Where it sits. At Meridian Bank, asset servicing is a product line of Securities Services, next to custody and settlement (see D01), fund administration (D02), depositary (D03), data and analytics (D05) and issuer services (D06). Custody keeps the securities safe and settles trades; asset servicing makes sure the client receives everything a security gives its owner while it sits in custody: income, the outcome of corporate events, and the right to vote. The teams sit in an operations centre (Meridian runs one in Paris and one near-shore centre), under a head of asset servicing who reports to the chief operating officer of Securities Services. The product manager for “shareholder services” designs the proxy voting and stewardship-reporting offer and sits with the commercial team.
Clients. Asset owners (pension funds, insurers, sovereign funds), asset managers and their funds, private banks acting for wealthy clients, and other banks that use Meridian as a sub-custodian in France. They hold equities and bonds in thirty to ninety markets. A large pension fund holding a global equity portfolio receives notices for several thousand general meetings and several thousand corporate events a year; it cannot read local-language notices from Seoul, São Paulo and Stockholm, and it relies on the custodian to tell it what is happening, by when it must decide, and what happened to its decision.
How the desk earns money. Asset servicing is a fee business with almost no balance sheet. Income collection and mandatory corporate events are usually bundled into the custody safekeeping fee (a fraction of a basis point of assets a year, see D01). On top of that, Meridian charges per item for the services that take judgement or carry deadlines: a fee per voluntary corporate-action election, a fee per meeting and per account for proxy voting (often called a “ballot”), a fee or a percentage of the amount recovered for withholding-tax reclaims, a flat fee for stewardship reporting. Orders of magnitude, as case assumptions in line with what clients see in tenders: EUR 15 to 40 per ballot, EUR 30 to 100 per voluntary election, 0.5% to 1.5% of a reclaim recovered. Across a large mandate this is a hundred to a few hundred thousand euros a year, small next to safekeeping and next to the agency securities lending revenue that often sits in the same client relationship. The economics of asset servicing are therefore about cost (staff, vendor platforms, sub-custodian charges) and about liability: a missed election can cost more than a decade of fees.
The team and adjacent functions.
WHO DOES WHAT — The corporate actions team captures events from the infrastructures and data vendors (“golden copy”), notifies clients, collects instructions and forwards them before the market deadline; it reconciles entitlements and payments. The income and tax team credits dividends and coupons and runs withholding-tax relief at source and reclaims. The proxy voting team (shareholder services) distributes meeting notices, collects vote instructions through a voting platform, handles powers of attorney and blocking where a market still requires them, and tracks vote confirmations. Agency securities lending lends clients’ securities to borrowers and recalls them when the client wants to vote or elect. Network management selects and monitors sub-custodians and records each market’s rules (record dates, cut-offs, documentation). Relationship managers own the client and the fee schedule. Operational risk owns the loss database and the scenarios; Finance allocates costs and capital.
A week on the desk in late April. Monday: the corporate actions team works the queue of new events; a Swedish rights issue arrives with subscription rights that must be sold or exercised within twelve days, and the event is scrubbed against two vendor feeds before it goes to clients. Tuesday: peak proxy season; the voting platform shows 900 meetings with cut-offs this week, and the team chases a Swiss sub-custodian whose notices arrived a day late. Wednesday: a pension fund client asks whether it can recall 25% of its lent shares in a French utility before a Say-on-Climate vote; agency lending checks the record date, the settlement cycle and the borrowers, and gives a recall deadline. Thursday: a voluntary election deadline falls at 10:00; two clients have not instructed; the default option is applied and recorded, with the client’s written confirmation that it had been notified. Friday: a client asks for confirmation that its votes at a German meeting were counted; the team requests the confirmation from the issuer’s agent through the chain under the Shareholder Rights Directive, and adds the case to the monthly stewardship report.
WHY IT MATTERS ON THE DESK — Asset servicing is where ownership rights turn into deadlines. A sustainable investor’s stewardship policy, its votes against a weak transition plan and its engagement reports depend on a chain of intermediaries that most investors never see. A student who understands that chain understands why “we voted against” is a claim that must be evidenced.
A shareholder of a listed European company rarely appears in the company’s register. Shares are held in a central securities depository (CSD) in the name of its participants, typically banks; these banks hold for their clients, which may themselves be banks or custodians holding for others. A Dutch pension fund holding shares of a French company typically holds them through a global custodian, which uses a local sub-custodian in France, which is a participant of the French CSD. Each layer keeps its own accounts and knows only the layer below it. The issuer sees the CSD’s participants, not the end investor, unless it asks.
INTUITION — Think of a block of flats owned through several letting agents. The owners’ association writes to the head agent, who writes to the next agent, who writes to the owner. The owner’s reply travels back the same way. Every agent has a postbox that closes at a set hour. Proxy voting is this exchange of letters, with thousands of buildings at once and closing times that each agent sets earlier than the next.
Three dates organise every entitlement. The record date fixes who holds the right: the holder whose account shows the position at the close of business on that date receives the dividend, or votes. The ex-date is the first trading day on which a buyer no longer acquires the right; in a T+2 market it is one business day before the record date, so that trades done before the ex-date settle by the record date. The payment date is when the cash or securities are distributed. For general meetings, the record date is set by national law; in France it is the second business day before the meeting at midnight Paris time, so the position that counts is the settled position at the close of the third business day before the meeting.
Corporate actions are events decided by the issuer that change the securities or distribute value. The market standards (the Corporate Actions Joint Working Group standards, and for Europe the SCoRE Corporate Actions standards of the Eurosystem’s AMI-SeCo) classify them into three types.
The corporate actions team runs each event through the same steps: capture the announcement from the CSD, the issuer’s agent and data vendors; scrub the data (compare sources, resolve discrepancies, create the “golden copy”); notify clients through SWIFT messages (MT564 in ISO 15022, seev.031 in ISO 20022) or a portal; collect instructions (MT565 or seev.033) before Meridian’s own cut-off, which sits one or two business days before the market deadline; forward the instruction to the sub-custodian or CSD; reconcile entitlements; pay and confirm (MT566 or seev.036). The legal fact that dominates the business: when a client’s instruction is lost or late, the client receives the default option, and the difference in value can be large.
Income processing is the mandatory event that happens most often. Dividends and coupons are credited on the payment date (“actual settlement”) or, for some clients and markets, on the payment date whether or not Meridian has received the cash (“contractual settlement”), in which case Meridian pre-funds and reverses if the payment does not come. Withholding tax is the second source of value: the issuer’s country withholds tax at its statutory rate unless the custodian can prove the investor’s entitlement to a treaty rate (“relief at source”); otherwise the investor must reclaim the excess, which can take months or years.
FORMULA
is the tax to be recovered; the gross dividend; the statutory withholding rate applied at payment; the treaty rate to which the investor is entitled; the time value lost while waiting; the investor’s annual opportunity rate; the months between payment and refund.
INTERACTIVE LAB — Withholding tax: relief at source against a reclaim
See what an investor loses when the custodian cannot apply the treaty rate at payment and the excess tax must be reclaimed, and what the reclaim fee and the waiting time cost.
| Parameter you can move | Range | Default |
|---|---|---|
| Gross dividend received | 0.5 to 50 EUR m | 3.5 EUR m |
| Statutory withholding rate applied | 0 to 35 % | 25 % |
| Treaty rate the investor is entitled to | 0 to 30 % | 15 % |
| Months until the refund is paid | 1 to 60 months | 18 months |
| Investor’s opportunity rate | 0 to 6 % | 2.5 % |
| Reclaim fee charged on the amount recovered | 0 to 3 % | 1 % |
| Result at default settings | Value |
|---|---|
| Excess tax withheld (to reclaim) | 350.0 EUR k |
| Time value lost while waiting | 13.12 EUR k |
| Reclaim fee paid to the custodian | 3.50 EUR k |
| Total cost of reclaim against relief at source | 16.62 EUR k |
| Cost as a share of the gross dividend | 47.5 bp |
Try it. Set the waiting time to 48 months, a duration still seen in some markets: the time value exceeds the reclaim fee several times over. The EU FASTER Directive aims to cut this to weeks from 2030.
CASE — On a gross dividend of EUR 3.5m withheld at 25% instead of a 15% treaty rate, EUR 350,000 must be reclaimed. Waiting 18 months at 2.5% costs EUR 13,125 and a 1% reclaim fee EUR 3,500: EUR 16,625 in total, or 47.5 bp of the dividend. Rates and the treaty level are illustrative; the actual position of a pension fund depends on the source country’s rules and the treaty.
A general meeting is a corporate action of its own kind: the event is a meeting, the “election” is a vote on each resolution. The chain runs both ways. Downstream, the issuer publishes the notice and the agenda; the information travels from the issuer’s agent to the CSD and down through each intermediary to the investor (MT564 with a meeting event code in ISO 15022, seev.001 meeting notification in ISO 20022). Upstream, the investor sends a vote instruction (seev.004) through its voting platform to its custodian, which passes it to the sub-custodian, which votes on behalf of its client with the issuer’s agent (in France, the centralising agent, often a bank’s issuer-services department, see D06). The issuer’s agent tabulates votes, the meeting takes place, results are published, and on request a confirmation that the vote was recorded and counted travels back (seev.007 vote execution confirmation).
Several features make the chain fragile.
PITFALL — Do not confuse the vote with the voting decision. The custodian transmits; it does not decide how to vote, unless the client has given it a discretionary mandate, which custodians generally refuse. The voting decision is the client’s or its asset manager’s, often informed by a proxy adviser. Mixing the two roles is both a conflict of interest and a liability trap.
