Where it sits. Asset and liability management (ALM) is the part of Finance and Treasury that manages the bank’s balance sheet as one portfolio. At Meridian Bank it reports to the Group Treasurer, who reports to the CFO. It owns three things: the funds transfer pricing (FTP) framework, by which every euro lent or borrowed by a business line is bought from or sold to Treasury at an internal price; the interest-rate risk in the banking book (IRRBB), the exposure of earnings and economic value to moves in rates; and, with the liquidity risk team, the liquidity position: the Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR), the Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR), the internal stress tests and the survival horizon. Group Treasury (C15) executes the funding plan; ALM tells it what the balance sheet needs and prices it to the desks.
Clients. ALM has no external clients. Its clients are the business lines (corporate lending, mortgages, cash management, markets), which it charges for funding and credits for deposits, and the asset and liability committee (ALCO), chaired by the CFO, which approves the FTP methodology, the IRRBB limits and the liquidity risk appetite. Its counterparts outside the bank are the supervisor (the ECB’s Joint Supervisory Team for a significant institution), which reviews the internal liquidity adequacy assessment (ILAAP) every year, and the auditors, who look at hedge accounting.
How it earns money. In principle ALM earns nothing: FTP is designed so that the business lines carry commercial margin and credit risk, and Treasury carries funding and interest-rate risk, hedged. In practice Treasury’s result is the sum of three pieces: the difference between the FTP it charges and the actual cost of funds (positive if Treasury funds more cheaply than its curve), the carry and hedge result on the liquidity buffer and the IRRBB position, and the charges it levies for scarce resources (contingent liquidity, MREL). For a bank of Meridian’s size (customer loans of about EUR 190bn, see C15) one basis point on the FTP of the whole loan book is EUR 19m a year moved between Treasury and the desks. This is why FTP is one of the most political documents in a bank.
The team. The head of ALM; FTP analysts, who maintain the curves and the grid of adjustments in the pricing tool and the management accounting system; behavioural modellers, who estimate how long deposits stay and how fast loans prepay; IRRBB analysts, who run the economic value of equity (EVE) and net interest income (NII) sensitivities and propose hedges; the liquidity reporting team, which produces the LCR and NSFR returns under the EBA reporting framework; and an ALCO secretariat. The liquidity risk management team in the Risk function is the second line: it sets limits, validates the models and challenges the stress scenarios. Model validation reviews the behavioural models. The sustainability office and the business-line CFOs are the main sources of requests for change, including green ones.
A week on the desk. Monday: daily liquidity report, counterbalancing capacity and the LCR estimate for the previous Friday. Tuesday: the FTP analyst publishes the weekly update of the liquidity premium curve from the latest new-issue spreads; a corporate banker asks why a twelve-year amortising loan costs 39 bp of liquidity premium when the five-year costs 30 bp. Wednesday: IRRBB run on the month-end balance sheet; the economic value sensitivity under the six supervisory shocks is reported to the second line. Thursday: pre-ALCO with the business CFOs; on the agenda, the 2027 FTP methodology review and a request from the sustainability office for a larger green FTP incentive. Friday: hedge execution with the rates desk (payer swaps against the fixed-rate mortgages originated in the month), and the monthly liquidity stress test with the new climate scenario.
IN ONE SENTENCE — ALM is the bank’s internal market for money: it buys funding from the deposit desks, sells it to the lending desks at a price for each tenor, and keeps the risks that no desk should run.
FTP has three jobs. It separates performance: a lending desk should be judged on its margin and its credit choices, not on whether rates rose after it lent. It transfers risk: the interest-rate and liquidity risks created by every loan and deposit are moved to Treasury, which manages them in one book and hedges the net. And it sends price signals: a desk that grows long, illiquid assets or volatile deposits pays for the liquidity it consumes, so that the bank does not grow in the direction its balance sheet can least afford. The CEBS Guidelines on liquidity cost benefit allocation (2010) set out these principles for European banks: all significant business activities should be in the mechanism, costs and benefits should reflect the actual liquidity risk, and the method should be approved and reviewed by senior management.
INTUITION — A lending desk is like a shop that sells on credit. FTP is the wholesale price at which the shop buys its stock from the central warehouse. If the warehouse sells at a fixed price for each delivery date, the shopkeeper’s profit depends only on what she charges her customers and on whether they pay, not on the warehouse’s own costs moving next month.
Each loan is funded, notionally, by a liability with the same interest-rate profile and the same liquidity profile. For a fixed-rate loan the base rate is the swap rate for the repricing profile; for a floating-rate loan it is the floating index (EURIBOR). To that Treasury adds a liquidity premium for the time the money is out. Meridian’s liquidity premium is 6 bp per year of tenor, hence 30 bp for five years (C15 derives it from the marginal funding mix of covered bonds, senior preferred bonds and stable deposits).
For an amortising loan the relevant tenor is not the final maturity but the weighted average life (WAL), the average time each euro of principal is outstanding. The FTP is fixed at drawdown for the life of the drawing: the desk is protected from later moves in the curve, and Treasury carries them.
FORMULA
is the base rate for the repricing tenor (EURIBOR for a floating loan, the swap rate for a fixed one); the liquidity premium; its slope, 6 bp per year at Meridian; the weighted average life in years; the principal repaid at time ; the contingent liquidity charge on undrawn commitments; the MREL charge, allocated by RWA rather than by tenor (C03).
The contingent liquidity charge prices the liquid assets Treasury must hold against a drawdown in a stress. Under the LCR (Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2015/61, Article 31) an undrawn committed credit facility to a non-financial corporate carries an outflow rate of 10%, and a committed liquidity facility (one that backs commercial paper or similar refinancing) 30%. Meridian holds high-quality liquid assets (HQLA) against those outflows at a net carry cost of 40 bp, so it charges 4 bp a year on an undrawn credit facility and 12 bp on an undrawn liquidity facility.
INTERACTIVE LAB — Building the funds transfer price of a term loan
Compute the weighted average life, liquidity premium and contingent liquidity charge of a corporate term loan, and compare bullet and amortising profiles across tenors.
| Parameter you can move | Range | Default |
|---|---|---|
| Drawn amount | 10 to 500 EUR m | 100 EUR m |
| Final maturity | 1 to 20 years | 7 years |
| Repayment profile | linear / bullet | linear |
| Liquidity premium per year of WAL | 0 to 15 bp | 6 bp |
| Base rate (EURIBOR or swap) | 0 to 5 % | 2.5 % |
| Undrawn commitment | 0 to 500 EUR m | 50 EUR m |
| Type of undrawn facility | credit / liquidity | credit |
| Net carry cost of HQLA | 0 to 100 bp | 40 bp |
| Result at default settings | Value |
|---|---|
| Weighted average life | 4.00 years |
| Liquidity premium | 24.0 bp |
| FTP rate on the drawn amount | 2.740 % |
| Annual liquidity premium charged | 0.240 EUR m |
| Contingent liquidity charge on undrawn | 4.0 bp |
| Annual contingent liquidity charge | 0.020 EUR m |
Try it. Switch the profile to bullet: the same seven-year loan pays 42 bp instead of 24 bp, because the money is out for seven years rather than four on average.
A seven-year loan repaid in equal annual instalments has a WAL of 4 years and pays a liquidity premium of 24 bp: EUR 0.24m a year on EUR 100m. The same loan as a bullet pays 42 bp. The undrawn EUR 50m, if it is a credit facility, costs 4 bp, EUR 0.02m a year; if it backs commercial paper, 12 bp.
PITFALL — Do not charge the liquidity premium on the contractual maturity of a loan that amortises or is usually prepaid. The desk would be overcharged and would lose the client to a competitor whose FTP uses the behavioural life. The reverse error, charging a short behavioural life on loans that in fact stay, is more dangerous: the bank grows long assets that it has priced as short.
A deposit desk sells funding to Treasury and receives an FTP credit: the base rate for the deposit’s repricing profile plus a liquidity value for its behavioural life. But not all of a deposit is stable. The LCR assumes that part of it leaves in a 30-day stress, and that part must be held in HQLA rather than lent: it brings no term liquidity. A simple and common rule is to pay the liquidity premium only on the stable part.
FORMULA
is the liquidity credit paid to the deposit desk, in bp a year above the base rate; the LCR outflow rate of the deposit category; the slope of the liquidity premium (6 bp per year); the behavioural life of the stable part, in years, estimated by the behavioural modellers.
The outflow rates come from Delegated Regulation (EU) 2015/61: 5% for stable retail deposits covered by a deposit guarantee scheme, at least 10% for other retail deposits, 25% for the operational deposits of corporate clients (those held for clearing, custody or cash management), and 40% for non-operational deposits of non-financial corporates. The behavioural lives in the widget are Meridian’s model outputs (case assumptions).
INTERACTIVE LAB — What a deposit is worth to Treasury, by category
Compute the liquidity credit of a deposit from its LCR outflow rate and behavioural life, and compare the four main categories.
| Parameter you can move | Range | Default |
|---|---|---|
| Deposit balance | 10 to 1000 EUR m | 100 EUR m |
| Category | Retail stable / Retail other / Corporate operational / Corporate non-operational | Corporate operational |
| Liquidity premium per year | 0 to 15 bp | 6 bp |
| Behavioural life, retail stable | 0 to 10 years | 5 years |
| Behavioural life, retail other | 0 to 10 years | 3 years |
| Behavioural life, corporate operational | 0 to 10 years | 3 years |
| Behavioural life, corporate non-operational | 0 to 10 years | 1 years |
| Result at default settings | Value |
|---|---|
| LCR outflow rate | 25 % |
| Liquidity credit | 13.5 bp |
| Annual liquidity credit | 0.135 EUR m |
Try it. Raise the behavioural life of corporate non-operational deposits to 3 years: the credit rises to 10.8 bp. That is the argument a cash management desk makes every year, and the one the behavioural modellers must test against data.
