Where it sits. Performance management is a team of the Finance function. At Meridian Bank it reports to the Group CFO, with a business-facing team embedded in each division: the CIB finance team sits with the investment bank, another with retail and commercial banking. It owns three things that every desk in this course has used without always seeing: the pricing tool that turns a term sheet into a RAROC; the allocation of capital to business lines, desks and ultimately deals; and the management accounts that tell each business, every month, how much it earned on the capital it consumed. Since 2025 it has owned a fourth, which is the subject of the second half of this module: the carbon budget and the internal carbon price that the bank’s transition plan cascades to the business lines.
Its clients. They are internal. Business heads want approval for deals and a share of next year’s capital. The Group CFO and the executive committee want a return on equity that beats the cost of equity. The board’s risk committee wants the risk appetite respected. The supervisor, through the ICAAP and the SREP, wants to see that the bank prices risk and does not grow businesses that destroy value (see A02 and E02). And, since the bank published a transition plan, the sustainability office wants evidence that capital is steered towards the plan rather than against it.
How it “earns” money. It does not; it decides who does. Orders of magnitude for Meridian (case assumptions): a group with EUR 300bn of risk-weighted assets, so about EUR 39bn of allocated capital at the course convention of 13%, and a net income target of about EUR 4.7bn, a 12% return on allocated capital. The CIB uses about EUR 110bn of RWA. Every year, Performance management proposes how much of the next year’s capital each division gets; every week, it helps decide which deals deserve a share of it. A 1-point error in the hurdle rate applied to EUR 14bn of CIB capital is EUR 140m of required profit: this is why the team is small, numerate and listened to.
The team. The head of performance management (often titled “Head of Financial Steering” or “CIB CFO office”); deal pricing analysts who maintain the pricing tool, check the inputs of deal teams and prepare the files for committee; capital management analysts who translate the capital plan into budgets in RWA, leverage exposure and, increasingly, financed emissions; an MI team that produces the monthly RAROC and EVA of each desk; and a liaison with the sustainability office, which owns the bank’s emissions inventory (see A03 and E07). Adjacent functions are Treasury, which publishes the FTP curve (see E04); credit risk, which supplies ratings, PD and LGD (see E01); capital management in the risk function, which supplies RWA and economic capital (see E02); and the business-line CFOs, who defend their desks’ numbers.
A realistic week. On Monday, the capital usage dashboard: each CIB desk’s RWA, leverage exposure and financed emissions against its quarterly budget, with the desks above 95% flagged. On Tuesday, pricing exceptions: the deal teams send the tool outputs for deals below the hurdle, with a justification (relationship, strategic client, refinancing expected). On Wednesday, the analysts challenge those files: is the cross-sell plan credible, is the sell-down realistic, is the internal rating up to date, are the emissions figures from the client’s report or from a sector proxy. On Thursday, the CIB pricing and capital allocation committee meets, chaired by the CIB CFO with the head of credit risk, the treasurer, the head of performance management and, since 2025, the head of the sustainability office. On Friday, the ex post review: twelve months after approval, did the relationship revenues promised to justify a below-hurdle facility actually arrive? This module follows one Thursday committee: the case of section 5.
WHY IT MATTERS ON THE DESK — Every module in this course ends with a RAROC. This one explains where those conventions come from, why the numbers produced in B03, B06 and C05 cannot be ranked directly against each other, and how a bank adds a second scarce resource, its carbon budget, to the first one, its capital.
The “product” of performance management is a set of measures and a set of prices. We first define the measures, then build the price of a loan from its costs, then explain where the hurdle and the capital ratio come from.
IN ONE SENTENCE — RAROC measures how much a deal earns after costs, expected losses and tax for each euro of capital the bank must hold against it; EVA is the same idea expressed in euros, after paying shareholders their required return.
INTUITION — A landlord compares flats not by their rent but by the rent per euro of purchase price, after the agent’s fees, the expected unpaid months and the tax. A bank does the same: the “purchase price” is the equity it must lock up to survive the deal going wrong.
FORMULA
is revenue: net interest margin over the funds transfer price (FTP), plus fees, in euros per year. is operating cost, here a cost-income ratio applied to revenue (40% for lending, 60% for fee and markets revenue at Meridian). is the expected loss: probability of default () times loss given default () times exposure at default (). is the tax rate (25%). is allocated capital: a ratio (13%) times risk-weighted assets. is the hurdle rate (12% after tax). EVA, economic value added, is the profit left after charging the deal for its capital at the hurdle.
Three measures circulate in banks under similar names, and the vocabulary is not standardised. RAROC (risk-adjusted return on capital) puts the risk adjustment in the numerator: the expected loss is deducted as a cost. RORAC (return on risk-adjusted capital) puts it in the denominator: the return is accounting profit, and the capital is risk-based. RARORAC does both. Meridian, like most European banks, uses the first name for what is in practice a mix: expected loss in the numerator, capital proportional to RWA in the denominator. Some banks also add a capital benefit, the interest earned by investing the allocated capital at the risk-free rate, because equity is a source of funding that costs no interest; the course ignores it unless stated, which makes RAROCs slightly conservative.
EVA (sometimes “SVA”, shareholder value added, or “economic profit”) is what committees should actually maximise. RAROC is a ratio and ratios can mislead: a EUR 1,000 profit on EUR 2,000 of capital (50%) creates less value than EUR 300m on EUR 2bn (15%). A desk paid on RAROC will refuse good large deals that dilute its ratio; a desk paid on EVA will accept them. The pitfall below is the most common one in committee.
PITFALL — Ranking deals by RAROC and filling the capital budget from the top works only if capital is the only scarce resource and all deals are of comparable size and nature. When a deal uses another resource (leverage exposure, liquidity, management time, a carbon budget) or when its capital is measured differently (operational-risk capital for fee businesses), the ranking by RAROC can be wrong. Section 5 shows both failures.
A loan priced at a margin over EURIBOR must pay for four things, in this order. Funding: Treasury lends the money to the desk at the FTP rate, EURIBOR plus a liquidity premium that grows with tenor (30 bp for five years at Meridian; see E04). Expected loss: the average cost of defaults, a cost of doing business rather than a risk. Operating costs: the people, systems and overheads of origination, credit analysis, agency and monitoring. Cost of capital: the after-tax return that shareholders require on the capital that absorbs unexpected losses, grossed up for tax. Whatever is left is EVA.
FORMULA
is the minimum margin over EURIBOR, in basis points, that gives exactly the hurdle; the liquidity premium; the cost-income ratio; the expected loss rate; the pre-tax cost of capital per euro lent, with the risk weight; the bracket is divided by because costs are proportional to revenue in Meridian’s convention.
The gross-up by matters. If costs are 40% of revenue, every euro of expected loss or capital charge requires 1.67 euros of margin. Banks that model costs as a fixed amount per deal (activity-based costing) find that small deals need far higher margins than large ones, which is closer to reality: a EUR 10m loan takes almost as long to document as a EUR 100m one.
INTERACTIVE LAB — The minimum margin of a five-year term loan, built from its costs
Build the break-even margin of a fully drawn loan from FTP, expected loss, operating cost and cost of capital, by rating grade and capital approach, and compare it with a market margin.
| Parameter you can move | Range | Default |
|---|---|---|
| Loan amount, fully drawn | 10 to 500 EUR m | 100 EUR m |
| Internal rating grade | AA / A / BBB / BB / B | BBB |
| Capital approach | F-IRB / SA | F-IRB |
| LGD (F-IRB senior unsecured: 40%) | 10 to 75 % | 40 % |
| Maturity M in the IRB formula | 1 to 5 years | 2.5 years |
| FTP liquidity premium | 0 to 100 bp | 30 bp |
| Cost-income ratio | 20 to 70 % | 40 % |
| Capital allocated per euro of RWA | 8 to 18 % | 13 % |
| Hurdle rate after tax | 6 to 16 % | 12 % |
| Tax rate | 0 to 40 % | 25 % |
| Capital benefit (return on allocated capital) | 0 to 4 % | 0 % |
| Market margin over EURIBOR (case assumption) | 30 to 400 bp | 95 bp |
| Result at default settings | Value |
|---|---|
| Risk weight | 39.02 % |
| Allocated capital | 5.072 EUR m |
| Funding: FTP liquidity premium | 30.0 bp |
| Expected loss | 8.0 bp |
| Operating costs | 59.4 bp |
| Pre-tax cost of capital | 81.2 bp |
| Minimum margin for the hurdle | 178.6 bp |
| Market margin minus minimum margin | -83.6 bp |
| RAROC at the market margin | 4.58 % |
| EVA at the market margin | -0.376 EUR m |
Try it. Switch the approach to SA: the minimum margin of a BBB loan rises from about 179 bp to about 303 bp. Then select grade AA under F-IRB: the market margin finally covers the cost stack.
CASE — A EUR 100m five-year loan to a BBB company, fully drawn, under F-IRB: risk weight 39.02%, capital EUR 5.07m. The minimum margin is 178.6 bp: 30 bp of FTP, 8.0 bp of expected loss, 59.4 bp of operating costs and 81.2 bp of pre-tax cost of capital. At an indicative market margin of 95 bp (case assumption) the loan earns a RAROC of 4.58% and destroys EUR 0.38m of value a year. Under the standardised approach the minimum margin would be 303 bp. With a 2.5% capital benefit, 157 bp.
The reading is the one that B03 found for a revolving facility and B06 for project finance, generalised: investment-grade lending does not earn its cost of capital on a stand-alone basis. The largest line of the stack is the cost of capital, not the expected loss. Competition between banks, many of which price to their marginal cost (a bank with excess capital, or one that counts on cross-sell), pushes margins to a level that only the relationship justifies. The stack also shows why the output floor matters (see E02): when a bank is bound by 72.5% of standardised RWA, its effective risk weight on a BBB corporate is 54%, not 39%, and its minimum margin rises accordingly.