Most institutional investors cannot analyse thousands of agendas. They buy research and voting recommendations from proxy advisers. Two firms dominate globally: Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) and Glass Lewis; national players exist (for example in France, Proxinvest, acquired by Glass Lewis). Investors either follow the adviser’s “benchmark” policy, choose a thematic policy (sustainability, climate, faith-based), or have the adviser apply the investor’s own custom voting policy. The adviser’s platform pre-populates the votes, and the investor can override them; the platform then sends the instructions to the custodian through a vote-transmission service. Academic work documents the risk that investors follow recommendations mechanically (“robo-voting”), which concentrates influence in two firms (Roncalli, ch. 6, summarises this literature).
A voting policy is a written document that says how the investor will vote on recurring items: board elections, remuneration, capital authorisations, auditors, shareholder proposals, and climate and social items. Large investors publish theirs. Under SRD II, institutional investors and asset managers in the EU must publish an engagement policy and, each year, how it was implemented and how they voted, or explain why not (comply or explain).
Clients lend securities through an agent lender (often their custodian) to earn a fee. Legally, a securities loan is a transfer of title: the borrower becomes owner and can vote or sell; the lender receives “manufactured” payments equal to dividends, and keeps the right to call the securities back. The fee is usually split between the client and the agent lender (70/30 to 90/10 is common, case assumption for Meridian: 80/20). To vote, the lender must recall the shares early enough that they settle back into its account before the record date. A recall is a sale-like delivery that settles in the standard cycle of the market, today two business days in the EU and one business day from 11 October 2027 (see D01). The agent lender also gives the client a borrower-default indemnity, which creates a credit exposure on Meridian’s books (see C11): this is why lending sits in a different desk with its own capital.
Asset servicing rests on four documents. The custody agreement sets the standard of care (typically negligence, fraud or wilful default), excludes indirect and consequential loss, and says how Meridian is liable for sub-custodians. The service level agreement sets cut-offs, notification times and the default option rule. The fee schedule lists per-item fees and pass-through charges. The proxy voting service terms state that Meridian acts on instructions only, that votes can be lost for reasons outside its control (local formalities, issuer’s agent rejection) and what confirmation it will provide. Liability is asymmetric: a missed vote rarely produces a measurable financial loss, while a missed election on a voluntary event produces an exact one, which the client will claim.
Nothing in the plumbing changes because a resolution concerns climate. What changes is the value the investor places on the vote, the evidence it needs afterwards, and the timing pressure.
A Say-on-Climate resolution is a vote on a company’s climate strategy or transition plan, or on its report on implementing it. It was popularised from 2020 by an initiative of The Children’s Investment Fund Foundation. When management puts it on the agenda, it is usually advisory: the board asks shareholders to approve its plan, often every three years, with an annual vote on progress. When shareholders file it, it asks the company to adopt such a vote or to set targets. In the EU, no law makes it mandatory; in France, amendments to make it compulsory for listed companies were adopted by the National Assembly in 2023 during the debate on the green industry law but were removed before the final text, and a new attempt in 2024 did not become law either.
The Shareholder Rights Directive (Directive 2007/36/EC, amended by Directive (EU) 2017/828, known as SRD II) and its Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/1212 apply since 3 September 2020 to shares of companies with a registered office in the EU admitted to trading on an EU regulated market. They impose obligations on every intermediary in the chain, including non-EU intermediaries that provide services for such shares.
| Obligation | What the intermediary does | Deadline (Reg. 2018/1212) |
|---|---|---|
| Shareholder identification (Art. 3a) | Passes the issuer’s request and returns its client’s identity and holding | Without delay; response by the business day after the record date or receipt |
| Transmission of information (Art. 3b) | Forwards the meeting notice and corporate event information | Same business day, or next business day if received after 16:00 |
| Facilitation of rights (Art. 3c) | Transmits votes, or enables the shareholder to vote itself | As set by the chain, within the meeting timetable |
| Vote confirmation (Art. 3c(2)) | Passes the issuer’s electronic confirmation of receipt and, on request, of recording and counting | Within 15 days of the request or the meeting |
| Charges (Art. 3d) | Discloses charges per service; charges must be non-discriminatory and proportionate | Publicly, per service |
Member States may allow issuers to identify only shareholders above a threshold, capped at 0.5% of shares or voting rights; France applies no threshold. The format of messages is set by the Implementing Regulation, and the market has translated it into the Market Standards for General Meetings and into ISO 20022 messages (seev.001 to seev.008 for meetings; seev.045 to seev.047 for shareholder identification).
The same directive requires institutional investors and asset managers to publish an engagement policy and an annual report on its implementation, including how they voted and their use of proxy advisers (Art. 3g), and requires proxy advisers to report against a code of conduct and disclose their research methods and conflicts (Art. 3j). The proxy advisers’ reference code is the Best Practice Principles for Shareholder Voting Research, monitored by an independent oversight committee.
NOTE — In July 2023 ESMA and the EBA published their assessment of SRD II. They called for a common EU definition of “shareholder”, more transparency on intermediaries’ charges, and technical improvements to the flow of information along the chain; ESMA suggested an EU-level registration mechanism for proxy advisers. These points framed the Commission’s review.
On 11 February 2026 the Commission opened a consultation and call for evidence on the evaluation and possible review of SRD II, which closed on 6 May 2026. Its impact assessment covers shareholder identification, transmission of information, exercise of rights, transparency of investors, asset managers and proxy advisers, and the format of general meetings, with competitiveness and digitalisation as stated objectives within the Savings and Investments Union. A legislative proposal was expected around the end of 2026; at the time of writing (mid-November 2026) we found no published proposal. Industry responses are split: issuers and infrastructures push for harmonised timelines, a single shareholder definition and less cost; investor groups such as Eurosif ask for stronger rights for engaged investors; EFAMA asked for a targeted revision only.
The Eurosystem’s AMI-SeCo fed the review with a report published in June 2026, Facilitating the exercise of investor rights. Its 2025 survey of 20 markets is a rare quantification of chain frictions: in the median case 8.75% of shareholder identification requests were not forwarded down the chain and 8.75% went unanswered; incorrect share quantities had a median of 5%. Among its proposals: let any investor holding a position at the record date vote regardless of its custody chain; set the record date early enough that votes can be cast before the last intermediary’s deadline; abolish optional thresholds for identification; use ISO 20022 throughout; cap and disclose fees.
Two plumbing standards matter to Meridian’s systems. The SCoRE Corporate Actions standards (fifth version December 2025) harmonise processes and data for corporate events and meetings in European (I)CSDs: standards 1 to 14 were mandatory from June 2025, with a final deadline of November 2026 for events relevant only to non-debt instruments, and the ISO 20022 standard applies to (I)CSDs and Eurosystem counterparties from June 2025 and to other actors by November 2028. The AMI-SeCo migration roadmap then aims at ISO 20022-only communication for general meetings by end-2026 and for corporate actions by end-2030, with a readiness review by end-2028. And the FASTER Directive (Council Directive (EU) 2025/50) on withholding-tax relief introduces an electronic tax residence certificate, relief at source or a quick refund, and reporting duties for certified financial intermediaries; Member States must transpose it by 31 December 2028 and apply it from 1 January 2030.
Demand for stewardship support comes from the investors’ own rules.
Three movements shape the business today.
Fewer climate votes. A Minerva Analytics review of 1,415 meetings in the twelve months to June 2026 counted 8 Say-on-Climate votes in Europe, against 28 in 2022, and 7 in the UK, against 18 at the peak; there has been no Say-on-Climate vote in the US since 2021. The number of high-dissent resolutions (20% or more against the board) in Europe fell from 329 to 188. BlackRock reported supporting 1 of 318 climate, nature and social proposals globally in its 2025-2026 voting year, and a median US market support for environmental and social proposals of 6.7%, down from 10.4%.
Less consensus, more customisation. In October 2025 Glass Lewis announced that it would stop offering a single benchmark voting policy in 2027 and move all clients to tailored policies. “Pass-through” or “voting choice” programmes let end investors in pooled funds choose a policy: BlackRock reported that Voting Choice was available for USD 3.96tn of its USD 8.79tn index equity assets, with about USD 923bn enrolled. For a custodian this means more distinct policies per fund, more split votes and more reporting lines.
Political pressure on proxy advisers in the US. On 11 December 2025 an executive order titled “Protecting American Investors from Foreign-Owned and Politically-Motivated Proxy Advisors” directed the SEC to review rules on proxy advisers and shareholder proposals, the FTC to investigate competition and consumer-protection issues, and the Department of Labor to revise ERISA guidance on proxy voting. Texas enacted a law in June 2025 requiring proxy advisers to flag recommendations based on non-financial factors; its enforcement was blocked by a preliminary injunction in August 2025. European investors voting US shares through Meridian are affected indirectly, through the advisers’ research and policies.
WHY IT MATTERS ON THE DESK — Fewer climate resolutions do not mean less work. They mean that each one is contested, closely watched, and voted by investors who will be asked to prove what they did. The custodian’s value moves from processing volume to evidencing the outcome.
The “deal” in asset servicing is an event. The flow below follows a general meeting with a contested climate resolution, from the issuer’s notice to the investor’s stewardship report, for shares held through a global custodian and a local sub-custodian. Corporate actions with options follow the same skeleton, with an election instead of a vote.