An operational corporate deposit of EUR 100m earns a liquidity credit of 13.5 bp, EUR 0.135m a year; a non-operational one 3.6 bp; a stable retail deposit 28.5 bp. The ranking explains why banks compete for retail and operational balances and price “hot” corporate money close to the base rate.
When a bank lends at a fixed rate for twenty years and funds itself with deposits that reprice faster, a rise in rates lowers the present value of its assets more than that of its liabilities. ALM measures two things: the change in the economic value of equity (EVE), the present value of all banking book cash flows, under rate shocks; and the change in net interest income (NII) over one to three years. The EBA Guidelines on IRRBB and CSRBB (EBA/GL/2022/14) set the internal framework; Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2024/856 sets the supervisory outlier tests: a decline in EVE larger than 15% of Tier 1 capital under any of six prescribed shock scenarios, or a decline in NII larger than 5% of Tier 1 under the parallel shocks, flags the bank to its supervisor. For the euro the parallel shock is 200 bp.
The tool is the interest rate swap: ALM receives floating and pays fixed against a block of fixed-rate loans, so that the bank’s net position becomes floating. The cost of the hedge is not a separate charge: it is already in the FTP, because the desk was charged the swap rate for the loan’s profile. Two behavioural questions make IRRBB difficult: how long non-maturity deposits really stay (the EBA’s 2025 IRRBB report found wide differences across banks in core shares and pass-through), and how fast fixed-rate loans are prepaid when rates fall. The second matters most for long-dated green assets (section 5.4).
WHY IT MATTERS ON THE DESK — FTP is where a bank’s balance sheet strategy becomes a price in a pricing tool. Every adjustment to it, green or not, changes the margin of thousands of deals. The desk knows that a tenth of a basis point on the curve is worth millions; the student should know it too.
The LCR requires a stock of HQLA at least equal to net cash outflows over a 30-day stress (Article 412 of the CRR, Delegated Regulation (EU) 2015/61). The NSFR requires available stable funding at least equal to required stable funding over one year (CRR2, applicable since June 2021). C15 computes Meridian’s LCR at 30 September 2026: EUR 50.99bn of HQLA against EUR 36.0bn of net outflows, 141.64%, against an internal target of 130%. For FTP the two ratios are the source of the charges: the NSFR’s 85% required stable funding on a corporate loan of more than one year (65% for low-risk-weight mortgages) is what the liquidity premium pays for; the LCR outflow rates drive the contingent charges and deposit credits. The ILAAP adds the bank’s own stress scenarios, longer and harsher than the LCR, and a survival horizon; this is where climate enters (section 5.5).
Sustainability reaches ALM by four doors. Funding: the bank issues green bonds, whose small greenium (C03, C15) lowers the cost of a slice of its funding. Incentives: the transition plan asks the business lines to grow green lending, and the FTP is one of the few levers that reaches every deal. Risk: climate events and the transition can make deposits leave, borrowers draw their lines and liquid assets lose value, which the liquidity risk framework must capture. Duration: many green assets (renewable energy loans, energy-efficient mortgages, rail and grid infrastructure) are long, fixed-rate or amortising over decades, so they lengthen the balance sheet that IRRBB manages.
The four doors lead to different kinds of adjustment, and confusing them is the root error in this field. The funding door supports a pass-through: if Treasury really saves money on green bonds, passing that saving to the assets that make those bonds possible is cost-based FTP. The risk door supports risk-based adjustments: a contingent liquidity charge calibrated on a climate stress is still a liquidity price. The incentive door produces strategic overlays: a bonus or a malus that does not reflect any cost or risk that Treasury bears, decided for strategic reasons. All three can be legitimate; they must be labelled as what they are.
IN ONE SENTENCE — A green FTP incentive is a price signal paid by someone: by the bond investors through the greenium, by Treasury’s shareholders, by other borrowers, or by brown borrowers through a malus.
There is no market standard for green FTP and few banks disclose the numbers. Public statements and consultancy surveys describe five families.
Supervisors push banks to integrate climate in pricing but do not prescribe FTP. The ECB Guide on climate-related and environmental risks (November 2020) expects loan pricing to reflect the different costs driven by those risks, and the ECB set end-2024 as the deadline for full alignment with its expectations. KPMG’s summary of ECB data reports that more than 40% of significant and less significant institutions had taken no action on climate in loan pricing in the first half of 2022. The EBA Guidelines on loan origination and monitoring (EBA/GL/2020/06, section 7) require a pricing framework that reflects funding costs, among others; a strategic overlay in FTP is compatible with that only if it is identified and approved as such.
Liquidity. No EU liquidity rule distinguishes green from other assets or liabilities. A green loan requires the same stable funding as its conventional twin; a green deposit has the outflow rate of its category; a green bond held in the buffer has the HQLA level of its issuer. The green label has no regulatory liquidity value. What has changed is on the central bank side: the Eurosystem introduced a climate factor in its collateral framework on 15 June 2026, which reduces the collateral value of certain corporate bonds according to the issuer’s exposure to transition risk (ECB blog of 7 July 2026). For a bank’s counterbalancing capacity the effect is small, because corporate bonds are a small part of collateral pledged, but it is the first time a climate variable enters a liquidity number directly.
Risk management. The EBA Guidelines on the management of ESG risks (EBA/GL/2025/01) apply from 11 January 2026 to large institutions and at the latest from 11 January 2027 to small and non-complex ones. They require ESG risks to be integrated in the risk management framework, including liquidity, and set the content of the plans that banks prepare to address ESG risks, which must be consistent with the transition plans disclosed under other EU laws. The ECB Guide’s liquidity expectation asks banks to assess whether climate and environmental risks could cause net cash outflows or deplete liquidity buffers and, if so, to reflect it in liquidity management and buffer calibration.
IRRBB. The EBA Guidelines EBA/GL/2022/14 and the outlier tests of Delegated Regulation (EU) 2024/856 are climate-neutral. Their relevance is indirect: green assets that are long and fixed-rate add to EVE risk and to prepayment optionality.
What may change. The Commission’s communication on the competitiveness of the EU banking sector, adopted on 17 July 2026, announces legislative proposals from the first quarter of 2027, including a more efficient allocation of capital and liquidity within groups. Nothing announced so far concerns green liquidity treatment.
Climate risk reaches liquidity through four channels. Deposit outflows after a physical event, when households and firms in an affected region draw on their savings to repair and rebuild. Drawdowns of committed facilities by clients whose business is hit by a physical event or by a transition shock (a carbon price jump, a ban, a loss of market access): the same clients draw at the same time, which is exactly what the LCR’s 10% average does not capture. Value of liquid assets: corporate bonds of high-emitting issuers lose value and, since June 2026, carry a climate factor at the central bank. Market access: a bank perceived as exposed to stranded assets may pay more for wholesale funding; a bank whose green bond allocation is questioned may lose part of its green investor base (C15). Supervisory exercises so far have concentrated on credit risk; liquidity scenarios are built by banks in their ILAAP, which is why they vary widely.
WHO DOES WHAT — The liquidity risk manager does not ask “is this climate?”. She asks “which clients draw or withdraw together, and why?”. A climate scenario is useful if it identifies a correlated group the standard LCR assumptions treat as independent: the undrawn lines of an energy-intensive sector, or the deposits of a region exposed to flooding.
Banks offer green deposits: term or sight deposits whose amount the bank commits to match with eligible green assets. For ALM they are ordinary deposits of their category: same outflow rate, same NSFR factor, same behavioural modelling. They may justify a better FTP credit only if data show that they are stickier, which in the short history of these products is not established. The pricing risk runs the other way: a bank that pays a premium rate on green deposits for the label pays more for funding that is no more stable. Green bonds, likewise, are term liabilities like any other; their only economic advantage is the greenium, measured in C03 at about 3 bp, with an uncertainty of the same size.
FTP has no “deal” of its own: its lifecycle is the annual methodology review, followed by daily use in the pricing tool and quarterly monitoring. The flow below follows the 2027 review at Meridian, from the sustainability office’s request to the first quarterly report on the cost of the new incentive.
INTERACTIVE LAB — The annual FTP methodology review with a green incentive
Follow the roles, documents and controls from a request for a green FTP incentive to its use in the pricing tool and its monitoring.
| # | Who | Does what | Deliverable |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Sustainability office | Requests a larger green FTP incentive in support of the transition plan’s green lending target | Request memo with origination targets |
| 2 | ALM, FTP analysts | Size the perimeter, compute the cost of designs of 5 to 10 bp over five years and the greenium available | Impact analysis and cost projection |
| 3 | Group Treasury | Confirms green issuance plans, greenium estimates and programme costs (C15) | Funding plan extract |
| 4 | Liquidity risk management (second line) | Runs the climate liquidity scenario and proposes risk-based contingent liquidity charges | ILAAP scenario note |
| 5 | IRRBB team | Measures the EVE and NII effect of the extra long fixed-rate green assets and the hedging plan | IRRBB impact note |
| 6 | Business-line CFOs | Challenge the perimeter, the volumes and the effect on their budgets | Written comments on the draft |
| 7 | Model validation | Reviews changed behavioural assumptions (prepayment, deposit lives) used in the proposal | Validation report |
| 8 | ALCO | Approves the design, the funding source, the cap and the review date | ALCO minutes and updated FTP policy |
| 9 | Finance, management accounting | Books the incentive in a separate line of the FTP grid and the central cost centre that pays it | FTP grid and cost-centre mapping |
| 10 | Pricing tool owner | Loads the new grid; the green flag is read from the green loan register at drawdown | Release note and test evidence |
| 11 | Lending desks | Price new green drawdowns with the incentive fixed for the life of each drawing | Credit applications with FTP breakdown |
| 12 | ALM and MI team | Report each quarter the volumes, cost, funding source and additional origination | Quarterly ALCO dashboard |
| 13 | Internal audit | Tests that flagged loans are in the register and that the incentive stops on declassification | Audit report |
The request. The sustainability office writes to ALCO with the target from the transition plan (here, a doubling of green corporate lending by 2030) and asks for an FTP incentive “visible to the desks”, which it puts at 5 to 10 bp. The memo usually lacks the cost; producing it is ALM’s job.
