Compliance and Legal earn no revenue, yet no sustainable product leaves Meridian Bank without their signature. They are the functions that answer three questions before a product, a document or a public statement goes out: is it allowed, is it fair to the client, and can we prove what we say? This module is about the third question when the statement concerns sustainability. The lecturer’s deck already sets out the typology of greenwashing (green crowding, green lighting, green shifting, green labelling, green rinsing, green hushing) and the AMF doctrine on funds with central, reduced or prospectus-only communication. We take that as known and work from the bank’s side: how a claim is approved, how a product is cleared, what happens when a supervisor or a court disagrees, and what that costs.
Where it sits. Compliance is a second-line function: it does not originate business, it sets the rules for the first line (the business), advises on them, and tests that they are applied. Under MiFID II the compliance function must be permanent, independent and effective, with its own head reporting to the management body (Article 22 of Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/565). Legal is usually not classed as a line of defence; it is the bank’s lawyer, defending its position in contracts, disputes and investigations, and it protects privileged advice. Internal audit, the third line, checks both. At Meridian (case assumptions) Compliance has about 420 staff and Legal about 160, split between the group functions in Paris and teams embedded in each business line.
Clients. The internal clients are the business lines: retail and private banking (consumer products, investment advice, structured notes), corporate and investment banking (loans, bonds, derivatives, advisory), asset management, and the group itself (annual report, sustainability statement, press releases, the chief executive’s speeches). The external counterparts are supervisors (ECB, ACPR, AMF in France; the DGCCRF for consumer law), courts, NGOs and claimant law firms, and the auditors who give assurance on the sustainability statement.
How it “earns” money. It does not, directly. Its value is the loss it avoids: fines, compensation to clients, legal costs, products withdrawn after launch, management time and reputation. The economics are therefore those of an expected-loss reduction, and section 5 quantifies them: for the product in our case, one well-run claims review moves the risk-adjusted return of the launch from deeply negative to above the hurdle. A compliance officer who can make that argument with numbers is listened to in a product committee; one who only says “no” is routed around.
The team.
| Role | What they produce | Typical seniority |
|---|---|---|
| Compliance advisory (business-facing) | Opinions on new products, deals and claims | Associate to director |
| Product governance and NPA secretariat | Product files, target market, committee minutes | VP, director |
| Marketing and claims review | Approved promotional material, claims register | Associate, VP |
| Monitoring and testing | Annual test plan, findings, remediation tracking | Associate to director |
| Legal (regulatory, transactional, litigation) | Legal opinions, prospectus sign-off, defence files | Counsel to general counsel |
| Conduct and operational risk | Risk taxonomy, loss data, scenarios, Pillar 2 input | VP, director |
| Sustainability office | Frameworks, KPIs, the bank’s transition plan | VP to chief sustainability officer |
Adjacent functions. The sustainable finance team owns the frameworks (green bond, sustainability-linked) and the evidence behind the bank’s targets (see A04, C02). Finance owns the sustainability statement and the Pillar 3 ESG templates (see E05, E06). Risk owns the climate risk framework that supervisors test (see E01). Marketing and communications draft the claims; Compliance reviews them.
A week in Compliance advisory, sustainable products desk. Monday: product committee pre-meeting on a sustainability-linked structured note for the retail network (our case); the business wants to launch in January. Tuesday: claims review of twelve marketing items, from a branch poster to a private-bank brochure; four come back with mark-ups. Wednesday: call with Legal on a letter from an NGO alleging that the group’s “net zero” statements mislead consumers; Legal opens a file and imposes a document hold. Thursday: monitoring and testing presents results on a sample of 60 advisory files: sustainability preferences were collected in all files, but in nine the product recommended did not match the preference recorded and no explanation was documented. Friday: regulatory watch note on the withdrawal of the Green Claims Directive proposal and on the state of French transposition of the Empowering Consumers Directive; update of the claims guidelines.
WHO DOES WHAT — Business sponsors propose; Compliance advises and challenges; Legal drafts and defends; the New Product Approval (NPA) committee decides; Monitoring and testing verifies afterwards; Internal audit checks the whole chain. Every greenwashing case in section 8 failed at one of these joints, usually between what the front office said and what the back office did.
Before adding sustainability, a student needs the plain mechanics of conduct regulation: what a product-governance process is, what makes a marketing document lawful, where conduct losses come from and how a bank prices them. Nothing in this section is specific to sustainability; all of it applies in full to a sustainable product.
IN ONE SENTENCE — Conduct risk is the risk that the bank’s own behaviour harms clients or markets, and that the bank then pays for it in fines, compensation and lost business.
INTUITION — A restaurant can lose money because the fish was bad (credit or market risk: the input failed) or because the menu said “wild” when the fish was farmed (conduct risk: the description failed). The second is cheaper to prevent and far more expensive to repair, because every diner who ordered the fish has a claim.
In the Basel taxonomy, conduct losses fall in the operational-risk event type “clients, products and business practices”: unsuitable advice, misleading information, breach of fiduciary duty, product defects. They are booked as operational losses, provisioned under IAS 37 when a payment is probable, and reported to the supervisor in the bank’s loss database. Legal risk, the risk of loss from a contract that cannot be enforced or from litigation, is part of operational risk in the Basel and CRR definitions. Reputational and strategic risk are outside Pillar 1 but inside the ICAAP and the supervisor’s review.
MiFID II (Directive 2014/65/EU, Articles 16(3) and 24(2)) and its Delegated Directive (EU) 2017/593 (Articles 9 and 10) require any firm that manufactures a financial instrument to run a product approval process, and any firm that distributes it to understand it and check that it reaches the right clients. ESMA’s guidelines on product governance requirements, last revised in 2023, set out how. The manufacturer must:
When the manufacturer is also the distributor, as when Meridian issues a note and sells it through its own branches, both sets of obligations fall on the same bank, and the internal conflicts of interest (the issuer wants cheap funding, the network wants commission, the client wants a fair price) have to be managed inside one building.
A retail note is sold at 100 and repays 100. The client’s cost is not visible on the term sheet: it is the gap between the issue price and the fair value, the price at which the same cash flows would trade if discounted at the issuer’s market funding curve.
FORMULA
is the fair value per 100 of nominal; the annual coupon in points; the issuer’s market yield for the same maturity and seniority; the maturity in years. The embedded cost is the sum of the distribution fee paid to the seller and the issuer’s margin, both taken at issue.
The reduction in yield expresses the same cost per year: the client earns on 100 while the fair yield is , so for a note bought at par the client gives up each year. PRIIPs key information documents show costs in this form.
CASE — Meridian sells a plain 5-year fixed-rate note with a 2.80% coupon to retail clients at 100. Meridian’s 5-year senior preferred yield on the market is 3.20% (case assumption: swap at 2.50% plus 70 bp). The fair value is 98.18, so the embedded cost is 1.82 points, of which 1.25 points of distribution fee to the network and 0.57 points of issuer margin. The client gives up 40 bp a year compared with buying Meridian’s bonds on the market.
INTERACTIVE LAB — Fair value and embedded cost of a plain retail note
Compute the fair value of a fixed-rate retail note at the issuer’s market yield, split the embedded cost between distributor and issuer, and express it per year.
| Parameter you can move | Range | Default |
|---|---|---|
| Annual coupon | 0.5 to 6 % | 2.8 % |
| Issuer’s market yield, same maturity and seniority | 0.5 to 7 % | 3.2 % |
| Maturity | 1 to 12 years | 5 years |
| Distribution fee paid upfront | 0 to 4 points | 1.25 points |
| Result at default settings | Value |
|---|---|
| Fair value per 100 | 98.18 points |
| Embedded cost (100 minus fair value) | 1.82 points |
| Issuer margin (embedded cost minus distribution fee) | 0.57 points |
| Cost per year as an annuity | 40.0 bp |
Try it. Raise the coupon until the embedded cost equals the distribution fee: from there the issuer funds itself at or above its market rate and the product is a subsidy from the issuer to the network.
PITFALL — “The client pays no fees” is a classic sentence in a structured-product brochure, and it is misleading: the fees are inside the price. Product governance rules exist precisely to make the embedded cost explicit and to test it against what the client receives. A sustainability feature that the client values is part of that “what the client receives”; one that the client cannot value is not.
Every information addressed to clients, including marketing communications, must be “fair, clear and not misleading” and identifiable as marketing (MiFID II Article 24(3); Article 44 of Delegated Regulation 2017/565 adds that information must not emphasise potential benefits without a fair and prominent indication of risks, and must be consistent with the legal documentation). For notes covered by a prospectus, advertisements must be consistent with the prospectus (Prospectus Regulation (EU) 2017/1129, Article 22). For funds, ESMA’s guidelines on marketing communications under the cross-border distribution regulation have applied since February 2022 and contain a specific section on sustainability-related aspects: they must be consistent with the fund’s documentation and proportionate to the weight of sustainability in the strategy.
Beyond financial regulation, the general law on unfair commercial practices (Directive 2005/29/EC, transposed in France in the Code de la consommation, Articles L121-1 and following) applies to business-to-consumer communications, including those of banks. It is enforced in France by the DGCCRF and in civil courts, including by associations, which is how the TotalEnergies case of October 2025 reached the Paris court (section 8).