INTERACTIVE LAB — From the notice of meeting to the stewardship report
Follow a general meeting through the custody chain: who sends what to whom, with which document and which control, from the issuer’s notice to the confirmation that the vote was counted.
| # | Who | Does what | Deliverable |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Issuer and its centralising agent | Publish the notice and agenda (in France in the BALO at least 35 days before the meeting) and send the meeting data to the CSD | Notice of meeting; meeting data file to the CSD |
| 2 | CSD (issuer CSD) | Create the meeting event and notify participants | seev.001 meeting notification (or MT564) |
| 3 | Sub-custodian (local account keeper) | Scrub the event, add local requirements (cut-off, power of attorney, beneficial owner disclosure) and notify its clients | Notification with local cut-off |
| 4 | Global custodian, proxy voting team | Match the event to client positions, set its own cut-off, forward to clients and to the voting platform | Client notification; event on the voting platform |
| 5 | Proxy adviser | Publish research and a recommendation per resolution; apply the client’s custom policy to pre-populate votes | Research report; pre-populated ballot |
| 6 | Investor stewardship team | Review recommendations, decide overrides on contested items, escalate to the stewardship committee, decide whether to recall lent shares | Voting decision and recall request |
| 7 | Agency securities lending | Issue recall notices to borrowers in time for settlement before the record date; monitor returns and fails | Recall notices; returned positions |
| 8 | Investor via voting platform | Submit vote instructions per account before the custodian’s cut-off | seev.004 meeting instruction |
| 9 | Global custodian, proxy voting team | Validate instructions against record-date positions, forward to the sub-custodian, track status | seev.006 instruction status; exception list |
| 10 | Sub-custodian | Vote with the centralising agent on behalf of the custodian’s clients, with any required beneficial owner details | Votes lodged with the centralising agent |
| 11 | Centralising agent and issuer | Tabulate votes, hold the meeting, publish results, send confirmations of receipt and, on request, of recording and counting | Meeting results; seev.007 vote execution confirmation |
| 12 | Global custodian and investor | Reconcile confirmations with instructions, investigate gaps, report votes per resolution | Vote confirmation report; SRD II 3g and stewardship report inputs |
Notice (steps 1 to 4). The issuer’s general counsel and its centralising agent set the meeting date and agenda; in France the notice must appear in the Bulletin des annonces légales obligatoires (BALO) at least 35 days before the meeting for listed companies. The CSD creates the event and its participants receive a standardised notification. Each intermediary checks the data (meeting type, record date, resolutions, deadlines) against a second source and adds its own cut-off. The control at Meridian is the event scrub: two analysts, or an analyst and a rule engine, compare the CSD data with vendor data; any discrepancy blocks the notification until resolved. Under SRD II each intermediary must pass the information on the same business day (next business day if received after 16:00), and Meridian’s service level agreement mirrors this.
Research and decision (steps 5 to 7). The proxy adviser publishes its report two to three weeks before the meeting for most European companies; for a large French company the report typically lands about twelve business days before the meeting. The investor’s stewardship analyst reads the transition plan, compares it with the voting policy, and if the decision departs from the adviser’s recommendation, documents why. The stewardship committee decides on contested items. If the investor lends its shares, it decides in parallel whether to recall them; the agency lending desk computes the latest recall date and sends recall notices. The control here belongs to the investor (four-eyes review of overrides) and to agency lending (recall tracking against the record date).
Instruction and transmission (steps 8 to 10). Votes are sent per account through the voting platform. Meridian validates each instruction against the expected record-date position, rejects instructions on accounts with no position, and forwards the rest. The sub-custodian lodges the votes with the centralising agent; in France, electronic votes can be received up to 15:00 Paris time on the day before the meeting, and postal forms at the latest three days before. The control is the instruction status tracking: every instruction must have an “accepted” status from the next layer within a set time, otherwise the exception team chases it.
Meeting, confirmation and reporting (steps 11 and 12). The issuer publishes results per resolution. The investor can ask for confirmation that its votes were recorded and counted; the request travels up and the confirmation down, and under the Implementing Regulation it must be provided within 15 days. Meridian reconciles confirmations with instructions and produces a monthly report: meetings voted, resolutions voted against management, instructions rejected and why, confirmations received. This report becomes evidence in the investor’s SRD II disclosure and stewardship report.
PITFALL — The weak point is between steps 9 and 11. A rejection by the centralising agent (wrong account, quantity above the record-date position, missing beneficial owner data) often reaches the investor only after the meeting, if at all. Without systematic confirmation requests, an investor can publish “we voted against” for a vote that was never counted.
Kestrel Pension Fund and Solvane Energie are fictional; the rules, messages and market practice are real; all figures are case assumptions unless a source is given. The case runs through the spring 2027 season, prepared in November 2026.
Question. How much does Kestrel’s vote weigh at Solvane’s meeting, and how much of it is at risk because shares are on loan?
Data. Kestrel Pension Fund is a Dutch occupational pension fund with EUR 40bn of assets, of which about EUR 18bn in listed equities in 30 markets. Meridian Bank is its global custodian and agent lender; Kestrel holds its equities in three segregated accounts at Meridian (developed-market index, active European equities, emerging markets). Meridian uses its own Paris branch as account keeper for French securities in most cases, but for historical reasons Kestrel’s accounts are serviced through Meridian’s Luxembourg securities-services entity, which holds French shares through a local sub-custodian, Atlantique Titres (fictional), a participant of Euroclear France. The vote chain is therefore: Kestrel, its voting platform, Meridian Luxembourg, Atlantique Titres, the centralising agent of the issuer.
Solvane Energie SA is a French listed utility with 600m shares. Because French law grants double voting rights to fully paid registered shares held for two years unless the articles opt out, 80m shares carry two votes: Solvane has 680m voting rights. Its general meeting is set for Thursday 27 May 2027. The agenda includes resolution 18, an advisory vote on Solvane’s updated climate transition plan (a management Say-on-Climate), three years after the first one. At the previous vote, 18% of votes cast were against. Turnout at Solvane meetings is about 72% of voting rights.
Kestrel holds 2.4m Solvane shares in bearer form, so with single voting rights, worth EUR 91.2m at EUR 38.00. Through Meridian’s agency lending programme, 0.6m shares are on loan. Kestrel’s policy votes against a Say-on-Climate if the plan’s capital expenditure is not consistent with its stated targets; its proxy adviser recommends “for”; its stewardship analysts lean “against”.
Calculation. Kestrel’s share of voting rights is . Votes cast are m. If all 2.4m shares vote, Kestrel’s weight in votes cast is ; without recalling the lent shares it votes 1.8m shares, a weight of . Recalling adds 0.123 points of the votes cast.
INTERACTIVE LAB — How much does a holding weigh at the meeting?
Compute the investor’s weight in voting rights and in votes cast, with and without recalling lent shares, in a company with double voting rights.
| Parameter you can move | Range | Default |
|---|---|---|
| Shares held | 0.1 to 20 m | 2.4 m |
| Shares on loan | 0 to 10 m | 0.6 m |
| Share of lent shares recalled | 0 to 100 % | 100 % |
| Shares outstanding | 100 to 2000 m | 600 m |
| Shares with double voting rights | 0 to 500 m | 80 m |
| Turnout (share of voting rights cast) | 30 to 100 % | 72 % |
| Share price | 5 to 200 EUR | 38 EUR |
| Result at default settings | Value |
|---|---|
| Total voting rights | 680.0 m |
| Market value of the holding | 91.20 EUR m |
| Shares voted | 2.40 m |
| Weight in voting rights (all shares held) | 0.3529 % |
| Weight in votes cast (shares voted) | 0.4902 % |
| Weight in votes cast without recall | 0.3676 % |
| Weight gained by the recall | 0.1225 points |
Try it. Set double voting rights to zero: Kestrel’s weight rises, because long-standing registered holders no longer count twice. Then set turnout to 50%: a lower turnout magnifies every vote cast.
Reading. Half a percent of votes cast does not decide an advisory resolution on its own, and Kestrel knows it. Its vote matters as part of a signal: proxy research, press coverage and the board’s reaction look at the level of dissent, and a Say-on-Climate with more than 20% against is treated by many boards as a message requiring a response. The reason the case is worth studying is that a quarter of Kestrel’s votes are at risk from lending, and an unknown share from the chain itself.
WHO DOES WHAT — At Kestrel, the stewardship team (three analysts and a head of stewardship) owns the voting policy and the decisions; the investment committee approves the policy each year; the operations team owns the relationship with Meridian. At Meridian, the client service manager for Kestrel is the single entry point; the proxy voting team runs the event on the platform; network management holds the file on Atlantique Titres (service level, cut-offs, last due-diligence visit); agency lending runs the recall. Kestrel’s proxy adviser is a separate contract, which Meridian does not manage but whose platform it connects to.
Before the vote: Solvane looks for its shareholders. Six weeks before the meeting, Solvane’s investor relations team wants to explain its updated plan to its largest institutional holders. Its register shows the CSD’s participants, not Kestrel. It therefore asks its issuer agent to launch a shareholder identification request under SRD II, with a reference date of 9 April 2027. The request travels down through Euroclear France to Atlantique Titres and to Meridian (seev.045); each intermediary must answer without delay, and at the latest by the business day following the reference date or the receipt of the request, whichever is later, with the identity of the shareholder (name, LEI, address), the number of shares and the type of holding. Meridian answers for Kestrel’s three accounts, giving the LEI of the fund and the position on the reference date, and passes on the request to no one, because Kestrel holds directly with it. Solvane’s IR team then invites Kestrel’s head of stewardship to a call with the chair of its sustainability committee. The call is useful but changes the vote in neither direction: Kestrel asks for the share of capital expenditure aligned with the plan’s targets, Solvane promises it for the following year. Two operational points matter for the custodian. First, the response must be right: AMI-SeCo’s survey found a median of 5% of responses with incorrect share quantities, and a wrong quantity reported to an issuer is a data error about a client. Second, the request is free for Kestrel but not for Meridian, which bears the cost of building responses; SRD II allows intermediaries to charge issuers, within the limits of Article 3d, and practice differs widely by market.
Question. How many business days does Kestrel have to decide, and by when must it recall the lent shares?