The impact analysis. The FTP analysts define the perimeter (which loans, drawn or undrawn, stock or new production), project volumes with the business lines, and compute the annual cost for several designs. They obtain from Group Treasury the green issuance plan and the greenium assumptions, and from the sustainability team the share of the pipeline that is Taxonomy-aligned rather than only eligible under the green bond framework. The output is a five-year cost projection, a split of the cost into the part funded by the greenium and the part that is a subsidy, and a list of possible payers.
Risk input. The second line runs the climate liquidity scenario and proposes any risk-based charge. The IRRBB team checks what the extra long fixed-rate assets do to EVE and NII and proposes a hedge. Model validation reviews any change in behavioural assumptions; a green incentive is not a reason to change a prepayment model, but a growing green mortgage book may be.
Challenge and decision. The business CFOs challenge the perimeter and the volumes: a bonus that applies to loans the desks would have made anyway is a transfer to them, and they know it. ALCO decides the design, the payer, a cap on the annual cost, and a review date, and records them in the minutes. The FTP policy, a document owned by ALM and approved by ALCO, is updated.
Implementation and control. Management accounting books the incentive as a separate line, so that the liquidity curve itself stays clean and the cost is visible in the paying cost centre. The pricing tool reads the green flag from the green loan register at drawdown: the incentive must follow the same eligibility evidence as the green bond allocation (C15), otherwise the bank pays incentives on loans it could not put in a green bond. Each quarter ALM reports the volumes, the cost and an estimate of additional origination. Internal audit tests the flag and the declassification rule.
The case is set at Meridian Bank in November 2026, during the review of the 2027 FTP methodology. It takes over where C15 stopped. In 2025 Meridian granted a flat 3 bp FTP rebate to all loans in the eligible green pool (B02). C03 showed that the greenium on Meridian’s green bonds could fund only about 2.06 bp of it in 2026, so the rest, about EUR 0.48m a year, was a subsidy from Treasury. C15 projected the 2027 position (green bonds saving EUR 1.2m a year, a pool of EUR 5,500m, a self-financing rebate of 2.182 bp gross and 1.818 bp net of the programme’s EUR 0.20m of running costs) and recorded ALCO’s provisional rule: 3 bp for Taxonomy-aligned loans and 1.818 bp for loans only eligible under the framework. Now the sustainability office asks for more.
Question. The sustainability office writes that “3 bp is invisible to the desks” and asks for an incentive of 5 to 10 bp. Before designing anything, ALM asks what a basis point of FTP does to the profitability of a typical green loan, and how far the loan is from the hurdle.
Data (case assumptions, from C03). The representative green loan: EUR 100m, five years, fully drawn, to a BBB-rated renewable energy developer; margin 110 bp over EURIBOR; FTP liquidity premium 30 bp; upfront fee 40 bp spread over five years; cost-income ratio 40% on revenues before any FTP incentive (the incentive creates no extra work); F-IRB with PD 0.20%, LGD 40%, M 2.5 years; MREL charge 6.266 bp of RWA (C03). The net self-financing rebate for 2027 is 1.818 bp (C15).
FORMULA
is the FTP incentive in decimal (1 bp = 0.0001); revenues before the incentive (margin over FTP plus fees); the drawn amount; operating costs; expected loss; the MREL charge; the tax rate (25%); the capital ratio (13%); risk-weighted assets; the hurdle (12%); the incentive that would bring the loan to the hurdle on its own.
INTERACTIVE LAB — What a green FTP bonus does to the RAROC of a green loan
Compute the RAROC of a green loan line by line with no incentive, the 3 bp rebate and a bonus of 5 to 10 bp; find the bonus that would reach the hurdle, and separate the desk’s gain from the bank’s.
| Parameter you can move | Range | Default |
|---|---|---|
| Loan amount (fully drawn) | 10 to 300 EUR m | 100 EUR m |
| Margin over EURIBOR | 50 to 300 bp | 110 bp |
| FTP liquidity premium | 0 to 80 bp | 30 bp |
| Upfront fee (spread over 5 years) | 0 to 100 bp | 40 bp |
| PD | 0.03 to 4 % | 0.2 % |
| MREL charge per euro of RWA | 0 to 20 bp | 6.266 bp |
| Green FTP bonus | 0 to 40 bp | 10 bp |
| Net self-financing rebate (C15) | 0 to 5 bp | 1.818 bp |
| Result at default settings | Value |
|---|---|
| F-IRB risk weight | 39.02 % |
| Allocated capital (13% of RWA) | 5.072 EUR m |
| Revenues before incentive | 0.880 EUR m |
| Operating costs | 0.352 EUR m |
| Expected loss | 0.080 EUR m |
| MREL charge | 0.0244 EUR m |
| Bonus received from Treasury | 0.100 EUR m |
| Profit before tax with bonus | 0.5236 EUR m |
| Profit after tax with bonus | 0.3927 EUR m |
| RAROC, no incentive | 6.26 % |
| RAROC, 3 bp rebate | 6.71 % |
| RAROC with the bonus (desk view) | 7.74 % |
| RAROC gained per bp of incentive | 0.1479 points |
| Bonus needed to reach the 12% hurdle | 38.8 bp |
| Treasury’s cost above the pass-through | 0.0818 EUR m |
| RAROC, bank view (pass-through only) | 6.53 % |
Try it. Set the margin to 150 bp, the price of a loan to a less sought-after green borrower: the RAROC rises by more than any FTP bonus in the policy range would give.
Calculation. Revenues before incentive: 80 bp of net margin on EUR 100m, EUR 0.80m, plus EUR 0.08m of upfront fee a year: EUR 0.88m. Costs at 40%: EUR 0.352m. Expected loss: 0.20% x 40% x EUR 100m = EUR 0.08m. RWA at a risk weight of 39.02%: EUR 39.02m; capital EUR 5.072m. MREL charge: EUR 0.0244m. RAROC with no incentive: 6.26%. With the 3 bp rebate: 6.71% (the figure of C03). With a 10 bp bonus the desk receives EUR 0.10m from Treasury, its profit before tax becomes EUR 0.5236m, after tax EUR 0.3927m, and its RAROC 7.74%; with 5 bp, 7.00%.
Result. Each basis point of FTP incentive is worth 0.1479 point of RAROC on this loan. The loan would need a bonus of 38.8 bp to reach the 12% hurdle on its own. Seen from the bank as a whole, only the pass-through is a real gain: the bank-level RAROC is 6.53%, and the remaining EUR 0.0818m a year of the 10 bp bonus is paid by Treasury.
Reading. Three lessons frame the rest of the case. First, a 5 to 10 bp incentive moves the RAROC of a typical green loan by 0.7 to 1.5 points. It will not make an unprofitable loan profitable; it can tip a marginal deal, or let a desk match a competitor’s price by a few basis points. Second, the effect is inversely proportional to the risk weight: on a green mortgage with a 15% risk weight, the same bonus moves RAROC about two and a half times as much, which is why incentives tend to flow to low-risk-weight assets. Third, FTP is a transfer inside the bank: what the desk gains, Treasury loses. Only the part of the incentive that is funded by a real saving, the greenium, raises the bank’s profit; the rest moves it.
INTUITION — A company that gives one department a discount on the rent it pays to the property department has not lowered its rent. It has decided which department looks more profitable. That can be a good management decision, as long as no one believes the building has become cheaper.
PITFALL — Do not present the desk’s RAROC with the bonus to a credit committee as if it were the bank’s return. The pricing tool should show both lines: the RAROC on the desk perimeter, with the incentive, and the RAROC on the bank perimeter, with only the pass-through. Meridian’s tool shows them side by side from 2027.
Question. ALM tests three designs within the 5 to 10 bp range. What does each cost per year from 2027 to 2031, how much of it can the greenium fund, and how much is a subsidy?
Data (case assumptions, building on C15). The green pool is EUR 5,100m at end-2026; amortisation and prepayments are EUR 600m in 2027, a run-off rate of 11.76% a year that ALM applies to every vintage; new eligible lending is EUR 1,000m a year, of which 70% is expected to be Taxonomy-aligned (the 2026 aligned share was 68.47%, C03). FTP incentives are fixed at drawdown for the life of each drawing, so loans drawn before 2027 keep their 3 bp rebate until they run off. Treasury is assumed to issue green bonds in step with the pool, so that the net self-financing rebate stays at 1.818 bp of the pool (C15). Drawdowns are spread over the year, so costs are computed on average balances.
The three designs:
| Design | Aligned loans | Eligible-only loans | Average on new lending |
|---|---|---|---|
| Status quo (C15 rule) | 3 bp | 1.818 bp | 2.645 bp |
| A: flat bonus | 8.5 bp | 8.5 bp | 8.5 bp |
| B: tiered bonus | 10 bp | 5 bp | 8.5 bp |
| C: flat maximum | 10 bp | 10 bp | 10 bp |
Designs A and B cost the same with a 70% aligned share; B is preferred by the sustainability office because it rewards Taxonomy alignment, which the bank needs to issue a European Green Bond later (C15). The widget computes design B; design C is obtained by setting both tiers to 10 bp.
FORMULA
is the legacy pool (loans drawn before 2027) at the end of year ; the stock of loans drawn under the new design; the run-off rate; new eligible lending per year; and the average balances of the year; the legacy rebate (3 bp); the average bonus on new lending, weighted by the aligned share; the annual cost of the incentive; the net self-financing rebate; the subsidy, the cost not funded by the greenium.