A claim is any statement, image or name that tells the reader something about the product or the firm. A claims review breaks a document into individual claims and tests each against four questions:
Each claim gets one of three outcomes: approve, amend (with the wording that would pass), or reject. The reviewer logs the outcome in a claims register, which is what a supervisor asks for first in an inspection.
| Route | Who acts | Typical outcome |
|---|---|---|
| Supervisory measure | ECB, ACPR, AMF | Injunction, periodic penalty, fine |
| Administrative sanction | AMF or ACPR sanctions committee | Fine, publication, ban |
| Criminal or quasi-criminal | Prosecutor, DGCCRF | Fine, settlement |
| Civil action | Clients, associations, NGOs | Damages, injunction, publication |
| Securities litigation | Shareholders, bondholders | Damages for misstatement |
Each route has its own standard of proof, timeline and ceiling. A single event typically triggers several routes in sequence: a whistleblower, then press articles, then a supervisor’s inquiry, then a prosecutor, then civil claims. Section 5.6 follows one such sequence.
IN ONE SENTENCE — Greenwashing, for the European Supervisory Authorities, is a sustainability-related statement, declaration, action or communication that does not clearly and fairly reflect the underlying sustainability profile of an entity, a financial product or a financial service, and that may mislead consumers, investors or other market participants.
The ESAs set out this common understanding in their progress reports of May 2023 and confirmed it in their final reports of 4 June 2024. Four features matter on the desk. First, it covers actions and omissions, not only words: hiding an inconvenient fact can be greenwashing. Second, it is not limited to intention: misleading by negligence counts. Third, it can occur at entity, product or service level, and anywhere in the life cycle (design, marketing, delivery, reporting). Fourth, it can be triggered by the bank or transmitted to it: a bank that relays a client’s or a data provider’s misleading claim has made the claim its own.
INTUITION — The supervisor does not ask “is this product green?”, a question with no stable answer. It asks “would a reasonable reader come away with a picture of the product’s sustainability that matches the evidence?”. That is a question about communication, which a bank can control.
The final reports also set four principles that Meridian’s claims guidelines adopt word for word as test headings. Sustainability claims should be accurate (precise, a fair picture), substantiated (backed by clear reasoning, facts and processes), accessible (the evidence available to the target audience), and up to date (material changes disclosed promptly with reasons).
The EBA’s final report on greenwashing (EBA/REP/2024/09) found that alleged greenwashing cases across all sectors rose by 21.2% in 2023, that EU banks accounted for about 8% of alleged cases involving EU companies in 2023, and that the banking area raising most concern was sustainability-linked lending, with weak incentives, low ambition in some targets and conflicts of interest when staff pay is tied to ESG volumes. Entity-level net-zero claims by large banks were the other main source. The map below is Meridian’s own.
| Business line | Typical claim | Where it goes wrong |
|---|---|---|
| Retail and private banking | “Green” savings, sustainable notes, preferences | Generic terms, unmatched preferences |
| Asset management | Fund names, Article 8 or 9 status | Screens not applied as described |
| Corporate lending | Green loan, SLL, transition finance | Weak KPIs, unmonitored proceeds |
| DCM and ECM | Green, SLB, transition bonds arranged | Arranger relays issuer claims |
| Markets | ESG indices, sustainability-linked swaps | Methodology changes not disclosed |
| Group | Net zero, financed emissions targets | Scope gaps, offsetting, selective metrics |
The lecturer’s typology maps onto this table. Green lighting is the group communication that features the solar loans and stays silent on the oil and gas book. Green labelling is the fund or note called “green” without a basis. Green rinsing is the target revised every year so that it is always met. Green hushing, the opposite reflex, is silence adopted to avoid scrutiny; section 3.6 explains why it is not a safe harbour.
EU consumer law: the Empowering Consumers Directive. Directive (EU) 2024/825 amends the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive. Member States had to transpose it by 27 March 2026 and apply it from 27 September 2026. It adds to the blacklist of practices that are unfair in all circumstances: generic environmental claims (“green”, “eco-friendly”, “climate friendly”) without recognised excellent environmental performance; claims that a product has a neutral, reduced or positive greenhouse-gas impact based on offsetting; sustainability labels not based on a certification scheme or set up by public authorities; and claims about future environmental performance (such as “net zero by 2050”) without clear, verifiable commitments, an implementation plan and regular independent verification. It applies to business-to-consumer practices, and therefore to a bank’s retail marketing. France had not adopted its transposition law at 12 November 2026: the bill adapting French law to EU law (the “DDADUE” bill) was adopted by the Senate on 18 February 2026 and was awaiting the National Assembly. French courts may still read existing law in the light of the directive, and Meridian’s guidelines apply the blacklist from 27 September 2026 regardless.
The Green Claims Directive that will not come. The Commission proposed a Green Claims Directive in March 2023, which would have required prior third-party verification of explicit environmental claims. Trilogues stalled in June 2025, and on 4 November 2026 the Commission listed the proposal among those it intends to withdraw in its 2027 work programme. The practical consequence: the EmpCo blacklist and national unfair-practice law remain the consumer-law standard, without an EU pre-verification regime.
French consumer law. A misleading commercial practice is an offence under Article L132-2 of the Code de la consommation. For a natural person it is punishable by two years’ imprisonment and a EUR 300,000 fine; for a legal person the fine is multiplied by five under the Code pénal. The fine may be raised, in proportion to the benefit obtained, to 10% of average annual turnover or to 50% of the expenses of the advertising or practice; the Climate and Resilience Act of 22 August 2021 raised the latter rate to 80% when the misleading practice rests on environmental claims. Section 5.5 uses these ceilings.
Financial regulation of products. SFDR (Regulation (EU) 2019/2088) governs fund and portfolio disclosures; its revision (“SFDR 2.0”, proposed on 20 November 2025) would replace the Article 8 and 9 shorthand with voluntary categories (sustainable, transition, ESG basics) with a 70% threshold and restrict sustainability language for uncategorised products (status in section 8). ESMA’s guidelines on funds’ names using ESG or sustainability-related terms apply to new funds from 21 November 2024 and to existing funds from 21 May 2025; the AMF decided on 16 December 2024 to comply and aligned its DOC-2020-03 doctrine, so that retail funds communicating centrally on extra-financial criteria must meet both. For a note issued by a bank, neither SFDR categories nor the fund-names guidelines apply directly; MiFID II product governance, the marketing rules of section 2.4, the prospectus regime and consumer law do. Meridian’s policy applies the logic of the fund-names guidelines to note names by analogy, because the client does not see the legal difference between a fund and a note.
MiFID II sustainability preferences. Since 2 August 2022 (Delegated Regulation (EU) 2021/1253), an adviser must ask each client for sustainability preferences, defined in three categories: a minimum proportion of taxonomy-aligned investments, a minimum proportion of SFDR sustainable investments, or the consideration of principal adverse impacts. A product can be presented as meeting a preference only if the manufacturer has classified it against one of these categories with evidence. Module C12 covers the suitability file; here the point is that a marketing line “meets your sustainability preferences” is itself a claim, and one of the most dangerous because it is personal advice.
Prudential supervision. The ECB treats climate and environmental risk management as a supervisory requirement for significant banks and has used its enforcement tools. On 10 November 2025 it announced periodic penalty payments of EUR 187,650 on ABANCA for 65 days in 2024 during which the bank had not sufficiently assessed the materiality of its climate-related and environmental risks, a requirement due by 31 March 2024. On 13 February 2026 it announced periodic penalty payments of EUR 7,551,050 on Crédit Agricole S.A. for 75 days of non-compliance in 2024 with a similar materiality-assessment requirement. These are not greenwashing cases, but they show that the supervisor converts climate expectations into binding decisions and then into money. The EBA Guidelines on the management of ESG risks (EBA/GL/2025/01) have applied to large institutions since 11 January 2026 and include, among the risks to be managed, the financial consequences of greenwashing (litigation and reputation).
INTERACTIVE LAB — Periodic penalty payments: what a day of non-compliance costs
Derive the daily amount of the two ECB periodic penalty decisions on climate materiality assessments and size a hypothetical delay at Meridian.
| Parameter you can move | Range | Default |
|---|---|---|
| Days of non-compliance at Meridian (hypothetical) | 0 to 180 days | 60 days |
| Daily amount assumed for Meridian | 0 to 150000 EUR | 40000 EUR |
| Result at default settings | Value |
|---|---|
| Crédit Agricole S.A.: EUR 7,551,050 over 75 days, per day | 100,681 EUR |
| ABANCA: EUR 187,650 over 65 days, per day | 2,887 EUR |
| Ratio of daily amounts | 34.9 x |
| Hypothetical total for Meridian | 2.40 EUR m |
Try it. The ECB sets the daily amount with regard to the materiality of the breach and the bank’s daily turnover, so the size of the bank, not only the gravity of the breach, drives the ratio of about 35 between the two decisions.
Other jurisdictions that a European bank meets. In the United Kingdom, the FCA’s anti-greenwashing rule (ESG 4.3.1R) has applied to all authorised firms since 31 May 2024, with guidance in FG24/3: sustainability references must be consistent with the product’s characteristics and fair, clear and not misleading. In the United States, the SEC used the general anti-fraud provisions of the Investment Advisers Act to sanction ESG misstatements (section 8). In Australia, ASIC took greenwashing cases to the Federal Court under consumer and corporations law.
