “do no significant harm” test, so Valtera stops counting as a sustainable investment. It remains aligned with the promoted characteristics (its environmental rating is still above the fund’s floor), so the 80% test is unchanged. Aurelia’s Thursday file removes Valtera from the list.
On Friday 18 September Meridian’s weekly run on Thursday’s positions gives:
The fund is 1.5 points, EUR 18m, below its 40% commitment. Before writing to anyone the analyst works through Meridian’s false-positive checklist, because a breach notice that turns out to be a data artefact costs credibility for months:
The analyst finds no artefact. Valtera’s position is reconciled, priced and correctly identified; the vendor feed shows the controversy upgrade on 15 September; and Aurelia has notified no change of methodology. The consistency check confirms that the vendor flag changed on 15 September. At 15:00 the analyst sends a breach notice to Aurelia’s compliance officer with the calculation and the source.
Event B, active. On Monday 21 September Aurelia’s compliance officer acknowledges the notice and replies that the portfolio manager will restore the share “in the coming weeks, in the best interests of investors”. On Tuesday 22 September the same portfolio manager, rebalancing towards industrials, sells EUR 24m of holdings classified as sustainable investments and buys EUR 24m of Kestrel Industrial, a fictional mid-cap with no coverage by the ESG vendor. Under Aurelia’s methodology an issuer without data is neither a sustainable investment nor aligned. Aurelia’s pre-trade system shows a warning, because the 40% rule was coded as “soft” and not as a hard block; the portfolio manager overrides it.
Friday 25 September run:
The shortfall on the 40% commitment is now:
The 80% test still holds, with EUR 48m of headroom. The name of the fund is not, at this stage, in question under the 80% test; its sustainable-investment commitment is.
Reading. Two events, two different natures, one combined shortfall of EUR 42m. The depositary saw each within three business days, which is what a weekly run on weekly data can achieve (section 5.4).
PITFALL — The analyst must not net the two events. A shortfall of EUR 42m reported as a single breach would let the manager argue that the whole of it is passive (the first event started it). The trade on 22 September is a separate decision, taken when the fund was already in breach, and it made the breach worse.
Question. Who caused what, and what does each part require?
IN ONE SENTENCE — A passive breach is a limit crossed without a decision of the manager (prices, subscriptions and redemptions, a reclassification by a third party); an active breach is a limit crossed, or an existing breach worsened, by a decision of the manager.
INTUITION — A driver whose speed limit drops from 90 to 70 km/h as he passes a sign is in passive breach: he must slow down promptly. A driver who accelerates while already above the limit is in active breach, whatever the reason the limit changed.
The decomposition follows the order of events. Without the trade, the fund would have stood at 38.5%, a passive shortfall of EUR 18m. The trade added EUR 24m. The simulator of section 5.1 performs the split: EUR 24m active, EUR 18m passive.
FORMULA
is the total shortfall to the minimum (EUR 42m); is the amount of sustainable investments sold by the manager’s decision while the fund was below or crossing the minimum (EUR 24m); the part due to the decision (EUR 24m); the part due to events outside the manager’s control (EUR 18m). The minimum avoids attributing to the trade more than its own size.
The consequences differ.
| Passive part | Active part | |
|---|---|---|
| Cause | Vendor controversy flag | Portfolio manager’s trade |
| Amount | EUR 18m | EUR 24m |
| Remedy | Correct in investors’ best interests | Correct immediately |
| Cost of correction | Borne by the fund | Borne by the management company |
| Compensation | None, in principle | Any loss to the fund |
Aurelia’s first reaction is to treat the whole as passive. Its argument: the trade was “within the investment policy” (industrials are eligible) and the fund was already in breach. Meridian’s control head rejects the argument in a letter on Monday 28 September: the binding element is a minimum on the whole portfolio, the trade lowered it further, and the pre-trade warning shows that the manager knew. The ESMA fund-name guidelines treat as passive only a deviation that is not the result of a choice of the manager; the trade is a choice.
Three arguments from Aurelia, and the answers. Before accepting the qualification, Aurelia’s compliance officer tested three lines of defence in a call on Tuesday 29 September. A depositary controller should be able to answer each.
“The trade was neutral for investors.” Kestrel is an eligible European equity and the trade served the investment policy (a tilt towards industrials). The answer: the investment policy and the binding elements are cumulative. A trade that respects the first and breaks the second is still a breach. The annex does not say “at least 40% unless the portfolio manager has a strong view on industrials”.
“Kestrel is probably sustainable; the vendor simply does not cover it.” Aurelia’s own methodology counts as sustainable only issuers it has assessed. An issuer without data cannot be counted pending coverage; if Aurelia wishes to assess Kestrel itself, it can do so under its methodology, document it and send the updated list, but it cannot classify the issuer retroactively to cure the breach. Meridian would in any case check that such an assessment exists and is consistent with the method disclosed.
“The fund was already in breach, so the trade changed nothing in nature.” This is the argument the pitfall of section 5.2 anticipates. The trade made the breach EUR 24m larger and longer. The fact that a fund is already below a limit increases the manager’s duty of care; it does not suspend the limit.