INTERACTIVE LAB — The cost of a green FTP incentive, 2027 to 2031: greenium-funded part and subsidy
Project the annual cost of a tiered green FTP bonus on new lending, the part the greenium can fund, the subsidy, and compare it with the status quo rule.
| Parameter you can move | Range | Default |
|---|---|---|
| Green pool at end-2026 | 2000 to 10000 EUR m | 5100 EUR m |
| Run-off in the first year | 100 to 2000 EUR m | 600 EUR m |
| New eligible lending per year | 0 to 3000 EUR m | 1000 EUR m |
| Taxonomy-aligned share of new lending | 0 to 100 % | 70 % |
| Bonus on aligned loans | 0 to 15 bp | 10 bp |
| Bonus on eligible-only loans | 0 to 15 bp | 5 bp |
| Status quo: rebate on aligned loans | 0 to 10 bp | 3 bp |
| Status quo: rebate on eligible-only loans | 0 to 10 bp | 1.818 bp |
| Rebate on loans drawn before 2027 | 0 to 10 bp | 3 bp |
| Net self-financing rebate | 0 to 5 bp | 1.818 bp |
| Result at default settings | Value |
|---|---|
| Run-off rate | 11.76 % |
| Average bonus on new lending | 8.50 bp |
| Cost in 2027 | 1.865 EUR m |
| Funded by the greenium in 2027 | 0.964 EUR m |
| Subsidy in 2027 | 0.901 EUR m |
| Subsidy in 2027 under the status quo | 0.609 EUR m |
| Cost in 2031 | 3.976 EUR m |
| Funded by the greenium in 2031 | 1.193 EUR m |
| Subsidy in 2031 | 2.783 EUR m |
| Subsidy in 2031 under the status quo | 0.646 EUR m |
| Cumulative subsidy 2027-2031 | 9.505 EUR m |
| Green pool at end-2031 | 6,681.6 EUR m |
| Steady-state pool | 8,500 EUR m |
| Steady-state annual subsidy | 5.680 EUR m |
Try it. Set the Taxonomy-aligned share to 100%: the average bonus rises to 10 bp. The more successful the alignment push, the more the tiered design costs.
Calculation for 2027. The legacy pool runs off from EUR 5,100m to EUR 4,500m, an average of EUR 4,800m at 3 bp: EUR 1.44m. The new vintage averages EUR 500m in its first year, at an average bonus of 0.7 x 10 + 0.3 x 5 = 8.5 bp: EUR 0.425m. Total cost EUR 1.865m. The greenium funds 1.818 bp on the average pool of EUR 5,300m: EUR 0.964m. Subsidy: EUR 0.901m, against EUR 0.609m under the status quo.
Result. The subsidy grows as new loans replace old ones: EUR 0.901m in 2027, EUR 2.783m in 2031, for a cumulative EUR 9.505m over five years. In 2031 the incentive costs EUR 3.976m, of which the greenium funds EUR 1.193m. Under the status quo the subsidy would stay around EUR 0.6m a year. If volumes stay at EUR 1,000m a year, the pool converges towards EUR 8,500m and the annual subsidy towards EUR 5.68m. Design C (10 bp flat) would cost EUR 3.331m of subsidy in 2031.
Reading. The first-year number is the one the sustainability office will quote, and it is misleading: because FTP is locked at drawdown, an incentive on new lending builds a liability that grows for as long as the loans are on the books. ALCO must look at the run-rate, not the first year. Note also that the greenium share does not grow with the bonus: it is fixed by the bond market, so every extra basis point of incentive is a basis point of subsidy.
PITFALL — Do not compare the subsidy with the greenium of a single year’s issuance. The greenium is earned on the stock of green bonds, the incentive is paid on the stock of green loans, and both stocks must be projected together. A rebate that looks self-financing in the year of a large green issue can be a subsidy three years later when that bond is the only one outstanding.
Question. The 2031 run-rate subsidy of design B is EUR 2.783m a year. Who could pay it, how much would each payer notice, and what does the bank buy with it?
Data (case assumptions). Meridian’s CET1 is EUR 16.52bn (C03). Customer loans are about EUR 200bn in 2031, of which EUR 6.68bn in the green pool. The candidate perimeter for a brown malus is new term lending to sectors on Meridian’s high-transition-risk list (oil and gas, coal-dependent power, cement, steel, aviation): EUR 3,000m a year, with a run-off of 20% a year (shorter loans than the green pool), malus fixed at drawdown like the bonus. The desks estimate that EUR 100m of the EUR 1,000m of annual green lending would not happen without the bonus; the other EUR 900m would be originated anyway.
There are four candidate payers.
FORMULA
is the subsidy to fund; its effect on the return on CET1; the surcharge if spread over the loan book excluding the green pool ; the brown malus; the average stock of malus-bearing loans in the fifth year; new brown lending per year; its run-off; the fall in brown volumes caused by the malus or by the bank’s sector policy; the annual cost of one vintage of the bonus per euro of additional green lending .
INTERACTIVE LAB — Who pays for the green FTP incentive, and what it buys
Allocate the subsidy to shareholders, to all borrowers or to brown borrowers through a malus; show how the malus rises when brown lending shrinks, and measure the cost per euro of additional green lending.
| Parameter you can move | Range | Default |
|---|---|---|
| Annual subsidy to fund (2031 run-rate) | 0 to 10 EUR m | 2.783 EUR m |
| Tax rate | 0 to 40 % | 25 % |
| CET1 | 5 to 40 EUR bn | 16.52 EUR bn |
| Customer loans | 50 to 400 EUR bn | 200 EUR bn |
| Green pool | 0 to 20 EUR bn | 6.68 EUR bn |
| New brown lending per year | 0 to 10000 EUR m | 3000 EUR m |
| Run-off of brown loans | 5 to 50 % a year | 20 % a year |
| Fall in brown volumes | 0 to 50 % | 0 % |
| New green lending per year | 100 to 3000 EUR m | 1000 EUR m |
| Average bonus | 0 to 15 bp | 8.5 bp |
| Green lending that happens only because of the bonus | 10 to 1000 EUR m | 100 EUR m |
| Result at default settings | Value |
|---|---|
| Cost after tax to shareholders | 2.087 EUR m |
| Effect on return on CET1 | 1.26 bp |
| Surcharge if spread over all other loans | 0.144 bp |
| Average malus-bearing brown stock, year 5 | 9,470.4 EUR m |
| Brown malus for revenue neutrality | 2.94 bp |
| Annual cost of one vintage of the bonus | 0.850 EUR m |
| Cost per euro of additional green lending | 85.0 bp a year |
| Share of the bonus paid on loans that would have happened anyway | 90 % |
Try it. Set the fall in brown volumes to 40%, the kind of contraction a sector exit policy targets: the malus rises to 4.9 bp. A malus that succeeds in shrinking its base must keep rising to fund the same bonus.
Calculation. Shareholders: EUR 2.783m before tax is EUR 2.087m after tax, 1.26 bp of return on CET1. All other borrowers: EUR 2.783m over EUR 193.32bn of non-green loans is 0.144 bp, below the rounding of the FTP grid. Brown borrowers: new brown lending of EUR 3,000m a year with 20% run-off builds a malus-bearing stock that averages EUR 9,470.4m in the fifth year; the malus needed is 2.94 bp. If the bank’s sector policy or the malus itself cuts brown volumes by 20%, the base falls to EUR 7,576.3m and the malus rises to 3.67 bp.
What the money buys. One annual vintage of the bonus costs EUR 0.85m a year (EUR 1,000m at 8.5 bp). If only EUR 100m of that lending is additional, the bank pays 85 bp a year for each additional euro of green lending, and 90% of the bonus goes to loans that would have been made anyway. If the additional lending were EUR 300m, the cost would fall to 28.3 bp a year per additional euro.
Reading. The arithmetic gives a clear and slightly uncomfortable answer.
WHY IT MATTERS ON THE DESK — Business heads will ask “who pays?” before they ask “does it work?”. The answer “the shareholders, about one basis point of ROE” ends the first discussion. The second question, additionality, is the one ALCO should keep on its agenda, with data.
PITFALL — “Revenue-neutral” bonus-malus designs are neutral only in the first year. The malus base is the business the bank wants to shrink; as it shrinks, the malus must rise or the bonus becomes a subsidy again. Any revenue-neutral design needs a funding fallback written into the ALCO decision.
Question. Part of the green lending the bonus encourages is long and fixed-rate. What does a vintage of green mortgages do to Meridian’s interest-rate risk, and how does its FTP depend on assumptions that have nothing to do with the bonus?
Data (case assumptions). Of the EUR 1,000m of green lending in 2027, EUR 400m are energy-efficient mortgages at a fixed 3.40% for 20 years, repaid in annual instalments (a simplification of monthly payments). Meridian’s prepayment model gives a constant prepayment rate (CPR) of 3% a year in the base case, rising by 5 points when rates fall by 200 bp, because borrowers refinance. In France the indemnity a lender can charge on early repayment of a home loan is capped at six months of interest and 3% of the capital outstanding, so the option is cheap for the borrower to exercise. Cash flows are discounted at the swap curve, flat at 2.50%, including the commercial margin for simplicity. Supervisory parallel shock: 200 bp. Meridian’s Tier 1 is EUR 18.29bn (CET1 EUR 16.52bn and AT1 EUR 1.77bn, C03).
FORMULA
is the cash flow in year (interest, scheduled principal and prepayment) under a prepayment rate ; the discount rate; the shock; the prepayment rate in the shocked scenario (higher when rates fall); the change in value for a 1 bp move.