Data. Solvane publishes its notice in the BALO on Thursday 22 April 2027, 35 calendar days before the meeting, which is 25 TARGET business days before it (D−25). Four intermediaries pass the notice downstream (Euroclear France, Atlantique Titres, Meridian, the voting platform), each with an average lag of one business day. Upstream, the centralising agent accepts electronic votes until D−1 at 15:00. Three intermediaries carry the vote upstream (platform, Meridian, Atlantique Titres), each setting its cut-off one business day before the next; Atlantique Titres adds one extra day for its beneficial-owner checks. The proxy adviser’s report is expected at D−12. The record date is D−2 at midnight, so the shares must be settled in Kestrel’s account by the close of D−3. Recalls settle in the standard cycle, T+2 in May 2027 (T+1 applies only from 11 October 2027), and agency lending keeps a one-day safety margin for borrower fails.
FORMULA
is the investor’s decision window in business days; the business days between the notice and the meeting; the number of intermediaries between the investor and the issuer side; the average downstream transmission lag per intermediary; the issuer agent’s deadline in business days before the meeting; the cut-off buffer each upstream intermediary adds (the CSD is not in the upstream path in France, hence ); any extra local buffer; the latest recall date in business days before the meeting; 3 stands for the close of D−3 that the French record date implies; the settlement cycle; the safety margin.
Calculation. The notice reaches Kestrel at (Wednesday 28 April). Kestrel’s own cut-off is (Thursday 20 May). The decision window is 16 business days, but only 7 of them follow the proxy research (D−12, Tuesday 11 May). The latest recall date is (Wednesday 19 May): the recall must be decided six business days after the research arrives and one day before the vote itself is due.
INTERACTIVE LAB — The investor’s decision window across a custody chain
Compute when the notice reaches the investor, its effective vote cut-off, the time left after the proxy research, and the latest recall date for lent shares; compare a manual chain with a straight-through ISO 20022 chain as intermediaries are added.
| Parameter you can move | Range | Default |
|---|---|---|
| Business days from notice to meeting | 10 to 40 days | 25 days |
| Intermediaries between investor and issuer side | 1 to 8 | 4 |
| Downstream lag per intermediary | 0 to 3 days | 1 days |
| Upstream cut-off buffer per intermediary | 0 to 3 days | 1 days |
| Issuer agent’s vote deadline before the meeting | 0 to 5 days | 1 days |
| Extra local buffer (sub-custodian checks) | 0 to 5 days | 1 days |
| Proxy research published, days before meeting | 5 to 25 days | 12 days |
| Settlement cycle of the recall | 2 / 1 | 2 |
| Recall safety margin | 0 to 3 days | 1 days |
| Result at default settings | Value |
|---|---|
| Notice reaches the investor (days before meeting) | 21.0 D- |
| Investor’s effective cut-off (days before meeting) | 5.0 D- |
| Decision window | 16.0 business days |
| Days between proxy research and cut-off | 7.0 business days |
| Latest recall date (days before meeting) | 6 D- |
| Days between research and recall deadline | 6 business days |
| Decision window with STP (lag 0, buffer 0.5) | 21.5 business days |
Try it. Add intermediaries with a two-day buffer each: at six layers the investor’s cut-off falls on the day the proxy research arrives, which is what happens in some emerging markets.
Reading. Sixteen days look comfortable; seven days after the research do not, when Kestrel’s analysts face 900 meetings that week. Two lessons for the desk. First, every buffer an intermediary adds for its own comfort is taken from the investor’s decision time; AMI-SeCo’s proposal that the record date and deadlines be set so that votes can be cast before the last intermediary’s deadline addresses exactly this. Second, the recall deadline comes before the vote cut-off, so the recall decision is made with less information than the vote. The move to T+1 in October 2027 gives one day back on the recall, not on the vote. A practical trap: 6 May (Ascension) and 17 May (Whit Monday) 2027 are French public holidays on which TARGET and Euronext are open; teams that count French holidays instead of TARGET days miscount the window.
Question. What does Kestrel give up by recalling 0.6m shares for the vote, and who bears the cost?
Data. The 0.6m shares on loan earn a lending fee of 18 bp a year (case assumption for a liquid large cap in general-collateral conditions). Recalled on D−6, they settle back on D−4; agency lending can lend them again after the record date, but the new loans settle only after the meeting. Allowing for weekend and frictions, the shares are out of loan for 6 calendar days. The fee is split 80/20 between Kestrel and Meridian as agent lender.
FORMULA
is the gross lending fee forgone; the number of shares recalled; the share price; the annual lending fee; the calendar days out of loan; the client’s share of the fee.
Calculation. The loan is worth $0.6 = $ EUR 22.8m. Six days at 18 bp: $22.8 % /365 = $ EUR 674.63 gross, of which EUR 539.70 for Kestrel and EUR 134.93 for Meridian.
INTERACTIVE LAB — The lending revenue forgone by recalling shares to vote
Compute the lending fee given up when lent shares are recalled for a vote, split between the client and the agent lender, and see how it grows with the days out of loan and with the fee level.
| Parameter you can move | Range | Default |
|---|---|---|
| Shares recalled | 0.1 to 10 m | 0.6 m |
| Share price | 5 to 200 EUR | 38 EUR |
| Lending fee | 5 to 500 bp a year | 18 bp a year |
| Calendar days out of loan | 1 to 30 days | 6 days |
| Client’s share of the fee | 50 to 95 % | 80 % |
| Result at default settings | Value |
|---|---|
| Value of the shares recalled | 22.80 EUR m |
| Gross fee forgone | 674.63 EUR |
| Forgone by the client | 539.70 EUR |
| Forgone by the agent lender | 134.93 EUR |
| Annual fee on the position (for scale) | 41,040 EUR |
Try it. Set the fee to 300 bp, a level a stock can reach when it becomes ‘special’ around a dividend or a takeover: the recall becomes a real economic decision.
Reading. At general-collateral fees the recall costs Kestrel a few hundred euros on a EUR 91m holding; it is not an economic question. Why then do lenders often not recall? Three reasons, which the stewardship committee must weigh. Information: the recall must be decided at D−6, sometimes before the analysts have finished; lenders that recall only for contested votes need a screen that flags them early. Scale: Kestrel lends hundreds of positions; a blanket recall across the season removes a large part of the programme’s revenue and borrowers penalise unreliable lenders with lower demand. Specials: when a stock is in demand (around dividends, takeovers or index events) the fee can be ten or twenty times higher. Policies that work in practice combine a list of priority meetings, a threshold on holding size, and a cap on the fee forgone. An honest stewardship report states how many votes were not cast because shares were on loan; few do.
PITFALL — Recalling is not the only way to lose votes through lending. If Kestrel’s shares are on loan at the record date, the borrower can vote them, possibly in the opposite direction. “Empty voting”, holding votes without economic exposure, is the reason some investors restrict lending around contested meetings rather than simply recalling.
Question. What is the probability that Kestrel’s instruction on resolution 18 is executed, and how many of its votes across the season can it actually evidence?
Data. Meridian’s exception data (case assumptions, consistent with the orders of magnitude in AMI-SeCo’s 2025 survey) give the probability that an instruction fails at each layer: voting platform 0.2% (mapping errors), Meridian 0.3% (position mismatch, late instruction), Atlantique Titres 1.0% (missing beneficial-owner data, quantity above record-date position), centralising agent 0.5% (account not recognised, late arrival). Across the season Kestrel sends 4,000 ballots (meeting and account combinations). 55% of them are for EU companies, where SRD II gives a right to confirmation; Meridian obtains a confirmation of recording and counting for 60% of the EU ballots it requests.
FORMULA
is the probability that an instruction is executed end to end; the failure probability at layer ; the number of layers; the expected number of ballots lost; the ballots sent; the ballots evidenced by a confirmation; the share of ballots in markets with a confirmation right; the confirmation rate obtained.
Calculation. . On resolution 18, the expected number of Kestrel shares counted is m. Over the season, about 79 ballots are expected to fail silently. Only ballots, 33%, can be evidenced by a confirmation.
INTERACTIVE LAB — Vote leakage along the chain and the evidence gap
Compute the probability that a vote instruction is executed through four layers, the expected ballots lost in a season, and the share of votes the investor can evidence with a confirmation; compare manual and straight-through chains as layers are added.
| Parameter you can move | Range | Default |
|---|---|---|
| Failure rate, voting platform | 0 to 5 % | 0.2 % |
| Failure rate, global custodian | 0 to 5 % | 0.3 % |
| Failure rate, sub-custodian | 0 to 5 % | 1.0 % |
| Failure rate, issuer’s agent | 0 to 5 % | 0.5 % |
| Ballots sent in the season | 100 to 20000 | 4000 |
| Shares instructed on resolution 18 | 0.1 to 20 m | 2.4 m |
| Share of ballots with a confirmation right | 0 to 100 % | 55 % |
| Confirmation rate obtained | 0 to 100 % | 60 % |
| Chart: failure rate per layer, manual chain | 0 to 5 % | 1.0 % |
| Chart: failure rate per layer, STP chain | 0 to 5 % | 0.25 % |
| Result at default settings | Value |
|---|---|
| Probability of execution end to end | 98.01 % |
| Expected shares counted on resolution 18 | 2.352 m |
| Expected ballots lost in the season | 79.5 |
| Ballots evidenced by a confirmation | 1,320 |
| Share of ballots evidenced | 33.0 % |
Try it. Set the sub-custodian’s failure rate to 3%, a level reported in some markets for beneficial-owner disclosure errors: the whole chain is only as good as its weakest layer.
Reading. A 98% execution rate sounds high until it is turned into 79 lost ballots, none of which Kestrel will hear about unless it asks. The evidence gap is larger than the execution gap: two thirds of Kestrel’s ballots cannot be confirmed, because they are outside the EU, because the confirmation was not requested, or because the chain did not return it. For a stewardship report this is the critical number. Meridian’s levers are concrete: request confirmations systematically on priority meetings, push sub-custodians to ISO 20022 meeting messages (the AMI-SeCo roadmap targets ISO 20022-only for meetings by end-2026), and report rejections to the client in real time rather than in the monthly pack.