Three lines of litigation now reach banks. The first is misleading claims in consumer law, the route that succeeded against TotalEnergies in Paris on 23 October 2025, when the court held that the group’s references to its ambition of carbon neutrality by 2050 and to being a major actor of the energy transition, on its consumer website, were misleading. The same reasoning can be run against a bank’s “net zero” advertising. The second is duty of care and duty of vigilance actions about financed emissions: in the Netherlands, Milieudefensie’s action against ING, which asks the court to order the bank to stop financing companies developing new oil and gas projects and to align its emissions with IEA and IPCC pathways, was declared admissible by the Amsterdam District Court in September 2026, with hearings expected in spring 2027. In France, NGOs brought a duty-of-vigilance action against BNP Paribas in 2023. The third is securities and investor claims, where shareholders or bondholders allege that sustainability statements were material misstatements. For a compliance officer, the lesson is that every public sustainability statement of the group is potential evidence in one of these cases, and has to be reviewed with that in mind.
The deck’s AMF doctrine (central, reduced, prospectus-only communication) gives a proportionality rule: the more prominent the sustainability message, the more demanding the evidence. Meridian generalises it to every product with a three-tier rule. A product whose name or headline message is about sustainability (“central”) must have a binding, measurable sustainability commitment in its legal documentation, an external review, and a published report. A product that mentions sustainability as a secondary feature (“reduced”) must keep the mention in proportion and in the body of the document, never in the name. A product with no binding commitment may describe the issuer’s policies only in the legal documentation. Section 5 applies the rule to a note whose sponsors want a central communication on a feature that, as we will compute, is close to immaterial.
Greenhushing, the decision to say less to avoid scrutiny, has spread since 2023. It does not remove legal risk. The ESAs’ definition includes omissions; CSRD requires the bank to report on its material sustainability matters whether it wishes to or not; Pillar 3 ESG templates are mandatory; and silence on a product that is in fact designed around sustainability deprives clients with sustainability preferences of the information they are entitled to. The answer is not less communication but calibrated communication: specific (metric, scope, baseline, date), sourced (link to the evidence), balanced (limits stated next to the benefit) and consistent across channels. Meridian’s rule of thumb for drafters: every sustainability sentence must survive being read aloud in court next to the bank’s Pillar 3 tables.
The lifecycle here is that of a product launch with a sustainability feature, from the idea to the annual review. It follows Meridian’s New Product Approval (NPA) policy, which mirrors the MiFID II product-governance steps of section 2.2 and adds the claims review and the sustainability evidence file.
INTERACTIVE LAB — From idea to annual review: clearing a sustainability-linked note
Follow the documents and controls that a sustainability-linked retail note goes through at Meridian, and who signs each one.
| # | Who | Does what | Deliverable |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Structured products desk (business sponsor) | Writes the product proposal: structure, target clients, volumes, revenues, sustainability feature | NPA request and draft term sheet |
| 2 | Compliance advisory | Triage: classifies the product as new, complex and sustainability-claiming, so full NPA and claims review are required | Triage note and list of required reviews |
| 3 | Sustainable finance team | Checks the KPI, baseline and target against Meridian’s framework and transition plan; commissions the external review | KPI evidence file and second-party opinion engagement |
| 4 | Product governance | Defines target and negative target market, sustainability-preference classification, scenarios and fair value test | Product governance file |
| 5 | Treasury and Finance | Values the note, sets the FTP credit, confirms the IFRS 9 treatment of the step-up and the reporting of the KPI | Valuation memo and accounting opinion |
| 6 | Marketing and claims review | Splits each marketing draft into claims, tests them against the evidence file, approves, amends or rejects | Claims register and marked-up materials |
| 7 | Legal (transactional) | Drafts final terms under the base prospectus, the KPI definition and fallback clauses; checks consistency with marketing | Final terms, KID review, legal sign-off |
| 8 | Conduct and operational risk | Assesses residual conduct risk, records it in the risk register, sets a scenario for the ICAAP | Risk assessment and residual-risk rating |
| 9 | NPA committee (chaired by the deputy CEO) | Decides approve, approve with conditions or reject; sets post-launch conditions | Signed minutes with conditions |
| 10 | Retail network and private bank | Trains advisers, sells only within target market, records sustainability preferences and the match | Training attestations and suitability reports |
| 11 | Compliance monitoring and testing | Tests a sample of sales files and the distribution data three months after launch | Testing report and remediation actions |
| 12 | Sustainability office and external assurance provider | Reports the KPI each year in the sustainability statement and Pillar 3; assurance on the KPI | KPI report and assurance statement |
| 13 | Product governance | Annual review of the product: performance, complaints, KPI status, claims still accurate | Product review and any corrective communication |
Step 1: the proposal. The structured products desk writes the business case: why clients want the product, how much will be sold, what it earns. For a sustainable product the proposal must also state the sustainability feature in one sentence, with its legal anchor (“coupon step-up of 50 bp if KPI 1 exceeds 150 gCO2e/kWh at 31 December 2029”). If the sponsor cannot write that sentence, the product has a marketing idea, not a sustainability feature.
Step 2: triage. Compliance advisory classifies the request. A variant of an existing product with no new risk goes through a light process; anything new, complex or carrying a sustainability claim goes through the full process. The triage note lists the reviewers and sets the timeline (six to ten weeks at Meridian for a full NPA).
Step 3: the sustainability evidence file. The sustainable finance team checks that the KPI is material, measurable and reported; that the baseline is audited or assured; that the target is the one published in the bank’s transition plan or more ambitious; and that the external reviewer has the scope to opine on it. The file contains the KPI methodology (here PCAF-based financed emissions intensity of the power portfolio, see A03 and E07), three years of history and the management projection. This file is what every later claim must point to.
Step 4: product governance. The product governance team writes the target market, the negative target market, scenarios (including a downgrade of Meridian and a missed KPI), and the fair value assessment. It also proposes the sustainability-preference classification: which of the three MiFID categories, if any, the note can be matched to, with the evidence.
Step 5: valuation and accounting. Treasury values the note on Meridian’s funding curve and agrees the internal funding credit to the business. Finance confirms the accounting of the step-up and that the KPI will be reported in the sustainability statement and reconciled with the Pillar 3 alignment metrics.
Step 6: claims review. Marketing produces drafts: product name, brochure, branch poster, web page, adviser script, social media posts. Each is split into claims and tested (section 2.5). Rejected claims go back with a reason and a compliant alternative.
Step 7: legal documentation. Legal drafts the final terms under Meridian’s base prospectus, including the KPI definition, the calculation and reporting dates, the fallback if the KPI cannot be calculated (for instance after a methodology change) and the recalculation policy for acquisitions and disposals. Legal checks that the marketing says nothing the final terms do not support, and that the KID shows the costs computed in step 4.
Step 8: residual risk. Conduct and operational risk rate the residual risk after controls, record it in the risk register, and decide whether a scenario (for instance “mis-selling of a sustainability-linked note with remediation”) enters the ICAAP stress tests.
Step 9: the committee. The NPA committee, chaired at Meridian by the deputy chief executive, with the heads of the business, Compliance, Legal, Risk, Finance and the sustainability office, decides. Typical conditions: amended name, cap on volumes in the first quarter, mandatory adviser training, a post-launch review at three months.
Steps 10 to 13: after launch. Distribution must stay inside the target market; monitoring and testing checks it; the KPI is reported yearly with assurance; product governance reviews the product annually, including whether claims are still accurate. If the KPI is missed, the step-up is paid, and the communication about the miss is itself a claim that Compliance reviews: the up-to-date principle requires prompt disclosure with reasons.
PITFALL — The most common failure in enforcement files is not at step 6 but between steps 9 and 13: the product was approved with conditions that nobody tracked. The DWS order in section 5.6 is the textbook case of a policy that existed on paper and was not applied in practice.
The case has two halves. In the first (5.1 to 5.6) Meridian’s compliance team pre-clears a sustainability-linked note that the bank wants to sell to its own retail and private-banking clients. In the second (5.7) the same team runs a post-mortem of a real enforcement case, DWS, to test whether Meridian’s controls would have caught what failed there. Section 5.8 records the committee decision and 5.9 recaps the figures. All Meridian data are case assumptions; all facts about DWS come from the regulators’ published decisions or, where stated, from press reports of the authority’s statement.
Question. What exactly is the business asking Compliance to clear?
