This module closes the course by climbing to the top floor. Every earlier module ended with a figure that someone above the desk had to approve or limit: a capital budget (E02), a hurdle and a carbon budget (E03), a green FTP bonus (E04), a sector target (E07), a stress-test threshold (E08). Here we meet the people who set those numbers, the documents in which they are written, and the one document that is supposed to hold them together: the bank’s prudential transition plan.
Where it sits. A European bank is governed by a management body with two functions. The supervisory function is the board of directors (or the supervisory board in a two-tier structure, as in Germany or the Netherlands); the management function is the chief executive and the executive committee. In a French société anonyme such as Meridian, both live in one board: the chair leads the board, the chief executive (directeur général) runs the bank, and the board has specialised committees. EU banking law requires a significant institution to have at least a risk committee, a nomination committee and a remuneration committee, plus an audit committee under the audit rules. Sustainability does not get its own legally required committee; it is distributed across these. Many banks add an ethics or sustainability committee of the board; Meridian has chosen not to, and gives climate to the Board Risk Committee (BRC) for risk and to the full board for strategy.
Below the board, Meridian runs four executive bodies that touch the plan. The Group Climate Committee, chaired by the Chief Risk Officer (CRO) with the head of Strategy and the business heads, sets sector targets and steering plans (E07). The Asset and Liability Committee (ALCO), chaired by the Chief Financial Officer (CFO), sets the FTP grid, including the green bonus (E04). The Capital and Performance Committee allocates capital budgets and the internal carbon budget (E03). The Group Risk Committee prepares the risk appetite statement (RAS) and the ICAAP that the BRC reviews. The prudential transition plan is drafted by the ESG risk team inside the CRO’s organisation (A02) with the Group Sustainability Office, which reports to the chief executive’s office and owns the public commitments.
How it “earns” money. It does not, but it decides how the rest of the bank does. The board approves a three-year strategic plan with return targets, the capital plan, the RAS with its limits, the remuneration policy and, since CRD6, the prudential transition plan. Orders of magnitude for Meridian (all from earlier modules): CET1 capital of EUR 16.52bn on EUR 118bn of RWA, a ratio of 14.00% (E02); one basis point of CET1 ratio is worth EUR 11.8m of capital. A climate limit that removes EUR 1bn of high-carbon exposure moves about 4.4 bp of stress depletion (section 5.4), a few million euros of income and roughly EUR 76m of allocated capital. The board’s decisions are measured in tens of basis points of CET1 and in tens of millions of euros of profit; they are also measured in supervisory findings, which can cost more.
The team and adjacent functions. At board level: the chair, about fifteen directors (a majority independent), the company secretary who writes the minutes. Around the plan: the CRO and the head of ESG risk (Meridian’s is the stress testing lead of E08, Karim Benali, promoted after the 2026 ICAAP); the Chief Sustainability Officer; the CFO and the head of Strategy; the Chief Human Resources Officer, who prepares the remuneration committee; the General Counsel, who checks every public commitment against litigation risk; and Internal Audit, the third line, which audits the plan’s process. Outside: the Joint Supervisory Team (JST) of the ECB, the statutory auditors who give limited assurance on the sustainability statement, the proxy advisers and investors who vote on pay, and the rating agencies.
A realistic week, mid-November 2026.
The “product” of this business line is a set of decisions and the documents that record them. A student who does not understand a risk appetite framework or a deferral schedule cannot understand a climate one.
IN ONE SENTENCE — Bank governance is the allocation of decisions between a board that sets direction and limits, executives who run the bank inside them, and control functions that tell the board when the limits are not respected.
INTUITION — Think of a ship. The owners’ representatives (the board) choose the destination and say how rough a sea they will accept; the captain (the chief executive) steers; the navigator and the engineer (risk and finance) report the position and the fuel; the auditor checks the logbook after the voyage.
EU law places the responsibility for the bank’s risks on the management body as a whole. Its members must be of good repute and have, individually and collectively, the knowledge, skills and experience to understand the bank’s activities and main risks. This is the fit and proper regime. For significant institutions in the euro area, the ECB assesses each appointment of a board member against five criteria (reputation, experience, conflicts of interest and independence of mind, time commitment, collective suitability), usually with an interview for the chair, the chief executive and the chairs of key committees. A bank documents collective suitability in a skills matrix: a table of directors against competences, which the nomination committee updates every year.
The committees divide the work. The risk committee advises the board on risk appetite and strategy and oversees the CRO. The remuneration committee prepares decisions on pay and checks that incentives do not reward excessive risk. The nomination committee proposes directors and assesses the board’s collective suitability. The audit committee oversees financial reporting and, since the CSRD, sustainability reporting and its assurance. Each committee has a charter, an annual agenda and minutes, and the supervisor reads all three.
The control functions sit beneath. The three lines of defence model allocates responsibility: the first line (business units) owns and manages its risks; the second line (risk management and compliance) sets the framework, challenges and reports independently; the third line (internal audit) gives assurance that the system works. The CRO has direct access to the risk committee and cannot be removed without the board’s approval.
PITFALL — “The board approved it” is not a control. Supervisors look for evidence of challenge: questions in the minutes, alternatives considered, a decision changed. A board pack of 300 pages approved in twenty minutes is a finding, not a defence.
IN ONE SENTENCE — A risk appetite framework turns “how much risk will we take to earn our returns” into a cascade of numbers, from the capital the bank cannot lose down to the limits a desk sees every morning.
The vocabulary comes from the Financial Stability Board’s Principles for an Effective Risk Appetite Framework (2013), which supervisors still use. Four layers:
| Layer | Definition | Meridian example (capital) |
|---|---|---|
| Risk capacity | Maximum risk before breaching regulatory constraints | CET1 down to 9.81%, the MDA trigger |
| Risk appetite | Aggregate level the board chooses to accept | CET1 at least 12.5% after severe stress |
| Risk limits | Allocation to risk types, businesses, sectors | Sector caps, single-name limits |
| Risk profile | Where the bank actually stands | CET1 14.00% today |
The risk appetite statement is the board-approved document that lists the metrics, each with a calibration in up to three tiers: a target (where the bank wants to be), an early-warning level or trigger (which starts an escalation) and a threshold or limit (which requires remediation and board information). Metrics are both quantitative (CET1 ratio, leverage ratio, LCR, stressed loss, concentration) and qualitative (zero tolerance for sanctions breaches). A good RAS has fifteen to thirty board-level metrics, cascaded into several hundred management limits.
FORMULA
is the current CET1 ratio; the ratio below which automatic restrictions on dividends, AT1 coupons and bonuses apply (Pillar 1, P2R in CET1 and the combined buffer); the post-stress level the board wants to keep, which sits above the MDA trigger plus Pillar 2 guidance. All in percentage points of RWA, read in basis points.
For Meridian, capacity is 14.00% − 9.81% = 419 bp. The board does not plan to use all of it: Pillar 2 guidance (1.25%) is the supervisor’s expectation of a buffer that absorbs stress, and a bank that plans to eat into it invites a capital add-on. The ICAAP (internal capital adequacy assessment process) is where the bank shows the supervisor that its capital covers all material risks in a baseline and in adverse scenarios over three years; the SREP (supervisory review and evaluation process) is the supervisor’s annual verdict, which sets P2R and P2G.
WHY IT MATTERS ON THE DESK — Every limit a desk meets comes from this cascade. When a coverage banker hears “the sector is full”, the sector cap was derived from the RAS, which was derived from capacity. Knowing the chain lets you argue at the right level: a deal that breaches a cap does not need a better RAROC, it needs a board decision.
IN ONE SENTENCE — EU banks must pay their risk-takers in a way that ties a large part of the reward to performance measured over several years and allows the bank to take it back.
The rules are in the Capital Requirements Directive (Articles 92 to 96) and apply to material risk-takers (MRTs), identified with criteria set out in Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2021/923: board members, executives, heads of material business units and control functions, and anyone above pay thresholds. For MRTs:
A bank’s variable pay usually has two parts: an annual bonus on a balanced scorecard (financial, risk and conduct, client, people, and increasingly sustainability), and for executives a long-term incentive plan (LTIP) of performance shares that vest after three to five years if long-term targets are met.