The hurdle. The 12% after tax is the shareholders’ required return, the cost of equity, plus a margin for safety and for capital that is held but not allocated. A CAPM estimate with the course’s 3.10% risk-free rate, a bank beta around 1.2 and an equity risk premium of 5.5% gives about 9.7%; the gap to 12% reflects the price-to-book discount at which many European banks traded for a decade and the targets they announced to markets. Some banks differentiate hurdles by business line (lower for low-volatility businesses), most use one; Meridian uses one.
The 13%. Allocated capital is not the regulatory minimum. A bank’s CET1 requirement stacks Pillar 1 (4.5% of RWA), the Pillar 2 requirement set in the SREP, the capital conservation buffer (2.5%), the countercyclical and systemic buffers, and a management buffer above all of them; total capital adds Additional Tier 1 and Tier 2. A bank that targets a CET1 ratio of 12.5 to 13.5% and allocates CET1 to its businesses arrives at about 13%. The point for a desk is that every euro of RWA consumes 13 cents of equity that shareholders want paid at 12%, so 1.56 cents a year after tax, or 2.08 cents before tax: the line “cost of capital” of the stack.
The other denominators. RWA is not the only constraint. The leverage ratio (Article 92(1)(d) of the CRR) requires Tier 1 capital of at least 3% of a non-risk-weighted exposure measure, plus a buffer for global systemically important banks. A business with very low risk weights, such as repo, consumes leverage exposure rather than RWA (see C11). Meridian allocates capital as the higher of 13% of RWA and 3.5% of leverage exposure. The output floor of CRR3 (50% of standardised RWA in 2025, 55% in 2026, rising to 72.5% in 2030) is a third denominator, applied at group level: how to allocate its cost to desks is a live debate (section 8). Liquidity (the LCR and NSFR) is charged through FTP rather than through capital. Section 5.4 shows how the choice of denominator changes the answer.
Relationship RAROC. Because stand-alone lending rarely clears the hurdle, credit applications show a second figure: the RAROC of the whole client relationship, adding the expected ancillary revenues (cash management, hedging, bond and equity fees, agency) with their own costs and a small capital charge (at Meridian, 60% cost-income and EUR 2.5 of RWA per euro of revenue). B03 and B06 used this convention. The control that makes it honest is the ex post review: a facility approved on promised cross-sell is reviewed a year later.
Fee businesses. A bookrunner on a bond or an IPO (see C01, C05) or a custodian (see D01) has no loan on its balance sheet. Its capital is mostly operational-risk capital, which under the CRR3 standardised approach is a fraction of the bank’s business indicator, a measure of income. Section 5.3 shows the consequence: its RAROC is a ratio of costs and coefficients, not a measure of risk.
The pricing manual. Every bank formalises these conventions in a document owned by Finance and approved by the asset and liability committee or the executive committee: the hurdle, the capital ratio, the cost-income ratios or cost allocation keys, the FTP curve, the ancillary-revenue rules, the exceptions procedure. The EBA Guidelines on loan origination and monitoring (EBA/GL/2020/06, applicable since 30 June 2021), section 7, require institutions to have a pricing framework in which pricing reflects the cost of capital, the cost of funding, operating and administrative costs, credit risk and competition, and to monitor deals priced below cost. The pricing tool is the software version of the manual; its output is a page in every credit application.
WHO DOES WHAT — The deal team (coverage banker and structurer) enters the terms in the pricing tool. Credit risk supplies the rating, PD and LGD. Treasury publishes the FTP grid. The deal pricing analyst checks the inputs, challenges the cross-sell, and decides whether the deal needs the committee. Finance’s MI team later compares actual with planned RAROC.
Sustainability enters the bank’s economics in two different ways that students often confuse. The first is as risk and cost: climate change and the transition modify the inputs of the RAROC (PD, LGD, capital, funding, costs, revenues). The second is as a constraint: a bank that has committed to a decarbonisation path has a second scarce resource, its emissions budget, which it can ration by quantity (a carbon budget) or by price (an internal carbon price). This section treats both, then the rules that govern them.
INTUITION — A green label is like a new paint colour on a delivery van: it changes how customers see the van, and sometimes which roads it may use, but the van’s fuel consumption, insurance and depreciation decide whether the delivery business is profitable.
The simulator applies the six points to the Borealis facility of B03, in the relationship view. Each bar adds one lever to the previous ones.
INTERACTIVE LAB — Where ESG enters the RAROC of the Borealis facility (relationship view)
Add, one at a time, the ratchet, the cost of the ESG process, a climate PD overlay, a green FTP rebate and an internal carbon fee to the relationship RAROC of B03’s EUR 75m sustainability-linked RCF.
| Parameter you can move | Range | Default |
|---|---|---|
| Average utilisation | 0 to 100 % | 20 % |
| FTP liquidity premium on drawn amounts | 0 to 80 bp | 30 bp |
| Sustainability margin adjustment (ratchet) | -7.5 to 7.5 bp | -3 bp |
| Annual cost of the ESG process charged to the deal | 0 to 50 EUR k | 10 EUR k |
| PD after climate overlay (base 0.20%) | 0.05 to 1 % | 0.3 % |
| Green FTP rebate on drawn amounts | 0 to 10 bp | 0 bp |
| Internal carbon fee | 0 to 150 EUR per tCO2e | 25 EUR per tCO2e |
| Financed scope 1 and 2 emissions attributed | 0 to 10000 tCO2e | 1886 tCO2e |
| Ancillary revenues of the relationship | 0 to 1500 EUR k | 620 EUR k |
| Result at default settings | Value |
|---|---|
| Facility revenues before ratchet | 225.9 EUR k |
| Effect of the ratchet | -10.8 EUR k |
| Internal carbon fee | 47.15 EUR k |
| Stand-alone RAROC, no lever | 3.96 % |
| Relationship RAROC, no lever | 12.12 % |
| + ratchet | 11.75 % |
| + cost of ESG process | 11.41 % |
| + climate PD overlay | 8.93 % |
| + green FTP rebate | 8.93 % |
| + internal carbon fee (all levers) | 7.60 % |
| Stand-alone RAROC, all levers | 0.64 % |
| F-IRB risk weight after overlay | 48.34 % |
Try it. Set the PD back to 0.20% and the carbon fee to zero: only the ratchet is left, and it costs less than 0.4 point. Then restore the PD overlay: half a notch of transition risk weighs almost seven times more than the ratchet.
CASE — Starting from B03’s relationship RAROC of 12.12%, the full 3 bp ratchet takes it to 11.75%; charging EUR 10,000 a year of ESG process cost to the deal, 11.41%; a climate overlay that moves Borealis’s PD from 0.20% to 0.30% (risk weight 48.34% instead of 39.02%), 8.93%; Meridian grants no green FTP to a general-purpose SLL, so nothing changes; and an internal carbon fee of EUR 25 per tonne on 1,886 tCO2e of financed emissions (EUR 47,150 a year), 7.60%.
Two readings. The labelled feature, the ratchet, is the smallest lever; the unlabelled ones, the credit view of transition risk and the price the bank puts on its own emissions, are the large ones. And the levers do not all point the same way for the same client: a successful decarbonisation lowers the ratchet revenue for the lender, but also the PD overlay and the carbon fee.
PITFALL — Do not add a climate PD overlay and an internal carbon fee calculated on the same carbon price as if they were the same thing counted once. The overlay is a risk estimate: the probability that the client cannot absorb a carbon cost. The fee is a policy price: what the bank charges itself for using a scarce emissions budget. Both can be justified; the committee must know which is which, and must not present the second as a risk measure to the supervisor.
IN ONE SENTENCE — An internal carbon price is a price per tonne of CO2-equivalent that an organisation applies to its own decisions, whether or not anyone actually pays it.
The literature, summarised in Roncalli’s handbook (section 10.2.3), distinguishes three forms. A shadow price is a hypothetical price used to test investments and acquisitions; it changes decisions but no money moves. An internal fee is a real internal charge paid by business units in proportion to their emissions, usually credited to a fund that finances decarbonisation. An implicit price is computed after the fact as the cost per tonne of the reductions a company actually made. CDP data analysed by Dao et al. (2024) show that among companies reporting an internal price in 2023 about two-thirds used a shadow price and about one in seven an internal fee; prices ranged from a few dollars to several hundred, and the banks listed reported low values (for example 9 to 10 USD for BNP Paribas and 25 USD for BBVA in the 2023 questionnaire). Prices are hard to compare because they differ in level, in the emissions covered and in the parts of the organisation where they apply.
For a bank, the carbon that matters is not its own (offices and data centres emit little) but its financed and facilitated emissions (see A03 and E07). A price can enter its decisions in three ways.
FORMULA
is the internal carbon price in EUR per tonne; the financed (or facilitated) emissions attributed to the bank for the deal, in tonnes per year, under the PCAF attribution rules; the other symbols are those of section 2.1. The fee is treated as a pre-tax internal cost, so it is deducted before tax.
The order of magnitude decides everything. A lender’s attributed share of a client’s emissions is its outstanding divided by the client’s enterprise value including cash: 0.21% for Meridian on Borealis (B03). Multiplied by a carbon price of EUR 90, the EU ETS level in November 2026 (section 8), the bank’s share of Borealis’s carbon bill is about EUR 170,000 a year, three-quarters of what the facility earns. Lending margins are thin and corporate emissions are large: a carbon fee at market prices would close most lending to heavy industry. This is why banks that use internal fees set them low, and use quantity limits for the rest.