Data. On 2 November 2026 the structured products desk submits an NPA request for a note to be sold from January 2027. The draft term sheet reads:
| Term | Draft | Comment |
|---|---|---|
| Issuer and ranking | Meridian Bank, senior preferred | Issued under the base prospectus |
| Size and price | EUR 150m, issued at 100 | Retail and private bank, France |
| Denomination | EUR 1,000 | Retail minimum |
| Maturity | 7 years, January 2034 | Capital repaid at 100 |
| Coupon | 3.00% a year, fixed | Annual |
| Step-up | +50 bp on coupons 5 to 7 | If KPI is missed |
| KPI | Power-portfolio financed emissions intensity | gCO2e/kWh, PCAF basis |
| Baseline and target | 230 (2024), 150 at end-2029 | Target already in transition plan |
| Distribution fee | 1.00 point upfront | Paid to the network |
| Draft name | “Meridian Green Climate Note” | Under review |
The KPI is the weighted average emissions intensity of the electricity generation of the borrowers in Meridian’s power-sector loan book, computed with the PCAF method and published in the sustainability statement and the Pillar 3 alignment-metrics template. The observation date is 31 December 2029; the figure is published in March 2030 and the step-up applies from the next interest period, so to coupons 5, 6 and 7 (paid in January 2032, 2033 and 2034). Meridian’s 7-year senior preferred market yield is 3.30% (case assumption: swap at 2.50% plus 80 bp).
Reading. This is a sustainability-linked bond in retail format, with the bank as issuer: the bank promises to pay more if it misses its own climate target. The mechanics are those of module C02 (Castellan Cement’s SLB), with two differences that matter for Compliance. The buyers are consumers, so consumer law and the full MiFID II retail protections apply. And the KPI belongs to the bank, so every claim about it is also a claim about the bank’s own transition plan.
Question. A sustainability-linked product is credible only if the target is ambitious relative to what would happen anyway. What is the probability that Meridian misses the target?
Data. The sustainability office’s projection for end-2029, built bottom-up from clients’ announced closures of coal and gas plants and new renewable capacity, is 138 gCO2e/kWh. The uncertainty around it, from timing of client capex, data revisions (PCAF data quality scores of 3 to 4 for a third of the book) and portfolio changes, is summarised by a standard deviation of 16 gCO2e/kWh. We treat the 2029 outcome as normally distributed around the projection.
Calculation. The probability of missing is the probability that the outcome exceeds the target :
FORMULA
is the probability that the KPI is above target at the observation date; the standard normal cumulative distribution function; the target (150); the management projection (138); the standard deviation of the outcome (16).
With , . The target requires a reduction of 34.8% from the 2024 baseline; the plan already delivers 40.0%.
INTERACTIVE LAB — How likely is Meridian to miss its own target?
Compute the probability of missing the KPI target from the management projection and its uncertainty, and compare the target with the reduction already in the plan.
| Parameter you can move | Range | Default |
|---|---|---|
| Baseline 2024 | 150 to 400 gCO2e/kWh | 230 gCO2e/kWh |
| Management projection for 2029 | 80 to 250 gCO2e/kWh | 138 gCO2e/kWh |
| Standard deviation of the 2029 outcome | 2 to 50 gCO2e/kWh | 16 gCO2e/kWh |
| Target for 2029 | 80 to 250 gCO2e/kWh | 150 gCO2e/kWh |
| Result at default settings | Value |
|---|---|
| Probability of missing the target | 22.66 % |
| Headroom in standard deviations | 0.750 |
| Reduction required by the target | 34.8 % |
| Reduction already in the plan | 40.0 % |
Try it. Set the target at the projection (138): the miss becomes a coin toss. Set it at 135, slightly beyond the plan, and the probability of paying the step-up rises to about 57%.
Result. A 22.66% probability of missing; a target that asks for less (34.8%) than the plan already delivers (40.0%).
Reading. The ICMA Sustainability-Linked Bond Principles ask for targets that go beyond a business-as-usual trajectory and are consistent with the issuer’s overall strategy (see C02). Here the target is consistent with the strategy because it is the strategy, published in Meridian’s transition plan in 2025. That is not a reason to block the product: a bank may legitimately put money behind a published target. It is a reason to forbid any claim that the note “raises Meridian’s ambition” or “accelerates” its transition, and to require the documentation to say plainly that the target is the one already published and that the management projection meets it. The miss probability is mostly noise in the data, not a measure of effort.
PITFALL — Do not read a low probability of missing as proof of a good target, or a high one as proof of a bad one. A target set at 135 would have a 57% probability of being missed and might look “ambitious”; it could equally be a target the bank does not intend to meet because the step-up is cheap. Stage 2 shows how cheap it is.
Question. The client accepts a coupon of 3.00% where Meridian’s market yield is 3.30%. How much of that 30 bp does the step-up give back?
Data. Term sheet of 5.1; from stage 1 (rounded); discount rate 3.30%.
Calculation. The note is a fixed-rate bond plus a contingent strip of three coupons of 50 bp:
FORMULA
is the base coupon (3.00 points); Meridian’s market yield (3.30%); the step-up (0.50 points); the probability of missing (22.7%); the coupon year. We use the probability as if it were risk-neutral, which is reasonable because the KPI outcome is largely unrelated to market risk factors.
The fixed part is worth 98.15. Discounting the three 50 bp coupons of years 5 to 7 at 3.30%, the step-up strip, if certain, would be worth 1.235 points; weighted by 22.7%, it is worth 0.28 points. Fair value is 98.43; the embedded cost is 1.57 points, of which 1.00 point of distribution fee and 0.57 points of issuer margin.
INTERACTIVE LAB — Fair value of the Meridian Climate Note and the value of its step-up
Split the fair value of a sustainability-linked retail note into its fixed part and the expected step-up, and see how little the sustainability feature moves the price.
| Parameter you can move | Range | Default |
|---|---|---|
| Issue size | 50 to 500 EUR m | 150 EUR m |
| Base coupon | 1 to 5 % | 3.0 % |
| Step-up if KPI missed | 0 to 150 bp | 50 bp |
| Probability of missing the KPI | 0 to 100 % | 22.7 % |
| Meridian’s 7-year market yield | 1 to 6 % | 3.3 % |
| Distribution fee | 0 to 3 points | 1.0 points |
| Result at default settings | Value |
|---|---|
| Fair value of the fixed part | 98.15 points |
| Step-up strip if certain | 1.235 points |
| Expected value of the step-up | 0.28 points |
| Fair value of the note | 98.43 points |
| Embedded cost | 1.57 points |
| Issuer margin | 0.57 points |
| Step-up as a running coupon equivalent | 4.6 bp a year |
| Coupon given up against the market yield | 30 bp a year |
| Embedded cost as a running equivalent | 25.4 bp a year |
| Present cost to Meridian if the KPI is missed | 1.85 EUR m |
| Expected present cost to Meridian | 0.42 EUR m |
Try it. Set the probability to 100%: even a certain step-up leaves the note below par, because three coupons of 50 bp in years 5 to 7 cannot repay a 30 bp shortfall over seven years.
Result. The step-up is worth 0.28 points, or 4.6 bp a year as a running coupon. The client gives up 30 bp a year against Meridian’s market yield and gets back 4.6 bp through the sustainability feature. For Meridian, missing the target would cost EUR 1.85m in present value; the expected cost is EUR 0.42m.
Reading. Three conclusions for the compliance file. First, the sustainability feature is a minor part of the client’s economics; the note is above all a 7-year Meridian credit exposure at a below-market coupon. The AMF proportionality logic (section 3.5) therefore points to a reduced communication, not a central one. Second, the incentive on Meridian is immaterial: EUR 1.85m at worst, against net banking income of EUR 6.2bn (A02). Nobody can claim that this note will change the bank’s lending decisions, which is the EBA’s main criticism of sustainability-linked products with weak incentives. Third, the structure contains a perverse optic: the client is better off if Meridian misses its climate target. That is inherent to every step-up instrument; it must be said plainly to retail clients, who may otherwise believe they are rewarded for climate progress.
Question. Who should buy the note, and can it be matched to clients’ sustainability preferences?
Target market (draft and Compliance’s amendments).
| Dimension | Business draft | After review |
|---|---|---|
| Client type | Retail and private bank | Unchanged |
| Knowledge | Basic | Informed: credit risk of a single bank, bail-in |
| Ability to bear loss | Capital protected | Capital at risk of issuer default and bail-in |
| Horizon | 7 years | 7 years; early exit at market price only |
| Objectives | “Invest sustainably” | Fixed income with a sustainability-linked feature |
| Negative market | None | Clients needing liquidity; preference (a) or (b) only |
The “capital protected” wording had to go. A senior preferred note is repaid at 100 only if Meridian is solvent; under the bank resolution regime (BRRD) it can be written down or converted in resolution. For retail clients this is the main risk of the product, and a sustainability narrative must not crowd it out.
Sustainability preferences. The draft adviser script said the note “meets all sustainability preferences”. Compliance’s analysis:
The adviser script therefore becomes: “This note can match a sustainability preference expressed as consideration of greenhouse-gas emissions. It does not invest in taxonomy-aligned activities and is not a sustainable investment within the meaning of SFDR.” Monitoring and testing will check, three months after launch, that no sale was matched to a category (a) or (b) preference.
Fair value. The embedded cost of 1.57 points (25.4 bp a year as a running equivalent, stage 2 block) is in the range Meridian accepts for plain 7-year notes; the fair value test passes as a fixed-income product. It would not pass as a “sustainability product” at a premium: the sustainability feature returns 4.6 bp a year of the 30 bp given up, and it would be misleading to justify the coupon gap by the sustainability benefit. Product governance records this sentence in the file, because it is the answer to the question a supervisor would ask first.
Question. Which of the claims in the marketing package can go out?