What happens when a vote is rejected. Suppose Atlantique Titres reports on D−2 that the centralising agent rejected the instruction on Kestrel’s active-equity account: the quantity instructed (900,000 shares) exceeds the record-date position (850,000), because a sale of 50,000 shares settled on D−3. The proxy voting team at Meridian sees the rejection status the same morning, checks the settled position in the custody system, and resubmits for 850,000 shares before the centralising agent’s deadline at 15:00 on D−1. Had the status arrived a day later, the vote on that account would have been lost entirely, not reduced by 6%. The control that saves it is not sophisticated: an automatic comparison of instructed quantities with expected record-date positions at D−3, and a named person who reads status messages twice a day during the season. Most lost votes in the industry come from such ordinary mismatches, not from exotic legal obstacles.
Question. The meeting also approves a dividend that shareholders may take in cash or in new shares. What is the election worth to Kestrel, what does lending do to it, and what would a missed election cost?
Data. Resolution 3 approves a dividend of EUR 1.40 per share with an option to receive it in new shares. French company law (Code de commerce, Articles L.232-18 to L.232-20) allows the issue price of such shares to be set at no less than 90% of the average opening price over the 20 trading sessions before the meeting, minus the dividend. Solvane uses the full 10% discount; the 20-session average is EUR 38.50. Timetable (case assumptions): ex-date Tuesday 1 June, record date Wednesday 2 June, option period 3 to 16 June, Meridian’s client cut-off Monday 14 June at 12:00, delivery of new shares and payment of cash on Friday 25 June. The default option is cash. After the meeting, Kestrel’s 0.6m recalled shares go back on loan, so at the dividend record date it holds 1.8m shares in its account; on the lent shares it receives a manufactured dividend in cash from the borrower, with no option. We assume the share trades ex-dividend at EUR 37.10 (the average minus the dividend) and is still there on delivery.
FORMULA
is the issue price of the new shares; the discount; the 20-session average price; the dividend per share; the new shares received per share held; the market price of the share at delivery; the shares eligible for the option; the value gained by electing shares rather than cash.
Calculation. $P_{issue} = 0.9 (38.50 - 1.40) = $ EUR 33.39; each share gives new shares, worth $0.041929 = $ EUR 1.5556 against EUR 1.40 in cash. On 1.8m shares: cash EUR 2.52m, shares worth EUR 2.80m, a gain of EUR 280,000 (11.1%). Had the 0.6m lent shares stayed in the account, the gain would have been EUR 373,333. The election stays favourable unless the share falls more than 10% below EUR 37.10 before delivery.
INTERACTIVE LAB — Value of a scrip-dividend election and cost of missing it
Compute the issue price of scrip shares, the value of electing shares instead of cash, what lending the shares over the record date costs in election value, and the claim if the custodian misses the election.
| Parameter you can move | Range | Default |
|---|---|---|
| Dividend per share | 0.2 to 5 EUR | 1.4 EUR |
| 20-session average price | 5 to 200 EUR | 38.5 EUR |
| Discount on the issue price | 0 to 10 % | 10 % |
| Shares in the account at the record date | 0.1 to 20 m | 1.8 m |
| Shares on loan at the record date | 0 to 10 m | 0.6 m |
| Market price at delivery | 5 to 200 EUR | 37.1 EUR |
| Result at default settings | Value |
|---|---|
| Issue price of new shares | 33.39 EUR |
| New shares per share held | 0.041929 |
| Dividend in cash | 2,520.0 EUR k |
| Value of new shares at delivery | 2,800.0 EUR k |
| Gain from electing shares (= claim if missed) | 280.0 EUR k |
| Gain as a share of the cash dividend | 11.11 % |
| Gain if the lent shares had been in the account | 373.3 EUR k |
| Fall in price at which cash becomes better | 10.00 % |
| Election value lost on the lent shares | 93.333 EUR k |
Try it. Set the market price at delivery to EUR 32: the shares are worth less than the cash and the default option would have been the better choice. The election carries market risk between the cut-off and delivery.
Reading. Three lessons. First, the value of an election can be computed to the euro, which is why missed elections are the classic custody claim: if Meridian failed to forward Kestrel’s instruction, Kestrel would receive cash by default and claim EUR 280,000, against a EUR 50 election fee. Second, lending over the record date has a cost that never appears in the lending report: EUR 93,333 of election value on the lent shares, against a few hundred euros of lending fee earned over the same days. A good agent lender recalls ahead of valuable elections as it does ahead of votes. Third, the “sustainable” vote and the “financial” election travel through the same chain, the same cut-offs and the same people; an operations team that is good at one is good at the other.
Question. What does Kestrel pay Meridian for asset servicing beyond custody, what does it cost Meridian to deliver, and what does the stewardship package add?
Data (case assumptions, in line with tender practice). Income collection and mandatory events are bundled into the safekeeping fee (see D01). Separately priced: proxy voting at EUR 22 per ballot for 4,000 ballots; voluntary and optional corporate actions at EUR 50 per election for 420 elections; a stewardship package at EUR 45,000 a year (vote confirmation requests on priority meetings, rejection alerts, a resolution-level vote report formatted for Kestrel’s SRD II and UK Stewardship Code reporting, a dashboard of climate resolutions and Say-on-Climate outcomes). Meridian’s bottom-up costs: voting platform licence EUR 6 per ballot; sub-custodian and market charges absorbed (not re-billed) EUR 3 per ballot; corporate-action processing EUR 20 per election; a fixed servicing cost of EUR 45,000 (share of team time, client service, controls), allocated two thirds to proxy voting and one third to corporate actions; stewardship package data and analyst time EUR 18,000.
Calculation. Revenue: $4{,}000 + 420 + 45{,}000 = $ EUR 154,000. Costs: $4{,}000 (6 + 3) + 420 + 45{,}000 + 18{,}000 = $ EUR 107,400. Cost-income ratio 69.7%, margin EUR 46,600. By line: proxy voting earns EUR 88,000 for EUR 66,000 of cost; corporate actions EUR 21,000 for EUR 23,400, a loss; the stewardship package EUR 45,000 for EUR 18,000. Without the package the cost-income ratio would be 82.0%.
INTERACTIVE LAB — Asset servicing mandate: fees, bottom-up cost and the stewardship package
Build Kestrel’s asset servicing bill by service line, compare it with Meridian’s bottom-up cost, and measure what the stewardship package does to the cost-income ratio.
| Parameter you can move | Range | Default |
|---|---|---|
| Ballots per year | 500 to 20000 | 4000 |
| Fee per ballot | 5 to 60 EUR | 22 EUR |
| Elections per year | 50 to 2000 | 420 |
| Fee per election | 10 to 250 EUR | 50 EUR |
| Stewardship package fee | 0 to 150 EUR k | 45 EUR k |
| Platform cost per ballot | 0 to 20 EUR | 6 EUR |
| Absorbed market charges per ballot | 0 to 20 EUR | 3 EUR |
| Processing cost per election | 0 to 100 EUR | 20 EUR |
| Fixed servicing cost | 0 to 200 EUR k | 45 EUR k |
| Stewardship package cost | 0 to 100 EUR k | 18 EUR k |
| Result at default settings | Value |
|---|---|
| Revenue | 154.0 EUR k |
| Operating cost | 107.4 EUR k |
| Cost-income ratio | 69.74 % |
| Margin before losses and tax | 46.6 EUR k |
| Cost-income ratio without the package | 82.02 % |
| Corporate actions line margin | -2.4 EUR k |
| Cost-income ratio of the stewardship package | 40.0 % |
Try it. Raise the election fee to EUR 100: the corporate-actions line turns profitable. Then compare that EUR 50 increase with the EUR 280,000 claim of stage 5.5.
Reading. The bottom-up cost-income ratio (69.7%) is higher than the course convention for fee businesses (60%): asset servicing is the labour-intensive end of securities services. We use the bottom-up figure in 5.7 and say so. The corporate-actions line loses money on its own because elections are priced as a commodity in tenders while they carry the liability; this is the line where pricing discipline is weakest across the industry. The stewardship package is the most profitable line, which is the commercial reason custodians invest in it. Two honest caveats: its cost excludes the development of the dashboard, carried centrally; and its value to the client depends on whether the confirmations it promises actually come back (5.4).
The negotiation. Kestrel’s operations team benchmarks the fee schedule every three years through a request for proposal. Its consultant compares per-ballot fees across custodians; Meridian’s relationship manager argues on service quality (rejection alerts, confirmation rate, reporting) rather than on price, because the per-ballot fee is easily undercut by a competitor that bundles proxy voting into safekeeping. SRD II requires each intermediary to disclose its charges for shareholder services publicly and per service, and forbids charging more for cross-border than for domestic rights without a justified cost difference: Meridian’s published tariff therefore sets a floor on how far a discount can be presented as specific to Kestrel. Pass-through charges (powers of attorney, local agents’ fees in some markets) are re-billed at cost where the contract allows; in this case Meridian absorbs EUR 3 a ballot, a concession made at the last renewal.
Question. Does the mandate clear Meridian’s 12% after-tax hurdle, and what does the answer depend on?
Data. From 5.6: revenue EUR 154,000, operating cost EUR 107,400. Expected operational loss: 420 elections a year, an error rate of 0.01% (one missed or wrong election in 10,000, Meridian’s loss history for comparable clients) and an average severity of EUR 150,000. Operational-risk capital: CRR3 standardised approach, marginal business-indicator coefficient 15% (Meridian’s bucket) applied to the mandate’s revenue, capital at 13% of RWA. Economic view: Meridian’s ICAAP holds a severe-but-plausible scenario for asset servicing, a missed election on a large voluntary event affecting several clients plus a mass-vote failure with compensation, of EUR 60m for the business line; it allocates it to mandates by their share of value at stake in elections, 0.75% for Kestrel, i.e. EUR 450,000.