CASE — Meridian’s chief executive (case assumptions): fixed pay EUR 1.8m; target variable pay EUR 1.2m; maximum 150% of target, so EUR 1.8m, exactly the 100% cap. As a member of the management body of a significant institution, 60% of the award is deferred over five years and half of every part is paid in shares. The block below shows the schedule.
INTERACTIVE LAB — How a bank executive’s variable pay is actually paid out
Split a variable pay award into upfront and deferred parts, cash and instruments, and see what remains exposed to malus at the award date.
| Parameter you can move | Range | Default |
|---|---|---|
| Variable pay awarded for the year | 0 to 3 EUR m | 1.2 EUR m |
| Fixed pay | 0.5 to 3 EUR m | 1.8 EUR m |
| Deferred share | 40 to 70 % | 60 % |
| Share paid in instruments | 50 to 100 % | 50 % |
| Deferral period | 4 / 5 | 5 years |
| Result at default settings | Value |
|---|---|
| Variable to fixed ratio | 66.7 % |
| Paid in cash in the award year | 0.240 EUR m |
| Paid in instruments in the award year | 0.240 EUR m |
| Deferred tranche vesting each year | 0.144 EUR m |
| Exposed to malus at award date | 0.720 EUR m |
Try it. Set the award to 1.8, the maximum: the ratio reaches the 100% cap. Then lower the deferred share to 40%: this is the minimum allowed, not the rule for a chief executive of a significant bank.
At target, the chief executive receives EUR 0.48m in the award year, half of it in shares, and EUR 0.144m a year for five years; EUR 0.72m remains exposed to malus. This is the lever that makes a multi-year climate metric meaningful: a target missed in 2029 can reduce pay awarded in 2026.
The board approves a strategic plan, typically three to four years, with targets for revenue growth, cost-income, return on tangible equity and CET1. The capital plan projects RWA and capital by business line under a baseline and an adverse scenario; it feeds the ICAAP. The business model analysis is the first block of the SREP: the supervisor asks whether the plan’s profitability is sustainable and what drives it. A transition plan that changes the business mix must therefore flow through the capital plan; otherwise it is a separate document that nobody runs.
Four things change. The board’s collective suitability must now include ESG risks. The RAS acquires climate and environmental metrics. The ICAAP includes climate scenarios (E08). And the bank must hold a plan: since CRD6, a legal requirement with quantifiable targets, addressed to the supervisor. Pay is affected at the margin: remuneration policies must be consistent with the bank’s approach to ESG risks.
IN ONE SENTENCE — A prudential transition plan is the board-approved document that shows how the bank will keep its balance sheet sound while the economy moves to the EU’s climate objectives, with targets that steer the business and limits that bind it.
INTUITION — A net-zero pledge is a destination announced at a press conference. A prudential plan is the route sheet given to the harbour master: the speed at each stage, the fuel reserve, and what the captain does if a storm comes. The harbour master does not care whether you advertised the destination; he cares whether the ship is safe on the way.
Directive (EU) 2024/1619 (CRD6) amended the Capital Requirements Directive. For ESG risks, its main provisions are:
The transposition deadline was 10 January 2026, with application from 11 January 2026. Many member states were late: on 27 March 2026 the Commission sent letters of formal notice to 22 member states for incomplete transposition. France transposed by Ordinance no. 2026-255, published on 9 April 2026, which requires credit institutions to establish prudential transition plans with quantifiable targets, a long-term horizon of at least ten years, and consistency with CSRD transition plans. As of November 2026, Meridian, a French bank supervised by the ECB, is under the obligation in law.
The EBA published the final Guidelines on 9 January 2025, under the mandate of Article 87a(5) CRD. They apply from 11 January 2026 to all institutions except small and non-complex institutions (SNCIs), which have until 11 January 2027 at the latest. Status in November 2026: in application for Meridian, in their first year; SNCIs have two months left.
The Guidelines have two halves. The first covers ESG risk management: a materiality assessment at least every two years (yearly for large institutions), over short, medium and long horizons, the long-term one being at least ten years; integration into the RAS, the ICAAP, credit policies and the three lines of defence; and a list of metrics (exposures to high-emitting sectors, portfolio alignment, financed emissions by scope, progress against plan targets, among others). The second half, Section 6, covers the plans under Article 76(2):
In its feedback on the consultation, the EBA wrote that the purpose of CRD plans is not to force institutions to exit or divest from carbon-intensive sectors but to assess the risks and engage and support clients alongside other mitigation actions. That sentence will matter in section 5.4.
Two companion texts: the EBA Guidelines on environmental scenario analysis (EBA/GL/2025/04, published 5 November 2025), applicable from 1 January 2027 (E08); and the EBA’s revised Guidelines on internal governance, final report published on 5 November 2026 to reflect CRD6, which will apply once translated and which bear on how the management body organises its responsibilities.
The ECB’s 2020 Guide on climate-related and environmental risks set thirteen expectations, of which several are about governance: the board’s oversight, the RAS, the organisational structure and reporting, and remuneration. After the 2022 thematic review the ECB set staged deadlines and then moved to enforcement through periodic penalty payments: ABANCA (EUR 187,650, made public in November 2025) and Crédit Agricole S.A. (about EUR 7.55m, made public in February 2026, for 75 days of delay in 2024 in assessing the materiality of climate and environmental risks). Both concerned materiality assessments, the first link of the chain this module describes. The ECB’s priorities for 2026-2028 announce a thematic review of transition planning (A02).
WHO DOES WHAT — The JST does not ask “do you have a plan?” but “show me the minutes where the board changed a limit because of it”, “show me a KRI that turned amber and what happened”, “show me how the plan’s targets appear in the remuneration of the people who can move them”. The module’s case is built around these three questions.
The word “transition plan” covers three different legal objects, and the board must keep them consistent.
| Plan | Legal basis | Audience | Status, November 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Prudential plan | CRD6 Art. 76(2); EBA/GL/2025/01 | Supervisor | Mandatory; applies since 11 Jan 2026 |
| Disclosure plan | CSRD, ESRS E1 | Investors, public | Report it if you have one |
| Due-diligence plan | CSDDD Art. 22 | Public, authorities | Deleted by Omnibus I |
| Voluntary pledge | NZBA, SBTi, GFANZ | Market | NZBA closed October 2025 |
CSRD and ESRS E1. After the Omnibus I Directive (Directive (EU) 2026/470, published in the Official Journal on 26 February 2026), the CSRD applies to EU companies with more than 1,000 employees and more than EUR 450m of turnover; Meridian remains in scope. Companies in scope must disclose their climate transition plan if they have one; ESRS E1 sets what the disclosure covers (targets, decarbonisation levers, financial resources, consistency with 1.5°C). The Commission adopted the revised, simplified ESRS by delegated act on 3 July 2026, expected to apply from financial year 2027. A bank that has a prudential plan has, in substance, a transition plan to disclose; the EBA Guidelines allow it to reuse the disclosed information as a starting point, and require targets to be consistent with public commitments.
CSDDD. The Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive (Directive (EU) 2024/1760) originally required in-scope companies, banks included, to adopt and put into effect a climate transition plan compatible with 1.5°C (Article 22). Omnibus I deleted Article 22 entirely, raised the thresholds to 5,000 employees and EUR 1.5bn of turnover, and moved application to 26 July 2029 (transposition by 26 July 2028). The exclusion of downstream financial services from the due-diligence chain was kept and the clause that would have reviewed it was removed. For banks, there is therefore no CSDDD transition-plan obligation any more; the prudential plan is the only mandatory one.
Voluntary alliances. The Net-Zero Banking Alliance voted to cease operations in October 2025 after the departure of most large US, Canadian, Japanese and several European members. Banks that had targets kept most of them, but the reference for European banks has become the CRD plan and the ESRS E1 disclosure (E07). The SBTi’s Financial Institutions Net-Zero Standard remains available as a voluntary benchmark, and the ISSB’s IFRS S2 and the Transition Plan Taskforce materials, now hosted by the IFRS Foundation, shape disclosure outside the EU.
PITFALL — Three documents, three teams, three sets of numbers is the most common failure. If the prudential plan says the power book reaches 162 kg/MWh in 2030, the sustainability statement says “net zero by 2050 aligned with 1.5°C” without an interim figure, and the investor deck says “EUR 100bn of sustainable finance by 2030”, the supervisor and the auditor will each ask why the other numbers differ. The General Counsel will ask first.