Aurelia’s chief executive closes the discussion the same evening: the trade will be unwound, the loss compensated, and the pre-trade rule hardened. Meridian records the call and the decision in the breach file.
Materiality. Is a 3.5-point shortfall on an ESG commitment “significant” for the AMF’s quarterly table? Meridian’s procedure classifies as significant any active breach of a binding element of the prospectus and any passive breach not remedied within the deadline agreed. The active part is therefore significant regardless of the outcome.
WHO DOES WHAT — The qualification letter is the most sensitive document of the case. It is written by the control head, reviewed by legal and sent to the management company’s compliance officer and its chief executive. It states facts, the rule, the calculation and the depositary’s position; it does not express an opinion on the manager’s motives.
Question. Why did Meridian need three business days to see each event, and would daily monitoring change the outcome?
Data. Meridian runs the ESG rules weekly. Aurelia’s list of sustainable investments arrives weekly. A run costs about EUR 120 of analyst and system time per fund (case assumption), including the review of false positives. There are 250 business days a year.
FORMULA
is the expected detection lag in business days from an event to the breach notice; the interval between two control runs; the interval between two updates of the data the rule uses; the processing day (positions are only available on T+1). An event occurs on average halfway through an interval; a run more frequent than the data adds nothing.
INTERACTIVE LAB — Monitoring frequency, data frequency and detection lag
See how the frequency of control runs and of ESG data updates drive the expected time to detect a breach and the annual cost of monitoring one fund.
| Parameter you can move | Range | Default |
|---|---|---|
| Interval between control runs | 1 / 5 / 10 / 21 | 5 business days |
| Interval between ESG data updates | 1 / 5 / 21 | 5 business days |
| Processing delay (positions at T+1) | 0 to 3 business days | 1 business days |
| Cost of one run for one fund | 20 to 500 EUR | 120 EUR |
| Shortfall while undetected | 0 to 100 EUR m | 42 EUR m |
| Result at default settings | Value |
|---|---|
| Expected detection lag | 3.5 business days |
| Runs a year | 50 number |
| Annual monitoring cost for the fund | 6,000 EUR |
| Expected shortfall-days before detection | 147 EUR m x days |
Try it. Switch to daily runs with weekly data: the cost is multiplied by five and the lag does not move. Then make the data daily too: the lag falls to 1.5 days, but the vendor licence for daily ESG feeds is the real cost.
Result. With weekly runs on weekly data the expected lag is 3.5 business days for EUR 6,000 a year; event A (Tuesday to Friday) and event B (Tuesday to Friday) were each caught in three. Daily runs on weekly data would cost EUR 30,000 and gain nothing. Monthly checks, still common for ESG rules in 2024, would have left an expected 11.5 business days.
Reading. The binding constraint is data, not computing. ESG flags move with controversies, annual reports and methodology changes; a depositary cannot test faster than the manager updates its classification. Speed also matters less than for a 10% issuer limit: no investor loses money because a fund is at 38.5% sustainable investments for a week. What matters is that the breach is not prolonged, not repeated, and not hidden in the periodic report.
Question. How is the breach corrected, and what does the fund receive?
After the letter of 28 September Aurelia accepts the qualification. Its remediation plan, sent on Tuesday 29 September, has two parts.
Active part: unwind immediately. On Wednesday 30 September the portfolio manager sells the EUR 24m Kestrel position and buys back sustainable investments for EUR 24m. Kestrel has fallen 3.5% since 22 September. Each leg costs 15 bp in commissions, taxes and market impact (case assumptions).
FORMULA
is the compensation paid by the management company to the fund; the amount of the active trade (EUR 24m); the return of the position bought between purchase and unwinding (); the transaction cost per leg (15 bp); the factor 2 covers the purchase and the sale, both of which the fund would not have paid without the breach. A gain on the position stays with the fund and is not netted against costs.
That is 7.6 bp of NAV. Aurelia pays it to the fund with value date Friday 2 October; Meridian’s cash monitoring team checks the receipt and the fund administrator books it so that the NAV of 2 October reflects it. The repurchase of the sustainable holdings is assumed at unchanged prices, so it creates no further loss.
INTERACTIVE LAB — Compensation owed to the fund for an active breach
Compute what the management company pays the fund when a trade made in breach is unwound, as a function of the market move and transaction costs.
| Parameter you can move | Range | Default |
|---|---|---|
| Amount of the active trade | 0 to 100 EUR m | 24 EUR m |
| Return of the position until unwinding | -10 to 10 % | -3.5 % |
| Transaction cost per leg | 0 to 50 bp | 15 bp |
| Fund NAV | 100 to 3000 EUR m | 1200 EUR m |
| Result at default settings | Value |
|---|---|
| Market loss compensated | 0.840 EUR m |
| Transaction costs compensated (two legs) | 0.072 EUR m |
| Total compensation paid to the fund | 0.912 EUR m |
| Compensation in bp of NAV | 7.60 bp |
Try it. Move the return to +2%: the fund keeps the EUR 0.48m gain and the manager still pays the transaction costs. The asymmetry is deliberate: a manager must never profit from a breach.