A carbon budget is a maximum quantity of financed emissions, usually expressed per sector and derived from a decarbonisation pathway. Banks that joined the Net-Zero Banking Alliance from 2021 set sector targets, mostly in emissions intensity (kgCO2e per MWh for power, tCO2e per tonne of cement or steel) and sometimes in absolute emissions (oil and gas). The alliance itself ceased operations in October 2025 after a vote of its remaining members, following the departure of most large US, Canadian, Japanese and UK banks; several European banks kept their targets.
The framework is now regulatory rather than voluntary in the EU. CRD6 (Directive (EU) 2024/1619) requires institutions to prepare plans to address the financial risks arising from ESG factors, including those arising from the transition towards the EU’s climate-neutrality objective, with quantifiable targets. The EBA’s Guidelines on the management of ESG risks (EBA/GL/2025/01, published 9 January 2025) specify these plans and apply from 11 January 2026, and no later than 11 January 2027 for small and non-complex institutions; they ask for metrics and targets consistent with the plan and for ESG factors in risk appetite, limits and the loan origination process. The ECB’s May 2026 report on good practices from its 2020-25 climate and nature programme describes institutions that set key risk indicators on the emissions intensity of portfolios against a trajectory, with breaches triggering action, and some that use carbon budgets per business line; it also lists the integration of climate and nature risks into loan pricing frameworks, and of additional capital costs into product pricing, among the good practices. The ECB’s 2020 Guide already expected loan pricing frameworks to reflect the bank’s credit risk appetite and business strategy for climate-related risks (expectation 8.5) and the different costs these risks drive (expectation 8.6).
On the voluntary side, the Science Based Targets initiative published its Financial Institutions Net-Zero Standard in July 2025. PCAF provides the accounting: Part A for financed emissions (third edition, December 2025), Part B for facilitated emissions, with a 33% weighting for capital-markets facilitation.
NOTE — A carbon budget is not a carbon price. A budget fixes the quantity and lets the price emerge; a price fixes the cost and lets the quantity emerge. Economists know this as the choice between a tax and a cap-and-trade system. The EU ETS is a cap; Meridian’s internal fee is a tax. A bank can use both: the fee steers everyday pricing, the budget is the hard limit in the risk appetite.
Three limits must be stated plainly. First, no EU rule requires a bank to use an internal carbon price, to set a carbon-adjusted RAROC, or to refuse a deal because of its emissions: the prudential rules require that ESG risks be identified, measured and managed, and that plans be consistent with the transition, but they leave the instruments to the bank. Second, capital requirements do not differentiate green and brown (see E02): a carbon budget is a management choice, not a capital rule. Third, the reporting framework is moving. The EBA’s final draft Pillar 3 ESG standards of June 2026 remove the Green Asset Ratio templates (see E06), and the revised ESRS adopted by the Commission in July 2026 apply from financial years starting on or after 1 January 2027 (see E06). A bank’s disclosure of its internal carbon price and of its financed-emissions targets must follow those texts at the date of reading.
Performance management works on two clocks. The annual clock sets the budgets: capital, leverage exposure, financed emissions, and the prices that go with them (hurdle, FTP curve, internal carbon price). The deal clock spends them, one committee at a time. The flow below follows both, from the budget round in the autumn to the ex post review a year after a deal is signed.
INTERACTIVE LAB — From the capital and carbon budget to the ex post review of a deal
Follow the annual budget cycle and the life of one deal through the functions that price it and allocate capital and carbon budget to it.
| # | Who | Does what | Deliverable |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Board and executive committee, Meridian | Approve the risk appetite statement, the capital plan (CET1 and leverage targets), the hurdle rate and the transition plan with sector targets (September to December) | Risk appetite statement, capital plan, transition plan |
| 2 | Group Finance, capital management | Translate the plan into annual budgets per division in RWA, leverage exposure and allocated capital; the sustainability office translates sector targets into financed-emissions envelopes | Capital budget and carbon budget per division |
| 3 | Treasury and ALM | Publish the FTP curve, contingent liquidity charges and any green FTP bonus for the year | FTP grid in the pricing tool |
| 4 | Performance management | Update the pricing manual and tool: hurdle, capital ratio, cost-income ratios, ancillary rules, internal carbon price, exception thresholds | Pricing manual, tool release notes |
| 5 | Coverage banker and structurer | Enter the proposed terms, the hold and the cross-sell plan; run the stand-alone and relationship RAROC and the carbon-adjusted RAROC | Pricing tool output attached to the deal file |
| 6 | Credit analyst and ESG risk analyst | Assign the internal rating, PD and LGD with any climate overlay; estimate attributed emissions from client reports or sector proxies | Rating sheet, ESG assessment with emissions data quality score |
| 7 | Deal pricing analyst, Performance management | Challenge inputs, cross-sell and sell-down assumptions; flag deals below hurdle or above the remaining capital or carbon budget | Pricing review note |
| 8 | CIB pricing and capital allocation committee | Approve, approve with conditions (hold, sell-down, cross-sell target, utilisation cap) or reject; record exceptions | Committee minutes and conditions |
| 9 | Credit committee | Approve the credit risk on the conditions set by the pricing committee | Credit approval |
| 10 | Loan operations and Finance | Book the deal with its pricing reference, sustainability flag and emissions data; capital and carbon budgets are consumed | Booking in loan and finance systems |
| 11 | MI team, Performance management | Report monthly actual RAROC, EVA, capital, leverage exposure and financed emissions by desk against budget | Monthly performance pack |
| 12 | Performance management and business line CFO | Ex post review after twelve months: realised cross-sell, utilisation, emissions, rating; feed into bonus pools and next year’s budget | Ex post review and incentive inputs |
The budget round. In the autumn, the board approves the risk appetite statement and the capital plan for the next year; the transition plan, required since January 2026 under CRD6 and the EBA Guidelines on ESG risks, sets sector targets. Group Finance turns them into budgets per division. The negotiation is a market without prices: each division asks for more capital than it will get, armed with its RAROC history. Meridian allocates on three criteria: the division’s marginal RAROC, its strategic weight, and its contribution to the transition plan. The carbon envelope is new: the sustainability office converts sector intensity targets into an absolute ceiling for each division’s new business, using the expected volumes of the plan.
The prices. Treasury publishes the FTP curve (see E04). Performance management publishes the hurdle, the capital ratio, the cost conventions and, at Meridian since 2025, an internal carbon fee of EUR 25 per tonne on financed and facilitated emissions (a case assumption). The fee is booked in management accounts as a charge to the desk and a credit to a central “transition fund” that finances the sustainability office’s data projects and a green FTP bonus; it is eliminated in the statutory accounts.
The deal. The deal team fills in the pricing tool. The credit analyst supplies the rating and any climate overlay (see E01). The ESG risk analyst supplies the emissions: reported scope 1 and 2 of the client, its enterprise value including cash or its balance sheet total, and a PCAF data quality score from 1 (verified) to 5 (sector average). The deal pricing analyst challenges everything: a cross-sell plan without named products, a sell-down without market soundings, an emissions figure taken from a three-year-old report. Deals above the hurdle and within delegated budgets are approved by the business head; the others go to committee.
The committee. It meets weekly or fortnightly. It sees the stand-alone and relationship RAROC, the EVA, the capital consumption, the leverage exposure, the carbon consumption and the remaining budgets of the division. Its typical decisions are not “yes” or “no” but conditions: reduce the hold, sell down within six months, achieve a cross-sell target, cap the expected utilisation, reprice at the next extension. Minutes record the exceptions to the pricing manual, which internal audit samples and the supervisor may ask to see (the EBA guidelines on loan origination require monitoring of deals priced below cost).
After the deal. The MI team tracks actual against plan every month. The ex post review a year later checks whether the relationship delivered; desks whose promises did not materialise lose credibility at the next committee and capital at the next budget round. Bonus pools are increasingly computed on EVA rather than revenue, which is the strongest lever performance management has over behaviour (section 5.9).
PITFALL — A committee that approves on “relationship RAROC” without an ex post review creates a free option for deal teams: promise cross-sell, book the loan, forget the promise. The review, with consequences, is the control.
Question. On Thursday 26 November 2026, the CIB pricing and capital allocation committee must decide on three deals for which the deal teams request capital that will be consumed in the first quarter of 2027. The CIB has EUR 12.0m of uncommitted allocated capital left for new business in that quarter, and a quarterly envelope of 2,300 tCO2e of new financed emissions (scope 1 and 2). Which deals should be approved, on which terms?
Data. The three files come from earlier modules; their figures are reused unchanged (B03 section 5.6, B06 section 6.2, C05 section 5.6).
| File | Desk | Request | Key terms |
|---|---|---|---|
| Borealis Packaging (B03) | Corporate lending | EUR 75m hold, 5-year SL RCF | Margin 70 bp, 20% drawn, 3 bp ratchet |
| Cap Ferrat Offshore Wind (B06) | Project finance | EUR 150m final hold | Margin 180 bp, slotting strong with ISF |
| Voltaris IPO (C05) | ECM | 30% joint global coordinator | 2.5% gross fee on EUR 664.5m |
Case assumptions specific to this module: the capital and carbon budgets above; Meridian’s internal carbon fee of EUR 25 per tonne; Borealis’s attributed financed emissions as computed in B03 (Borealis reports 880 kt of scope 1 and 2, enterprise value including cash EUR 7,000m); Cap Ferrat’s operating scope 1 and 2 emissions, which B06 did not need and which the ESG analyst estimates at 6,000 tCO2e a year (mostly fuel of service vessels), against total project financing of EUR 1,901.25m; Voltaris’s facilitated emissions of 621 tCO2e from C05, weighted at 33% under PCAF Part B. The committee’s members are the CIB CFO (chair), the head of credit risk, the treasurer, the head of performance management and the head of the sustainability office; the three deal teams present in turn.
WHO DOES WHAT — The deal pricing analyst has prepared a single sheet: the three deals on Meridian’s common template, the budgets, and four questions for the committee. Can these RAROCs be compared? Is RWA the right denominator? What fits in the capital budget? What fits in the carbon budget, and at what price?