Data. Compliance splits the brochure, poster, web page and adviser script into ten distinct claims. Each is scored for impact (1 to 5: how much the claim would drive a retail client’s decision and how severe the harm if wrong) and likelihood of misleading (1 to 5: how far the evidence file falls short of what a reader would understand). Meridian’s rule: score of 16 or more, reject; 8 to 15, amend; below 8, approve.
| Claim | Text (abridged) | Impact | Likelihood | Reason |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| C1 | Name: “Meridian Green Climate Note” | 5 | 5 | Generic “green” without basis; proceeds not earmarked |
| C2 | “Your money finances the energy transition” | 5 | 4 | General corporate purposes |
| C3 | “Meridian will cut power-sector intensity by 35% by 2029” | 4 | 2 | Needs baseline, metric, scope |
| C4 | “Your coupon rises if Meridian misses its target” | 3 | 2 | Accurate; add the perverse optic |
| C5 | “Aligned with the Paris Agreement” | 5 | 4 | No scenario disclosed; litigated claim |
| C6 | “An independent opinion confirms the framework” | 3 | 3 | Name the reviewer, scope, date |
| C7 | “Carbon-neutral issuance: emissions offset” | 5 | 5 | Offsetting-based claim, EmpCo blacklist |
| C8 | “Meets your sustainability preferences” | 4 | 3 | Category (c) only |
| C9 | Forest and wind-turbine imagery on cover | 3 | 4 | Overall impression exceeds feature |
| C10 | “Capital repaid at maturity, subject to issuer risk” | 2 | 1 | Accurate, keep |
INTERACTIVE LAB — Claims review: scoring the ten claims of the marketing package
Score each claim as impact times likelihood, apply the reject and amend thresholds, and see how the decision changes with the bank’s risk appetite.
| Parameter you can move | Range | Default |
|---|---|---|
| Reject threshold (score at or above) | 6 to 25 score | 16 score |
| Amend threshold (score at or above) | 2 to 20 score | 8 score |
| Result at default settings | Value |
|---|---|
| Claims rejected | 4 claims |
| Claims to amend | 4 claims |
| Claims approved as drafted | 2 claims |
| Average score | 13.9 score |
| Share of claims cleared as drafted | 20 % |
Try it. Raise the reject threshold to 21: only the name and the carbon-neutral claim are rejected, and the ‘Paris-aligned’ claim slips into ‘amend’. Ask yourself whether you could defend that choice after the TotalEnergies judgment.
Result. Four claims rejected (C1, C2, C5, C7), four amended (C3, C6, C8, C9), two approved (C4 with an added sentence, C10). Only 20% of the claims could go out as drafted; the average score was 13.9.
Reading claim by claim, the four rejections.
The four amendments. C3 becomes “Meridian’s published target is to reduce the emissions intensity of its power-generation loan book from 230 gCO2e/kWh in 2024 to 150 by end-2029, as defined in the final terms; the bank’s current projection meets this target.” C6 names the second-party opinion provider, the date and the scope, and links to it. C8 becomes the category (c) sentence of stage 3. C9 replaces the forest with a neutral visual; the impression created by imagery is part of the claim, as the ESAs’ work on misleading visuals underlines.
The two approvals. C4 is accurate, but Compliance adds: “You receive a higher coupon if Meridian does not reach its target; the step-up compensates you, it does not fund climate action.” C10 stays.
Question. If the note were launched as drafted and later found misleading, what would Meridian lose, and how much does the claims review save in expectation?
Data (case assumptions). Advertising spend on the campaign EUR 1.2m. In a greenwashing event: a consumer-law fine at the base ceiling for a legal person, EUR 1.5m (five times EUR 300,000), as the 80% advertising-spend ceiling would be lower; an AMF sanction of EUR 5m for misleading marketing of a financial instrument; a remediation offer to buy back the notes at par from the 40% of holders who accept, when the market price is 96; legal and investigation costs of EUR 3m; lost franchise revenue of EUR 4m. Probability of such an event over the life of the note: 10% for the package as drafted, 3% after the claims review.
Calculation.
FORMULA
is the loss given a greenwashing event; the consumer-law fine; the AMF sanction; the issue size; the take-up of the buy-back offer; the market price of the note at the time; legal and investigation costs; lost revenue; the probability of an event over the life of the product; the expected loss.
Remediation costs EUR 150m × 40% × 4% = EUR 2.4m. The loss given an event is EUR 15.9m. Expected loss: EUR 1.59m as drafted, EUR 0.477m after review, a saving of EUR 1.113m. The theoretical turnover-based ceiling of the consumer-law fine (10% of Meridian’s EUR 6.2bn net banking income) would be EUR 620m; it is a ceiling proportionate to the benefit obtained, not a forecast, but it explains why legal teams take consumer-law exposure seriously.
INTERACTIVE LAB — Expected cost of a greenwashing event on the note
Build the loss given a greenwashing event from fines, remediation, legal costs and lost revenue, and compare the expected loss before and after the claims review.
| Parameter you can move | Range | Default |
|---|---|---|
| Issue size | 50 to 500 EUR m | 150 EUR m |
| Advertising spend on the campaign | 0 to 10 EUR m | 1.2 EUR m |
| AMF sanction assumed | 0 to 50 EUR m | 5 EUR m |
| Take-up of the buy-back offer | 0 to 100 % | 40 % |
| Market price of the note at the time | 80 to 100 points | 96 points |
| Legal and investigation costs | 0 to 20 EUR m | 3 EUR m |
| Lost franchise revenue | 0 to 30 EUR m | 4 EUR m |
| Probability of an event, as drafted | 0 to 30 % | 10 % |
| Probability of an event, after review | 0 to 30 % | 3 % |
| Meridian net banking income | 1000 to 30000 EUR m | 6200 EUR m |
| Result at default settings | Value |
|---|---|
| Consumer-law fine assumed (max of EUR 1.5m and 80% of ad spend) | 1.50 EUR m |
| 80% advertising-spend ceiling | 0.96 EUR m |
| 10% turnover ceiling (theoretical) | 620 EUR m |
| Remediation (buy-back at par) | 2.40 EUR m |
| Loss given an event | 15.90 EUR m |
| Expected loss as drafted | 1.590 EUR m |
| Expected loss after review | 0.477 EUR m |
| Expected saving from the review | 1.113 EUR m |
Try it. Set the market price at 88, as after a downgrade of Meridian: remediation, not the fine, becomes the largest item. In conduct cases the compensation of clients usually dwarfs the penalty.
Result. Loss given an event EUR 15.9m; expected loss EUR 1.59m as drafted, EUR 0.477m after review; expected saving EUR 1.113m. The consumer-law fine is the smallest item; the AMF sanction, lost revenue and legal costs dominate, with the cost of making clients whole close behind.
Reading. The expected saving of the review (EUR 1.1m) is more than twice the expected cost to Meridian of the step-up itself (EUR 0.42m, stage 2). In other words, the conduct risk created by the way the product is described is larger than the economic commitment the product contains. That ratio is the quantitative signature of greenwashing risk, and it reappears in the RAROC of section 6. The probabilities are judgements, not statistics: no data set gives the frequency of enforcement against bank notes. The committee should see them as an ordering of magnitudes and test the conclusion against a range (the chart does exactly that).
Where the probabilities come from. Compliance builds the two figures from observable drivers rather than from a guess. Exposure: a retail campaign in branches and online, read by tens of thousands of consumers, is far more visible to the DGCCRF, consumer associations and NGOs than a professional term sheet. Blacklist hits: the drafted package contained two claims (C1 and C7) that are unfair in all circumstances under EmpCo, and one (C5) that a French court has already held misleading in a comparable context; any of them gives a claimant an easy case. Evidence gaps: three claims had no document in the evidence file. After the review, none of the claims is on the blacklist, every remaining claim points to a dated document, and the residual risk comes from execution (an adviser who improvises, a social-media post that was not reviewed, a KPI restatement badly communicated). The drop from 10% to 3% is the committee’s judgement of that change; a sensitivity at 5% after review is shown to the committee alongside the base case.
Who pays inside the bank. If the event happens, the loss is booked as an operational loss of the retail business line that sold the note, not of Compliance. That allocation matters for behaviour: the business line that pushed for the “green” name would bear the cost, which is why Meridian’s product committee asks the business head, not the compliance officer, to sign the final wording.
Question. What failed at DWS, and would Meridian’s controls have caught it?