What does the compensation look like in the books of the fund? Meridian’s fund administration team (see D02) books a receivable from the management company on the day the amount is agreed, so that the NAV is not understated while the cash is in transit; the statutory auditor of the fund reviews the calculation at year end. Investors who redeemed between 22 September and 2 October left at a NAV that already reflected the loss on Kestrel but not yet the compensation; Aurelia and Meridian check that the effect on any single redeeming investor is below the threshold that would trigger individual compensation under Aurelia’s error policy. For a 7.6 bp effect spread over a few days, it is.
Passive part: correct in the investors’ best interests. After the unwinding the fund is back at 38.5%, EUR 18m below the minimum. Aurelia commits to a switch of EUR 30m from non-sustainable to sustainable holdings, which takes the fund to its internal target of 41.0% and restores a 1-point buffer, within ten business days, by Friday 9 October. The costs of this switch are borne by the fund, as for any passive correction; the manager argues, and Meridian accepts, that spreading the switch over several days limits market impact. Meridian checks the result in the run of 9 October: 41.0%.
Process failure. The root cause of the active part is the soft limit in Aurelia’s pre-trade system. Meridian’s letter requests that the 40% rule be coded as a hard block with a warning at 42%. Aurelia implements it on 15 October. The depositary’s file keeps the evidence.
PITFALL — Compensation for an ESG breach is often zero or small, because the loss to investors is not financial: they were promised a share of sustainable investments and did not get it for three weeks. No formula compensates that. The protection is the speed of correction and the honesty of the periodic report, not the cheque.
Question. Who must be told, and what does the breach change for the fund’s name and documents?
The AMF. The situation has been rectified, so no immediate notification for an unrectifiable situation is required. Under the AMF depositary instruction as updated in September 2026, the active breach is a significant irregularity resolved during the quarter: Meridian includes it in its quarterly table to the AMF for the fourth quarter (the breach was closed on 9 October), with the cause, the amount, the compensation and the corrective action. Had Aurelia refused to unwind the trade or to pay the compensation, Meridian would have sent a formal letter to its senior management and, failing correction, notified the AMF directly.
Investors. The breach does not require an individual notice to investors in France under these facts, but it will show in the periodic SFDR report (see D02): the report for the year discloses the actual proportion of sustainable investments, and Aurelia’s annual report and statutory auditor will reflect the compensation. A manager that published an average without mentioning three weeks below the minimum would create a second problem, a misleading periodic disclosure.
The name. The 80% test held throughout (lowest point 84.0%), and the PAB exclusions were not affected. The fund invested “meaningfully” in sustainable investments at every point, even at 36.5%. The name was therefore never at risk under the ESMA guidelines; the commitment was. Had the vendor flagged Valtera for revenue from activities on the PAB list instead of a controversy, the analysis would have changed: an exclusion breach in a fund with “Sustainable” in its name is both a breach of a binding element and a breach of the conditions for using the name.
SFDR 2.0. Under the categories proposed for SFDR 2.0, a “Sustainable” product would need at least 70% of its assets meeting the category’s objective. A fund like Aurelia’s, with a 40% sustainable-investment minimum, would have to change its strategy, move to the ESG Basics category, or drop the term. The depositary will re-map every rule.
Question. Suppose Meridian’s ESG rules had run monthly, or that the analyst had dismissed the alert of 18 September as a data issue. What would the depositary have risked?
Start with the legal structure of section 2.1. Nothing was lost from custody, so the strict-liability term is zero. The question is entirely one of fault: did the depositary fail, by negligence, to perform its oversight duty, and did that failure cause a loss to the fund or its investors?
Three tests decide it.
Was the rule within the depositary’s scope? Yes. The 40% minimum is a binding element of the prospectus annex and appears in the control plan and the depositary agreement. A depositary that has not listed a binding element in its control plan has a harder conversation: the omission is itself a possible failure of the duty to set up procedures adapted to the fund’s strategy.
Was the failure negligent? A monthly frequency is not negligent per se; Delegated Regulation 2016/438 asks for procedures proportionate to the nature, scale and complexity of the fund. But a monthly check on a fund sitting 1.5 points above its minimum, with data that changes weekly, is hard to defend once the depositary’s own risk assessment at onboarding identified ESG reclassification as a risk. Dismissing a valid alert without documentation is worse: the exception log would show an alert closed without reason.
Was there a loss, and did the failure cause it? Here the depositary is usually protected. The financial loss of the case, EUR 0.912m, arose from the manager’s active trade; it is the manager who owes it, and the manager paid. Had the manager refused to pay and become insolvent, investors could have turned to the depositary for the part of the loss that timely oversight would have prevented. With monthly monitoring the expected detection lag rises from 3.5 to 11.5 business days (section 5.4): the trade of 22 September would have been detected around 7 October, after a longer period of exposure to Kestrel’s price, and the compensation claim would have been larger.