Question. What do the three deals earn, consume and create, on the same conventions?
Calculation. The block below recomputes each deal from its source module’s inputs: revenues net of FTP, costs at the module’s cost-income ratio, expected loss, tax at 25%, capital at 13% of RWA. For the two loans it also gives the relationship view with their ancillary revenues (EUR 620,000 for Borealis, EUR 0.9m for Cap Ferrat), at 60% cost-income and EUR 2.5 of RWA per euro of revenue. For each deal it computes EVA at the 12% hurdle.
INTERACTIVE LAB — Three deals on Meridian’s common template: RAROC, capital and EVA
Recompute the RAROC of the Borealis RCF, the Cap Ferrat project finance hold and the Voltaris IPO from their source modules, stand-alone and with relationship revenues, and compare their EVA.
| Parameter you can move | Range | Default |
|---|---|---|
| Hurdle rate after tax | 6 to 16 % | 12 % |
| Borealis ancillary revenues | 0 to 1500 EUR k | 620 EUR k |
| Cap Ferrat ancillary revenues | 0 to 3 EUR m | 0.9 EUR m |
| Result at default settings | Value |
|---|---|
| Borealis: net result, stand-alone | 0.0783 EUR m |
| Borealis: allocated capital, stand-alone | 1.978 EUR m |
| Borealis: RAROC stand-alone | 3.96 % |
| Borealis: RAROC relationship | 12.12 % |
| Borealis: capital, relationship | 2.180 EUR m |
| Borealis: EVA stand-alone | -0.159 EUR m |
| Borealis: EVA relationship | 0.0027 EUR m |
| Cap Ferrat: net result, stand-alone | 0.6975 EUR m |
| Cap Ferrat: allocated capital, stand-alone | 10.238 EUR m |
| Cap Ferrat: RAROC stand-alone | 6.81 % |
| Cap Ferrat: RAROC relationship | 9.19 % |
| Cap Ferrat: capital, relationship | 10.530 EUR m |
| Cap Ferrat: EVA stand-alone | -0.531 EUR m |
| Cap Ferrat: EVA relationship | -0.296 EUR m |
| Voltaris: net result | 1.7651 EUR m |
| Voltaris: allocated capital | 1.503 EUR m |
| Voltaris: RAROC | 117.44 % |
| Voltaris: EVA | 1.585 EUR m |
| Capital requested, relationship view | 14.213 EUR m |
| Total EVA, relationship view | 1.291 EUR m |
Try it. Set both ancillary revenues to zero: the two loans destroy value on their own. Then lower the hurdle to 9%: Cap Ferrat’s relationship EVA turns positive, which is what a project finance banker means by ‘your hurdle is too high for infrastructure’.
Result.
| Deal | RAROC stand-alone | RAROC relationship | Capital (relationship) | EVA (relationship) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Borealis RCF | 3.96% | 12.12% | EUR 2.180m | EUR +0.003m |
| Cap Ferrat PF | 6.81% | 9.19% | EUR 10.530m | EUR -0.296m |
| Voltaris IPO | 117.44% | n.a. | EUR 1.503m | EUR +1.585m |
| Total | EUR 14.213m | EUR +1.291m |
Reading. Three deals, three orders of magnitude, and a request of EUR 14.21m against a budget of EUR 12.0m. Ranked by RAROC, the order is Voltaris, Borealis, Cap Ferrat; ranked by EVA it is the same, and the committee could cut the deal at the bottom. Before doing so, the analyst asks two questions about the denominators: is Voltaris’s 117% a return of the same nature as Borealis’s 12%, and is RWA the constraint that binds?
What the analyst checked before the meeting. Recomputing the three deals on one template is not a formality; it is where most errors are found. The analyst verified that the three files use the same hurdle, tax rate and capital ratio (they do, because the course’s conventions are the bank’s pricing manual); that the ratings are less than twelve months old (Borealis’s BBB was reviewed in September 2026, Cap Ferrat’s internal BB+ at financial close); that the FTP charges are those of the current grid (30 bp on Borealis’s drawn amount, 60 bp on the ten-year average life of Cap Ferrat); and that the ancillary revenues are itemised. Borealis’s EUR 620,000 is broken down by product and owner in the account plan (B03); Cap Ferrat’s EUR 0.9m combines a swap execution spread recognised over time, deposit margin and agency fees (B06), which the analyst accepts because Meridian is mandated as hedging bank and account bank. The analyst also notes what the running view leaves out: Cap Ferrat’s share of the arranging and underwriting fees on EUR 350m, earned once at closing, and Voltaris’s pulled-deal risk, which the next stage addresses.
Question. Is the ECM deal really thirty times more profitable than the loan?
The mechanism. For a fee deal, there is no credit RWA. Capital is operational-risk capital, which under the CRR3 standardised approach is a percentage (12%, 15% or 18% by tranche) of the business indicator, a three-year average of income; Meridian’s marginal coefficient is 15%. So capital is proportional to revenue, and revenue cancels out of the RAROC.
FORMULA
is the fee revenue; the cost-income ratio (60%); the tax rate; the capital ratio (13%); the marginal operational-risk coefficient (15%), multiplied by 12.5 to convert own funds into RWA. With the course values the result is 123.1% whatever the deal, its size, its client or its risk.
INTUITION — Measuring a fee business by RAROC is like measuring a translator’s productivity by words translated per kilogram of desk: the desk is not what limits the translator, so the ratio is large and says nothing.
INTERACTIVE LAB — The structural RAROC of a fee business, and what the pipeline does to it
Show that with operational-risk capital proportional to revenue the RAROC of a fee deal depends only on cost-income, tax and coefficients, reproduce the Voltaris figures and test alternative capital conventions.
| Parameter you can move | Range | Default |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue of the completed deal (Voltaris: fee and stabilisation) | 0.5 to 20 EUR m | 5.88375 EUR m |
| Cost-income ratio | 30 to 95 % | 60 % |
| Marginal operational-risk coefficient | 12 / 15 / 18 | 15 |
| Capital per euro of RWA | 8 to 18 % | 13 % |
| Tax rate | 0 to 40 % | 25 % |
| Underwriting RWA, annualised | 0 to 5 EUR m | 0.5292 EUR m |
| Share of mandates completed | 30 to 100 % | 70 % |
| Business-risk capital as share of annual costs | 0 to 100 % | 0 % |
| Result at default settings | Value |
|---|---|
| Structural RAROC of any fee revenue | 123.08 % |
| Cost-income ratio at which a fee business reaches only the hurdle | 96.1 % |
| RAROC of the completed deal | 117.44 % |
| RAROC across the pipeline | 41.94 % |
| Completion rate needed for 12% | 62.56 % |
| EVA of the completed deal | 1.585 EUR m |
| Operational-risk RWA per euro of revenue | 1.875 EUR |
Try it. Move the cost-income ratio: the structural RAROC moves, the deal size does not matter. Then set business-risk capital to 50% of costs: the completed deal falls from 117% to 54%, still far above any loan.
Result. Any fee revenue earns a structural RAROC of 123.08% at 60% cost-income; C12 and C01 found exactly this figure, and the D-block modules (custody, fund administration, depositary, asset servicing, data services) report RAROCs between about 60% and 120% for the same reason. Voltaris shows 117.44% only because its short underwriting commitment adds a little market-risk capital. A fee business clears the 12% hurdle as long as its cost-income ratio is below 96.1%: the hurdle tests almost nothing. Across a pipeline where 70% of mandates are completed (the team’s cost is the same whether or not a deal prices), the ECM franchise earns 41.94%, and it needs a completion rate of 62.56% to earn 12%.
Reading. Four reasons why the 117% and the 4% must not sit on the same ranking.
What performance managers use instead, for fee businesses: EVA in euros (which is modest: EUR 1.585m for Voltaris); the cost-income ratio and its trend; revenue per front-office head; the pipeline conversion rate; and, where an economic-capital model exists, a business-risk capital charge on the fixed cost base, which the D-block modules call the “economic” view. With business-risk capital equal to half of annual costs, Voltaris’s RAROC falls to 54.01%. The rule for the committee is simple: compare fee businesses with each other, compare lending deals with each other, and compare the two only through EVA and client-level profitability.
PITFALL — Blending a fee deal into a lending package to show a “package RAROC” above the hurdle hides the lending shortfall. Section 5.5 shows that the three deals together earn about 24% while the two loans earn about 10%. Committees should see both numbers.
Question. RWA is one denominator; Meridian also allocates capital against leverage exposure. Does that change the ranking?
Data. Meridian allocates the higher of 13% of RWA and 3.5% of leverage exposure (the 3% minimum plus a management buffer; see C11). The leverage exposure of a loan is its drawn amount plus its undrawn commitment weighted by the standardised credit conversion factor (40% for a committed facility under CRR3). An IPO leaves nothing on the balance sheet after settlement. For comparison, the committee’s sheet adds the Lyra repo programme of C11: EUR 1,000m of reverse repo with a profit after tax of EUR 0.904m.
FORMULA
is the leverage exposure; the capital allocated per euro of leverage exposure; the RWA density of the business. Any business whose average risk weight is below 26.9% is constrained by leverage, not by RWA.