Data: the facts as found by the authorities.
| Date | Authority and act | Content |
|---|---|---|
| Aug 2018 to late 2021 | Period covered by the SEC order | Gap between ESG statements and practice |
| 2020 to 2023 | Period covered by the German proceedings (as reported) | ESG marketing beyond implementation |
| 25 Sep 2023 | SEC order against DWS Investment Management Americas | USD 19m penalty for ESG misstatements |
| 25 Sep 2023 | Separate SEC order, same entity | USD 6m for anti-money-laundering failures |
| 1 to 2 Apr 2025 | Frankfurt Public Prosecutor’s Office | EUR 25m fine on DWS, final on 1 April, announced 2 April |
The SEC found that from August 2018 until late 2021 DWS’s US investment adviser marketed itself as a leader in ESG that followed specific policies for integrating ESG factors into research and investment decisions, describing ESG as part of its “DNA”, while it failed adequately to implement certain provisions of its global ESG integration policy, and that it failed to adopt and implement policies and procedures reasonably designed to ensure that its public statements about its ESG integrated products were accurate. The order relied on the anti-fraud provisions of the Investment Advisers Act (sections 206(2) and 206(4) and rules 206(4)-7 and 206(4)-8); DWS neither admitted nor denied the findings, and accepted a cease-and-desist order and a censure. The German case was investigated by the Frankfurt prosecutor with the Federal Criminal Police Office, starting from a suspicion of capital investment fraud; according to the press reports of the prosecutor’s statement, the fine sanctioned breaches of the German Capital Investment Code (KAGB), its amount took account of the turnover of the group, proceedings against the two DWS legal entities were closed, and the investigation of individuals continued at the time. The case had become public in 2021, when the group’s former head of sustainability alleged that its ESG claims did not reflect practice.
Calculation: root causes mapped to controls. We classify each finding by the joint of the lifecycle (section 4) where it failed, and check Meridian’s control at that joint.
| Finding | Joint that failed | Meridian control | Would it catch it? |
|---|---|---|---|
| Entity claims (“leader”, “DNA”) | Claims review of group statements | Group claims register | Only if group comms are in scope |
| Policy not applied in practice | Post-launch monitoring | Annual testing of ESG process | Yes, if sample is large enough |
| No procedure for accuracy of statements | Claims review | Claims guidelines and register | Yes |
| Transformation announced as done | Up-to-date principle | Annual product review | Partly |
| Whistleblower concerns | Speak-up channel | Whistleblowing under EU Directive 2019/1937 | Depends on escalation |
Result. Two of the five failure points are covered at Meridian with confidence; two partly; one depends on culture more than on procedure. The weakest is the first: in many banks, group communications (annual report, chief executive’s interviews, advertising campaigns) are reviewed by the communications department and Legal, not by the compliance team that reviews product claims. That is where DWS’s most damaging statements were made.
Reading. The DWS case is about implementation, not about the definition of ESG. The authorities did not argue that DWS’s ESG policy was weak; they found that the firm said it applied a policy that it did not apply consistently. The other enforcement cases of section 8 share that pattern: Goldman Sachs Asset Management (USD 4m, SEC, 22 November 2022) for not consistently following its own ESG research procedures, with questionnaires often completed after securities were selected; BNY Mellon Investment Adviser (USD 1.5m, SEC, 23 May 2022) for implying that all investments in certain funds had undergone an ESG quality review when many had not; Vanguard Investments Australia (AUD 12.9m, Federal Court on ASIC’s action, 25 September 2024) for a fund presented as screening out fossil-fuel issuers when about 74% of the securities by market value had not been screened. For a bank, the lesson is that monitoring and testing, the unglamorous step 11 of the lifecycle, is the control that would have prevented most of these cases. The timeline carries a second lesson. The concerns became public in 2021; the US order came about two years later and the German fine three and a half years later, with the investigation of individuals still running then. Through that period the firm managed a live controversy, document holds, two regulators on two continents and the market’s reaction, while continuing to sell products. A bank cannot assume that a claim problem will be closed in the year it is found, and its provisioning, disclosure and communication have to hold over several years. Meridian’s post-mortem produces three actions: bring group communications into the claims register; size the annual testing sample by risk; and report speak-up cases on sustainability claims to the board’s risk committee.
WHY IT MATTERS ON THE DESK — On the desk, a post-mortem is not an academic exercise: supervisors ask banks to show that they have learnt from peers’ enforcement cases, and the ECB’s and EBA’s work on greenwashing explicitly encourages benchmarking. A compliance officer who can say “here is what failed at DWS, here is our control at that joint, here is the test result” is giving the supervisor exactly what it wants.
The NPA committee of 7 December 2026 approves the note with conditions:
The committee also asked the sustainability office whether a more demanding target (135) should be used. It declined: the transition plan is a board document and a product cannot quietly move it. Finally, the committee approved in advance the communication plan for the two possible outcomes in March 2030. If the target is met, the bank may say so in factual terms, citing the assured figure, but may not present the note as having contributed to the result. If the target is missed, the bank must announce the step-up in the same channels used to sell the note, explain the reasons for the miss and state the corrective measures in its transition plan; a quiet notice in the final-terms annex would breach the up-to-date principle and invite exactly the kind of criticism the review was meant to prevent. The record of the discussion on the target is itself a control: it shows the committee understood the ambition issue and chose disclosure over embellishment.
| Item | Value | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Fair value of a plain 5-year note (section 2) | 98.18 | Block e10-note-fair-value |
| Probability of missing the KPI | 22.66% | Stage 1 |
| Reduction required by the target vs in the plan | 34.8% vs 40.0% | Stage 1 |
| Fixed part of the Climate Note | 98.15 | Stage 2 |
| Value of the step-up | 0.28 points, 4.6 bp a year | Stage 2 |
| Fair value and embedded cost | 98.43 and 1.57 points (25.4 bp a year) | Stage 2 |
| Cost to Meridian if missed / expected | EUR 1.85m / EUR 0.42m | Stage 2 |
| Claims rejected, amended, approved | 4, 4, 2 | Stage 4 |
| Loss given a greenwashing event | EUR 15.9m | Stage 5 |
| Expected loss before and after review | EUR 1.59m and EUR 0.477m | Stage 5 |
| Expected saving from the review | EUR 1.113m | Stage 5 |
| DWS fines (SEC ESG; Frankfurt) | USD 19m; EUR 25m | Stage 6, published decisions |
| RAROC of the launch, no conduct risk / after review / as drafted | 82.8% / 27.9% / -100.3% | Section 6 |
The note is a liability of Meridian and a fee-earning product for its network, so the bank-side economics are those of a fee business with conduct risk attached, not of a loan. We adapt the standard grid accordingly.
Credit risk. None for Meridian: the note is Meridian’s own debt. The credit risk sits with the buyers, which is exactly why the retail target market must understand it.
Operational risk, Pillar 1. Since 1 January 2025, CRR3 has replaced the previous operational-risk approaches with a single standardised approach. The capital requirement equals the business indicator component (BIC): the business indicator (BI), a three-year average of interest, services and financial components of income, multiplied by marginal coefficients of 12% up to EUR 1bn, 15% between EUR 1bn and EUR 30bn, and 18% above. Basel allows an internal loss multiplier (ILM) that raises capital for banks with a history of large losses; the EU set the ILM at 1 for all banks. Meridian’s BI is in the 15% bucket, so each additional euro of revenue adds 15 cents of operational-risk capital requirement, or EUR 1.875 of RWA (12.5 × 0.15).
FORMULA
is the operational-risk own funds requirement; the part of the business indicator in bucket ; the marginal coefficient of the bucket (12%, 15%, 18%); the operational-risk exposure amount.
PITFALL — Because the EU set the ILM at 1, a bank’s own conduct losses no longer raise its Pillar 1 operational-risk capital. A large greenwashing settlement does not mechanically cost capital. It reaches capital through Pillar 2: the supervisor’s SREP assessment of operational and conduct risk, the bank’s ICAAP scenarios, and the P2R add-on. Students who say “greenwashing costs nothing in capital” have read only Pillar 1.
Revenues. The group’s revenue is the embedded margin of stage 2: 1.57 points on EUR 150m, EUR 2.35m in present value, shared between the network (distribution fee) and Treasury (issuer margin). Expressed as an annuity over seven years at 3.30%, it is EUR 0.382m a year.
Costs. Meridian’s 60% cost-income ratio on fee revenues gives EUR 0.229m. The sustainability feature adds specific one-off costs of EUR 0.35m (second-party opinion, extra assurance on the KPI, the claims review and adviser training), or EUR 0.05m a year over seven years. Total EUR 0.279m.
Expected conduct loss. From stage 5: EUR 15.9m loss given an event times the life-time probability, spread over seven years. EUR 0.068m a year after the review, EUR 0.227m as drafted.
Capital. Operational-risk RWA from the BIC at 15%: EUR 0.716m; allocated capital at 13%: EUR 0.093m.