Calculation. Expected loss $420 % 000 = $ EUR 6,300. Pre-tax profit $154{,}000 - 107{,}400 - 6{,}300 = $ EUR 40,300; after tax EUR 30,225. Regulatory view: own funds $15% 000 = $ EUR 23,100; RWA $12.5 100 = $ EUR 288,750; allocated capital $13% 750 = $ EUR 37,537.50; RAROC 80.5%. Economic view: $30{,}225 / 450{,}000 = $ 6.7%, below the hurdle. The election fee that would clear 12% under the economic view is EUR 125.48. One missed scrip election on Solvane (EUR 280,000) would consume 9.3 years of the mandate’s net profit.
INTERACTIVE LAB — RAROC of an asset servicing mandate: regulatory against economic capital
Compute the after-tax profit of the Kestrel mandate, its RAROC on CRR3 operational-risk capital and on ICAAP economic capital, the election fee needed to clear the hurdle, and the years of profit one tail claim consumes; switch the stewardship package off to see what it contributes.
| Parameter you can move | Range | Default |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue including package | 20 to 1000 EUR k | 154 EUR k |
| Operating cost including package | 10 to 1000 EUR k | 107.4 EUR k |
| Include the stewardship package (1 yes, 0 no) | 1 / 0 | 1 |
| Package revenue | 0 to 150 EUR k | 45 EUR k |
| Package cost | 0 to 100 EUR k | 18 EUR k |
| Elections per year | 50 to 2000 | 420 |
| Error rate per election | 0 to 0.2 % | 0.01 % |
| Average severity of an error | 10 to 1000 EUR k | 150 EUR k |
| Marginal BIC coefficient | 12 / 15 / 18 | 15 |
| Business-line stress scenario (ICAAP) | 10 to 200 EUR m | 60 EUR m |
| Mandate’s share of the scenario | 0.1 to 5 % | 0.75 % |
| Current fee per election | 10 to 250 EUR | 50 EUR |
| Tail claim: one missed election | 0 to 2000 EUR k | 280 EUR k |
| Result at default settings | Value |
|---|---|
| Revenue in scope | 154.0 EUR k |
| Operating cost in scope | 107.4 EUR k |
| Expected operational loss | 6.30 EUR k |
| Expected loss as a share of revenue | 4.09 % |
| Net profit after tax (25%) | 30.225 EUR k |
| Operational-risk own funds | 23.10 EUR k |
| Operational-risk RWA | 288.75 EUR k |
| Allocated capital, CRR3 operational risk | 37.5375 EUR k |
| RAROC on regulatory capital | 80.52 % |
| Allocated economic capital | 450.0 EUR k |
| RAROC on economic capital | 6.72 % |
| Election fee to clear 12% on economic capital | 125.48 EUR |
| Years of net profit consumed by one tail claim | 9.26 years |
Try it. Double revenue, cost and elections together: the regulatory RAROC does not move, because capital scales with revenue. Then switch the package off: both RAROCs fall, the economic one to about 2%.
Reading. The two RAROCs answer different questions. The regulatory view says that, given the CRR3 formula, a mandate with a 70% cost-income ratio earns 80% on the capital the formula assigns, whatever its size and whatever it does. The economic view says that once the bank accounts for the liability it actually carries on elections, the mandate does not pay for its risk. The stewardship package more than triples the mandate’s profit; without it, the economic RAROC falls to 2.2%. Meridian’s approval file for the annual review shows both views, the tail-claim ratio and three levers: reprice elections (a fee of EUR 125 clears the hurdle), reduce the error rate through automation of election capture (each halving of the error rate removes EUR 3,150 of expected loss), and, at contract renewal, cap liability for elections received late or incomplete.
Which lever matters most. The simulator separates them. Taking the error rate to zero (perfect automation) lifts the regulatory RAROC to 93.1% but the economic RAROC only to 7.8%: the economic capital is set by the tail scenario, not by the expected loss, so better processes help only if they also convince the risk function to reduce the scenario allocated to the mandate. Repricing elections works directly on the numerator, but the tender process limits it. The most powerful lever is the scenario share itself, which depends on how much value is at stake in Kestrel’s elections: a mandate that rarely elects on large positions carries a smaller share of the business line’s tail. This is why Meridian’s relationship managers are asked, at each renewal, for an estimate of the client’s voluntary-event exposure, a question that clients find unusual and that risk managers find essential.
| Item | Value | Stage |
|---|---|---|
| Kestrel holding; value at EUR 38 | 2.4m shares; EUR 91.2m | 5.1 |
| Weight in voting rights / votes cast | 0.353% / 0.490% | 5.1 |
| Weight without recall; gain from recall | 0.368%; 0.123 points | 5.1 |
| Notice reaches Kestrel; vote cut-off | D−21; D−5 | 5.2 |
| Decision window; after proxy research | 16; 7 business days | 5.2 |
| Latest recall date (T+2; T+1) | D−6; D−5 | 5.2 |
| Lending fee forgone by recall (gross / Kestrel / Meridian) | EUR 674.63 / 539.70 / 134.93 | 5.3 |
| Probability of execution; shares counted | 98.01%; 2.352m | 5.4 |
| Ballots lost; ballots evidenced | 79.5; 1,320 (33%) | 5.4 |
| Scrip issue price; gain on 1.8m shares | EUR 33.39; EUR 280,000 | 5.5 |
| Gain if lent shares kept; break-even fall | EUR 373,333; 10% | 5.5 |
| Revenue; cost; cost-income | EUR 154,000; 107,400; 69.7% | 5.6 |
| Cost-income without package | 82.0% | 5.6 |
| Expected loss; net profit after tax | EUR 6,300; EUR 30,225 | 5.7 |
| Op-risk capital; RAROC | EUR 37,537.50; 80.5% | 5.7 |
| Economic capital; RAROC | EUR 450,000; 6.7% | 5.7 |
| Break-even election fee; years per tail claim | EUR 125.48; 9.3 | 5.7 |
IN ONE SENTENCE — Asset servicing consumes almost no credit capital; its capital is a regulatory formula driven by revenue, while its real risk is a contractual liability for missed deadlines that the formula does not see.
Operational risk under CRR3. Since 1 January 2025 EU banks compute operational-risk own funds with the standardised approach of Regulation (EU) 2024/1623 (see D01 and D03 for the full mechanics). The business indicator is a three-year average of interest, services and financial components; fee and commission income enters the services component. Marginal coefficients are 12% up to EUR 1bn, 15% from EUR 1bn to EUR 30bn and 18% above; the EU sets the internal loss multiplier at one, so the bank’s own loss history does not change the charge. Allocated to a mandate through its revenue, as the course does:
FORMULA
is the capital Meridian allocates to the mandate for operational risk; the marginal coefficient of Meridian’s bucket; the mandate’s annual revenue; 12.5 converts own funds into RWA; 13% is Meridian’s capital allocation rate. For Kestrel: $0.24375 000 = $ EUR 37,537.50.
Credit and liquidity exposures. Small but real. Contractual income crediting means Meridian pays Kestrel the dividend on the payment date even when the cash arrives late from the sub-custodian; for a day or two Meridian is exposed to the sub-custodian and to Kestrel (if the payment is reversed). Scrip and rights elections may require Kestrel to pay a subscription amount before the new shares arrive, creating an intraday or overnight overdraft. Agency securities lending carries a borrower-default indemnity, which is credit risk on the borrowers after collateral; it is booked and capitalised in the agency lending desk (see C11) and excluded from this mandate’s RAROC.
Pillar 2 and liability. Because the standardised formula is pure size, Meridian’s ICAAP holds scenarios specific to asset servicing: a missed election on a large voluntary event affecting several clients; an error in a mandatory event processed for all clients (a wrong ratio on a stock split applied to every account); a sub-custodian failing to forward votes during a contested season; a systematic withholding-tax error discovered after several years. These scenarios drive economic capital and, in the supervisor’s review, can justify a Pillar 2 add-on. The contract shapes the loss: Meridian is liable for negligence, fraud or wilful default; indirect and consequential losses are excluded; a missed election caused by an instruction received after Meridian’s cut-off is at the client’s risk; the measure of loss for a missed election is the difference between the elected and the default option on the payment date. These clauses are what make the EUR 280,000 of stage 5.5 a claim rather than a debate.
| Line (EUR) | With package | Without package |
|---|---|---|
| Fee revenue | 154,000 | 109,000 |
| Operating costs | −107,400 | −89,400 |
| Expected operational loss | −6,300 | −6,300 |
| Net after tax (25%) | 30,225 | 9,975 |
| Op-risk capital (13% of RWA) | 37,537.50 | 26,568.75 |
| RAROC, regulatory | 80.5% | 37.5% |
| Economic capital | 450,000 | 450,000 |
| RAROC, economic | 6.7% | 2.2% |
These figures are the outputs of the simulator of stage 5.7. With capital proportional to revenue, the regulatory RAROC collapses into a function of the cost-income ratio and of expected losses as a share of revenue:
FORMULA
is the cost-income ratio; expected losses as a share of revenue; the tax rate; the marginal BIC coefficient. For Kestrel: .
Compare with the lending RAROC of B03. In lending, revenue is a margin on an exposure, capital is proportional to the exposure times a risk weight that rises with PD, LGD and maturity, and expected loss uses the same parameters. The RAROC is risk-sensitive: a weaker borrower needs a wider margin to earn the same return, and pricing can be derived from the hurdle. In asset servicing, three things differ in nature.