The non-financial harm, investors holding a fund below its sustainability promise, is real but rarely compensable in money. The depositary’s main exposure in the counterfactual is therefore not the cheque but three other things: a supervisory finding by the AMF on the quality of its oversight, a possible sanction if the failure is systemic across funds, and the loss of the mandate. That is why section 6 treats the depositary’s risk as operational and reputational rather than credit.
WHY IT MATTERS ON THE DESK — A depositary’s defence is its file: the control plan, the run logs, the exception log, the notices and the letters. In any dispute it must show what it tested, when, with which data, and what it did with each alert. Banks that understand this invest in workflow tools and audit trails before they invest in faster engines.
Question. What does Meridian earn on this mandate, and does the ESG monitoring pay for itself?
Data (case assumptions). The core tariff is the one of section 2.3: depositary fee 2.5 bp of NAV, safekeeping 1.0 bp, 3,000 transactions a year at EUR 15, 2% of NAV in cash at a margin of 20 bp after FTP, for EUR 513k. On top, Meridian charges an ESG monitoring add-on of 0.4 bp of NAV for the six ESG rules, the monthly vendor cross-check and the ESG section of the annual depositary report. The add-on’s direct cost is EUR 35k a year: 0.15 full-time equivalent of a specialised analyst at a loaded cost of EUR 140k (EUR 21k) and EUR 14k of vendor data allocated to the fund. It also raises the expected operational loss of the mandate: Meridian’s operational-risk team estimates the annual probability of a compensable oversight failure on the mandate at 0.5% for the core duties and 0.2% for the ESG rules, with a severity of EUR 2m in both cases.
INTERACTIVE LAB — Pricing the ESG monitoring add-on of a depositary mandate
Compute the revenue of the mandate with and without the ESG add-on, the add-on’s contribution after its direct cost and expected loss, and the break-even fee or fund size.
| Parameter you can move | Range | Default |
|---|---|---|
| Fund NAV | 200 to 5000 EUR m | 1200 EUR m |
| Core mandate revenue (section 2.3) | 100 to 3000 EUR k | 513 EUR k |
| ESG add-on fee | 0 to 1.5 bp of NAV | 0.4 bp of NAV |
| Analyst time on the fund | 0 to 1 FTE | 0.15 FTE |
| Loaded cost of one analyst | 80 to 250 EUR k | 140 EUR k |
| ESG vendor data allocated to the fund | 0 to 100 EUR k | 14 EUR k |
| Annual probability of a compensable ESG oversight failure | 0 to 2 % | 0.2 % |
| Severity of a compensable failure | 0 to 10000 EUR k | 2000 EUR k |
| Result at default settings | Value |
|---|---|
| ESG add-on revenue | 48.0 EUR k |
| Total mandate revenue | 561.0 EUR k |
| Total revenue in bp of NAV | 4.675 bp |
| ESG add-on direct cost | 35.0 EUR k |
| ESG expected operational loss | 4.0 EUR k |
| Add-on contribution after cost and expected loss | 9.0 EUR k |
| Break-even add-on fee at this NAV | 0.325 bp |
| Break-even NAV at this fee | 975 EUR m |
Try it. Halve the NAV to EUR 600m: the add-on loses EUR 15k a year. ESG monitoring is a fixed cost per fund, so small funds need a minimum fee or a lighter rule set.
Result. The add-on brings EUR 48k, taking the mandate to EUR 561k, 4.675 bp of NAV. Its direct cost is EUR 35k and its expected loss EUR 4k, leaving a contribution of EUR 9k. The break-even fee at this NAV is 0.325 bp; at 0.4 bp the break-even fund size is EUR 975m.
Reading. The add-on barely pays for itself on a EUR 1.2bn fund and loses money below EUR 975m. Meridian sells it anyway for three reasons: it is increasingly expected in tenders for Article 8 and 9 funds; it protects the core fee (a depositary that missed an ESG breach would lose the whole EUR 561k mandate, not the EUR 48k); and the six rules are largely reusable across funds, so the marginal analyst time falls as the book grows. The case also shows the limit of the price: 0.4 bp is the price of testing the manager’s classification, not of re-doing it. A depositary that re-performed the sustainability assessment of every holding would need a fee closer to that of an ESG data service (see D05).