INTERACTIVE LAB — RAROC of the note launch, with and without conduct risk
Compute the RAROC of the Meridian Climate Note as a fee business, with operational-risk capital from the CRR3 BIC, and show how the expected cost of greenwashing moves it across the hurdle.
| Parameter you can move | Range | Default |
|---|---|---|
| Issue size | 50 to 500 EUR m | 150 EUR m |
| Base coupon | 1 to 5 % | 3.0 % |
| Step-up | 0 to 150 bp | 50 bp |
| Probability of missing the KPI | 0 to 100 % | 22.7 % |
| Meridian’s 7-year market yield | 1 to 6 % | 3.3 % |
| Cost-income ratio on fee revenues | 30 to 90 % | 60 % |
| One-off cost of the sustainability feature | 0 to 2 EUR m | 0.35 EUR m |
| Marginal BIC coefficient | 12 / 15 / 18 | 15 % |
| Loss given a greenwashing event | 0 to 60 EUR m | 15.9 EUR m |
| Probability of an event, after review | 0 to 30 % | 3 % |
| Probability of an event, as drafted | 0 to 30 % | 10 % |
| Result at default settings | Value |
|---|---|
| Embedded margin, present value | 2.352 EUR m |
| Revenue per year (annuity equivalent) | 0.382 EUR m |
| Operating costs per year, incl. one-off spread | 0.279 EUR m |
| Expected conduct loss per year, after review | 0.068 EUR m |
| Expected conduct loss per year, as drafted | 0.227 EUR m |
| Operational-risk RWA | 0.716 EUR m |
| Allocated capital (13% of RWA) | 0.093 EUR m |
| RAROC without conduct risk | 82.8 % |
| RAROC after review | 27.9 % |
| RAROC as drafted | -100.3 % |
| Event probability at which RAROC equals the 12% hurdle | 3.87 % |
Try it. Move the probability after review from 3% to 4%: RAROC falls below the 12% hurdle (break-even is about 3.9%). The launch is viable only if the review really works.
| Line (EUR m a year) | No conduct risk | After review | As drafted |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | 0.382 | 0.382 | 0.382 |
| Operating costs | -0.279 | -0.279 | -0.279 |
| Expected conduct loss | 0 | -0.068 | -0.227 |
| Allocated capital | 0.093 | 0.093 | 0.093 |
| RAROC after tax | 82.8% | 27.9% | -100.3% |
Reading. Three points. First, the RAROC without conduct risk (82.8%) is high because a fee business consumes little capital; as E03 explains, it is not comparable with a lending RAROC and must not be read as “this product is seven times better than a loan”. Second, conduct risk is the dominant risk of the product: a 3% life-time probability of an event cuts the RAROC from 82.8% to 27.9%, and the as-drafted package (10%) destroys value outright. The break-even probability is 3.87%: the product clears the 12% hurdle only if the review keeps the probability of a greenwashing event below about 4% over seven years. Third, the sustainability feature itself changes the RAROC very little through its direct costs (EUR 0.05m a year) and its expected step-up (already in the fair value, worth 4.6 bp a year to the client). What it changes is the conduct-risk profile. That is the general lesson for sustainable products in retail: their economics are driven less by the sustainability mechanism than by the claims made about it.
Treasury treats the note as 7-year senior unsecured funding. Meridian’s FTP credit for 7-year term funding is based on its market curve; the business is credited with the difference between the FTP rate and the note’s all-in cost (coupon, expected step-up and distribution fee amortised). That difference is the issuer margin of stage 2 (0.57 points), which Treasury and the network share according to internal rules. Under the LCR, own debt securities create an outflow only when they fall due within 30 days, so the note is neutral for the LCR until its final month; under the NSFR, liabilities with residual maturity above one year carry a 100% available stable funding factor, so the note improves the NSFR for its first six years. Two liquidity points are specific to retail notes: the market-making commitment (Meridian undertakes to quote a buy-back price in normal market conditions, which shortens the effective funding tenor if clients sell back) and the remediation scenario of stage 5, in which 40% of the issue is bought back at par at once. Treasury includes the latter in its liquidity stress scenarios as a conduct-driven outflow.
The note in Meridian’s books. Under IFRS 9 the note is a financial liability at amortised cost. The step-up depends on a non-financial variable specific to a party to the contract (Meridian’s own emissions intensity), so it does not meet the IFRS 9 definition of a derivative and is not separated as an embedded derivative. Meridian estimates the expected cash flows, including its best estimate of the step-up, in the effective interest rate; if the estimate changes, it recalculates the carrying amount at the original effective interest rate and books the difference in profit or loss (the catch-up adjustment of IFRS 9 B5.4.6). The ESG-linked features amendments to IFRS 9 and IFRS 7 published by the IASB in May 2024, effective from 1 January 2026, mainly concern the holder’s classification test and add disclosures on contingent features; they confirm the direction of travel: ESG-linked cash flows must be explained, not hidden.
Conduct risk in the accounts. Under IAS 37, Meridian recognises a provision for a fine, a settlement or a remediation programme when an outflow is probable and can be estimated reliably, and discloses a contingent liability when it is only possible. In a greenwashing investigation the sequence is typically: contingent liability disclosed once the investigation is known, provision when a settlement becomes probable, utilisation when paid. Legal privilege and the risk of prejudicing the bank’s defence are the classic reasons for limited disclosure, and auditors challenge them.
Green Asset Ratio and BTAR. None: the GAR measures assets, and this is a liability whose proceeds are not earmarked. Any claim that the note “increases Meridian’s green assets” would be false (claim C2 failed for that reason).
Financed emissions and Pillar 3. The KPI is a PCAF-based financed-emissions intensity (see A03, E07). It must be identical to the power-sector figure in Meridian’s sustainability statement (ESRS E1, transition plan and targets) and consistent with the Pillar 3 ESG template on alignment metrics, which reports sector intensities against a reference scenario. A product that pays a coupon on a metric makes that metric legally binding as well as reportable: any restatement of the baseline (new PCAF data, a methodology change) must follow the recalculation policy in the final terms, and Compliance checks that a restatement is disclosed to noteholders, not only in the next sustainability statement.
Own claims and assurance. Meridian’s sustainability statement is subject to limited assurance under CSRD. The statement will mention the note as part of the bank’s transition plan implementation. That sentence is a group claim: it goes through the claims register (DWS lesson), and it must say what the note is (a funding instrument with a step-up) and not what it is not (a source of green finance).
Operational-risk disclosures. Pillar 3 operational-risk disclosures include the bank’s losses and its approach. A greenwashing settlement would appear in the loss data, in the risk report’s legal proceedings section and, if material, in the note on provisions.
| Risk | Control | Owner |
|---|---|---|
| Generic or blacklisted claim (green, carbon-neutral) | Claims review against EmpCo list | Marketing compliance |
| Claim without evidence | Evidence file, claims register | Sustainable finance, Compliance |
| Product name implies use of proceeds | Naming policy by analogy with ESMA | Product governance |
| Weak or business-as-usual KPI target | Ambition test, disclosure of projection | Sustainability office |
| Mis-selling against sustainability preferences | Classification, adviser script, testing | Product governance, Monitoring |
| Policy stated but not applied | Annual testing, sample sized by risk | Monitoring and testing |
| Group claims outside review | Group statements in claims register | Communications, Compliance |
| KPI restatement badly disclosed | Recalculation clause, noteholder notice | Legal, Finance |
| Stale claims after a miss or a change | Annual product review, up-to-date rule | Product governance |
| Whistleblower concern ignored | Speak-up channel, board reporting | Compliance, board risk committee |
| Litigation on entity-level net zero | Legal review of transition plan wording | Legal, sustainability office |
| Greenhushing of material facts | CSRD and Pillar 3 completeness check | Finance |
Red-flag checklist for a compliance reviewer. Stop and escalate when one of these appears:
WHY IT MATTERS ON THE DESK — Each red flag on this list corresponds to a finding in a published decision or report: generic claims and offsetting to the EmpCo blacklist; outcome claims to the ESAs’ use-of-proceeds examples; “applied systematically” to the SEC orders against DWS, GSAM and BNY Mellon and to ASIC’s Vanguard case; Paris claims to the TotalEnergies judgment; weak targets to the EBA’s criticism of sustainability-linked lending. A reviewer who can name the source of each flag wins the argument with the business.
Supervisory picture (dated).
Enforcement cases (each from the authority’s decision or release).
| Date | Authority | Firm | Amount |
|---|---|---|---|
| 23 May 2022 | SEC | BNY Mellon Investment Adviser | USD 1.5m |
| 22 Nov 2022 | SEC | Goldman Sachs Asset Management | USD 4m |
| 25 Sep 2023 | SEC | DWS Investment Management Americas | USD 19m (ESG) |
| 25 Sep 2024 | Federal Court of Australia (ASIC action) | Vanguard Investments Australia | AUD 12.9m |
| 2 Apr 2025 | Frankfurt Public Prosecutor | DWS | EUR 25m |
| 10 Nov 2025 | ECB (climate risk, not greenwashing) | ABANCA | EUR 187,650 |
| 13 Feb 2026 | ECB (climate risk, not greenwashing) | Crédit Agricole S.A. | EUR 7,551,050 |
The amounts are small relative to the firms’ revenues; the cost lies in remediation, management time, the length of the proceedings and the reputational effect on flows. ASIC described the Vanguard penalty as the highest greenwashing penalty to date at the time.
Courts. 23 October 2025, Paris Judicial Court: TotalEnergies’ consumer-facing references to its carbon-neutrality ambition for 2050 and to being a major actor of the transition held to be misleading commercial practices; the court ordered the communications to stop and the operative part of the judgment to be published, and awarded damages to the claimant associations. September 2026, Amsterdam District Court: Milieudefensie’s claims against ING declared admissible; hearings expected in spring 2027.
SFDR 2.0. The Commission’s proposal of 20 November 2025 would create three voluntary categories with a 70% threshold and restrict sustainability language for products outside them. The Council agreed its mandate on 24 June 2026; the Parliament’s ECON committee adopted its report on 10 September 2026 and the plenary its mandate on 5 October 2026; the first trilogue was scheduled for 22 October 2026, no agreement had been reached by mid-November 2026, and application is expected around 2029, the Council and ECON both favouring a 24-month implementation period. For banks the relevance is indirect but real: the categories will shape what advisers can say about funds they distribute, and the naming and marketing restrictions will spill over by analogy to notes.