The EBA Guidelines require the plan to include remuneration policies and practices that promote sound management of ESG risks, consistent with the bank’s objectives and risk appetite; the annex suggests indicators such as the share of staff with ESG metrics in variable pay and their weight. The ECB’s 2020 Guide expected banks’ remuneration policies to be consistent with their climate risk strategy and appetite. Neither prescribes a weight or a metric. In practice, large European banks have introduced climate or ESG metrics into executive scorecards and LTIPs, usually with modest weights; the course does not quote an average because published surveys use different definitions.
On fit and proper, supervisors now expect the board’s collective knowledge to include climate and environmental risks, assessed in the skills matrix and in the interview of the chair and the chief executive. One climate expert on the board is not enough: the expectation is that the board as a whole can challenge the plan. Training programmes and external briefings are the usual answer, documented in the nomination committee’s annual review.
The “deal” here is the annual planning cycle that produces the prudential transition plan, the climate part of the RAS and the remuneration metrics. At Meridian it runs from September to April, aligned with the ICAAP.
INTERACTIVE LAB — The annual cycle of Meridian’s prudential transition plan
Follow the plan from the materiality assessment to board approval, supervisory submission and quarterly monitoring.
| # | Who | Does what | Deliverable |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | ESG risk team (second line) | Refreshes the ESG materiality assessment by sector, geography and horizon, including the ten-year horizon | Materiality report, September |
| 2 | Stress testing team | Runs the climate scenarios of the ICAAP on the corporate book (E08) and the longer-horizon scenario analysis | Stress results and methodology note, October |
| 3 | Group Sustainability Office and Strategy | Propose sector targets and steering plans (E07) and the positioning options for high-carbon sectors | Target proposals and strategic options paper |
| 4 | Group Climate Committee (chair: CRO) | Adopts sector steering plans and the glide paths that will become KRIs | Committee minutes, sector plans |
| 5 | Finance and Strategy | Translate the plans into the capital plan and the three-year budget: RWA, income, capital by business line | Financial trajectory of the plan |
| 6 | CRO and Group Risk Committee | Calibrate climate RAS metrics: targets, early-warning levels, thresholds, and cascade them into sector limits | Draft RAS and limit framework |
| 7 | ALCO and Capital and Performance Committee | Set the FTP green bonus, the internal carbon price and the carbon budget for the year | 2027 FTP grid, capital and carbon budgets |
| 8 | Remuneration Committee with the CHRO | Selects climate metrics and weights for the executive scorecard and the LTIP, with malus triggers | Remuneration proposal |
| 9 | Legal, Compliance and Finance (sustainability reporting) | Check consistency of targets and wording with the CSRD statement, Pillar 3 ESG and investor communication | Consistency memo |
| 10 | Board Risk Committee | Challenges the plan, the RAS and the ICAAP climate add-on; records alternatives rejected | Recommendation to the board |
| 11 | Board of directors | Approves the plan, the RAS and the remuneration policy; the policy goes to the shareholders’ vote | Board resolution and minutes |
| 12 | ESG risk team | Submits the plan with the ICAAP package and answers the JST’s questions | Supervisory submission, spring |
| 13 | Internal Audit (third line) | Audits the plan’s process, data and governance on a risk-based cycle | Audit report and actions |
| 14 | Group Risk Committee | Monitors KRIs quarterly, escalates breaches to the BRC, proposes remedial actions | Quarterly dashboard, escalation notes |
Materiality first. The cycle starts with the materiality assessment because the EBA Guidelines make it the input to everything else: a risk that is not material does not need a target or a limit, and a material one must have both. The assessment is done by sector and geography, for transition and physical risk, and for the short (three years), medium (to 2030) and long (at least ten years) horizons. The document is a table of exposures with a heatmap and a written justification; the supervisor reads the justification for the cells marked “not material”. The penalty payments of 2025-2026 were about this step being late.
Scenarios and targets. The stress testing team runs the ICAAP scenarios (E08) and the longer scenario analysis that the EBA scenario guidelines require from January 2027. In parallel, the steering team proposes sector targets (E07). Two things must be consistent: the scenario used to set targets (here an IEA net-zero pathway for power) and the scenarios used to stress (NGFS-based). If the bank sets targets on a 1.5°C pathway but its business plan assumes a world of current policies, the plan’s financial projections and its targets describe two different worlds, and the supervisor will say so.
The financial trajectory. Finance translates each target into volumes, RWA and income in the capital plan. This is where many plans fail: targets are approved by a climate committee, the budget by the executive committee, and nobody checks that the budget’s loan growth by sector is compatible with the glide path. At Meridian the Finance business partner for each division signs a reconciliation between the two.
Risk appetite calibration. The CRO’s team converts the plan into RAS metrics with three tiers (section 5.3), and cascades them into sector limits and origination rules (for example: new lending to a high-carbon client above the sector cap requires a “Credible” transition-plan score, B01). The CRO also decides which metrics stay at management level: the internal carbon budget of E03 is a steering tool of the Capital and Performance Committee, not a board metric.
Prices and budgets. ALCO sets the FTP grid (the green bonus and its cap, E04) and the Capital and Performance Committee the internal carbon price and the carbon budget (E03). These are the prices the desks see; the plan must say why they are set where they are, and what they are expected to change.
Pay. The remuneration committee chooses the metrics that enter the executive scorecard and the LTIP, their weights and the payout curves, and checks them against the plan’s targets (section 5.6). The remuneration policy is put to the shareholders’ vote, and the remuneration report describes the outcome each year: two documents that investors and proxy advisers read closely.
Consistency, challenge and approval. Legal, Compliance and the sustainability reporting team check that every target in the plan is described the same way in the CSRD statement, the Pillar 3 ESG templates and investor material. The BRC then challenges: its minutes should record the alternatives rejected (for example, a lower threshold that would have forced an exit) and why. The board approves the plan, the RAS and the remuneration policy, and the plan goes to the JST with the ICAAP.
Monitoring and audit. The plan lives through its quarterly dashboard: each KRI with its status, the actions taken on ambers, the escalation of reds to the BRC. Internal Audit reviews the process on its risk-based cycle; a first audit of a new plan usually finds data lineage gaps and undocumented judgements, which is normal and must be followed up.
WHO DOES WHAT — The company secretary is the unsung owner of the plan’s evidence. When the JST asks “when did the board discuss climate limits, and what did it decide?”, the answer is in the minutes, the board pack index and the action log. A plan without minutes is, for a supervisor, a plan that was not approved.
Question. In November 2026 the board asks the CRO and the Chief Sustainability Officer for a prudential transition plan under Article 76(2) CRD, to be approved with the RAS in December (limits) and with the ICAAP in March 2027 (plan), and submitted to the JST in spring. The board wants four answers: how much climate risk the bank can carry (stage 1); which metrics the RAS will use, and how they are calibrated (stage 2); which strategy for the high-carbon book (stage 3); what the plan costs and who pays (stage 4). The remuneration committee adds a fifth: what climate metric goes into the 2027-2029 LTIP (stage 5).
Data: the inheritance. The plan does not start from a blank page. Each earlier module of block E produced a decision that the plan must now hold together. The figures below are inputs to this case; each is computed and tested in its own module.
| Source | Figure | Value |
|---|---|---|
| E02 | CET1 capital; RWA; CET1 ratio | EUR 16.52bn; EUR 118bn; 14.00% |
| E02 | MDA trigger; P2G; floor add-on in 2030 | 9.81%; 1.25%; EUR 1.625bn of RWA |
| E03 | Internal carbon price; shadow price of the carbon budget | EUR 25; EUR 36.38 per t |
| E03 | Net income cost of the carbon budget | EUR 0.5349m a year |
| E04 | Green FTP incentive (aligned loan); subsidy cap | 10 bp (1.8 + 8.2); EUR 3m a year |
| E04 | Strategic subsidy run-rate in 2031 | EUR 2.783m a year, pre-tax |
| E06 | GAR; BTAR; financed emissions | 6.69%; 5.62%; 11.84 MtCO2e |
| E07 | Power book intensity 2025; SDA target 2030 | 376.2; 162.4 kg/MWh |
| E07 | Plan M 2030; exit plan 2030 | 160.4; 152.7 kg/MWh |
| E07 | Client-effect share: Plan M; exit | 70.6%; 51.5% |
| E08 | S2 depletion, static; with 15% run-down | 155.9 bp; 142.5 bp |
| E08 | RAS threshold; early warning; high-carbon book | 150 bp; 125 bp; EUR 7.85bn |
| E08 | ICAAP climate add-on (after tax) | EUR 268m |
Reading. These numbers were set by different committees at different times: ALCO for FTP, the Capital and Performance Committee for the carbon price, the Group Climate Committee for the power target, the board for the stress threshold. The first job of the plan’s drafters, Karim Benali (head of ESG risk) and Sofia Lindqvist (ESG risk analyst), is to check that they are compatible. Two tensions appear at once. The stress metric is already above its threshold on the static balance sheet (155.9 bp against 150 bp), so the RAS cannot simply restate it. And the internal carbon price (EUR 25) is below the shadow price of the bank’s own carbon budget (EUR 36.38), so the price alone does not deliver the budget (E03). The plan must say which instrument binds.