On the desk, therefore, mandates are priced on margin and on unit cost (cost per ballot, per election), with the regulatory RAROC as a line in the approval file, and the economic view, built from Pillar 2 scenarios, as the risk-sensitive check.
What the sustainable feature changes. The stewardship package adds EUR 45,000 of revenue at a 40% cost-income ratio; it raises the regulatory RAROC from 37.5% to 80.5% and the economic RAROC from 2.2% to 6.7%. It does not add credit or leverage capital. It adds a specific liability, however: if Meridian reports to Kestrel that a vote was cast and counted when it was not, and Kestrel publishes that statement, the error becomes part of Kestrel’s public stewardship claims. The package’s terms must therefore separate what Meridian evidences (instruction sent, status received, confirmation received) from what it cannot know.
Asset servicing generates cash flows in transit rather than funding. Dividends, coupons, redemption proceeds and cash from elections pass through Kestrel’s cash accounts at Meridian; the balances are operational deposits for the treasury (25% outflow rate in the LCR for the operational part of financial customers’ deposits, see D01) and earn the business line a funds transfer pricing credit. Contractual income crediting costs Meridian a day or two of funding on late payments; pre-funding a EUR 2.5m dividend for two days costs a few hundred euros at current euro rates, negligible per event but a line in the annual service cost. Intraday liquidity is used when subscription payments for elections and rights issues settle before the corresponding sales or income arrive.
Client securities are not Meridian’s assets and stay off its balance sheet. Under IFRS 15, per-ballot and per-election fees are recognised at a point in time, when the service is performed (the instruction is transmitted, the event is processed); the stewardship package is a service delivered over time and is recognised monthly. Market charges re-billed to the client are presented gross or net depending on whether Meridian acts as principal or agent for that service (IFRS 15, paragraphs B34 to B38); the charges it absorbs are operating costs. A claim for a missed election is a provision under IAS 37 when Meridian has a present obligation and can estimate it reliably, typically as soon as the error is identified and the elected-option value is known; the loss also enters the operational loss database. Overdrafts arising from elections are financial assets at amortised cost with a twelve-month expected credit loss under IFRS 9. Lending fees are recognised over the life of each loan in the agency lending desk.
GAR and BTAR. Custody assets are off balance sheet and outside the Green Asset Ratio and the Banking Book Taxonomy Alignment Ratio. Asset servicing does not move either.
Fees and commissions KPI. The Taxonomy disclosures for credit institutions include a KPI on fee and commission income from Taxonomy-aligned activities, postponed by the 2025 simplification to 1 January 2028 (see C01 and D01). If it applies as designed, proxy and corporate action fees on holdings of aligned issuers could in principle count, which would require the alignment data D05 describes.
Financed and facilitated emissions. PCAF’s financed-emissions standard covers on-balance-sheet loans and investments; its facilitated-emissions standard covers capital-markets issuance arranged by the bank. Neither applies to holding or servicing a client’s securities. Meridian should not attribute the emissions of Kestrel’s portfolio to itself, nor claim the outcomes of Kestrel’s votes as its own impact.
Own reporting and conflicts. In its sustainability statement Meridian can describe stewardship services as part of its business model and report service-level metrics (ballots processed, confirmation rate) as entity-specific information, but not as impact. Two conflicts must be managed and disclosed: Meridian’s asset management subsidiary votes at the same meetings through the same platform, so information barriers must prevent the servicing team from sharing clients’ voting intentions; and Meridian’s own shares and those of its large corporate clients are voted through its chain, so the team must be seen to transmit without influence. Policies on both are part of Meridian’s conflicts of interest framework under MiFID and are reviewed by Compliance.
| Risk | Example | Control | Owner |
|---|---|---|---|
| Missed or late election | Scrip instruction not forwarded; cash default applied | Cut-off monitoring, unanswered-event escalation at D−2, four-eyes on manual instructions | Head of corporate actions |
| Wrong event data | Wrong ratio or date in the golden copy | Two-source scrub, rule engine, block on discrepancies | Event capture team |
| Vote not executed | Rejection by the issuer’s agent unseen until after the meeting | Status tracking per instruction, position check at D−3, rejection alerts | Proxy voting team |
| Missed recall | Shares on loan at the record date of a priority meeting | Priority-meeting list, recall calendar from record date and settlement cycle | Agency lending |
| Sub-custodian failure | Late notices, lost instructions in one market | Service levels, KPIs, annual due diligence, escalation | Network management |
| Withholding-tax error | Statutory rate applied despite valid documentation | Documentation tracking, reclaim deadlines register | Income and tax team |
| Misreporting stewardship | Report states votes “cast” that were rejected | Report only statuses evidenced; flag unconfirmed votes | Product management |
| Conflict of interest | Servicing team shares a client’s voting intentions | Information barriers, access logs, Compliance review | Compliance |
| Liability creep | Contract silent on late instructions | Standard terms, legal review of side letters | Legal and relationship manager |
Greenwashing red flags in stewardship-support services. These concern Meridian’s own claims and the claims it enables.
PITFALL — The custodian’s strongest protection against greenwashing claims is precise language. “Instructed”, “accepted by the sub-custodian”, “confirmed as counted by the issuer” are three different facts; a report that merges them turns an operational gap into a misleading statement by the client.
| Data point | Value | Source and date |
|---|---|---|
| Say-on-Climate votes, Europe | 8 in the year to June 2026, against 28 in 2022 | Minerva Analytics, Harvard Law School Forum, 25 October 2026 |
| Say-on-Climate votes, UK | 7, against 18 at the peak | Same |
| High-dissent resolutions, Europe | 188, down from 329 | Same |
| Support for E&S proposals, US median | 6.7%, down from 10.4% | BlackRock Investment Stewardship, 30 October 2026 |
| BlackRock Voting Choice | USD 3.96tn eligible, about USD 923bn enrolled | Same |
| SI requests not forwarded / unanswered (median) | 8.75% / 8.75% | AMI-SeCo, June 2026 (2025 survey of 20 markets) |
| SRD review consultation | 11 February to 6 May 2026 | European Commission |
| Glass Lewis benchmark policy | Ends in 2027 | Announced October 2025 |
| US executive order on proxy advisers | 11 December 2025 | White House |
| UK Stewardship Code 2026 | In effect 1 January 2026 | FRC, published 3 June 2025 |
| SCoRE CA standards, ISO 20022 for other actors | By November 2028 | AMI-SeCo, December 2025 |
| FASTER Directive | Applies from 1 January 2030 | Council Directive (EU) 2025/50 |
| EU T+1 settlement | 11 October 2027 | Regulation (EU) 2025/2075 (see D01) |
What changed recently. The 2026 season was the quietest for climate resolutions since 2020: fewer Say-on-Climate votes, fewer shareholder proposals, lower support for environmental and social resolutions, and more management resolutions passing comfortably. At the same time, the infrastructure has kept improving: ISO 20022 meeting messages are now offered by the main European CSDs, SCoRE standards are in force for most events, and the SRD review has put chain frictions on the legislative agenda with hard data.
Open debates.
INTERACTIVE LAB — Asset servicing, proxy voting and corporate actions: check yourself
Test the mechanics of the voting chain, corporate actions, recalls, SRD II and the economics of the business.
Q1. In France, which position determines who may vote at a general meeting held on a Thursday?
Answer: A. The record date is the second business day before the meeting at midnight Paris time, so the settled position at the close of the third business day before counts.
Q2. Why does the recall deadline for lent shares fall before the investor’s vote cut-off in the case?
Answer: B. Recall date = close of D−3 minus the settlement cycle minus a safety margin: D−6 under T+2 with one day of margin, before the D−5 vote cut-off.
Q3. Under SRD II, by when must an intermediary pass on a meeting notice received at 17:00?
Answer: C. Implementing Regulation 2018/1212 requires transmission on the same business day, or the next business day if received after 16:00.
Q4. A scrip dividend gives new shares at a 10% discount to the average price minus the dividend. If the share price at delivery equals that average minus the dividend, the gain over cash is:
Answer: D. Gain per share = d × δ/(1−δ) = d × 0.1/0.9, i.e. 11.1% of the dividend.
Q5. What happens to the scrip option on shares that are on loan at the dividend record date?
Answer: A. A securities loan transfers title; the lender is compensated by a manufactured payment, which does not replicate the option.
Q6. Which statement about the CRR3 operational-risk charge allocated to a fee business is correct?
Answer: C. The EU sets the internal loss multiplier at one; the charge is a coefficient times the business indicator, so capital scales with revenue.
Q7. Four layers with failure rates of 0.2%, 0.3%, 1.0% and 0.5% give an end-to-end execution probability of about:
Answer: B. The product of the success rates is 0.998 × 0.997 × 0.990 × 0.995 = 98.01%.
Q8. What did Glass Lewis announce in October 2025?
Answer: C. Glass Lewis said it would move all clients to tailored voting policies by 2027.
Q9. Which is the ISO 20022 message for a vote instruction?
Answer: D. seev.004 is the meeting instruction; seev.001 the notification, seev.007 the vote execution confirmation, seev.031 a corporate action notification.
Q10. Why is a missed voluntary election a larger liability than a missed vote?
Answer: A. A missed vote rarely creates a measurable financial loss; a missed election creates a quantifiable one that the client claims.
Q11. How many Say-on-Climate votes did European companies hold in the year to June 2026, according to Minerva Analytics?
Answer: C. Eight, against 28 in 2022; the UK had seven, the US none since 2021.
Q12. Which PCAF standard covers a custodian servicing a client’s equity portfolio?
Answer: D. Financed emissions cover the bank’s own loans and investments; facilitated emissions cover issuance it arranges. Servicing is neither.
Q13. Under IFRS 15, how is a flat annual fee for a stewardship reporting package recognised?
Answer: A. The package is a service delivered continuously over the year, so revenue is recognised over time, typically monthly.