| Item | Value | Source |
|---|---|---|
| NAV (constant) | EUR 1,200m | Assumption |
| Sustainable share, 10 September | 41.5% | 5.1 |
| After reclassification (passive) | 38.5% | 5.2 |
| After trade (active) | 36.5% | 5.2 |
| Aligned share (#1) at lowest | 84.0% | 5.2 |
| Headroom on the 80% test | EUR 48m | 5.2 |
| Total shortfall to 40% | EUR 42m | 5.2 |
| Active / passive split | EUR 24m / EUR 18m | 5.3 |
| Expected detection lag, weekly | 3.5 business days | 5.4 |
| Annual cost of weekly runs | EUR 6,000 | 5.4 |
| Compensation to the fund | EUR 0.912m (7.6 bp) | 5.5 |
| Corrective switch | EUR 30m, to 41.0% | 5.5 |
| Core mandate revenue | EUR 513k (4.275 bp) | 2.3 |
| ESG add-on revenue | EUR 48k | 5.8 |
| Total mandate revenue | EUR 561k (4.675 bp) | 5.8 |
| Add-on contribution | EUR 9k | 5.8 |
| Break-even NAV of the add-on | EUR 975m | 5.8 |
| RAROC of the mandate, regulatory | 75.9% | 6.2 |
| RAROC, scenario-based capital | 10.2% | 6.2 |
IN ONE SENTENCE — A depositary consumes almost no credit capital; its regulatory capital is operational-risk capital, which CRR3 computes from the size of the bank’s income, not from the risk of any particular mandate.
The securities in custody (EUR 1.2bn for Aurelia) are not assets of Meridian. They are segregated, belong to the fund and stay out of the bank’s balance sheet and of its RWA. The credit exposures that remain are small: intraday credit to settle trades before cash arrives (no capital charge when repaid within the day), end-of-day overdrafts, and fee receivables. Meridian’s average end-of-day overdraft to the fund is EUR 0.5m, weighted at 100% under the standardised approach (case assumption), so EUR 0.5m of credit RWA.
Operational risk under CRR3. Since 1 January 2025 all EU banks use the new standardised approach for operational risk (Regulation (EU) 2024/1623). The capital requirement is the business indicator component:
FORMULA
is the business indicator, a three-year average of the bank’s income in three components (interest, leases and dividends; services, which includes fee and commission income and expense; financial, which includes trading results); the slice of in bucket ; the marginal coefficient: 12% up to EUR 1bn, 15% from EUR 1bn to EUR 30bn, 18% above EUR 30bn. The internal loss multiplier, which in the Basel text scales the charge by the bank’s own loss history, is set at one in the EU, so past losses do not change the charge.
The formula has no input that describes a mandate’s risk. It is pure size. To allocate it to a business line, Meridian applies the marginal coefficient of its bucket (its business indicator is about EUR 20bn, case assumption, so 15%) to the business line’s contribution to the business indicator, approximated by its revenue:
Add the EUR 500k of credit RWA, and the mandate carries RWA of EUR 1,551.9k and allocated capital of EUR 201.7k (13%).
INTUITION — Operational-risk capital under CRR3 is a tax on income: the more a business earns, the more capital it is charged, whatever it does to manage its risk. A depositary that halves its error rate keeps the same capital; one that doubles its fees doubles it.
INTERACTIVE LAB — RAROC of a depositary mandate: regulatory capital against scenario capital
Work out the RAROC of the Aurelia mandate line by line, with and without the ESG add-on, and compare a regulatory allocation of operational-risk capital with an economic-capital allocation based on a liability scenario.
| Parameter you can move | Range | Default |
|---|---|---|
| Core revenue (fees and deposit margin) | 100 to 3000 EUR k | 513 EUR k |
| ESG monitoring add-on sold | yes / no | yes |
| ESG add-on revenue | 0 to 200 EUR k | 48 EUR k |
| ESG add-on direct cost | 0 to 200 EUR k | 35 EUR k |
| Cost-income ratio on core revenue | 30 to 90 % | 60 % |
| Probability of a compensable failure, core duties | 0 to 3 % | 0.5 % |
| Probability of a compensable failure, ESG rules | 0 to 2 % | 0.2 % |
| Severity of a compensable failure | 0 to 10000 EUR k | 2000 EUR k |
| Marginal BIC coefficient | 12 / 15 / 18 | 15 % |
| Credit RWA (overdrafts, receivables) | 0 to 5000 EUR k | 500 EUR k |
| Capital allocation | regulatory / scenario | regulatory |
| Scenario-based economic capital for the mandate | 250 to 3000 EUR k | 1500 EUR k |
| Fund cash deposited (operational deposit) | 0 to 100 EUR m | 24 EUR m |
| Result at default settings | Value |
|---|---|
| Revenues | 561.0 EUR k |
| Operating costs | 342.8 EUR k |
| Expected operational loss | 14.0 EUR k |
| Result after tax (25%) | 153.15 EUR k |
| Operational-risk RWA | 1,051.9 EUR k |
| Total RWA | 1,551.9 EUR k |
| Allocated capital | 201.7 EUR k |
| RAROC | 75.9 % |
| Maximum capital for a 12% RAROC | 1,276 EUR k |
| RAROC of a pure fee business (no loss, no credit RWA) | 123.1 % |
| Regulatory capital per euro of revenue (op risk) | 24.375 % |
| HQLA held against the fund’s cash (25% outflow) | 6.0 EUR m |
Try it. Switch the allocation to ‘scenario’ and move the economic capital: the mandate clears the 12% hurdle only if its scenario capital stays below about EUR 1.28m. The conclusion depends entirely on the allocation convention.