NOTE — The CSRD statement for 2026 will report the same financed emissions (E06) and, if the board approves the plan, describe it as Meridian’s climate transition plan under ESRS E1. The drafting team therefore writes with three readers in mind: the supervisor (risk), the auditor (disclosure) and the investor (strategy).
Question. Is the 150 bp threshold of the climate stress metric a sensible share of Meridian’s risk capacity, and what does it leave after the output floor binds in 2030?
Data. From E08, the three scenarios over 2027-2029: extra credit loss of EUR 62.63m (S1 orderly), EUR 357.29m (S2 disorderly) and EUR 250.17m (S3 hot house and flood), and RWA migration of EUR 3.07bn, 12.63bn and 10.15bn. Losses reduce CET1 after tax at 25%; migration adds to RWA. From E02: the floor adds EUR 1.625bn of RWA in 2030 (RWA EUR 119.625bn), with constant capital. The post-stress reference level is the MDA trigger plus P2G: 9.81% + 1.25% = 11.06%.
FORMULA
is the stressed CET1 ratio in scenario ; CET1 capital (EUR 16.52bn); the tax rate (25%); the extra credit loss of the scenario; the starting RWA (modelled, or floor-bound in 2030); the RWA migration; the depletion in basis points.
INTERACTIVE LAB — Climate stress against Meridian’s risk capacity, today and with the output floor
Compute the stressed CET1 ratio in the three E08 scenarios, the depletion, and the headroom to the MDA trigger and to the P2G level, with modelled RWA or with the 2030 floor.
| Parameter you can move | Range | Default |
|---|---|---|
| Starting RWA | 2026, modelled RWA / 2030, output floor binding | 2026, modelled RWA |
| Scenario for the headline outputs | S1 / S2 / S3 | S2 |
| CET1 capital | 12 to 22 EUR bn | 16.52 EUR bn |
| Modelled RWA | 90 to 150 EUR bn | 118 EUR bn |
| Output floor add-on in 2030 | 0 to 10 EUR bn | 1.625 EUR bn |
| MDA trigger | 7 to 12 % | 9.81 % |
| Pillar 2 guidance | 0 to 3 % | 1.25 % |
| Climate stress appetite (RAS threshold) | 50 to 300 bp | 150 bp |
| Result at default settings | Value |
|---|---|
| CET1 ratio before stress | 14.00 % |
| Stressed CET1 ratio | 12.44 % |
| Depletion | 155.9 bp |
| Risk capacity: distance to the MDA trigger | 419.0 bp |
| Climate appetite as share of capacity | 35.8 % |
| Headroom to MDA trigger after stress | 263.1 bp |
| Headroom to MDA plus P2G after stress | 138.1 bp |
| Share of depletion due to losses (rest is RWA migration) | 14.6 % |
Try it. Switch to the 2030 floor: the ratio starts lower, so the same losses use fewer basis points of a larger denominator, but the bank ends closer to its P2G level. Then raise the floor add-on to EUR 8bn to see what a less favourable standardised comparison would do.
Result. Today, S2 takes the CET1 ratio from 14.00% to 12.44%, a depletion of 155.9 bp. Risk capacity, the distance to the MDA trigger, is 419 bp; the 150 bp appetite is 35.8% of it. After S2 Meridian keeps 263.1 bp above the MDA trigger and 138.1 bp above MDA plus P2G. Only 14.6% of the depletion comes from losses; the rest is RWA migration, the downgrades that raise risk weights. With the floor binding in 2030, the starting ratio is 13.81%, S2 depletion 152.1 bp, and the headroom above MDA plus P2G falls to 122.8 bp.
Reading. Three conclusions go into the plan.
PITFALL — A depletion in basis points depends on the denominator. The same EUR 268m after-tax loss costs fewer basis points on a floor-bound RWA than on modelled RWA, which makes the metric look better just when the bank is weaker. Meridian’s RAS defines the metric on the RWA basis of the year being tested and reports the post-stress ratio alongside it.
Question. Which climate metrics go into the board-level RAS, with what tiers, and how should a decarbonisation target be turned into a KRI that turns amber at the right time?
The metric set. The drafters start from the EBA list and the ECB’s expectation that metrics be few, owned and linked to limits. They propose five board-level metrics; others stay at management level.
| Metric | Target | Early warning | Threshold | Owner |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| S2 CET1 depletion | below 140 bp | 150 bp | 155 bp until end-2027, then 150 bp | CRO |
| High-carbon exposure | EUR 6.5bn by 2029 | EUR 7.0bn | EUR 7.85bn, then 7.0bn from end-2027 | CRO, business heads |
| Power book intensity | glide path | path + 5% | path + 15% | Head of Corporate Banking |
| Share of high-carbon book with “Credible” plans | 60% by 2028 | 40% | 30% | Coverage heads |
| Flood-exposed CRE without insurance check | 0% of new loans | 2% | 5% | Head of Real Estate |
The first two metrics come straight from E08’s decision: the board lowered the high-carbon cap from EUR 9bn to EUR 7.0bn by end-2027, and the stress threshold of 150 bp was already in the RAS. Because the static result (155.9 bp) is above 150 bp today, the drafters propose a transitional threshold of 155 bp until end-2027, with 150 bp as the early-warning level in the meantime. The alternative, declaring a breach in the first month of the plan, would trigger an escalation with no new information; the transitional calibration must be explained in the minutes and the JST will ask for it.
The power-intensity metric is the hard one. A target in 2030 (162.4 kg/MWh) needs annual milestones, and the choice of path changes what the board sees.
FORMULA
is the baseline intensity (376.2 kg/MWh in 2025); the target (162.4 in 2030); years; the year index; the compound path (a constant percentage reduction); the linear path; the actual intensity; the deviation tested against the amber (5%) and red (15%) tolerances.
Data. The plan-based path is the steering team’s projection of Plan M (case assumption built on E07): 352 in 2026, 318 in 2027, 248 in 2028 (Baltica’s two additional coal units close and half its facility moves to use of proceeds when it is refinanced), 200 in 2029 and 160.4 in 2030 as renewables origination accumulates. The question is what happens if Meridian delivers exactly this plan.
INTERACTIVE LAB — One target, three glide paths: when does the KRI turn amber?
Build the compound, linear and plan-based milestones for the power-book intensity target, and test an outturn against amber and red tolerances.
| Parameter you can move | Range | Default |
|---|---|---|
| Glide path used as KRI | Compound / Linear / Plan-based | Compound |
| Year tested | 2026 / 2027 / 2028 / 2029 / 2030 | 2027 |
| Outturn versus Plan M projection | -20 to 30 % | 0 % |
| Amber tolerance above path | 0 to 15 % | 5 % |
| Red tolerance above path | 5 to 30 % | 15 % |
| Result at default settings | Value |
|---|---|
| Compound annual reduction required | 15.47 % |
| Milestone for the year tested | 268.8 kg/MWh |
| Outturn | 318.0 kg/MWh |
| Deviation from milestone | 18.3 % |
| Status (0 green, 1 amber, 2 red) | 2 |
| Years in amber, 2026-2030, if Plan M is delivered | 2 years |
| Years in red, 2026-2030, if Plan M is delivered | 1 years |
Try it. Keep the compound path and set the outturn 10% better than Plan M in 2027: the KRI is still amber. Then choose the plan-based path and set the outturn 10% worse: amber, as it should be, because the plan itself is slipping.