INTERACTIVE LAB — A vintage of fixed-rate green mortgages: behavioural life, FTP and economic value at risk
Compute the contractual and behavioural life of a fixed-rate amortising green mortgage vintage, its liquidity premium, its DV01, the hedge needed, and the change in economic value under the supervisory parallel shocks with prepayment.
| Parameter you can move | Range | Default |
|---|---|---|
| Vintage amount | 50 to 3000 EUR m | 400 EUR m |
| Term | 5 to 30 years | 20 years |
| Fixed client rate | 1 to 7 % | 3.4 % |
| Swap curve (flat) | 0 to 6 % | 2.5 % |
| Base prepayment rate (CPR) | 0 to 15 % a year | 3 % a year |
| Extra prepayment when rates fall 200 bp | 0 to 15 points | 5 points |
| Parallel shock | 50 to 300 bp | 200 bp |
| Liquidity premium per year of WAL | 0 to 15 bp | 6 bp |
| Tier 1 capital | 5 to 40 EUR bn | 18.29 EUR bn |
| Result at default settings | Value |
|---|---|
| Contractual WAL | 11.60 years |
| Behavioural WAL | 9.56 years |
| Liquidity premium on contractual WAL | 69.6 bp |
| Liquidity premium on behavioural WAL | 57.4 bp |
| Economic value of the vintage | 429.16 EUR m |
| DV01 | 0.3424 EUR m per bp |
| Equivalent 10-year payer swap notional | 391.3 EUR m |
| Change in EVE, rates up | -60.74 EUR m |
| Change in EVE, rates down (with faster prepayment) | 51.64 EUR m |
| Loss of upside from prepayment (convexity) | 9.10 EUR m |
| Rates-up loss as share of the 15% Tier 1 outlier threshold | 2.21 % |
Try it. Set the base prepayment rate to 6%: the behavioural life falls from 9.6 to 8.0 years and the liquidity premium by more than 9 bp. A change in one behavioural parameter moves the FTP of the loan as much as the whole green bonus.
Calculation. With no prepayment the vintage has a WAL of 11.60 years, a liquidity premium of 69.6 bp. With a CPR of 3% the behavioural WAL is 9.56 years and the premium 57.4 bp. The vintage is worth EUR 429.16m at the swap curve; its DV01 is EUR 0.3424m per basis point, the same as about EUR 391m of ten-year payer swaps. A 200 bp rise in rates lowers its value by EUR 60.74m; a 200 bp fall, with prepayments rising to 8%, raises it by only EUR 51.64m. The difference, EUR 9.10m, is the value given up through the borrowers’ prepayment option. The rates-up loss on this one vintage is 2.21% of the supervisory outlier threshold (15% of EUR 18.29bn of Tier 1).
Reading. Four points for ALCO. First, the IRRBB of the green vintage is managed like any other: ALM hedges it with payer swaps, the hedge cost is in the FTP through the swap rate, and the bonus changes nothing in that calculation. Second, the vintage is small against the outlier test, but the bonus is designed to make such vintages recur; ALM must include the planned green mortgage growth in its NII and EVE projections. Third, the behavioural assumption moves the FTP more than the bonus: the difference between contractual and behavioural life is worth 12.2 bp of liquidity premium, more than the 10 bp bonus, and a move of the CPR from 3% to 6% is worth more than 9 bp. A desk that wants cheaper funding for green mortgages has a stronger argument in prepayment data than in the label. Fourth, the prepayment option has a cost (EUR 9.10m of value in the down scenario on EUR 400m), which a complete FTP charges to the desk as an option cost; banks that do not charge it subsidise long fixed-rate lending far more than any green bonus does.
PITFALL — Do not let the green label change a behavioural model. A request to assume a longer life for green deposits or a lower prepayment rate for green mortgages “because green clients are loyal” is a request for a hidden subsidy unless the data support it. Model validation should treat it like any other parameter change.
Question. Liquidity risk management adds a climate scenario to the 2027 ILAAP. What does it do to the LCR-type ratio, how much extra HQLA does Meridian need to stay at its 130% target, and what risk-based charge follows for undrawn lines to high-transition-risk sectors?
Data (case assumptions). Starting point: the regulatory LCR at 30 September 2026 (C15): HQLA EUR 50.99bn after haircuts, outflows EUR 44bn, inflows EUR 8bn, LCR 141.64%. The internal scenario combines a transition shock (a sharp rise in the carbon price and a sector downgrade) with a flood in one region where Meridian has a large SME and mid-cap franchise. Assumptions: undrawn committed credit facilities to high-transition-risk sectors of EUR 15bn, drawn at 25% instead of the LCR’s 10%; undrawn liquidity facilities to the same sectors of EUR 3bn, drawn at 50% instead of 30%; operational deposits of corporate clients in the flooded region of EUR 6bn, with an outflow of 40% instead of 25%; their non-operational deposits of EUR 4bn, 60% instead of 40%; and a EUR 0.3bn loss of value on Level 2 corporate bonds of high-emitting issuers. Net carry cost of HQLA: 40 bp.
FORMULA
is the stressed ratio; the loss of HQLA value; and the regulatory outflows and inflows; the balance of category (undrawn lines, deposits); its regulatory outflow rate and its stressed rate; the risk-based contingent charge on category , with the HQLA carry cost.
INTERACTIVE LAB — A climate liquidity stress: stressed coverage ratio, HQLA top-up and risk-based charges
Apply climate-driven drawdowns and deposit outflows to Meridian’s LCR, compute the extra HQLA needed for the internal target and the risk-based contingent liquidity charges it implies.
| Parameter you can move | Range | Default |
|---|---|---|
| HQLA after haircuts | 20 to 100 EUR bn | 50.99 EUR bn |
| Regulatory outflows, 30 days | 10 to 80 EUR bn | 44 EUR bn |
| Inflows, 30 days | 0 to 40 EUR bn | 8 EUR bn |
| Internal target | 100 to 180 % | 130 % |
| Undrawn credit facilities, high-transition-risk sectors | 0 to 40 EUR bn | 15 EUR bn |
| Stressed drawdown, credit facilities (LCR 10%) | 10 to 60 % | 25 % |
| Undrawn liquidity facilities, same sectors | 0 to 10 EUR bn | 3 EUR bn |
| Stressed drawdown, liquidity facilities (LCR 30%) | 30 to 100 % | 50 % |
| Operational corporate deposits, flooded region | 0 to 20 EUR bn | 6 EUR bn |
| Stressed outflow, operational (LCR 25%) | 25 to 100 % | 40 % |
| Non-operational corporate deposits, flooded region | 0 to 20 EUR bn | 4 EUR bn |
| Stressed outflow, non-operational (LCR 40%) | 40 to 100 % | 60 % |
| Loss of HQLA value | 0 to 5 EUR bn | 0.3 EUR bn |
| Net carry cost of HQLA | 0 to 100 bp | 40 bp |
| Result at default settings | Value |
|---|---|
| Regulatory LCR | 141.64 % |
| Additional stressed outflows | 4.55 EUR bn |
| Stressed net outflows | 40.55 EUR bn |
| Stressed coverage ratio | 125.01 % |
| HQLA needed to restore the internal target | 2.025 EUR bn |
| Annual carry of the top-up | 8.10 EUR m |
| Extra contingent charge, credit facilities | 6.0 bp |
| Extra contingent charge, liquidity facilities | 8.0 bp |
| Annual revenue of the extra charges | 11.40 EUR m |
Try it. Raise the stressed drawdown on credit facilities to 40%: the stressed ratio falls to about 118%. The undrawn lines of a few correlated sectors move the ratio more than the whole deposit scenario.
Calculation. Extra outflows: EUR 15bn x 15 points = EUR 2.25bn on credit facilities, EUR 3bn x 20 points = EUR 0.6bn on liquidity facilities, EUR 6bn x 15 points = EUR 0.9bn on operational deposits, EUR 4bn x 20 points = EUR 0.8bn on non-operational ones: EUR 4.55bn in total. Net outflows rise to EUR 40.55bn (inflows of EUR 8bn are below the 75% cap), HQLA fall to EUR 50.69bn, and the stressed ratio is 125.01%. To restore 130% Meridian would need EUR 2.025bn of extra HQLA, at a carry of EUR 8.1m a year.
The risk-based charge. If Treasury prices the undrawn lines to high-transition-risk sectors on the stressed drawdown rather than the regulatory one, the contingent charge rises by 15 points x 40 bp = 6 bp on credit facilities (from 4 bp to 10 bp) and by 20 points x 40 bp = 8 bp on liquidity facilities (from 12 bp to 20 bp). On the EUR 18bn of undrawn lines this is EUR 11.4m a year.
Reading. Three conclusions. First, the climate scenario does not threaten the regulatory ratio, but it uses most of the surplus over the internal target: the 130% target exists for this kind of correlated stress. Second, the charge of 6 to 8 bp on brown undrawn lines is the one “brown” FTP component that a liquidity manager can defend, because it prices a buffer that Treasury actually holds; it is calibrated on a documented scenario that the second line owns and model validation reviews. Third, it is not a funding source for the green bonus. Its revenue, EUR 11.4m, pays for the extra HQLA that the risk requires; if Meridian decided not to hold that buffer, the charge would have no basis. Using it to pay the green bonus would mean pricing a risk and then not covering it.
WHO DOES WHAT — When a relationship manager asks why his client’s undrawn RCF now costs 10 bp instead of 4 bp, the answer is not “because the client is brown”. It is “because in our stress scenario this sector draws its lines together, and we hold liquid assets for that”. The second answer survives a discussion with the client, the supervisor and internal audit; the first does not.
Question. Putting stages 5.1 to 5.5 together, what does ALCO approve, and how is it written in the FTP grid?