Q14. The SRD II shareholder identification threshold that Member States may set is capped at:
Answer: B. Member States may allow issuers to identify only holders above a threshold of at most 0.5% of shares or voting rights; France applies none.
A meeting is notified 30 business days before it is held. Five intermediaries sit between the investor and the issuer side, each with a downstream lag of one business day and an upstream buffer of one day; the issuer agent’s deadline is D−2; there is no extra local buffer. Proxy research arrives at D−14. The record date follows the French rule. The meeting is in late 2027, after the move to T+1, and the agent lender keeps a one-day safety margin. The investor has 1.5m shares on loan at EUR 20, lending fee 40 bp, out of loan for 5 days, split 85/15. Compute the decision window, the review time after research, the recall deadline and the fee forgone.
Solution. The notice arrives at D−(30 − 5) = D−25. Cut-off: D−(2 + 4 × 1 + 0) = D−6. Window: 25 − 6 = 19 business days; after research: 14 − 6 = 8. Recall: D−(3 + 1 + 1) = D−5, so under T+1 the recall can be decided one day after the vote cut-off. Fee forgone: 1.5m × 20 = EUR 30m; 30m × 0.40% × 5/365 = EUR 1,643.84 gross; EUR 1,397.26 for the investor and EUR 246.58 for the agent.
Dividend EUR 2.00; 20-session average EUR 50.00; discount 8%; the investor holds 3.0m shares at the record date, none on loan. Compute the issue price, the gain from electing shares if the price at delivery is EUR 48.00, the fall at which cash becomes better, and the gain if the price at delivery is EUR 45.00.
Solution. Issue price 0.92 × (50 − 2) = EUR 44.16; new shares per share 2 / 44.16 = 0.045290. At EUR 48.00 the shares are worth 0.045290 × 48 = EUR 2.1739 per share, a gain of EUR 0.1739, i.e. 3.0m × 0.1739 = EUR 521,739.13 (equal to 3.0m × 2 × 0.08/0.92). Cash becomes better below EUR 44.16, a fall of 1 − 44.16/48 = 8%. At EUR 45.00 the gain is 3.0m × (0.045290 × 45 − 2) = EUR 114,130.43: still positive, but the election has lost most of its value between the cut-off and delivery.
10,000 ballots at EUR 18; 900 elections at EUR 60; stewardship package EUR 60,000. Costs: EUR 7 per ballot (platform and absorbed charges), EUR 25 per election, fixed EUR 90,000, package EUR 25,000. Error rate 0.02% per election, severity EUR 100,000. Marginal BIC coefficient 15%; economic capital 0.5% of a EUR 120m scenario. Compute the cost-income ratio, the two RAROCs and the election fee that clears 12% on economic capital.
Solution. Revenue 180,000 + 54,000 + 60,000 = EUR 294,000. Costs 70,000 + 22,500 + 90,000 + 25,000 = EUR 207,500; cost-income 70.6%. Expected loss 900 × 0.02% × 100,000 = EUR 18,000. Pre-tax EUR 68,500; after tax EUR 51,375. Op-risk capital 0.24375 × 294,000 = EUR 71,662.50; RAROC 71.7%. Economic capital EUR 600,000; RAROC 8.6%. Required pre-tax profit 12% × 600,000 / 0.75 = EUR 96,000, i.e. EUR 27,500 more, or EUR 30.56 per election: a fee of EUR 90.56.
1. Walk me through how a pension fund’s vote reaches a French issuer. The issuer publishes its notice and sends the meeting data to Euroclear France, which notifies its participants. The notice travels down through the sub-custodian and the global custodian to the fund’s voting platform, where the proxy adviser’s recommendations are pre-populated. The fund sends its instruction back through the platform and the custodian to the sub-custodian, which votes with the issuer’s centralising agent before its deadline, the day before the meeting at 15:00 for electronic votes. Each layer sets an earlier cut-off, so the fund’s effective deadline is several days before the meeting. The fund can then request confirmation that its vote was recorded and counted.
2. What does SRD II require from a custodian? Three duties: pass on shareholder identification requests and answer them, by the business day after the record date or receipt; transmit meeting and corporate event information without delay, same day if received before 16:00; and facilitate the exercise of rights, including transmitting votes and confirmations. It must also disclose its charges per service, and charges must be non-discriminatory and proportionate. The obligations also apply to non-EU intermediaries in the chain, which is where enforcement is weakest.
3. A client asks whether to recall lent shares before a climate vote. What do you tell them? I give them the recall deadline, computed from the record date and the settlement cycle with a safety margin, and the fee they would forgo, which at general-collateral rates is usually tiny. I point out that the decision must be taken before their vote cut-off, so they need a list of priority meetings in advance. I flag whether the stock is special, because then the cost becomes real, and whether a dividend election falls close by, because recalling also protects the election right. The decision is theirs; my job is to make the trade-off visible.
4. Why is a missed election worse for the bank than a missed vote? The loss from an election is measurable: the difference between the value of the elected option and the default option on the payment date. Custody agreements make the bank liable for losses caused by its negligence, so the claim is direct. A missed vote is a reputational and service failure, but rarely a quantifiable loss. That asymmetry is why corporate-actions controls are tighter, and why elections should be priced for their liability, not as a commodity.
5. Your proxy voting business shows an 80% RAROC. Is it a great business? Not necessarily. Under CRR3 the operational-risk capital allocated to a fee business is proportional to revenue, so the RAROC mostly reflects the cost-income ratio; it would be the same for a mandate of any size and any complexity. The real risk is a liability tail that the formula ignores. I would look at margin, unit costs and an economic-capital view built from Pillar 2 scenarios; on that view the same mandate can fall below the hurdle.
6. How has the 2026 proxy season changed the business? Climate resolutions are much fewer: eight Say-on-Climate votes in Europe in the year to June 2026, against 28 in 2022, and support for environmental proposals has fallen. At the same time voting is fragmenting, with pass-through voting and Glass Lewis ending its benchmark policy in 2027, so custodians process more policies and more split votes. And US political pressure on proxy advisers affects the research European investors receive. The value for a custodian moves from processing volume to evidencing outcomes.
7. What is a stewardship package, and what are its risks? It is a reporting service on top of proxy voting: confirmation requests, rejection alerts, resolution-level vote reports formatted for the client’s regulatory and code reporting, sometimes a climate-resolution dashboard. It is profitable and improves client retention. Its risk is that the client publishes what the custodian reports; if the report says votes were cast when they were rejected, the custodian has helped produce a misleading statement. The control is precise statuses: instructed, accepted, confirmed.
8. What does the SRD review try to fix? Fragmentation and friction in the chain: divergent national definitions of shareholder, record dates and deadlines, identification requests not forwarded or answered, incorrect data, unclear fees, and weak enforcement on third-country intermediaries. The Commission’s 2026 consultation also covered virtual meetings, proxy advisers and transparency of investors. AMI-SeCo proposed harmonised key dates, ISO 20022 throughout, abolition of identification thresholds and capped, disclosed fees. A proposal was expected around the end of 2026.
| Term | Definition |
|---|---|
| Agent lender | Institution that lends a client’s securities on its behalf and shares the fee, often its custodian. |
| AMI-SeCo | Eurosystem advisory group on market infrastructures for securities and collateral; owns the SCoRE standards. |
| Ballot | One meeting for one account; the unit of proxy voting fees. |
| BALO | French official bulletin where listed companies publish meeting notices, at least 35 days before. |
| Business indicator | CRR3 income measure that drives the operational-risk charge. |
| Centralising agent | Institution appointed by a French issuer to collect votes and run the meeting logistics. |
| Contractual income | Crediting income on the payment date whether or not the cash has been received. |
| Corporate action | Event decided by an issuer that affects its securities: mandatory, mandatory with options, or voluntary. |
| Cut-off | Deadline an intermediary sets for instructions, before the next layer’s deadline. |
| Default option | Option applied when a holder does not instruct on an event with options. |
| Double voting rights | French rule giving two votes to registered shares held two years, unless the articles opt out. |
| Election | The holder’s choice on an optional or voluntary event. |
| Empty voting | Holding votes without the corresponding economic exposure, for example through borrowed shares. |
| Engagement policy | Investor’s published policy on monitoring, dialogue and voting (SRD II Art. 3g). |
| FASTER Directive | EU directive on faster withholding-tax relief, applying from 2030. |
| Golden copy | Validated version of event data after comparing sources. |
| Manufactured dividend | Payment from a borrower to a lender equal to a dividend on lent shares. |
| Pass-through voting | Programme letting end investors in pooled funds choose the voting policy applied. |
| Power of attorney | Document some markets require for an intermediary to vote for a client. |
| Proxy adviser | Firm that provides voting research and recommendations and runs voting platforms. |
| Recall | Lender’s demand for the return of lent securities, settled in the standard cycle. |
| Record date | Date on which the holding that carries a right is determined. |
| Relief at source | Application of the treaty withholding rate at payment instead of a later reclaim. |
| Say-on-Climate | Shareholder vote on a company’s climate strategy or its implementation. |
| SCoRE | Single Collateral Management Rulebook for Europe, including corporate action standards. |
| Scrip dividend | Dividend payable in new shares at the holder’s option. |
| Shareholder identification | SRD II process by which an issuer learns who its shareholders are. |
| Split vote | Votes cast for and against on the same resolution by one intermediary for different clients. |
| SRD II | Shareholder Rights Directive as amended by Directive (EU) 2017/828. |
| Stewardship code | Voluntary code setting expectations on investors’ stewardship, such as the UK Code 2026. |
| Vote confirmation | Confirmation that a vote was received, recorded and counted (SRD II Art. 3c). |
| Voting policy | Investor’s written rules on how it votes on recurring items. |
EU legislation
Supervisory and official papers
Market practice
Academic and reference works