Result. The compound path requires a 15.47% reduction every year and sets the 2027 milestone at 268.8 kg/MWh. If Meridian delivers Plan M exactly (318 in 2027), the KRI shows a deviation of 18.3%: red. Over 2026-2030 a perfectly delivered plan spends two years in amber and one in red on the compound path. On the linear path the 2027 milestone is 290.7, the deviation 9.4%: amber, and two amber years in total. On the plan-based path the KRI stays green unless the plan slips: a 10% slippage in 2027 gives a 10% deviation and an amber signal.
Reading. The glide path is not a technical detail; it decides whether the board’s dashboard tells the truth.
CASE — The drafters propose the plan-based path for the RAS, and the compound path as a disclosed benchmark in the CSRD statement, with a sentence explaining why actual intensity will sit above it until 2029. The CRO accepts; the Chief Sustainability Officer asks that the board pack show both lines on the same chart every quarter.
Question. For the high-carbon book (EUR 7.85bn: oil and gas, coal-dependent power, cement and lime, steel and heavy industry), which positioning should the plan adopt, and what does each option do to the stress metric, income and capital?
Data. From E08, S2 depletion is 155.9 bp with the book unchanged and 142.5 bp with a 15% annual run-down over three years (book at EUR 4.82bn in 2029). The two points define a straight line, which E08’s other results confirm (6.05% a year gives 150.0 bp; 48.25% gives 126 bp). For economics, the drafters take the oil and gas book of E08 as representative of the high-carbon book: RAROC 8.92% with its ancillary business, EUR 6.76m of after-tax profit and EUR 75.7m of allocated capital per EUR 1bn of exposure. Freed capital can be redeployed into renewables project finance on Cap Ferrat’s relationship economics (E03), with the 10 bp aligned green FTP incentive of E04. The pipeline is the constraint: the project finance team estimates it can absorb half of the freed capital at those terms within three years (case assumption); the rest becomes surplus capital, which in this income view earns nothing.
FORMULA
is the S2 depletion in bp; the high-carbon exposure in EUR bn; the marginal depletion per EUR bn; the depletion that does not depend on the high-carbon book; the annual run-down rate (negative for growth).
INTERACTIVE LAB — High-carbon book: growth, run-down or exit, against the stress threshold
Project the high-carbon book under a run-down rate, compute the S2 depletion in 2029, the capital freed, the renewables it can fund and the change in after-tax income.
| Parameter you can move | Range | Default |
|---|---|---|
| Annual run-down of the high-carbon book (negative = growth) | -10 to 100 % | 6.05 % |
| Share of freed capital redeployed in renewables | 0 to 100 % | 50 % |
| Green FTP incentive on redeployed loans | 0 to 20 bp | 10 bp |
| Result at default settings | Value |
|---|---|
| Depletion per EUR 1bn of high-carbon exposure | 4.42 bp |
| Depletion independent of the high-carbon book | 121.2 bp |
| High-carbon exposure end-2029 | 6.51 EUR bn |
| S2 depletion in 2029 | 150.0 bp |
| Allocated capital per EUR 1bn of high-carbon book | 75.72 EUR m |
| RAROC of the high-carbon book | 8.92 % |
| RAROC of redeployed renewables (relationship) | 9.83 % |
| Capital freed by 2029 | 101.5 EUR m |
| Renewables funded with redeployed capital | 0.72 EUR bn |
| Change in after-tax income | -4.07 EUR m a year |
Try it. Set the run-down to 100%, a complete exit: depletion falls only to 121 bp. Then set redeployment to 100% at the default run-down: the plan becomes income-neutral, which tells you the binding constraint is the renewables pipeline, not the hurdle.
Result. Each EUR 1bn of high-carbon exposure adds 4.42 bp of S2 depletion; 121.2 bp does not depend on the high-carbon book at all. Three options compared at end-2029:
| Option | Run-down a year | Book 2029 | S2 depletion | After-tax income |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Growth | −5% | EUR 9.09bn | 161.4 bp | EUR +8.36m |
| Transition partner | 6.05% | EUR 6.51bn | 150.0 bp | EUR −4.07m |
| Exit | 48.25% | EUR 1.09bn | 126.0 bp | EUR −20.53m |
The transition-partner option frees EUR 101.5m of capital, of which half funds EUR 0.72bn of renewables; the after-tax income falls by EUR 4.07m a year. Exit frees EUR 512.1m, funds EUR 3.65bn of renewables, and costs EUR 20.53m a year. Even a complete exit leaves a depletion of 121.2 bp, just below the early-warning level. If all freed capital could be redeployed, the transition-partner option would add EUR 0.92m of income, because the redeployed renewables earn 9.83% against 8.92% for the high-carbon book.
Reading. The board strategy seminar draws four lessons.
Competitive positioning. The strategy seminar then asks the question a board should always ask: who else is competing for this business, and what happens to the clients Meridian leaves? Three observations are recorded.
PITFALL — The linear relation between book size and depletion is a property of E08’s model, in which the stress of the remaining book does not depend on which clients leave. In reality a run-down that keeps the clients with credible plans removes more risk per euro than an across-the-board cut, and an exit that keeps the worst clients until maturity removes less. The plan must say how the run-down is targeted, not only how fast it goes.
Question. What is the annual cost of the plan to shareholders, line by line, and which costs are real, which are internal transfers, and which are opportunity costs?
Data. Green FTP strategic subsidy: EUR 2.783m pre-tax a year at its 2031 run-rate (E04), paid from the central transition budget. Carbon budget: EUR 0.5349m of net income a year at the perimeter analysed in E03. Income effect of the run-down: EUR 4.07m after tax (stage 3). ESG risk and data programme: EUR 20m a year pre-tax for people, data, models, assurance (case assumption; E11 discusses the business case). ICAAP climate add-on: EUR 268m of internal capital (E08), charged to business lines at the 12% hurdle. Internal carbon fee: charged to desks at EUR 25 per tonne and credited to the central budget.
FORMULA
is the after-tax cost to shareholders; the FTP subsidy and the programme opex (both pre-tax); the after-tax cost of the carbon budget; the after-tax income lost by the run-down; the opportunity cost of the climate add-on at hurdle on capital ; CET1 capital; the ROE cost is in basis points.
INTERACTIVE LAB — The annual bill of the transition plan, line by line
Add up the after-tax cost of the plan’s components, separate real costs from internal transfers and opportunity costs, and express the total in basis points of return on CET1.
| Parameter you can move | Range | Default |
|---|---|---|
| Green FTP strategic subsidy (pre-tax) | 0 to 10 EUR m | 2.783 EUR m |
| Carbon budget, net income forgone | 0 to 5 EUR m | 0.5349 EUR m |
| Run-down, after-tax income lost | 0 to 30 EUR m | 4.069 EUR m |
| ESG risk and data programme (pre-tax) | 0 to 60 EUR m | 20 EUR m |
| ICAAP climate add-on | 0 to 600 EUR m | 268 EUR m |
| Hurdle rate after tax | 6 to 16 % | 12 % |
| CET1 capital | 10000 to 25000 EUR m | 16520 EUR m |
| Result at default settings | Value |
|---|---|
| FTP subsidy after tax | 2.087 EUR m |
| Programme cost after tax | 15.00 EUR m |
| Internal carbon fee, group level | 0.0 EUR m |
| Real cost to shareholders, after tax | 21.69 EUR m a year |
| Real cost in return on CET1 | 13.13 bp |
| Share of the real cost that is programme opex | 69.2 % |
| Opportunity cost of the climate add-on | 32.16 EUR m a year |
| Real plus opportunity cost in return on CET1 | 32.60 bp |
Try it. Replace the run-down loss with the exit figure of stage 3 (20.529): the bill almost doubles. Then set the hurdle to 9%: the opportunity cost of the add-on falls, which is why the capital committee’s choice of hurdle matters as much as the add-on.
Result. The real cost of the plan to shareholders is EUR 21.69m a year after tax, 13.1 bp of return on CET1. The largest line is not a climate price but the programme’s own operating cost: 69.2% of the total. The FTP subsidy costs EUR 2.09m after tax, the carbon budget EUR 0.53m, the run-down EUR 4.07m. The internal carbon fee costs the group nothing: it moves money from desks to a central budget. The ICAAP climate add-on is an opportunity cost of EUR 32.16m a year if the capital it ties up would otherwise earn the hurdle or be returned; with it, the total is 32.6 bp. Under the exit option the real cost would be EUR 38.15m, 23.1 bp.