The decision. ALCO approves design B with four conditions. (1) The incentive applies to new drawdowns from 1 January 2027 and is split in the grid into a pass-through of 1.8 bp (the rounded net self-financing rebate, recomputed each year by Treasury) and a strategic bonus for the rest. (2) The strategic part is paid by the group’s central transition budget, not by the liquidity curve and not by other borrowers; it is capped at EUR 3m of subsidy a year, consistent with the 2031 run-rate of EUR 2.783m, and the cap is reviewed if green volumes exceed plan. (3) No brown malus is introduced in FTP; transition risk is priced through the credit overlays and the internal carbon fee (E01, E03). The risk-based contingent charge on undrawn lines to high-transition-risk sectors is adopted from 1 April 2027, after model validation of the scenario. (4) A review in the fourth quarter of 2028 on additionality evidence: if the quarterly reports do not show a change in the volume or mix of green origination, the strategic bonus falls back to the status quo.
| Line of the 2027 FTP grid | Aligned green loan | Eligible-only green loan | Other loan |
|---|---|---|---|
| Liquidity premium (5-year WAL) | 30 bp | 30 bp | 30 bp |
| Pass-through of the greenium | -1.8 bp | -1.8 bp | none |
| Strategic green bonus | -8.2 bp | -3.2 bp | none |
| Net liquidity charge | 20 bp | 25 bp | 30 bp |
| Contingent charge, undrawn credit line | 4 bp | 4 bp | 4 bp, or 10 bp if high-transition-risk |
Reading. The grid keeps three numbers apart that are often merged: the cost of liquidity (30 bp, the same for all), the market benefit of green funding (1.8 bp, a pass-through) and the bank’s strategic choice (3.2 to 8.2 bp, a subsidy paid centrally). Anyone reading the grid, a desk, an auditor or a supervisor, can see which is which. The risk-based charge appears where it belongs, in the contingent liquidity line.
How ALCO will know whether it works. The fourth condition needs a method, which ALM and the MI team agree before the bonus goes live, so that the result cannot be designed after the fact. Four measures are reported each quarter. Volume: green drawdowns against the plan of EUR 1,000m a year and against the 2024-2026 trend, by desk. Mix: the share of Taxonomy-aligned loans in new green lending, against the 70% assumed in the projection; if the tiered design works, this share should rise, which also raises the cost (section 5.2). Price: how much of the bonus the desks pass to clients, measured as the change in the average client margin on green loans against comparable conventional loans of the same rating and tenor; a bonus fully passed to clients may win deals, a bonus fully kept by the desks only improves their reported RAROC. Win rate: the share of green mandates where Meridian was invited and won, from the deal pipeline system, before and after January 2027. None of these isolates the effect of the bonus perfectly, because the market, rates and competitors move at the same time. The closest thing to a control group is the population of eligible loans in business lines where the bonus does not apply (for instance, green trade finance under one year, which is outside the term-lending perimeter): if green volumes rise as much there as in term lending, the bonus is not the cause. ALM writes this limit into the first report rather than waiting for a business head to point it out.
What the desks will do. Experience with internal incentives suggests three reactions, which the dashboard should watch for. Desks reclassify: loans that were borderline become “eligible” because the flag is now worth money, which is why the flag must come from the register and its evidence, not from the desk. Desks reprice: they keep most of the bonus as margin on deals they would have won, which raises their RAROC and the deadweight. And desks redirect effort towards low-risk-weight green assets, where the bonus moves RAROC most (section 5.1), which may or may not match the transition plan’s priorities. None of these is misconduct; all of them are the predictable response to a price, and ALCO’s design should anticipate them.
NOTE — The status quo rule of C15 (3 bp for aligned loans, 1.818 bp for eligible-only loans) remains in force for drawings made in 2026 and before; the 2025 flat 3 bp rebate remains on legacy loans until they run off. The pricing tool reads the drawdown date and the register flag to apply the right line.
| Stage | Key figure | Value |
|---|---|---|
| 5.1 RAROC | Green loan: no incentive; 3 bp; 10 bp | 6.26%; 6.71%; 7.74% |
| 5.1 RAROC | RAROC per bp; bonus to reach hurdle | 0.1479 point; 38.8 bp |
| 5.1 RAROC | Bank view with pass-through only | 6.53% |
| 5.2 Bill | Average bonus, design B | 8.5 bp |
| 5.2 Bill | Cost; greenium-funded; subsidy (2027) | EUR 1.865m; 0.964m; 0.901m |
| 5.2 Bill | Cost; greenium-funded; subsidy (2031) | EUR 3.976m; 1.193m; 2.783m |
| 5.2 Bill | Cumulative subsidy 2027-2031; steady state | EUR 9.505m; EUR 5.68m a year |
| 5.2 Bill | Status quo subsidy 2027; 2031 | EUR 0.609m; 0.646m |
| 5.3 Payers | Shareholders: after tax; ROE effect | EUR 2.087m; 1.26 bp |
| 5.3 Payers | All borrowers; brown malus (0%; 20% fall) | 0.144 bp; 2.94 bp; 3.67 bp |
| 5.3 Payers | Cost per additional euro; deadweight | 85 bp a year; 90% |
| 5.4 IRRBB | WAL contractual; behavioural | 11.60; 9.56 years |
| 5.4 IRRBB | Liquidity premium contractual; behavioural | 69.6 bp; 57.4 bp |
| 5.4 IRRBB | DV01; hedge equivalent | EUR 0.3424m; EUR 391m of 10-year swaps |
| 5.4 IRRBB | Change in EVE up; down; convexity | EUR -60.74m; +51.64m; 9.10m |
| 5.5 Liquidity | LCR; stressed ratio | 141.64%; 125.01% |
| 5.5 Liquidity | Extra outflows; HQLA top-up; carry | EUR 4.55bn; EUR 2.025bn; EUR 8.1m |
| 5.5 Liquidity | Risk-based charge; revenue | 6 bp and 8 bp; EUR 11.4m |
The thread through the case: a 5 to 10 bp green FTP incentive is cheap for the bank (about one basis point of ROE) and modest for the desk (one to one and a half points of RAROC). Its funding by the greenium is fixed at about 1.8 bp by the bond market, so everything above that is a subsidy that grows for years after the decision. The costs that matter more, the behavioural life of long green assets and the correlated drawdowns of brown sectors, are risk prices that FTP should get right whatever the bank’s green strategy.
ALM is a function, not a business line with its own clients, so this section looks at the economics of the FTP incentive on the perimeters where it lands: the lending desk, Treasury, the bank as a whole, and the brown borrowers a malus would have hit.
FTP consumes no capital. An internal transfer price creates no exposure: the green bonus changes no risk weight, no PD, no LGD. The loan of section 5.1 has a risk weight of 39.02% under F-IRB with or without the incentive. There is no green supporting factor in CRR3, and the incentive should not be mistaken for one.
IRRBB is a Pillar 2 risk. Interest-rate risk in the banking book has no Pillar 1 capital requirement in the EU. It is assessed in the ICAAP, where Meridian holds internal capital for the EVE and earnings risk of its hedged position, and in the supervisory review, where a bank that breaches the outlier tests of Delegated Regulation (EU) 2024/856 can be required to hold additional own funds (a Pillar 2 requirement) or to reduce its exposure. The green mortgage vintage of section 5.4, once hedged, adds almost nothing to that capital; unhedged, its EVE loss of EUR 60.74m would be a small but real call on the internal capital allocated to IRRBB.
Liquidity consumes no capital either, but it consumes a resource that is priced like capital: the HQLA buffer, whose carry Meridian charges at 40 bp. The climate scenario of section 5.5 shows that the binding constraint is the internal target, not the regulatory ratio.
Hedges consume a little. The payer swaps that hedge fixed-rate green mortgages are traded with the rates desk or a central counterparty; they carry counterparty credit risk (SA-CCR) and a CVA charge, both small for cleared interest-rate swaps.
The RAROC convention of the course applies: revenues are the net margin over FTP plus fees; costs are 40% of revenues before the incentive; expected loss is PD x LGD x EAD; capital is 13% of RWA; tax 25%. The block below computes the green loan of 5.1 on the desk perimeter (with the 10 bp bonus) and on the bank perimeter (with only the 1.818 bp pass-through), and a comparable brown loan, a EUR 100m five-year loan to a BBB cement producer at 130 bp, before and after the 2.94 bp malus that ALCO rejected.
INTERACTIVE LAB — RAROC of the case loans on the desk, Treasury and bank perimeters
Work out the RAROC of the green loan line by line with the bonus, show what Treasury pays and what the bank earns, and compare with the brown loan a malus would have charged.
| Parameter you can move | Range | Default |
|---|---|---|
| Loan amount | 10 to 300 EUR m | 100 EUR m |
| Green loan margin | 50 to 300 bp | 110 bp |
| FTP liquidity premium | 0 to 80 bp | 30 bp |
| Upfront fee (spread over 5 years) | 0 to 100 bp | 40 bp |
| PD, green borrower | 0.03 to 4 % | 0.2 % |
| MREL charge per euro of RWA | 0 to 20 bp | 6.266 bp |
| Green bonus | 0 to 15 bp | 10 bp |
| Pass-through | 0 to 5 bp | 1.818 bp |
| Brown loan margin | 50 to 300 bp | 130 bp |
| PD, brown borrower | 0.03 to 4 % | 0.2 % |
| Brown malus (rejected design) | 0 to 10 bp | 2.94 bp |
| Result at default settings | Value |
|---|---|
| Green loan RWA | 39.02 EUR m |
| Allocated capital | 5.072 EUR m |
| Revenues including bonus | 0.980 EUR m |
| Operating costs | 0.352 EUR m |
| Expected loss | 0.080 EUR m |
| MREL charge | 0.0244 EUR m |
| Profit before tax | 0.5236 EUR m |
| Profit after tax | 0.3927 EUR m |
| Green loan RAROC, no incentive | 6.26 % |
| Green loan RAROC, desk perimeter | 7.74 % |
| Treasury’s cost before tax (bonus less pass-through) | 0.0818 EUR m |
| Treasury’s cost after tax | 0.0614 EUR m |
| Green loan RAROC, bank perimeter | 6.53 % |
| Brown loan RAROC | 8.04 % |
| Brown loan RAROC with malus | 7.60 % |
Try it. Set the brown borrower’s PD to 1% (BB): its RAROC falls far more than any malus would move it. Credit risk, not FTP, is where transition risk shows up in the numbers.