INTERACTIVE LAB — Which constraint binds: RWA or leverage exposure
Recompute allocated capital and RAROC of the three committee deals and of the C11 repo programme as the higher of 13% of RWA and a share of leverage exposure, and find the RWA density below which leverage binds.
| Parameter you can move | Range | Default |
|---|---|---|
| Capital per euro of RWA | 8 to 18 % | 13 % |
| Capital per euro of leverage exposure | 3 to 6 % | 3.5 % |
| CCF on the undrawn Borealis commitment in the leverage exposure | 10 / 40 / 50 / 100 | 40 |
| Share of repo leverage exposure netted (sponsored clearing) | 0 to 95 % | 0 % |
| Result at default settings | Value |
|---|---|
| Borealis: capital, RWA view | 2.180 EUR m |
| Borealis: capital on leverage exposure alone | 1.365 EUR m |
| Borealis: RAROC on the binding constraint | 12.12 % |
| Borealis: RWA density | 39.0 % |
| Cap Ferrat: capital on leverage exposure alone | 5.250 EUR m |
| Cap Ferrat: RAROC on the binding constraint | 9.19 % |
| Cap Ferrat: RWA density | 52.5 % |
| Voltaris: RAROC on the binding constraint | 117.44 % |
| Lyra repo: capital, RWA view | 0.383 EUR m |
| Lyra repo: capital on the binding constraint | 35.260 EUR m |
| Lyra repo: RAROC, RWA view | 236.0 % |
| Lyra repo: RAROC on the binding constraint | 2.57 % |
| Lyra repo: RWA density | 0.09 % |
| RWA density below which leverage binds | 26.9 % |
Try it. Raise the capital per euro of leverage exposure to 6%: the Borealis RCF, whose RWA density is 39%, becomes leverage-bound too. Then net 80% of the repo through sponsored clearing.
Result. For the three committee deals RWA binds: Borealis has an RWA density of 39.0% (capital EUR 2.180m against EUR 1.365m on leverage), Cap Ferrat 52.5% (EUR 10.53m against EUR 5.25m), and Voltaris has no leverage exposure. Their RAROCs are unchanged. For the Lyra repo, the RWA density is 0.09%: on RWA it earns 236.0%, on the binding constraint 2.57%, and 12.46% if 80% of the exposure is netted through sponsored clearing.
Reading. The threshold of 26.9% is the number to remember. Below it are repo and securities financing, short-term interbank lending, sovereign bonds held for liquidity, highly rated mortgages under IRB, and deposits placed at central banks: businesses that look excellent on RWA and mediocre on leverage. A bank whose leverage ratio is close to its target should allocate on the higher of the two, as Meridian does, or charge leverage through a balance-sheet price in FTP (C11). A bank that allocates only on RWA will grow its low-density businesses until the leverage ratio stops it, and will then discover that its most “profitable” desk was the one consuming the scarce resource. Two further points for sustainable finance. Green mortgages and green sovereign bonds are low-density assets: if leverage binds, their RAROC is lower than the RWA view suggests. And the CCF used in the leverage exposure follows the standardised approach, so a bank cannot reduce the leverage cost of an undrawn RCF through internal models.
Question. The three deals ask for EUR 14.21m; the budget is EUR 12.0m. What should the committee cut?
The options. Voltaris is the most value-creating and uses little capital: it stays. Borealis is a relationship at the hurdle (12.12%) and its hold is set by the syndicate: it cannot be scaled, only accepted or refused. Cap Ferrat is below the hurdle (9.19%) and its final hold is a choice: Meridian underwrote EUR 350m and planned to sell down to EUR 150m (B06). Selling more is feasible in a market where banks seek renewable assets. The committee therefore looks at the largest Cap Ferrat hold that fits.
FORMULA
is the largest Cap Ferrat hold in EUR m; the budget (EUR 12.0m); and the capital of the two other deals; the capital on Cap Ferrat’s ancillary revenues, which do not depend on the hold; the effective risk weight of the hold (70% times the 0.75 supporting factor, 52.5%).
INTERACTIVE LAB — Fitting three deals into EUR 12m of capital
Compute the capital shortfall, the largest Cap Ferrat hold that fits the budget, and the RAROC and EVA of the resulting package, with and without the fee deal.
| Parameter you can move | Range | Default |
|---|---|---|
| Capital budget for the quarter | 8 to 20 EUR m | 12 EUR m |
| Cap Ferrat final hold | 50 to 200 EUR m | 115 EUR m |
| Result at default settings | Value |
|---|---|
| Capital requested at a EUR 150m hold | 14.213 EUR m |
| Shortfall against the budget | 2.213 EUR m |
| Largest Cap Ferrat hold within the budget | 117.58 EUR m |
| Cap Ferrat capital at the chosen hold | 8.141 EUR m |
| Cap Ferrat relationship RAROC at the chosen hold | 9.88 % |
| Cap Ferrat relationship EVA at the chosen hold | -0.172 EUR m |
| Capital used by the package | 11.824 EUR m |
| Budget left | 0.176 EUR m |
| RAROC of the three-deal package | 23.97 % |
| RAROC of the two loans only | 10.36 % |
| EVA of the package | 1.415 EUR m |
Try it. Move the Cap Ferrat hold from 50 to 200: every additional million of hold lowers the package EVA, because the project finance loan earns less than the hurdle at the margin.
Result. The shortfall is EUR 2.213m. The largest Cap Ferrat hold within the budget is EUR 117.58m; the committee rounds to EUR 115m, which leaves EUR 0.176m of headroom. At that hold, Cap Ferrat’s relationship RAROC rises to 9.88% (the EUR 0.9m of ancillary revenues is spread over less capital) and its EVA improves from EUR -0.296m to EUR -0.172m. The package uses EUR 11.824m, earns a RAROC of 23.97% and an EVA of EUR 1.415m; the two loans alone earn 10.36%.
Reading. On capital alone, the decision is to keep Borealis whole and sell EUR 35m more of Cap Ferrat. The chart shows why: in this range, every additional euro of the project finance hold reduces EVA. The project finance team will object that the running view ignores the arranging fee earned on the EUR 350m underwritten and the acceleration of fees at refinancing (B06), and that selling more of a good asset to competitors weakens the bank’s position in the next deal. Both arguments are legitimate and are recorded in the minutes. The treasurer offers an alternative to a larger sell-down: buy credit protection on part of the hold through a synthetic risk transfer (see B16), which would keep the asset and the client relationship on Meridian’s books while freeing capital. At the size involved, the fixed cost of a dedicated transaction is too high; the committee asks capital management to include the loan in the next portfolio-level risk transfer instead, and to revisit the hold if that transaction closes. The committee notes something else: on capital alone, the bank keeps the carbon-intensive relationship whole and shrinks the renewable project. The next two stages add the second scarce resource.
Question. Does the package fit in the quarterly envelope of 2,300 tCO2e of new financed emissions, and how robust is the answer?
Data and conventions. Meridian’s budget counts financed scope 1 and 2 emissions of new lending, measured as PCAF does at the reporting date: on the drawn amount, with the client’s latest reported emissions. Facilitated emissions are reported separately (PCAF Part B) and charged the internal fee, but not counted in the budget. Borealis: 20% average utilisation, so EUR 15m drawn, attribution 15 / 7,000 of 880 kt. Cap Ferrat: attribution hold / 1,901.25 of 6,000 t. The deal team for Borealis argues that the budget should use the client’s FY2027 sustainability performance target of 790 kt, since it is tested annually under the facility (B03). The credit officer asks what happens if Borealis draws more.
INTERACTIVE LAB — The package against the carbon budget: conventions decide the answer
Compute the financed emissions attributed to Meridian for the Borealis RCF and the Cap Ferrat hold, and the facilitated emissions of the Voltaris IPO, under different measurement conventions, against the quarterly carbon budget.
| Parameter you can move | Range | Default |
|---|---|---|
| Quarterly carbon budget for new business | 1000 to 5000 tCO2e | 2300 tCO2e |
| Borealis average utilisation | 0 to 100 % | 20 % |
| Cap Ferrat final hold | 50 to 200 EUR m | 115 EUR m |
| Cap Ferrat operating scope 1 and 2 emissions | 1000 to 15000 tCO2e a year | 6000 tCO2e a year |
| Borealis emissions used | Reported FY2025 (880 kt) / FY2027 SPT (790 kt) | Reported FY2025 (880 kt) |
| Borealis exposure measured on | Drawn amount / Committed amount | Drawn amount |
| Count Voltaris facilitated emissions in the budget | no / yes | no |
| Result at default settings | Value |
|---|---|
| Borealis: financed emissions attributed | 1,885.7 tCO2e |
| Cap Ferrat: financed emissions attributed | 362.9 tCO2e |
| Voltaris: facilitated emissions (33% weighted) | 621 tCO2e |
| Financed emissions of the package | 2,248.6 tCO2e |
| Emissions counted against the budget | 2,248.6 tCO2e |
| Budget left | 51.4 tCO2e |
| Highest Borealis average utilisation within the budget (drawn basis) | 20.5 % |
| Borealis: tCO2e per EUR m of allocated capital | 865.1 t |
| Cap Ferrat: tCO2e per EUR m of allocated capital | 44.6 t |
| Borealis: kgCO2e per euro of facility revenue | 8.35 kg |
| Cap Ferrat: kgCO2e per euro of loan revenue | 0.231 kg |
| Voltaris: kgCO2e per euro of revenue | 0.106 kg |
Try it. Raise Borealis’s utilisation to 40%: the package breaks the budget by almost 1,900 tonnes without any change in Borealis’s emissions. Then measure on the committed amount, as PCAF’s optional method for undrawn commitments allows.
Result. At the capital-constrained package (Cap Ferrat at EUR 115m), financed emissions are 2,248.6 tCO2e: 1,885.7 for Borealis and 362.9 for Cap Ferrat, leaving 51.4 t of headroom. At the original EUR 150m hold the package would exceed the budget by 59.1 t. The headroom is so thin that Borealis cannot draw more than 20.5% on average without breaking it. On the deal team’s SPT basis with facilitated emissions counted, the figure is 2,676.8 t; on the committed amount, 9,791.5 t.
Reading. Four lessons, each of which the committee writes into the conditions.
Question. With Meridian’s internal fee of EUR 25 per tonne, what are the carbon-adjusted RAROCs, and at what price would the ranking of the two loans change?