The credit-committee table, with Meridian’s conventions (cost-income 60% on core fee revenue, ESG add-on costed bottom-up, tax 25%, capital 13% of RWA):
| Line | With ESG add-on | Without |
|---|---|---|
| Revenues | EUR 561.0k | EUR 513.0k |
| Operating costs | EUR 342.8k | EUR 307.8k |
| Expected operational loss | EUR 14.0k | EUR 10.0k |
| Result after tax | EUR 153.15k | EUR 146.4k |
| RWA (operational + credit) | EUR 1,551.9k | EUR 1,461.9k |
| Allocated capital | EUR 201.7k | EUR 190.0k |
| RAROC | 75.9% | 77.0% |
Reading the number. A RAROC of 75.9% against a 12% hurdle looks spectacular, and it is the reason why banks describe securities services as “capital-light”. But it is a different kind of number from a lending RAROC, for four reasons.
Banks therefore steer the business on other measures: the cost-income ratio, the operating margin per mandate, revenue in basis points of assets under custody, and an economic-capital view built from operational-risk scenarios in the ICAAP. With a scenario-based capital of EUR 1.5m for this mandate (Meridian’s 1-in-1,000 scenario of a severe oversight or custody failure allocated by assets and complexity, a case assumption), the RAROC falls to 10.2%, below the hurdle. The mandate is worth keeping only if its scenario capital stays under about EUR 1.28m, which is the right question for the pricing committee: is the fee enough for the liability we accept?
What the sustainable feature changes. The ESG add-on adds EUR 48k of revenue and EUR 35k of cost, raises the expected loss by EUR 4k, and raises the operational-risk capital because it raises revenue. The result after tax goes from EUR 146.4k to EUR 153.15k and the RAROC from 77.0% to 75.9%: the add-on is slightly dilutive on this measure and slightly accretive in euros. The strategic case for it lies outside the RAROC: retention of a EUR 561k mandate and a lower probability of the supervisory finding described in section 5.7.
PITFALL — Do not compare the 75.9% RAROC of a depositary mandate with the 8% RAROC of a corporate loan and conclude that the bank should lend less and hold more funds. The two numbers share a formula, not a meaning. The comparison that matters for a fee business is euros of contribution against the liability and franchise risk accepted.
A depositary is also a deposit gatherer. Aurelia keeps 2% of its NAV, EUR 24m, in cash at Meridian. Because the cash is needed for the fund’s settlement and custody activity, it qualifies as an operational deposit under the LCR Delegated Regulation (EU) 2015/61: it carries a 25% outflow assumption, against 100% for non-operational deposits from financial customers. Meridian therefore holds EUR 6.0m of HQLA against it, and the NSFR gives it a 50% available stable funding factor. Meridian’s treasury credits the depositary business with an FTP rate reflecting this liquidity value; after paying the fund its contractual rate, the business keeps a margin of 20 bp, EUR 48k, already included in the core revenue. In large custodian banks, operational deposits from funds are a significant and cheap funding source; when rates were negative they were a cost, which is why depositaries then charged for cash balances.
Fees are revenue from contracts with customers under IFRS 15, recognised over time as the service is rendered, generally monthly on the basis of the average NAV. The fund’s securities are not recognised by Meridian; the cash deposits are financial liabilities at amortised cost; overdrafts and fee receivables are financial assets at amortised cost with a negligible IFRS 9 expected credit loss. A claim against the depositary would be recognised as a provision under IAS 37 when an outflow becomes probable and can be estimated, and disclosed as a contingent liability before that. Under CRR3 larger banks must keep and disclose operational-loss data even though the EU neutralises its effect on capital; an oversight compensation would be recorded in the loss database under the event type “execution, delivery and process management”.
A depositary mandate changes almost nothing in Meridian’s sustainability metrics, and the student should be able to say why.
WHY IT MATTERS ON THE DESK — For the depositary, sustainability is not an asset-side story but a conduct-and-control story. Its contribution to the transition is the credibility of the funds it watches, and its exposure is the liability and reputation attached to that watch.
| Risk | Example | Control | Owner |
|---|---|---|---|
| Rule not in the control plan | Binding element omitted | Annex-to-rule mapping signed off | Depositary control |
| Ambiguous rule | “Predominantly sustainable” | Written interpretation at onboarding | Control and legal |
| Stale ESG data | Controversy flag a month late | Data-age check, vendor SLA | Investment compliance |
| Manager’s flag not independent | Self-declared SI list | Monthly vendor cross-check | Investment compliance |
| Identifier mismatch | ISIN-to-issuer mapping error | Reconciliation of list to holdings | Data management |
| Alert dismissed | Valid breach closed as artefact | Four-eyes on closures, exception log | Control head |
| Late escalation | Breach open for weeks | Escalation clock, ageing report | Control head |
| Wrong qualification | Active breach called passive | Event-by-event decomposition | Control head |
| Compensation not paid | Loss left in the fund | Cash monitoring of receipt | Cash monitoring |
| Conflict of interest | Manager in the same group | Independence rules, separate reporting lines | Compliance |
| Custody loss | Sub-custodian failure | Due diligence, segregation, monitoring | Network management |
| Over-promising | Depositary marketed as ESG verifier | Scope clause, data-reliance clause | Client service and legal |
Red-flag checklist for a depositary analyst.