Line by line, green loan, desk perimeter. Revenues EUR 0.98m (EUR 0.80m of net margin over the 30 bp FTP, EUR 0.08m of upfront fee a year, EUR 0.10m of bonus). Operating costs EUR 0.352m (40% of revenues before the bonus). Expected loss EUR 0.08m. MREL charge EUR 0.0244m. Profit before tax EUR 0.5236m; after tax EUR 0.3927m. Capital EUR 5.072m on RWA of EUR 39.02m. RAROC 7.74%, against 6.26% without any incentive.
Treasury perimeter. Treasury pays EUR 0.10m and recovers the pass-through of EUR 0.0182m from the greenium: a net cost of EUR 0.0818m before tax, EUR 0.0614m after tax, booked in the central cost centre that ALCO designated.
Bank perimeter. Adding the desk and Treasury, only the pass-through remains: RAROC 6.53%. This is the figure that capital allocation (E03) should use when it compares green lending with other uses of capital.
Brown loan. The cement loan earns 8.04%; with the 2.94 bp malus it would have earned 7.60%. The malus would have cost the brown desk 0.44 point, a smaller effect than half a notch of transition-risk PD overlay (E03). This supports ALCO’s view that FTP is the wrong place to price transition risk: the instrument is too weak to steer and too blunt to measure risk.
A green loan has the same liquidity profile as its conventional twin. For the NSFR a corporate loan of more than one year requires 85% stable funding, a residential mortgage with a risk weight of 35% or less 65%; the label changes neither. In the LCR, contractual inflows from performing loans count at 50% of the amounts due within 30 days for non-financial counterparties, whatever the purpose of the loan. The liquidity premium of 30 bp at five years therefore stays the right charge for both.
What the green strategy changes is the shape of the balance sheet. Green assets are on average longer than the rest of the book (mortgages, infrastructure, renewable energy), so the incentive, if it works, lengthens the assets that the NSFR and the IRRBB framework must carry. ALM includes the planned growth of the green pool in its three-year NSFR projection and in the EVE and NII projections. On the liability side, green bonds are term liabilities like any other: 100% available stable funding while their residual maturity exceeds one year (C15).
Two control points link funding and pricing. The green flag in the pricing tool must come from the same register as the green bond allocation report (C15), so that the bank never pays an incentive on a loan it could not allocate to a green bond. And the pass-through must be recomputed each year from the actual greenium and the actual pool: it is a market number that moves.
FTP is management accounting. Internal transfers between desks and Treasury are eliminated on consolidation: they do not appear in the IFRS income statement. They do appear in the segment reporting of IFRS 8 when the chief operating decision maker reviews segment results after FTP, as most banks do; the bonus then moves profit between segments without changing the group total. The bank’s net interest income is the same whether the bonus is 0 bp or 10 bp, unless the bonus changes client pricing.
The client rate. If the desk passes the bonus to the client through a lower margin, the bank’s IFRS 9 interest income falls; the loan, measured at amortised cost, carries the lower effective interest rate. A green loan whose cash flows do not depend on a sustainability outcome passes the SPPI test like its conventional twin; the IFRS 9 amendments of May 2024 on contractual cash flow characteristics, effective from 1 January 2026, concern loans whose margin is linked to ESG targets (B03, E05).
Hedge accounting. The payer swaps of section 5.4 hedge a portfolio of fixed-rate loans. Most EU banks use the portfolio fair value hedge of IAS 39, with the EU carve-out that allows hedging of core deposits and relaxes effectiveness rules; IFRS 9 lets entities keep IAS 39 hedge accounting until the IASB completes its project on dynamic risk management. The IASB published the exposure draft Risk Mitigation Accounting (ED/2025/4) on 3 December 2025, with comments due by 31 July 2026; the final model is not yet issued in November 2026. Prepayment behaviour matters here too: when green mortgages prepay faster than modelled, the hedged portfolio shrinks and hedge ineffectiveness appears in profit or loss.
Liquidity buffer. HQLA bought to restore the internal target after the climate scenario would be classified at amortised cost or at fair value through OCI depending on the business model; the latter is common for buffer portfolios that may be sold in a stress.
Green Asset Ratio and BTAR. FTP does not appear in the GAR, which counts Taxonomy-aligned assets over covered assets. An incentive that works raises the numerator over time; the tiered design B targets exactly that, by paying more for aligned loans. Under Delegated Regulation (EU) 2026/73, which applies from 1 January 2026, exposures to undertakings outside the scope of the CSRD, derivatives, on-demand interbank loans, cash and goodwill are excluded from the ratio (see E06); this changes the denominator, not the effect of the incentive.
Pillar 3 ESG. The EBA’s implementing technical standards on Pillar 3 ESG disclosures include templates on Taxonomy-aligned exposures (stopped for large institutions under the final draft of 22 June 2026, not yet adopted) and on other climate change mitigating actions; green loans that are framework-eligible but not aligned appear in the latter. Banks also disclose, qualitatively, how ESG risks are integrated into their risk management, including liquidity: the climate scenario of section 5.5 is the kind of evidence that disclosure should rest on.
Financed emissions. The incentive does not change how financed emissions are computed under the PCAF standard (A03); it may change their level if it shifts origination. The honest metric is the one 5.3 asked for: additional green lending caused by the incentive, not total green lending. A bank that reports the bonus as a transition lever in its transition plan should report the evidence of its effect, or say that the evidence is not yet available.
Transition plan. The EBA Guidelines on the management of ESG risks require plans to address ESG risks consistent with the bank’s disclosed transition plan. An FTP incentive is one of the levers such a plan may list; its cost, cap and review date belong in the governance description, so that the supervisor can see that the lever is managed.
The risks of a green FTP incentive are less about losses than about mispricing, mislabelling and claims the bank cannot support. The table lists the main ones with the control and its owner.
| Risk | What goes wrong | Control | Owner |
|---|---|---|---|
| Subsidy presented as market benefit | “Green bonds make our green loans cheaper” | Grid splits pass-through and strategic bonus | ALM, Communications |
| Incentive on ineligible loans | Bonus paid on loans outside the register | Flag read from the green loan register | Pricing tool owner, Audit |
| No stop on declassification | Bonus continues after loan leaves pool | Automatic removal from register event | Management accounting |
| Cost drift | Subsidy grows past plan as stock builds | Annual cap, five-year projection | ALCO, ALM |
| Deadweight | Bonus paid on business won anyway | Quarterly additionality report | ALM, MI team |
| Hidden subsidy in models | Longer life assumed for “green” balances | Validation of every behavioural change | Model validation |
| Unhedged duration | Green mortgage growth lengthens EVE | Hedge plan, IRRBB limits | IRRBB team, Liquidity risk |
| Unpriced correlated drawdowns | Brown sectors draw together in stress | Climate ILAAP scenario, contingent charge | Liquidity risk management |
| Malus as disguised risk price | Policy surcharge called liquidity cost | No malus in liquidity curve | ALCO |
| Inconsistent numbers | Pool in FTP differs from allocation report | Single register, reconciliation | Treasury, Sustainability team |
Red flags that an analyst, an auditor or a supervisor should look for:
Rates and market data (November 2026). The ECB kept its key rates unchanged on 29 October 2026: deposit facility 2.50%, main refinancing operations 2.65%, marginal lending facility 2.90%; its statement noted that the effects of an energy shock were still unfolding. The course’s flat 2.50% swap level is consistent with the deposit rate.
Liquidity regulation. The LCR (Delegated Regulation (EU) 2015/61) and the NSFR (CRR2, applicable since 28 June 2021) are unchanged in their green-neutral design. The Commission’s communication on banking competitiveness of 17 July 2026 announces proposals from the first quarter of 2027, including on the allocation of capital and liquidity within groups.
IRRBB. The EBA Guidelines EBA/GL/2022/14 apply since 30 June 2023. Delegated Regulation (EU) 2024/856, in force since 14 May 2024, sets the outlier thresholds: 15% of Tier 1 for EVE under six shocks, 5% of Tier 1 for NII under the parallel shocks. The EBA’s report on the implementation of the IRRBB heatmap (published in early 2025, data at end-2023) found deposits averaging 65% of banking book liabilities, non-maturity deposits about 76% of deposits, mean core shares of 44% for all non-maturity deposits, and wide differences in modelling across banks.
Climate and liquidity. The EBA Guidelines on the management of ESG risks (EBA/GL/2025/01) apply from 11 January 2026 for large institutions. The Eurosystem’s climate factor in the collateral framework applies since 15 June 2026; the ECB expected the immediate effect on banks to be limited, given low central bank borrowing and limited use of corporate bonds as collateral.
Green FTP in practice. There is no public benchmark of green FTP incentives across banks. Banks’ disclosures tend to mention the existence of an incentive rather than its size or funding. Consultancy notes (KPMG 2023, Oliver Wyman 2024) discuss green pricing curves and funding advantages qualitatively; the Oliver Wyman note proposes a central bank green refinancing facility that banks could pass through their FTP, which does not exist in the euro area. The course’s numbers (a greenium of about 3 bp, a self-financing rebate below 2 bp) are therefore built from the case, not from a market survey.
What changed recently. The rise and stabilisation of rates since 2022 has made the behavioural modelling of deposits and prepayments the dominant FTP issue; climate has entered liquidity through supervisory expectations and the collateral framework rather than through regulation of ratios; and the debate on green FTP has moved from “should we pass on the greenium?” to “who pays for the part above it?”.
Open debates.