Calculation. Each deal is charged before tax: financed emissions for the loans, facilitated emissions for the IPO. Cap Ferrat is taken at the EUR 115m hold decided in stage 5.5. The price at which the two loans earn the same carbon-adjusted RAROC is:
FORMULA
and are the pre-tax results per euro of allocated capital of the relationship RCF and of the project loan (relationship views); and their attributed emissions per euro of allocated capital. Above , the low-carbon deal has the higher carbon-adjusted return.
INTERACTIVE LAB — Carbon-adjusted RAROC of the three deals as the internal carbon price rises
Charge an internal carbon fee on financed and facilitated emissions, compute the carbon-adjusted RAROC of each deal, the price at which the two loans swap places, and the ancillary revenues Borealis would need to stay at the hurdle.
| Parameter you can move | Range | Default |
|---|---|---|
| Internal carbon fee | 0 to 150 EUR per tCO2e | 25 EUR per tCO2e |
| Cap Ferrat final hold | 50 to 200 EUR m | 115 EUR m |
| Borealis attributed emissions | 0 to 10000 tCO2e | 1885.7143 tCO2e |
| Borealis ratchet effect on revenue | -10.8 to 10.8 EUR k | 0 EUR k |
| Result at default settings | Value |
|---|---|
| Borealis: carbon fee | 47.14 EUR k |
| Cap Ferrat: carbon fee | 9.07 EUR k |
| Voltaris: carbon fee | 15.53 EUR k |
| Borealis: carbon-adjusted relationship RAROC | 10.50 % |
| Cap Ferrat: carbon-adjusted relationship RAROC | 9.80 % |
| Voltaris: carbon-adjusted RAROC | 116.67 % |
| Borealis: fee as share of relationship pre-tax result | 13.4 % |
| Carbon price that brings Borealis to the hurdle | 1.90 EUR per t |
| Carbon price at which the two loans swap places | 36.38 EUR per t |
| Borealis ancillary revenues needed for 12% | 745.1 EUR k |
| Borealis: Meridian’s share of a carbon bill at this price | 47.1 EUR k |
Try it. Set the price to 90, the EU ETS level of November 2026: Borealis’s carbon-adjusted RAROC halves while Cap Ferrat barely moves. Then find the price at which the two lines cross.
Result. At EUR 25 per tonne the fees are EUR 47,140 for Borealis, EUR 9,070 for Cap Ferrat and EUR 15,530 for Voltaris. The carbon-adjusted relationship RAROCs become 10.50% for Borealis (from 12.12%), 9.80% for Cap Ferrat (from 9.88%) and 116.67% for Voltaris. The fee absorbs 13.4% of Borealis’s relationship pre-tax result. Borealis falls below the hurdle at a price of only EUR 1.90 per tonne, because it was at the hurdle to begin with. The two loans swap places at EUR 36.38 per tonne. To stay at 12% with the fee, Borealis would need EUR 745,100 of ancillary revenues instead of EUR 620,000; with the full ratchet discount as well, EUR 776,200. At EUR 90 per tonne, Meridian’s share of Borealis’s carbon bill would be EUR 169,700 a year and the relationship RAROC would fall to 6.28%.
Reading. The fee does what it is designed to do: it reorders deals by carbon efficiency without changing anything for low-carbon business (Cap Ferrat loses 0.08 point, Voltaris 0.8 point). But Meridian’s EUR 25 is below the EUR 36.38 at which the two loans would swap places, so on carbon-adjusted RAROC Borealis still ranks above Cap Ferrat; the fee alone would not have changed stage 5.5’s decision to shrink the wind farm. And the fee is tiny compared with the carbon bill that a full carbon price would imply for the client. The coverage banker for Borealis argues that the fee punishes a client that is decarbonising under a contractual trajectory; the head of the sustainability office answers that the fee is charged on reported emissions and will fall as they fall, which is exactly the incentive the bank wants to transmit. Both are right; the fee is a steering price, not a judgement on the client.
PITFALL — A carbon fee charged on PCAF-attributed emissions moves with the client’s enterprise value and with the drawn amount. A desk can lower its fee by keeping a line undrawn at quarter-end or by lending to a client whose share price has risen. Fees and budgets should be measured on averages, not on reporting-date snapshots.
Question. Beyond this committee, how should the CIB allocate a year’s lending capital between relationship lending to industrial clients like Borealis and renewable project finance like Cap Ferrat, when both capital and financed emissions are capped? And what price of carbon is implicit in the cap?
Model. Treat each type of deal as a family that can be scaled: relationship RCFs with Borealis’s economics per euro of capital, and project finance holds with Cap Ferrat’s economics at the EUR 115m hold. The fee and repo businesses are left out because they use no carbon budget and, as stage 5.3 showed, are limited by mandates and balance sheet rather than by capital. The problem is linear: maximise profit subject to two budgets.
FORMULA
and are the capital allocated to each family (EUR m); and their pre-tax results per euro of capital; the lending capital budget; and their attributed emissions per EUR m of capital; the carbon budget (tCO2e). When both budgets bind, . The shadow price of carbon, , is the profit lost per tonne removed from the budget: here , the same expression as in stage 5.7.
INTUITION — A shadow price is what you would pay for one more unit of something you are not allowed to buy. If adding one tonne of carbon budget would let the CIB earn 36 more euros, then a tonne of budget is worth 36 euros to the CIB, whether or not anyone sells it.
INTERACTIVE LAB — Allocating lending capital under a joint capital and carbon budget
Solve the two-family allocation problem, trace the frontier of net income against the carbon budget, and compute the shadow price of carbon implied by the budget.
| Parameter you can move | Range | Default |
|---|---|---|
| Lending capital budget for the year | 10 to 100 EUR m | 40 EUR m |
| Carbon budget for new lending | 0 to 40000 tCO2e | 15000 tCO2e |
| Internal carbon fee applied in the desks’ choice | 0 to 100 EUR per t | 0 EUR per t |
| Result at default settings | Value |
|---|---|
| Relationship RCF: tCO2e per EUR m of capital | 865.1 t |
| Project finance: tCO2e per EUR m of capital | 44.6 t |
| Capital to relationship RCFs | 16.107 EUR m |
| Capital to project finance | 23.893 EUR m |
| Number of Borealis-type relationships | 7.39 |
| Project finance holds | 337.5 EUR m |
| Financed emissions | 15,000 tCO2e |
| Net income after tax (before internal fee) | 4.3145 EUR m |
| RAROC of the lending allocation | 10.79 % |
| Net income without carbon budget | 4.8494 EUR m |
| Financed emissions without carbon budget | 34,605 tCO2e |
| Net income given up for the carbon budget | 0.5349 EUR m |
| Shadow price of carbon, pre-tax | 36.38 EUR per t |
| Shadow price of carbon, after tax | 27.28 EUR per t |
Try it. Leave the budget at 15,000 t and set the internal fee to 36, then to 37: the desks’ choice flips from all relationship lending to all project finance. A price steers a linear world all at once; a quantity steers it exactly.
Result. With EUR 40m of lending capital and no carbon limit, the CIB would put everything into Borealis-type relationships (12.12% beats 9.88%): net income EUR 4.8494m and 34,605 tCO2e of financed emissions. With a 15,000 t budget, both constraints bind: EUR 16.107m to relationship RCFs (about 7.4 relationships) and EUR 23.893m to project finance (about EUR 337.5m of holds). Net income is EUR 4.3145m, a RAROC of 10.79%; the budget costs EUR 0.5349m a year. Its shadow price is EUR 36.38 per tonne before tax (EUR 27.28 after tax): exactly the price at which the two loans swapped places in stage 5.7. If desks chose freely with an internal fee of EUR 40, they would move entirely to project finance and emit 1,783 t: the fee would overshoot the budget by a wide margin.
Reading. Three results that a performance manager should be able to explain at an interview.
NOTE — The model is deliberately simple: two families, constant returns, no interaction with cross-sell, emissions measured on today’s data. Real allocation adds sector targets in intensity, client transition plans (an emitter with a credible plan is a different credit and a different carbon trajectory), concentration limits and the strategic value of relationships. The method is the same: profit, capital and carbon per deal, and the trade-off between them.
The minutes. The committee approves:
The package uses EUR 11.824m of capital and 2,248.6 tCO2e of financed emissions, within both budgets. It earns a RAROC of 23.97%, but the minutes state the lending RAROC (10.36%) next to it.