Reading. Who pays?
WHO DOES WHAT — The CFO’s question in the board seminar will be “is this in the budget?”. The answer must be yes, line by line: the programme opex in the cost base of the Risk and Finance functions, the FTP subsidy in the central transition budget with its EUR 3m cap, the run-down in the business lines’ income plans. An unbudgeted plan is a plan the executive committee will cut in the first bad quarter.
Question. The 2027-2029 LTIP will vest on 2030 outcomes. The pay consultant proposes “power book intensity against the 162.4 kg/MWh target” as the climate metric, with a 15% weight. Does it reward the right strategy?
Data (case assumptions). Target variable pay EUR 1.2m (section 2.3); climate weight 15%; payout from 0% to 150%. Intensity metric: 0% at or above the threshold of target + 10% (178.64 kg/MWh), 100% at target (162.4), 150% at stretch, target − 5% (154.28), linear between. Client-effect metric (the share of the book’s improvement due to clients’ own decarbonisation, E07): 0% at or below 50%, 100% at 60%, 150% at 70%. Strategies and their 2030 outcomes from E07: clients’ plans only (261.1 kg/MWh, client effect 100% by construction, because nothing else changes), Plan M (160.4; 70.6%), exit Baltica with EUR 1.5bn of renewables (152.7; 51.5%).
INTERACTIVE LAB — A climate metric in the LTIP: which strategy does it pay for?
Compute the payout of the climate component of executive variable pay under three strategies and three scorecard designs.
| Parameter you can move | Range | Default |
|---|---|---|
| Scorecard design | Intensity only / 50/50 blend / Blend with intensity gate | Intensity only |
| Strategy delivered by 2030 | Clients’ plans only / Plan M / Exit Baltica + EUR 1.5bn PF | Plan M |
| Target variable pay | 0.5 to 3 EUR m | 1.2 EUR m |
| Weight of the climate component | 5 to 30 % | 15 % |
| Result at default settings | Value |
|---|---|
| Intensity threshold (zero payout) | 178.64 kg/MWh |
| Intensity stretch (maximum payout) | 154.28 kg/MWh |
| Payout on the intensity metric | 112.3 % |
| Payout on the client-effect metric | 150.0 % |
| Payout of the climate component | 112.3 % |
| Climate component of the award | 0.2022 EUR m |
Try it. Under ‘Intensity only’, compare Plan M and exit: the scorecard pays the maximum for the strategy that does less in the real economy. Then try the 50/50 blend with ‘Clients’ plans only’: doing nothing earns 75%.
Result. With the consultant’s metric, Plan M pays 112.3% of target on the climate component (EUR 0.2022m), and exit pays the maximum 150% (EUR 0.27m): the scorecard rewards the strategy that the Group Climate Committee rejected because it delivers less real decarbonisation. A 50/50 blend with the client-effect metric reverses the ranking (Plan M 131.2%, exit 82.5%) but pays 75% for doing nothing, because a book where only clients move has a client-effect share of 100%. The gated blend, which pays nothing unless intensity is below the threshold, gives Plan M 131.2%, exit 82.5% and inaction 0%.
Reading. The amounts are small, a few tens of thousands of euros of difference on one person’s award, and that is the first lesson: a 15% climate weight will not by itself change a chief executive’s strategy. The signal matters more than the money, in both directions: investors and the supervisor read the metric as a statement of what the bank values, and a metric that pays for exit tells the organisation that the plan’s “transition partner” stance is not meant. The remuneration committee retains the gated blend and adds three safeguards.
PITFALL — Every metric has a way to win without doing the work. Intensity rewards dilution and exit; absolute financed emissions reward exit and a fall in clients’ enterprise value; green volumes reward relabelling; the client-effect share rewards inaction. A scorecard needs at least two metrics that fail in different directions, and a gate.
Question. What does the plan look like on paper, and what does the board decide?
The document. The drafters follow the structure of paragraph 109 of the EBA Guidelines, so that the JST can map it directly. The plan runs to about forty pages plus annexes.
| Section of the plan | Meridian content | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Strategy and materiality | Transition partner stance; material sectors | Stage 3, E08 |
| Metrics and targets | Power 162.4 kg/MWh in 2030; high-carbon EUR 6.5bn by 2029 | E07, stage 3 |
| Risk appetite and limits | Five board metrics with tiers | Stage 2 |
| Governance and pay | Committee map; gated LTIP metric | Stage 5 |
| Implementation | FTP grid, carbon price, origination budget | E03, E04, E07 |
| Engagement | Client plan scoring, escalation, milestones | B01, E07 |
| Financial resources | EUR 21.7m a year; EUR 268m add-on | Stage 4, E08 |
| Monitoring | Quarterly dashboard, annual review | Section 4 |
The challenge. Before the vote, the BRC chair asks the company secretary to record the questions directors raised and the answers given, because the JST will read them. Five stand out.
The decision. The board, on the BRC’s recommendation, approves the RAS metrics and limits in December 2026 and the plan in March 2027. The minutes record five points.
WHY IT MATTERS ON THE DESK — These five points are the “use test”. Each changes something a desk will see in January: a limit, a price, an origination rule, a metric in a manager’s objectives. A plan that changes nothing for the desks is a disclosure document, whatever its title.
| Stage | Key figure | Value |
|---|---|---|
| 5.2 Capacity | CET1 before and after S2 | 14.00%; 12.44% |
| 5.2 Capacity | S2 depletion; risk capacity; appetite share | 155.9 bp; 419 bp; 35.8% |
| 5.2 Capacity | Headroom after S2: to MDA; to MDA + P2G | 263.1 bp; 138.1 bp |
| 5.2 Capacity | Share of depletion from losses | 14.6% |
| 5.2 Capacity | 2030 floor-bound: CET1; depletion; headroom to P2G | 13.81%; 152.1 bp; 122.8 bp |
| 5.3 Glide path | Compound annual reduction; 2027 milestone | 15.47%; 268.8 kg/MWh |
| 5.3 Glide path | Plan M 2027 deviation: compound; linear | 18.3% red; 9.4% amber |
| 5.3 Glide path | Plan delivered: amber and red years, compound | 2 and 1 |
| 5.4 Strategy | Depletion per EUR 1bn; non-avoidable part | 4.42 bp; 121.2 bp |
| 5.4 Strategy | Transition partner: book 2029; depletion; income | EUR 6.51bn; 150.0 bp; EUR −4.07m |
| 5.4 Strategy | Exit: book 2029; depletion; income | EUR 1.09bn; 126.0 bp; EUR −20.53m |
| 5.4 Strategy | Growth 5%: depletion; income | 161.4 bp; EUR +8.36m |
| 5.4 Strategy | RAROC high-carbon; redeployed renewables | 8.92%; 9.83% |
| 5.5 Cost | Real cost after tax; in ROE | EUR 21.69m; 13.1 bp |
| 5.5 Cost | Programme share; add-on opportunity cost | 69.2%; EUR 32.16m |
| 5.5 Cost | Real plus opportunity; exit variant | 32.6 bp; EUR 38.15m |
| 5.6 Pay | Intensity only: Plan M; exit | 112.3%; 150% |
| 5.6 Pay | Gated blend: Plan M; exit; inaction | 131.2%; 82.5%; 0% |
The plan is not a deal, but it is made of deals, and its economics land in the same five places as every other module’s.
There is no green supporting factor or brown penalising factor in CRR3 (E02): a renewables loan and a coal-plant loan of the same rating, maturity and collateral carry the same Pillar 1 risk weight. The plan therefore moves Pillar 1 capital only through volumes and through ratings, which credible client transition plans can protect (E01, E08). Three capital effects matter more.
The plan’s growth leg is the EUR 2bn renewables origination budget granted by the Group Climate Committee (E07). The capital and performance team prices it on Cap Ferrat’s economics (B06, E03): margin 180 bp, FTP 60 bp for a ten-year average life, upfront fee 200 bp amortised over twelve years, PD 0.50%, LGD 40%, risk weight 52.5% (slotting “strong” 70% times the 0.75 infrastructure supporting factor), cost-income 40%. Relationship revenues are scaled from Cap Ferrat (EUR 0.9m per EUR 150m) at 60% cost-income and EUR 2.5 of RWA per euro. Attributed emissions are 3.16 t per EUR m (Cap Ferrat’s 362.9 t for EUR 115m, E03).