INTERACTIVE LAB — Self-assessment: FTP, ALM, liquidity and green incentives
Check understanding of FTP mechanics, liquidity rules, IRRBB and the economics of green FTP incentives.
Q1. A seven-year loan repaid in equal annual instalments: what tenor drives its liquidity premium under matched-maturity FTP?
Answer: B. For equal annual instalments the WAL is (n+1)/2 = 4 years; the premium follows the average time the money is out.
Q2. What is the LCR outflow rate on an undrawn committed liquidity facility to a non-financial corporate?
Answer: C. Credit facilities carry 10%, liquidity facilities 30% (Delegated Regulation (EU) 2015/61, Article 31).
Q3. Why does a non-operational corporate deposit earn a much lower liquidity credit than an operational one?
Answer: B. Only the stable part earns a term premium, and the stable part of non-operational balances is both smaller and shorter-lived.
Q4. Meridian’s greenium can fund a net rebate of 1.818 bp. A bonus of 10 bp is granted. Which statement is correct?
Answer: B. FTP is an internal transfer: only the pass-through funded by a real saving raises the bank’s profit.
Q5. Why does the subsidy of an incentive on new lending grow for several years after it is introduced?
Answer: B. Each new vintage carries the bonus for its life; the cost converges to the bonus times the steady-state stock.
Q6. A brown malus designed to be revenue-neutral works as intended and brown lending falls. What happens?
Answer: B. The malus is levied on the business the bank wants to shrink; success erodes its own base.
Q7. What is the supervisory outlier threshold for the economic value of equity?
Answer: C. Delegated Regulation (EU) 2024/856 sets 15% of Tier 1 for EVE under six shocks; 5% of Tier 1 applies to the NII test.
Q8. A fixed-rate green mortgage vintage loses more value when rates rise 200 bp than it gains when they fall 200 bp. Why?
Answer: B. The prepayment option is negative convexity for the lender: gains in falling-rate scenarios are cut by refinancing.
Q9. Which of these is a risk-based FTP adjustment rather than a strategic overlay?
Answer: C. It prices a buffer the bank actually holds, calibrated on a scenario owned by the second line.
Q10. Does a green label change the NSFR required stable funding of a five-year corporate loan?
Answer: C. No liquidity rule distinguishes green assets; a corporate loan of more than one year requires 85%.
Q11. Where do FTP transfers appear in the IFRS consolidated income statement?
Answer: C. Internal transfers cancel at group level; segment reporting may show results after FTP.
Q12. What did the Eurosystem introduce on 15 June 2026?
Answer: B. The climate factor adjusts collateral values for issuers’ transition risk exposure; it is the first climate variable in a liquidity number.
Q13. With a 10% additionality, an 8.5 bp bonus on EUR 1,000m of lending costs how much per year per additional euro?
Answer: C. EUR 0.85m a year buys EUR 100m of additional lending: 85 bp a year per additional euro.
Q14. Which change moves the FTP of a 20-year green mortgage most in the case?
Answer: B. Contractual WAL 11.6 years vs behavioural 9.56 years: 12.2 bp of liquidity premium.
Question. A corporate client of another bank, which uses Meridian’s conventions (6 bp per year of WAL, HQLA carry 40 bp), has: a EUR 60m nine-year term loan repaid in equal annual instalments; an undrawn EUR 40m committed facility that backs its commercial paper programme; and EUR 200m of operational deposits with a behavioural life of 2 years. Compute the liquidity premium of the loan, the contingent charge on the facility and the liquidity credit on the deposits, each in bp and EUR a year.
Solution. Loan: WAL = (9 + 1) / 2 = 5 years; liquidity premium 6 x 5 = 30 bp; on EUR 60m, EUR 0.18m a year. Facility: a liquidity facility to a non-financial corporate has an LCR outflow of 30%; charge 30% x 40 bp = 12 bp; on EUR 40m, EUR 0.048m a year. Deposits: operational, outflow 25%; credit (1 - 0.25) x 6 x 2 = 9 bp; on EUR 200m, EUR 0.18m a year. The deposits pay back exactly the liquidity premium of the loan; the facility is a net cost. A relationship view (E03) nets the three.
Question. A bank has a green pool of EUR 3,000m, a run-off of EUR 300m a year (10%), new eligible lending of EUR 600m a year of which 50% is Taxonomy-aligned. It introduces a bonus of 8 bp on aligned and 4 bp on eligible-only new loans; legacy loans keep a 2 bp rebate. Its net self-financing rebate is 1.5 bp of the pool. (a) Compute the cost, the greenium-funded part and the subsidy in the first year, on average balances. (b) Compute the steady-state pool and the steady-state subsidy. (c) What brown malus would fund that steady-state subsidy on a malus-bearing stock of EUR 9,000m?
Solution. (a) Average bonus 0.5 x 8 + 0.5 x 4 = 6 bp. Legacy pool falls from EUR 3,000m to EUR 2,700m, average EUR 2,850m, at 2 bp: EUR 0.57m. New vintage averages EUR 300m at 6 bp: EUR 0.18m. Cost EUR 0.75m. Greenium-funded: 1.5 bp on EUR 3,150m, EUR 0.4725m. Subsidy EUR 0.2775m. (b) Steady-state pool = 600 / 10% = EUR 6,000m; subsidy (6 - 1.5) bp x EUR 6,000m = EUR 2.7m a year, almost ten times the first-year figure. (c) EUR 2.7m / EUR 9,000m = 3 bp, before any fall in brown volumes.
Question. A EUR 50m five-year green loan to an A-rated company (PD 0.07%, LGD 40%, M 2.5 years, F-IRB), fully drawn, at a margin of 80 bp; FTP 30 bp; no fees; costs 40% of revenues before any incentive; ignore the MREL charge. Compute the RAROC without incentive, with a 6 bp bonus, the RAROC gained per bp, the bonus needed to reach 12%, and the bank-level RAROC if the pass-through is 1.5 bp.
Solution. Risk weight 21.36%, RWA EUR 10.68m, capital EUR 1.389m. Revenues 50 bp x EUR 50m = EUR 0.25m; costs EUR 0.10m; EL 0.07% x 40% x EUR 50m = EUR 0.014m. Profit before tax EUR 0.136m, after tax EUR 0.102m: RAROC 7.35%. A 6 bp bonus adds EUR 0.03m before tax: RAROC 8.97%. Each bp is worth EUR 0.005m x 0.75 / EUR 1.389m = 0.270 point. Bonus to the hurdle: (12 - 7.35) / 0.270 = 17.2 bp. Bank level, with 1.5 bp: 7.35 + 1.5 x 0.270 = 7.75%. The incentive is twice as powerful as on the BBB loan of the case because the capital per euro is about half: incentives favour low-risk-weight assets.
1. What is FTP and why does a bank need it? FTP is the internal price at which Treasury lends to and borrows from the business lines. It separates commercial performance from funding and interest-rate risk, which Treasury manages centrally and hedges. It also sends price signals, so that desks pay for the liquidity they consume and are paid for the stable funding they bring. Without it, a lending desk’s profit would depend on rate moves it does not control, and the bank would grow the assets that its funding can least support.
2. How do you price the liquidity of an amortising loan with a revolving tranche? The drawn amortising part is charged the liquidity premium for its weighted average life, behavioural if prepayments are material. The undrawn commitment is charged a contingent liquidity cost: the LCR outflow rate (10% for a credit facility to a corporate, 30% for a liquidity facility) times the carry cost of the HQLA held against it. Both are fixed at drawdown or at signing for the relevant period. I would also check whether internal stress scenarios assume a higher drawdown for this sector.
3. Should a bank pass its greenium to green loans? Passing a real saving to the assets that make the green bonds possible is cost-based FTP, so yes, at the self-financing level: the annual saving net of programme costs, divided by the eligible pool. For a typical European bank that is one to two basis points. Anything above that is a subsidy. It can be justified by the transition plan, but it should be labelled, capped and paid by a named cost centre.
4. Your sustainability office wants a 10 bp green FTP bonus. What do you tell ALCO? I would show three numbers: the cost over five years on the stock, not the first year, because FTP is locked at drawdown; the share funded by the greenium, which is fixed by the bond market; and the cost per additional euro of green lending, which depends on how much lending the bonus really changes. Then I would propose a design that keeps the pass-through and the strategic part separate, a payer, a cap and a review date with an additionality test.
5. Is a brown malus in FTP a good idea? It is a way to make a green bonus revenue-neutral, but it is a policy price presented as a funding cost: a cement loan does not cost more to fund than a wind loan. It also erodes its own base if brown lending falls. Transition risk is better priced in the credit overlay and an internal carbon price. The one brown adjustment I would put in FTP is a contingent liquidity charge calibrated on a documented stress where a sector draws its lines together.
6. How does climate risk enter liquidity risk management? Through correlated deposit outflows after physical events, correlated drawdowns by sectors hit by a transition shock, losses of value on liquid assets of high-emitting issuers, and market access. The regulatory LCR does not capture correlation, so banks add climate scenarios to the ILAAP, as the EBA ESG guidelines and the ECB guide expect. The output is an internal buffer target and, where justified, contingent charges.
7. What IRRBB issues do long green assets raise? Fixed-rate green mortgages and infrastructure loans are long and amortising, so they add EVE sensitivity, and their prepayment option gives the bank negative convexity. ALM hedges them with payer swaps and includes the planned growth of the green book in EVE and NII projections against the 15% and 5% of Tier 1 outlier thresholds. The behavioural prepayment assumption matters more for their FTP than any green incentive.
8. Does a green deposit deserve a better FTP credit? Only if it behaves better. The LCR applies the outflow rate of its category, retail or corporate, operational or not, whatever its label. If the bank has data showing that green deposits are stickier, the behavioural model can reflect it after validation. Without data, paying more for green deposits raises the cost of funds for funding that is no more stable.
Regulation and supervisory texts
Practice notes
Books and further reading