How the desks respond. Every pricing rule changes behaviour, and the committee must anticipate the responses it will see next quarter.
| Figure | Value | Stage |
|---|---|---|
| Minimum margin, 5-year BBB loan, F-IRB / SA | 178.6 bp / 303.3 bp | 2.2 |
| Borealis relationship RAROC: base, after all ESG levers | 12.12% / 7.60% | 3.1 |
| RAROC stand-alone: Borealis / Cap Ferrat / Voltaris | 3.96% / 6.81% / 117.44% | 5.2 |
| RAROC relationship: Borealis / Cap Ferrat | 12.12% / 9.19% | 5.2 |
| EVA relationship: Borealis / Cap Ferrat / Voltaris | EUR +0.003m / -0.296m / +1.585m | 5.2 |
| Capital requested / budget | EUR 14.213m / EUR 12.0m | 5.2 |
| Structural fee RAROC; cost-income ceiling | 123.08%; 96.1% | 5.3 |
| Voltaris pipeline RAROC at 70%; completion for 12% | 41.94%; 62.56% | 5.3 |
| Leverage threshold on RWA density | 26.9% | 5.4 |
| Lyra repo: RAROC on RWA / on leverage | 236.0% / 2.57% | 5.4 |
| Largest Cap Ferrat hold; hold approved | EUR 117.58m; EUR 115m | 5.5 |
| Package capital; RAROC; lending-only RAROC; EVA | EUR 11.824m; 23.97%; 10.36%; EUR 1.415m | 5.5 |
| Financed emissions of package / budget | 2,248.6 t / 2,300 t | 5.6 |
| tCO2e per EUR m capital: Borealis / Cap Ferrat | 865.1 / 44.6 | 5.6 |
| Carbon-adjusted RAROC at EUR 25: Borealis / Cap Ferrat | 10.50% / 9.80% | 5.7 |
| Price at which the loans swap; Borealis break-even price | EUR 36.38; EUR 1.90 per t | 5.7 |
| Ancillary revenues for 12% with fee and full ratchet | EUR 776,200 | 5.7 |
| Shadow price of the 15,000 t lending budget | EUR 36.38 pre-tax, EUR 27.28 after tax | 5.8 |
| Net income cost of the carbon budget | EUR 0.5349m a year | 5.8 |
Allocated capital is a management construction built on regulatory numbers. Group capital management starts from the bank’s CET1 target, converts it into a ratio of RWA (13% at Meridian), and allocates it to divisions in proportion to their RWA by risk type: credit RWA follow the exposure (F-IRB, slotting or standardised, as in B03 and B06); market-risk RWA follow the trading desks’ positions; operational-risk RWA, computed for the group under the CRR3 standardised approach as a function of the business indicator, are allocated by each division’s share of income, which is why fee desks carry them (C05, C12). Three items are contested inside every bank. The output floor: when the group is bound by 72.5% (from 2030) of standardised RWA, the extra capital must be allocated; allocating it pro rata to IRB savings penalises the low-risk-weight portfolios (mortgages, investment-grade corporates, specialised lending) that produce the savings. Pillar 2: the Pillar 2 requirement, including any climate-related add-on decided in the SREP, is usually allocated in proportion to Pillar 1, which tells no desk anything. Leverage: Meridian allocates the higher of RWA-based and leverage-based capital (section 5.4); others charge leverage through FTP. CRR3 contains no green supporting or brown penalising factor (see E02): every effect of sustainability on capital in this module passed through PD, LGD, the infrastructure factor or the denominator, never through a green weight.
The approved package (Borealis on the full-discount case, Cap Ferrat at EUR 115m, Voltaris) is booked in the CIB’s management accounts as follows.
INTERACTIVE LAB — The approved package in Meridian’s management accounts
Rebuild the package line by line, with the ratchet, an optional green FTP rebate on the project loan and the internal carbon fee, and compare the package RAROC with the lending RAROC.
| Parameter you can move | Range | Default |
|---|---|---|
| Cap Ferrat final hold | 50 to 200 EUR m | 115 EUR m |
| Borealis ratchet effect on revenue | -10.8 to 10.8 EUR k | -10.8 EUR k |
| Green FTP rebate on Cap Ferrat | 0 to 10 bp | 0 bp |
| Internal carbon fee | 0 to 150 EUR per t | 25 EUR per t |
| Result at default settings | Value |
|---|---|
| Revenues (net of FTP, with ancillary) | 9.1905 EUR m |
| Operating costs | 5.1613 EUR m |
| Expected loss | 0.2612 EUR m |
| Pre-tax result before carbon fee | 3.7680 EUR m |
| Tax at 25% | 0.9420 EUR m |
| Net result | 2.8260 EUR m |
| Internal carbon fee | 0.0717 EUR m |
| Financed and facilitated emissions charged | 2,869.6 tCO2e |
| RWA | 90.953 EUR m |
| Allocated capital | 11.824 EUR m |
| Package RAROC | 23.90 % |
| Package RAROC after carbon fee | 23.45 % |
| Lending RAROC after carbon fee | 9.87 % |
| Package EVA after carbon fee | 1.3534 EUR m |
Try it. Set the carbon fee to zero and the ratchet to zero: the package returns to stage 5.5. Then add a 3 bp green FTP rebate on the wind farm: worth less than a quarter of a point on the lending RAROC.
| Line | EUR m |
|---|---|
| Revenues: two loans net of FTP (after ratchet), ancillary EUR 1.52m, IPO EUR 5.884m | 9.1905 |
| Operating costs (40% lending, 60% ancillary and fees) | -5.1613 |
| Expected loss (Borealis 0.0312, Cap Ferrat 0.23) | -0.2612 |
| Pre-tax result | 3.7680 |
| Tax at 25% | -0.9420 |
| Net result | 2.8260 |
| Internal carbon fee (2,869.6 t at EUR 25), pre-tax | -0.0717 |
| Allocated capital (13% of EUR 90.953m RWA) | 11.824 |
Result. Package RAROC 23.90%, 23.45% after the carbon fee; lending RAROC after the fee 9.87%; package EVA after the fee EUR 1.3534m.
What the sustainable features change. The Borealis ratchet costs EUR 10,800 a year: 0.07 point of package RAROC. A 3 bp green FTP rebate on Cap Ferrat, which Meridian does not grant, would add EUR 34,500 and 0.25 point of lending RAROC. The carbon fee costs EUR 71,700 and 0.45 point of package RAROC. None of the three changes the decision; what changed it was capital (stage 5.5) and the carbon budget (stage 5.6). This is the general finding of the course: labels move the economics by basis points, while risk, capital and quantity limits move them by points.
Treasury’s FTP charges each desk the cost of the liquidity it consumes (see E04). Two sustainability-related instruments now sit next to it, and they should not be confused. A green FTP bonus lowers the funding charge on assets eligible for the bank’s green bond programme; its economic basis is the greenium the bank obtains on its own green bonds (a few basis points, C01, C15), and anything above that is a subsidy paid by Treasury’s other users. An internal carbon fee charges desks for emissions, whatever the funding. A bank can run both, and the transition fund fed by the fee can finance the green FTP bonus, which makes the system self-funding: brown activity pays for the green incentive. At Meridian’s EUR 25, the fee on the package (EUR 71,700) would finance a 6 bp bonus on EUR 115m of Cap Ferrat. Liquidity charges themselves are unaffected by sustainability: the contingent liquidity charge on Borealis’s undrawn line (B03) and the long-term funding premium on Cap Ferrat (B06) are the same as for any comparable loan.
RAROC is a management measure. It differs from the IFRS accounts on four points. Expected loss (a one-year through-the-cycle figure) is not the IFRS 9 expected credit loss, which is point-in-time and, in stage 2, lifetime (see E01 and E05). Upfront fees spread on a straight line in the pricing tool are recognised in IFRS through the effective interest rate for loans, and at completion under IFRS 15 for advisory and underwriting fees (B06, C05). Allocated capital has no accounting counterpart. And the internal carbon fee is an internal transfer: it appears in the desk’s management P&L and in the transition fund’s, and is eliminated in the group’s consolidated accounts. Finance reconciles management and statutory results each quarter; differences above a threshold are explained to the CFO.
The committee’s decisions feed four reporting chains. Financed emissions (PCAF Part A) enter the bank’s inventory at year-end on the drawn amounts: Borealis’s 1,885.7 t at 20% utilisation, Cap Ferrat’s 362.9 t at the EUR 115m hold; Voltaris’s 621 t is reported separately as facilitated emissions (Part B). Transition plan metrics: the CRD6 plan and the EBA Guidelines on ESG risks expect the bank to monitor its portfolios against its targets; the carbon budget and the shadow price are internal tools that make the monitoring operational, and the ECB’s May 2026 good-practices report names carbon budgets per business line as one way to do it. Pillar 3 ESG: the transition-risk templates show exposures and financed emissions by sector and the alignment metrics by sector (see E06); the internal carbon price is not a Pillar 3 item. Sustainability statement: the original ESRS E1 (2023) asked undertakings applying internal carbon pricing to describe the schemes, the price levels and their scope; for financial years starting on or after 1 January 2027 the revised ESRS adopted in July 2026 govern what a bank must disclose about such a scheme. For a bank, the material scheme is the one applied to financed emissions, not to its own offices.
| Risk | Control | Owner |
|---|---|---|
| Cross-sell promised, never delivered | Ex post review at 12 months; target in minutes | Performance management |
| Fee RAROC used to carry loss-making lending | Show lending and package RAROC separately | Committee chair |
| Allocation on RWA while leverage binds | Capital = max(RWA, leverage) or balance-sheet FTP | Capital management |
| Stale rating or missing climate overlay | Rating date check; sector overlay policy | Credit risk |
| Emissions from proxies or old reports | PCAF data quality score in the file | ESG risk |
| Reporting-date window dressing | Average-based measurement of budget and fee | Finance MI |
| Client targets used instead of reported data | Budget on reported data; SPT only as sensitivity | Sustainability office |
| Sell-down presented as decarbonisation | Separate portfolio shift from real-economy effect | Sustainability office |
| Hurdle or FTP subsidies hidden in the tool | Board approval of any differentiated hurdle | CFO |
| Model error in the pricing tool | Model validation; release control | Model risk |
Red flags in a pricing file or in a bank’s communication.
What changed recently. Bank climate commitments moved from voluntary alliances to prudential plans; supervisors now ask how targets reach the business lines, which puts pricing and capital allocation at the centre.
Open debates. Should hurdles differ by business line or for transition finance, and who pays for the difference? How should the output floor be allocated? Should carbon budgets be absolute or in intensity, and should they cover facilitated emissions? Is an internal carbon fee on attributed emissions a meaningful price, given that attribution depends on enterprise values and utilisation? Does pricing carbon in loans reduce real emissions or only move them to lenders that do not price it? The honest answer to the last question is that the evidence is thin: the instrument steers the bank’s portfolio with certainty and the real economy only if clients cannot find the same financing elsewhere.
INTERACTIVE LAB — Self-assessment: RAROC, capital allocation and carbon pricing
Fourteen questions on the measures, the cost stack, the denominators, the carbon budget and the internal carbon price.
Q1. In Meridian’s convention, where does expected loss appear in the RAROC?