What changed recently. The centre of gravity has moved from fund disclosures (2021 to 2023) to claims in consumer law (EmpCo, the TotalEnergies judgment) and to execution (the SEC and ASIC cases on policies not applied). The EU has abandoned pre-verification of green claims but kept a strict blacklist. Prudential supervisors now put money behind climate-risk expectations.
Open debates.
INTERACTIVE LAB — Compliance, conduct and greenwashing: check your understanding
Test the definitions, rules, case results and bank-side economics of the module.
Q1. Which element is part of the ESAs’ common understanding of greenwashing?
Answer: B. The ESAs’ definition covers statements, declarations, actions and communications, intentional or not, at entity, product or service level.
Q2. From which date must EU Member States apply the Empowering Consumers Directive (EU) 2024/825?
Answer: C. Transposition was due by 27 March 2026 and application from 27 September 2026.
Q3. A product described to consumers as ‘carbon-neutral’ because the issuer bought offsets is, under EmpCo:
Answer: A. Claims of neutral, reduced or positive GHG impact of a product based on offsetting are on the blacklist.
Q4. In the case, why was the probability of missing the KPI not a sign of ambition?
Answer: D. The target required a 34.8% reduction while the plan already delivered 40.0%; the 22.66% miss probability reflects data noise.
Q5. What is the expected step-up of the Meridian note worth to the client as a running coupon?
Answer: A. 0.28 points of present value spread as an annuity over 7 years at 3.30% gives 4.55 bp a year.
Q6. Which sustainability-preference category could the note be matched to?
Answer: C. Proceeds are not earmarked, so (a) and (b) cannot be evidenced; (c) can be, through the GHG KPI, once product governance documents it.
Q7. Under CRR3 in the EU, a large greenwashing settlement raises Pillar 1 operational-risk capital through:
Answer: B. The EU set the ILM at 1; conduct losses reach capital through Pillar 2 (SREP, ICAAP, P2R).
Q8. What did the SEC find against DWS’s US adviser in September 2023?
Answer: D. The order concerned the gap between statements and implementation from August 2018 to late 2021, and the lack of policies to ensure accuracy.
Q9. In stage 5, which item of the loss given a greenwashing event was the smallest?
Answer: C. The consumer-law fine (EUR 1.5m) is below the AMF sanction (EUR 5m), lost revenue (EUR 4m), legal costs (EUR 3m) and remediation (EUR 2.4m).
Q10. Why does the step-up not count as an embedded derivative to be separated under IFRS 9 for the issuer?
Answer: A. A derivative’s underlying cannot be a non-financial variable specific to a party; the step-up is included in estimated cash flows instead.
Q11. The French consumer-law fine for misleading practices based on environmental claims can be raised to what share of the advertising expenses?
Answer: C. The Climate and Resilience Act of 2021 raised the rate from 50% to 80% for misleading practices resting on environmental claims.
Q12. What is the break-even life-time probability of a greenwashing event at which the launch RAROC equals the 12% hurdle?
Answer: D. The section 6 block gives 3.87%: above it, the expected conduct loss pushes RAROC below 12%.
Q13. Which statement about greenhushing is correct?
Answer: B. Silence does not exempt the bank from mandatory reporting, and the ESAs’ definition includes omissions.
Q14. What was the status of the Green Claims Directive proposal in November 2026?
Answer: A. On 4 November 2026 the Commission listed it in Annex III (withdrawals) of its 2027 work programme.
A bank issues a 5-year note at 100 with an annual coupon of 2.60%; its 5-year market yield is 3.00%. If its KPI is missed, coupons 4 and 5 step up by 40 bp. The probability of missing is 30%; the distribution fee is 1.20 points. Compute the fair value, the embedded cost, the issuer margin and the value of the step-up as a running equivalent.
Solution. Fixed part: , where . Discount factors for years 4 and 5: . Step-up strip if certain: points; expected: points. Fair value . Embedded cost points; issuer margin points. Step-up as a running equivalent: bp a year, against a coupon shortfall of 40 bp a year. The sustainability feature is a small part of the client’s economics, so a central sustainability communication would be disproportionate.
A bank’s retail campaign for a EUR 200m note cost EUR 2.5m in advertising. In a greenwashing event, assume: consumer-law fine at the higher of EUR 1.5m and 80% of the advertising spend; an AMF sanction of EUR 3m; a buy-back offer at par accepted by 30% of holders when the market price is 94; legal costs of EUR 2m; lost revenue of EUR 3m. The life-time probability of an event is 8% as drafted and 2% after review. Compute the loss given an event and the expected loss before and after review.
Solution. Consumer-law fine: m. Remediation: m. Loss given an event: m. Expected loss as drafted: m; after review: m; expected saving: EUR 0.816m. Here remediation is the largest single item, which is typical of retail conduct cases.
A 5-year fee product earns EUR 0.5m a year. Costs: 60% cost-income ratio plus a one-off EUR 0.2m spread over 5 years. Operational-risk RWA come from the BIC at 15%. Loss given a conduct event: EUR 12m; life-time probability 4%. Meridian’s conventions apply (capital 13% of RWA, tax 25%). Compute the RAROC and the break-even probability at a 12% hurdle.
Solution. Costs: m. Expected conduct loss: m a year. RWA: m; capital: m. RAROC . Break-even expected loss: m a year, i.e. a life-time probability of . The product clears the hurdle only if controls keep the probability of an event below about 6%.
1. How would you define greenwashing to a business head who says “our product is green, so there is no risk”? Greenwashing is not about whether the product is green but about whether what we say matches the evidence. The ESAs define it as sustainability statements, actions or communications that do not clearly and fairly reflect the sustainability profile of the entity, product or service. It includes omissions and unintentional errors. So a genuinely green product can still be greenwashed by an exaggerated name or an unsupported outcome claim. The control is the claims review, not the product’s merit.
2. What changed for bank marketing on 27 September 2026? The Empowering Consumers Directive started to apply. It adds generic environmental claims without recognised excellent performance, offsetting-based neutrality claims about products and self-made sustainability labels to the list of practices unfair in all circumstances, and requires future-performance claims like net zero to rest on verifiable commitments and independent monitoring. It covers bank retail marketing like any other consumer communication. France had not adopted its transposition law by mid-November 2026, but banks apply the blacklist anyway because courts can read national law in the light of the directive.
3. Walk me through how you would pre-clear a sustainability-linked note for retail. I would start with the evidence file: KPI definition, baseline, target and management projection, and test the ambition. Then product governance: target market including capital at risk and bail-in, sustainability-preference classification by category, and a fair value test that separates the value of the step-up from the coupon given up. Then the claims review of every marketing item, with approve, amend or reject decisions logged in the register. Finally conditions for the committee, especially post-launch testing and the annual review of claims.
4. Why can a small step-up be a greenwashing red flag? Because it makes the sustainability feature cheap for the issuer and minor for the client, while the communication often gives it the headline. In our case the step-up was worth 4.6 bp a year to the client and EUR 1.85m at worst to a bank with EUR 6.2bn of revenue. That does not make the product illegal, but it makes any claim that the product drives climate action unsupportable. The EBA made the same criticism of sustainability-linked loans with weak incentives.
5. What are the lessons of the DWS case for a bank? The authorities did not challenge the ESG policy itself; they found that the firm said it applied the policy and did not apply it consistently, and that it had no procedure to make its ESG statements accurate. The SEC imposed USD 19m in September 2023 and the Frankfurt prosecutor EUR 25m in April 2025. For a bank, that means group communications must be inside the claims review, and monitoring and testing must verify that stated processes are applied. It also shows that such cases last for years.
6. Does a greenwashing fine cost a European bank capital? Not directly in Pillar 1: under CRR3 operational-risk capital is the business indicator component, and the EU set the internal loss multiplier at 1, so past losses do not raise it. It does cost capital through Pillar 2, because the supervisor assesses conduct risk in the SREP and can raise the P2R, and the bank must include conduct scenarios in its ICAAP. It also costs earnings through provisions under IAS 37 and through remediation.
7. Is greenhushing a sensible response to litigation risk? Only partly. Reducing unsupported claims is good practice, but silence is not a safe harbour: the ESAs’ definition includes omissions, CSRD and Pillar 3 disclosures are mandatory, and clients with sustainability preferences are entitled to accurate information. The better answer is calibrated communication: specific metrics, sources, limits stated next to benefits, and consistency across channels.
8. How do you put a number on conduct risk in a product committee? I build a loss given an event from its components (fines with their statutory ceilings, remediation, legal costs, lost revenue) and multiply by a life-time probability that I justify from observable drivers such as blacklist hits and evidence gaps. I show the expected loss before and after the controls I propose and its effect on the RAROC. In our case the review moved RAROC from negative to 27.9%, with a break-even probability of about 3.9%. That turns a compliance opinion into a business decision.
EU legislation and supervisory texts
French law and doctrine
Enforcement decisions
Status of legislation and litigation (secondary sources, dated)
Standards and academic reading