INTERACTIVE LAB — RAROC of the EUR 2bn renewables origination budget, and what each plan instrument adds
Compute the RAROC and EVA of the plan’s renewables budget line by line, then add the green FTP incentive, relationship revenues, the internal carbon fee and a climate add-on, and see the effect on the Green Asset Ratio.
| Parameter you can move | Range | Default |
|---|---|---|
| Renewables lending | 500 to 4000 EUR m | 2000 EUR m |
| Margin | 100 to 300 bp | 180 bp |
| FTP liquidity charge (10-year average life) | 0 to 100 bp | 60 bp |
| Green FTP incentive | 0 to 20 bp | 0 bp |
| Upfront fee, amortised over 12 years | 0 to 300 bp | 200 bp |
| Include relationship revenues | no / yes | no |
| PD | 0.1 to 3 % | 0.5 % |
| LGD | 10 to 60 % | 40 % |
| Risk weight | 20 to 150 % | 52.5 % |
| Internal carbon fee | 0 to 100 EUR per t | 0 EUR per t |
| Climate add-on allocated | 0 to 100 EUR m | 0 EUR m |
| GAR covered assets (denominator) | 100 to 250 EUR bn | 151 EUR bn |
| Result at default settings | Value |
|---|---|
| Revenues | 27.333 EUR m |
| Operating costs | 10.933 EUR m |
| Expected loss | 4.00 EUR m |
| Internal carbon fee | 0.0000 EUR m |
| RWA | 1,050.0 EUR m |
| Allocated capital | 136.50 EUR m |
| Net result after tax | 9.300 EUR m |
| RAROC | 6.81 % |
| EVA at 12% | -7.080 EUR m |
| GAR uplift if fully aligned | 132.5 bp |
Try it. With the FTP incentive and relationship revenues, raise the margin until RAROC reaches 12%: it takes a margin well above Cap Ferrat’s 180 bp. Then allocate EUR 20m of climate add-on and watch a low-carbon book pay for a risk it does not carry.
Line by line. Lending revenue: EUR 2,000m × (180 − 60) bp = EUR 24.0m, plus the amortised upfront fee EUR 3.333m: EUR 27.333m. Costs at 40%: EUR 10.933m. Expected loss: 0.50% × 40% × 2,000 = EUR 4.0m. RWA: 52.5% × 2,000 = EUR 1,050m; capital EUR 136.5m. Net result: (27.333 − 10.933 − 4.0) × 75% = EUR 9.3m. RAROC 6.81%, EVA EUR −7.08m.
What the plan’s instruments add. The aligned green FTP incentive of 10 bp adds EUR 2.0m of revenue and lifts RAROC to 7.47%. Relationship revenues (swaps, account bank, agency) add EUR 12m and EUR 30m of RWA: 9.83%, EVA EUR −3.05m. The internal carbon fee at EUR 25 costs EUR 0.158m and takes RAROC to 9.74%; at the proposed EUR 35, 9.71%. A climate add-on would be allocated at zero to this book, since its S2 loss is negligible.
Reading. The plan’s growth engine does not reach the hurdle, even with every internal instrument. Three readings are possible, and the board should hear all three. The hurdle may be too high for low-risk, long-dated infrastructure (E03’s “through-the-cycle” debate). The arranging and underwriting fees, earned once and not in this running view, may close the gap for originate-to-distribute business (B16). Or the bank is choosing to accept a lower return on part of its book as the price of its positioning, which is legitimate if it is decided and disclosed, not hidden in a transfer price. What is not legitimate is to argue that green lending is more profitable without showing the numbers.
The plan inherits the 2027 FTP grid (E04): 30 bp liquidity charge for all five-year loans; a 1.8 bp pass-through of the greenium on green-funded assets; a strategic bonus of 8.2 bp for aligned loans and 3.2 bp for eligible-only loans, paid by a central budget capped at EUR 3m a year; a risk-based contingent charge on undrawn lines to high-transition-risk sectors from April 2027. For the plan, two points. First, the bonus is a subsidy, budgeted as such in stage 4; it is not evidence that green assets are cheaper to fund. Second, the run-down of the high-carbon book releases undrawn commitments as well as loans, which reduces the HQLA buffer and its carry cost (E04 computed EUR 8.1m a year of carry on a stressed top-up); the plan’s liquidity section should count that saving, which is small but real.
IFRS 9. The plan does not change the expected credit loss model, but it changes the information the model uses. A client classified “not credible” in the transition-plan scoring, or a sector placed in managed run-down, is a candidate for a significant increase in credit risk review; Meridian’s sector overlays (E01, E05) are reviewed against the plan’s sector list every quarter. The consistency check runs both ways: an ECL overlay that assumes a disorderly transition and a business plan that assumes growth in the same sector describe two worlds.
Provisions. A public decarbonisation target does not create a provision under IAS 37: there is no present obligation to transfer economic benefits. A contractual commitment to fund (a committed renewables facility) is a loan commitment under IFRS 9, with its own ECL.
Share-based pay. Performance shares under the LTIP are equity-settled share-based payments under IFRS 2. A climate metric is a non-market performance condition: the expense is measured at grant-date fair value and adjusted over the vesting period for the number of shares expected to vest. If the bank expects Plan M to be delivered, it accrues the climate component at 131.2% of target; a change in that expectation changes the expense. A share-price condition (relative total shareholder return) would be treated differently, in the grant-date fair value.
Sustainability statement. ESRS E1 asks for the transition plan, targets, and anticipated financial effects of climate risks. The plan’s financial resources (stage 4) and its stress results (stage 1) are the natural content; their limitations must be stated with them.
The plan should state how each instrument moves the published figures. The EUR 2bn renewables budget, if fully Taxonomy-aligned, adds 132.5 bp to a GAR whose covered-asset denominator is EUR 151bn (E06): from 6.69% towards 8.0%, before any run-off of other aligned assets. The run-down of the high-carbon book reduces financed emissions in the numerator of E06’s 11.84 MtCO2e, but the attribution trap of E07 applies: exit removes emissions from Meridian’s book without removing them from the atmosphere. Pillar 3 ESG Template 3 (alignment metrics) will show the power intensity against the IEA benchmark, and Template 1 the exposures to carbon-intensive sectors. The plan’s quarterly dashboard and the Pillar 3 templates must be produced from the same data, with the same cut-off dates; E11 describes the data model that makes that possible.
| Risk | Example | Control | Owner |
|---|---|---|---|
| Plan not used | Targets approved, no limit changes | Use test: every target linked to a KRI or limit | CRO |
| Inconsistent plans | CRD plan, CSRD and investor deck differ | Consistency memo signed before publication | General Counsel, CFO |
| Glide path miscalibrated | Red when on track, or green until 2029 | Plan-based path with justified steps, fixed end-point | Group Climate Committee |
| Metric gaming | Intensity met by exit or dilution | Paired metrics, client-effect reporting | ESG risk team |
| Pay rewards wrong strategy | LTIP pays for exit | Gated blend, malus, data lock | Remuneration Committee |
| Data restatement | EVIC or PCAF change moves the KRI | Methodology freeze, restatement log | Finance |
| Board suitability gap | No director can challenge scenarios | Skills matrix, training, external briefings | Nomination Committee |
| Unbudgeted plan | Costs cut in a bad quarter | Line-by-line budget, CFO sign-off | CFO |
| Supervisory action | Weak plan reflected in SREP | Gap analysis against EBA GL, JST dialogue | CRO |
| Litigation | Claims that commitments were misleading | Legal review of public wording | General Counsel |
| Stress model risk | Linear depletion assumed | Model validation, sensitivity to client selection | Model Risk Management |
Red-flag checklist for a bank’s own transition plan.
PITFALL — Since the NZBA’s closure, some banks have softened or removed public targets. A softer public commitment does not reduce the CRD obligation: the prudential plan still needs quantifiable targets. Removing a target from the website while keeping it in the plan creates exactly the inconsistency the supervisor and the auditor look for.
Regulatory calendar (verified November 2026).