Answer: B. RAROC = (revenues − costs − expected loss) × (1 − tax) / allocated capital; expected loss is a cost, capital covers unexpected loss.
Q2. Why should a committee maximise EVA rather than RAROC when deals differ in size?
Answer: D. EVA = (RAROC − hurdle) × capital; a ratio says nothing about the amount of value created.
Q3. In the cost stack of a five-year BBB loan under F-IRB at Meridian, which component is the largest?
Answer: C. 81.2 bp of the 178.6 bp minimum margin is the pre-tax cost of capital, against 8 bp of expected loss.
Q4. With 60% cost-income, 15% operational-risk coefficient, 13% capital and 25% tax, the RAROC of any fee revenue is:
Answer: C. Revenue cancels out: 0.4 × 0.75 / (0.13 × 12.5 × 0.15) = 123.1%.
Q5. Below which RWA density does the leverage ratio bind at Meridian (13% of RWA, 3.5% of leverage exposure)?
Answer: C. 3.5 / 13 = 26.9%: businesses with a lower average risk weight consume more capital on leverage than on RWA.
Q6. The Lyra repo earns 236% on RWA. Its RAROC on the binding constraint, without netting, is about:
Answer: A. Leverage-based capital of EUR 35.26m against EUR 0.904m of profit gives 2.57%.
Q7. Why did the committee reduce the Cap Ferrat hold rather than the Borealis hold?
Answer: A. The project loan earns 9.19% and its final hold is a choice; selling EUR 35m more fits the budget.
Q8. Under PCAF, Meridian’s financed emissions on the Borealis RCF depend on:
Answer: C. The attribution factor is outstanding over EVIC; an undrawn line contributes nothing under the standard method.
Q9. Why is an absolute carbon budget a blunt tool for a renewable project loan?
Answer: D. Absolute envelopes treat tonnes alike; sector intensity targets are needed to recognise low-carbon activities.
Q10. At Meridian’s EUR 25 internal fee, Borealis’s relationship RAROC falls from 12.12% to about:
Answer: B. The fee of EUR 47,140 is charged before tax on 1,885.7 t of financed emissions.
Q11. The shadow price of a binding carbon budget is:
Answer: A. It is the marginal value of the constraint; it equals the fee that would make desks choose the same allocation.
Q12. Which statement on the climate PD overlay and the internal carbon fee is correct?
Answer: C. One estimates the client’s ability to absorb a carbon cost; the other prices the bank’s own emissions budget.
Q13. Which EU text requires institutions to have plans with quantifiable targets to address risks from the transition, specified by EBA guidelines applying from January 2026?
Answer: D. CRD6 introduced the prudential plans; the EBA Guidelines on the management of ESG risks apply from 11 January 2026.
Q14. Selling down a carbon-intensive loan to another bank:
Answer: A. The emissions move to the buyer’s inventory; a transition plan should separate portfolio shifts from real decarbonisation.
A bank lends EUR 200m for four years, fully drawn, to an A-rated company (PD 0.07%). F-IRB, LGD 40%, M 2.5 years. FTP liquidity premium 25 bp; cost-income 45%; capital 13% of RWA; hurdle 12% after tax; tax 25%. Compute the minimum margin, its components, and the RAROC and EVA at a market margin of 70 bp.
Solution. The F-IRB risk weight for PD 0.07% and LGD 40% is 21.36%, so RWA are EUR 42.72m and capital EUR 5.554m. Expected loss: 0.07% × 40% × 200 = EUR 0.056m, or 2.8 bp. Required after-tax profit: 12% × 5.554 = EUR 0.666m, so the pre-tax cost of capital is EUR 0.889m, or 44.4 bp. Revenue over FTP must cover both after costs: (0.056 + 0.889) / 0.55 = EUR 1.718m, or 85.9 bp, of which 38.6 bp of operating costs. Adding FTP, the minimum margin is 110.9 bp. At 70 bp the net revenue is 200 × 45 bp = EUR 0.900m; costs EUR 0.405m; expected loss EUR 0.056m; pre-tax EUR 0.439m; net EUR 0.329m. RAROC = 0.329 / 5.554 = 5.93%; EVA = 0.329 − 0.666 = EUR -0.337m a year. Even an A-rated loan needs a relationship to justify it.
A DCM desk runs at 70% cost-income. Operational-risk capital is 15% of revenue (times 12.5 for RWA), capital 13% of RWA, tax 25%; there is no market or credit risk. Compute its structural RAROC. The desk’s cost base is set for a pipeline in which every mandate completes; if only 80% complete, with costs unchanged, what is the RAROC? What completion rate gives 12%?
Solution. Structural RAROC: 0.30 × 0.75 / (0.13 × 1.875) = 92.3%, independent of the deal. With 80% completion, revenue is 0.8 R and costs 0.7 R, so profit after tax is 0.1 R × 0.75 = 0.075 R, and capital 0.13 × 1.875 × 0.8 R = 0.195 R: RAROC 38.5%. For 12%: (q − 0.7) × 0.75 = 0.12 × 0.24375 q, so q = 0.525 / 0.7208 = 72.8%. The lesson: a fee desk’s return is decided by its cost-income ratio and its conversion rate; capital plays almost no role.
A bank has EUR 50m of lending capital for two families. Family R earns 20% pre-tax per euro of capital and finances 1,200 tCO2e per EUR m of capital; family P earns 15% and finances 50 t. The carbon budget is 20,000 t. Tax is 25%. Compute the optimal allocation, the net income, the cost of the budget and the shadow price of carbon. What carbon-adjusted RAROC does each family earn with a fee of EUR 30 per tonne?
Solution. Without the budget, all capital goes to R: pre-tax EUR 10.0m, net EUR 7.5m, emissions 60,000 t. With the budget both constraints bind: , . Pre-tax profit 0.20 × 15.22 + 0.15 × 34.78 = EUR 8.26m, net EUR 6.20m: the budget costs EUR 1.30m a year. The shadow price is (0.20 − 0.15) / (1,200 − 50) per tonne per euro, that is EUR 43.48 per tonne pre-tax (EUR 32.61 after tax). With a EUR 30 fee, R earns (0.20 − 30 × 1,200 / 1,000,000) × 0.75 = 12.30% and P (0.15 − 0.0015) × 0.75 = 11.14%. Since 30 is below the shadow price, desks would still prefer R, and the budget must be enforced by quantity.
1. What is RAROC and how does it differ from return on equity? RAROC is a deal- or business-level return: profit after costs, expected loss and tax, divided by the capital allocated for the risk taken. Return on equity is a group-level accounting ratio on book equity. RAROC uses expected rather than actual losses and allocated rather than book capital, so it is forward-looking and comparable across deals. The two connect: if every business earns its RAROC and capital is fully allocated, group ROE converges to the weighted RAROC.
2. Walk me through the minimum margin of a corporate loan. Start from the funding cost: EURIBOR plus Treasury’s liquidity premium. Add the expected loss, PD times LGD. Add the cost of capital: hurdle times allocated capital, grossed up for tax. Divide the last two by one minus the cost-income ratio, because costs scale with revenue in the convention. For a BBB five-year loan at our conventions that gives about 180 bp, far above the market, which is why relationship economics matter.
3. Our ECM desk shows a 117% RAROC and our lending desk 4%. Should we move capital to ECM? No. ECM’s capital is operational-risk capital proportional to its income, so its RAROC is a structural ratio of about 123% at 60% cost-income, whatever the deal. Extra capital would not produce extra IPOs: ECM is limited by mandates and people. The right comparison is EVA, cost-income and pipeline conversion for ECM, and client-level profitability that includes the lending that brought the mandate.
4. When is the leverage ratio the binding constraint, and what do you do about it? When a business’s RWA density is below the ratio of the leverage capital rate to the RWA capital rate, about 27% at our parameters. Repo, interbank and high-quality sovereign holdings are the usual cases. I would allocate capital on the higher of the two measures or charge leverage through FTP, and look for netting, for instance through sponsored clearing. Otherwise the bank grows the businesses that consume its scarcest resource.
5. How would you build a carbon-adjusted RAROC? Take the deal’s attributed emissions under PCAF: financed for loans, facilitated with the 33% weighting for capital-markets deals. Multiply by an internal carbon price and deduct the result before tax. Keep it separate from the climate overlay on PD, which is a risk estimate. Disclose the conventions: drawn or committed exposure, reporting date or average, reported or estimated emissions.
6. What is the difference between an internal carbon fee and a carbon budget, and which would you use? A fee sets a price and lets quantities adjust; a budget sets a quantity and lets the price, the shadow price, emerge. With linear deal economics, a fee steers the whole portfolio at once when it crosses the indifference price, which makes it imprecise. I would use both: a modest fee to make desks see carbon in everyday pricing, and a budget as the hard limit in the risk appetite, with the shadow price published so that the gap between the two is visible.
7. A relationship RCF to a heavy emitter is exactly at the hurdle. The carbon fee pushes it below. What do you recommend? First check the relationship itself: are the ancillary revenues real and itemised? Then the client’s trajectory: a credible transition plan lowers future emissions, the fee and probably the PD. Options are a higher cross-sell target, a lower hold, a utilisation condition, or a sustainability-linked structure that ties the bank’s economics to the trajectory. I would not approve on a promise that the client will meet its targets, and I would not reject a client in transition only because of today’s figure.
8. What are the main ways business lines game pricing and carbon rules? Over-promising cross-sell; keeping lines undrawn at reporting dates; choosing clients with high enterprise values to lower attribution; selling down or hedging exposures to move emissions out of the inventory; lobbying for lower hurdles or green FTP without funding; and blending fee deals into lending packages. The controls are ex post reviews, average-based measures, separate reporting of portfolio shifts and real-economy effects, and incentives based on EVA after carbon with clawback.
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