Orders of magnitude (dated).
What changed recently.
Open debates.
INTERACTIVE LAB — Self-assessment: depositary duties and ESG monitoring
Check your understanding of depositary duties, ESG rule monitoring, breach qualification and the economics of the business.
Q1. For which losses is a UCITS depositary liable without any fault on its part?
Answer: B. Strict liability applies to the loss of custody assets, which must be restored without undue delay unless an external event beyond reasonable control is proved. Everything else requires negligent or intentional failure.
Q2. Which text sets out the detailed oversight duties of a UCITS depositary, including the escalation procedure?
Answer: C. Delegated Regulation 2016/438 supplements the UCITS Directive on depositary obligations. 2022/1288 is the SFDR RTS, 2020/1818 the climate benchmarks act, 2024/1623 CRR3.
Q3. Under the ESMA fund-name guidelines, a fund called ‘Climate Leaders’ must at least:
Answer: A. Environmental terms such as ‘climate’ trigger the 80% threshold and the PAB exclusions. The ‘meaningful’ sustainable-investment requirement is added for ‘sustainable’ terms.
Q4. From which date do the ESMA fund-name guidelines apply to funds existing before 21 November 2024?
Answer: D. New funds from 21 November 2024; existing funds after a six-month transition, from 21 May 2025.
Q5. A data vendor reclassifies an issuer and the fund falls below its sustainable-investment minimum. The breach is:
Answer: B. No decision of the manager crossed the limit. The breach is passive; it must still be corrected, and repeated passive breaches from the same source deserve questions.
Q6. While the fund is already in passive breach, the manager sells sustainable holdings to buy an unclassified stock. What is the consequence?
Answer: C. A decision that worsens an existing breach is active. The case splits EUR 42m into EUR 24m active and EUR 18m passive.
Q7. In the case, why does a daily control run not reduce the detection lag?
Answer: B. The lag depends on the slower of run frequency and data frequency. Daily runs on weekly data multiply cost by five for no gain.
Q8. How is the compensation for the active breach computed in the case?
Answer: A. EUR 24m × 3.5% + EUR 24m × 0.15% × 2 = EUR 0.912m. The manager must never profit from a breach.
Q9. Under CRR3, operational-risk capital in the EU depends on:
Answer: B. The business indicator component applies marginal coefficients by size bucket; the EU sets the internal loss multiplier at one.
Q10. Why is the 75.9% RAROC of the mandate not comparable with a lending RAROC?
Answer: C. Operational-risk capital is roughly 24% of revenue; the RAROC measures margin, not risk. Scenario-based capital gives 10.2%.
Q11. What LCR outflow rate applies to an operational deposit of a fund at its depositary bank?
Answer: D. Operational deposits carry a 25% outflow assumption, non-operational deposits from financial customers 100%.
Q12. What happens to the bank’s Green Asset Ratio when it becomes depositary of a large Article 9 fund?
Answer: A. The GAR covers on-balance-sheet exposures. The fees-and-commissions KPI that would have captured service income is postponed to 2028 and the EBA advised removing it.
Q13. Under AIFMD II, an AIF may appoint a depositary from another Member State when:
Answer: C. The derogation is narrow, subject to prior approval, and does not apply to UCITS.
Q14. In the SFDR 2.0 proposal, the minimum share of assets meeting a product category’s objective is:
Answer: B. Each of the three proposed categories requires at least 70%; the 80% figure belongs to the ESMA fund-name guidelines.
A UCITS with a NAV of EUR 800m commits to at least 50% sustainable investments. Its sustainable holdings are EUR 412m. A vendor reclassification removes EUR 20m from the list; a week later the portfolio manager sells EUR 16m of sustainable holdings to buy a stock without ESG coverage. NAV is constant. Compute the share at each stage, the shortfall, its active and passive parts, and the switch needed after unwinding the trade to reach a 51% target.
Solution. Start: 412 / 800 = 51.5%. After reclassification: 392 / 800 = 49.0%, a passive shortfall of EUR 8m against the minimum of EUR 400m. After the trade: 376 / 800 = 47.0%; total shortfall 400 − 376 = EUR 24m. Active part: min(16, 24) = EUR 16m; passive part: EUR 8m. After unwinding, the fund is back at EUR 392m; the 51% target is EUR 408m, so the switch is EUR 16m, after which the share is 51.0%.
In another fund, an active trade of EUR 10m is unwound after a fall of 6%, with transaction costs of 20 bp per leg. Compute the compensation and its size in bp of the EUR 800m NAV. What would it be if the position had risen by 4%?
Solution. Market loss: 10 × 6% = EUR 0.600m. Costs: 10 × 0.20% × 2 = EUR 0.040m. Compensation: EUR 0.640m, that is 0.640 / 800 = 8.0 bp of NAV. With a 4% rise the EUR 0.400m gain stays with the fund and the manager pays only the costs, EUR 0.040m.
A depositary bank with a business indicator below EUR 1bn (marginal coefficient 12%) earns EUR 900k a year on a mandate, with a cost-income ratio of 55%, an expected operational loss of 0.4% × EUR 3,000k, no credit RWA, tax 25% and capital at 13% of RWA. Compute the RAROC with regulatory capital, then with a scenario-based economic capital of EUR 2.5m, and the maximum capital compatible with a 12% hurdle.
Solution. Costs: 55% × 900 = EUR 495k. Expected loss: 0.4% × 3,000 = EUR 12k. Result after tax: (900 − 495 − 12) × 75% = 393 × 0.75 = EUR 294.75k. RWA: 12.5 × 12% × 900 = EUR 1,350k; capital 13% × 1,350 = EUR 175.5k. RAROC = 294.75 / 175.5 = 168.0%. With EUR 2,500k of economic capital: 294.75 / 2,500 = 11.8%, just below the hurdle. Maximum capital for 12%: 294.75 / 0.12 = EUR 2,456k. As in the case, the regulatory RAROC says nothing about whether the fee pays for the liability; the scenario view does.
1. What does a depositary do that a custodian does not? A custodian holds assets and settles trades under a commercial contract. A depositary does that and, by law, monitors all the fund’s cash flows and oversees the management company’s compliance with the law and the fund rules, independently of the manager. It also carries strict liability for the loss of custody assets, which cannot be excluded by contract for a UCITS. The oversight role is why a depositary must escalate irregularities, up to the supervisor.
2. Is a depositary liable if an Article 8 fund breaches its sustainable-investment minimum? Not for the breach itself: the management company is responsible for compliance. The depositary can be liable for its own negligent or intentional failure, for example if the binding element was not in its control plan or if it ignored a valid alert, and only for losses that the failure caused. In practice ESG breaches rarely produce large financial losses, so the depositary’s main exposure is supervisory and reputational. Its defence is a documented control plan and a complete exception log.
3. How would you translate an SFDR pre-contractual annex into monitoring rules? I would list every binding element, the proportions, the exclusions, the rating floors and any portfolio metric, and write each as a formula with a limit, a data source and a frequency. I would add the tests implied by the fund’s name under the ESMA guidelines. Each ambiguity would be resolved in writing with the manager before launch. Finally I would agree the data flows and a data-reliance clause in the depositary agreement, because the depositary tests the manager’s classification but does not re-perform it.
4. Explain the difference between an active and a passive breach with an ESG example. A passive breach occurs without a decision of the manager: a vendor raises a controversy flag and an issuer stops counting as a sustainable investment, pushing the fund below its minimum. An active breach comes from a decision: a trade that crosses the limit or worsens an existing breach. The passive breach is corrected in the best interests of investors, at the fund’s cost; the active one is corrected immediately, and the manager compensates any loss. In the case, EUR 18m of the EUR 42m shortfall was passive and EUR 24m active.
5. What do the ESMA fund-name guidelines change for a depositary? They turn names into testable rules: an 80% threshold of investments meeting the characteristics or objectives, PAB or CTB exclusions depending on the term, and a meaningful sustainable-investment requirement for “sustainable” names. They apply to new funds since 21 November 2024 and to existing funds since 21 May 2025. For the depositary they add rules to the control plan and make exclusion data critical. They also generated a large wave of renamings that required re-mapping the rules of many funds.
6. Why do banks call securities services capital-light, and what is wrong with that view? Custody assets are off balance sheet and credit exposures are small, so regulatory capital is mainly operational-risk capital, roughly a quarter of revenue for a bank in the 15% bucket. That produces RAROCs far above any lending business. But the capital is a function of income and not of the mandate’s risk, while the real tail, strict liability on custody assets and liability for oversight failures, is large and rare. A scenario-based capital can bring the RAROC of a mandate below the hurdle, which is the more useful test for pricing.
7. How would you price an ESG monitoring service for depositary clients? I would start from the direct cost: specialist analyst time per fund and vendor data, and add the expected operational loss that the extra rules bring. That gives a break-even fee per fund size; in the case, 0.325 bp on a EUR 1.2bn fund and a break-even size of EUR 975m at 0.4 bp. Because the cost is largely fixed per fund, I would set a minimum fee for small funds. I would also weigh the retention value for the core mandate, which usually justifies the service more than its own margin.
8. What will SFDR 2.0 change for depositaries? The proposal replaces self-defined Article 8 and 9 commitments with three categories, Transition, ESG Basics and Sustainable, each requiring at least 70% of assets meeting the category’s objective plus exclusions. For depositaries, legal category thresholds are easier to test than manager-defined minimums, and common criteria reduce disputes. But every Article 8 and 9 fund will have to be re-mapped, and the transition period will produce many breaches of a new kind. As of mid-November 2026 the text is in trilogue without agreement, with application expected around 2029.
Legislation (EUR-Lex)
Supervisory texts and data
Reform tracking (SFDR 2.0, AIFMD II)
Enforcement
Theory