What changed recently. Three shifts in eighteen months. First, the centre of gravity moved from voluntary pledges to prudential law: the plan that a European bank must have is now the CRD plan, and the supervisor, not an alliance, checks it. Second, the corporate side was simplified: with Article 22 of the CSDDD deleted and the CSRD scope narrowed, fewer of a bank’s clients will publish transition plans under EU law, which makes the bank’s own client assessment (B01) more important, not less. Third, enforcement became real: the penalty payments were small relative to bank earnings, but they were public and they were about governance steps, not about outcomes.
Orders of magnitude. For a bank of Meridian’s size: a climate stress depletion of 40 to 160 bp across scenarios (E08); the cost of an ESG risk and data programme in the low tens of millions of euros a year (case assumption here, consistent with the scale of the data work described in E11); a climate component of executive variable pay that in published European schemes is usually a minority of the scorecard. The course does not quote an average weight because published surveys define “ESG metric” differently.
Open debates.
INTERACTIVE LAB — Governance, risk appetite and the bank’s transition plan: check your understanding
Test the key concepts of the module.
Q1. Which provision requires an EU bank to hold plans with quantifiable targets to address financial risks from ESG factors?
Answer: B. Article 76(2) CRD, introduced by CRD6, requires the management body to develop and monitor specific plans with quantifiable targets.
Q2. From when do the EBA Guidelines on the management of ESG risks apply to a large bank such as Meridian?
Answer: C. They apply from 11 January 2026 to institutions other than SNCIs; SNCIs have until 11 January 2027.
Q3. What did the Omnibus I Directive do to the CSDDD transition-plan obligation?
Answer: A. Article 22 was deleted entirely in the final text published on 26 February 2026.
Q4. Meridian’s S2 depletion is 155.9 bp, and risk capacity is 419 bp. What share of capacity does a 150 bp appetite represent?
Answer: B. 150 / 419 = 35.8%.
Q5. Why is most of the S2 depletion not removed by exiting the high-carbon book?
Answer: C. With the book at zero, depletion is still 121.2 bp: the scenario’s macro shock hits the whole book.
Q6. A compound glide path, compared with a linear one to the same 2030 target, makes early milestones:
Answer: A. A constant percentage reduction takes the largest absolute steps first, so early milestones are lower.
Q7. Which LTIP metric pays the most for exiting a coal-heavy client while keeping its emissions unchanged in the real economy?
Answer: C. Exit lowers book intensity fastest; in the case it pays 150% against 112.3% for Plan M.
Q8. The internal carbon fee charged to desks at EUR 25 per tonne costs the group:
Answer: B. It moves money between desks and the centre; it matters through the decisions it changes.
Q9. Under CRD rules for material risk-takers, variable pay may exceed 100% of fixed pay:
Answer: B. The bonus cap is 100% of fixed pay, or 200% with a qualified-majority shareholder approval.
Q10. Under IFRS 2, a climate metric in a performance-share plan is:
Answer: C. Non-market conditions affect the expected number of instruments vesting, not the grant-date fair value.
Q11. Which body approves the prudential transition plan under the EBA Guidelines?
Answer: C. The management body approves the plans, oversees implementation and decides on remedial actions.
Q12. What is the long-term horizon that plans and ESG risk management must cover at minimum?
Answer: C. CRD6 and the EBA Guidelines require at least ten years, with milestones, anchored on EU 2030 and 2050 objectives.
Q13. Why does the S2 depletion in bp fall from 155.9 to 152.1 when the output floor binds in 2030?
Answer: B. Same euro losses and migration over a larger starting RWA give fewer basis points, while the starting ratio is lower.
Q14. What did the ECB’s first two public climate-related penalty payments concern?
Answer: B. ABANCA and Crédit Agricole were penalised for not completing climate and environmental materiality assessments on time.
A bank has CET1 capital of EUR 8.0bn and RWA of EUR 60bn. Its MDA trigger is 9.50% and its P2G 1.00%. A disorderly-transition scenario produces EUR 200m of extra pre-tax credit loss and EUR 5bn of RWA migration. Tax rate 25%. Compute the CET1 ratio before and after stress, the depletion, the risk capacity and the headroom to MDA plus P2G.
Solution. Before stress: 8.0 / 60 = 13.33%. After-tax loss: 0.75 × 200 = EUR 150m. Stressed ratio: (8.0 − 0.15) / (60 + 5) = 7.85 / 65 = 12.08%. Depletion: 13.333 − 12.077 = 125.6 bp. Capacity: 13.333 − 9.50 = 383.3 bp. Headroom after stress to MDA plus P2G (10.50%): 12.077 − 10.50 = 157.7 bp. Losses explain only 0.15 / 60 = 25 bp of the depletion; the rest, about 100 bp, is migration. An appetite of 150 bp would be 39% of capacity.
A bank’s steel book has an intensity of 300 (index units) in 2025 and a target of 120 in 2030. The steering plan projects 235 in 2027. Compute the compound and linear 2027 milestones and the deviation of the plan under each, with an amber tolerance of 5% and a red tolerance of 15%.
Solution. Compound factor: (120 / 300)^(1/5) = 0.4^0.2 = 0.8326, a reduction of 16.75% a year. 2027 milestone: 300 × 0.8326² = 207.9. Linear step: (300 − 120) / 5 = 36 a year, 2027 milestone 228.0. Deviation of the plan: 235 / 207.9 − 1 = 13.0% on the compound path (amber), 235 / 228 − 1 = 3.1% on the linear path (green). If the plan’s step is justified by dated actions (for example, an electric-arc furnace commissioned in 2028), the linear or plan-based path tells the board the truth; a compound KRI would show amber for a plan on track.
An executive’s target variable pay is EUR 0.9m; the climate component weighs 20%. The metric pays 0% at or above 220, 100% at the target of 200, 150% at or below the stretch of 190, linearly between. The outcome is 196. Deferral is 60% over five years. Compute the payout, the climate award, the deferred part and the annual tranche; then the award if the outcome were 185.
Solution. Payout: 100% + 50% × (200 − 196) / (200 − 190) = 120%. Climate award: 0.9 × 20% × 120% = EUR 0.216m. Deferred: 60% × 0.216 = EUR 0.1296m, paid in five tranches of EUR 0.0259m. At 185 the payout is capped at 150%: award EUR 0.27m. The committee should check whether the outcome below the stretch came from client decarbonisation or from portfolio effects before paying the cap.
1. What is a prudential transition plan, and how is it different from a net-zero pledge? It is the plan required by Article 76(2) CRD, as amended by CRD6, with quantifiable targets and processes to monitor and address the financial risks from ESG factors, including the transition. It is approved by the management body, addressed to the supervisor and reviewed in the SREP. A net-zero pledge is a voluntary public commitment about impact. A bank can have the first without the second, and since the NZBA closed, many European banks rely on the first as their reference.
2. How would you set a climate risk appetite? I would start from capacity: the distance from the current CET1 ratio to the MDA trigger. I would then decide how much of it a severe climate scenario may use, recognising that climate scenarios include a macro shock that overlaps with the general stress appetite. I would express the appetite as a depletion threshold, an early-warning level and a target, and cascade it into exposure limits using the stress model’s sensitivity per euro of exposure. Finally I would check that the threshold is consistent with the capital plan, including the output floor.
3. Why might a well-designed plan show a red KRI when it is on track? Because the glide path used for the KRI may not match the plan’s timing. A compound path front-loads reductions, while power and industrial decarbonisation is lumpy and back-loaded. If the KRI is red when the plan is delivered, the board learns to ignore it. The fix is a plan-based path, approved with the actions that justify it, with the end-point fixed by the target.
4. Should a bank exit high-carbon sectors to meet its plan? Exit reduces the bank’s attributed emissions and some stress loss, but it does not remove the recession channel, and it may not reduce real-world emissions if another lender steps in. The EBA has said plans are not meant to force divestment. A transition-partner stance, staying with clients who have credible plans, financing their transition with conditions and running down the others, usually gives a better balance of risk, income and impact. Client-level exit remains a necessary fallback for clients who miss milestones.
5. How would you put climate into executive pay without creating bad incentives? I would use at least two metrics that fail in different directions, for example book intensity and the client-effect share, and add a gate so that inaction does not pay. I would measure outcomes on a methodology frozen at grant, have Internal Audit review them, and link the deferred climate component to malus if the plan is revised downward or the KRI stays red. I would keep the weight modest and disclose the calculation in the remuneration report.
6. What does the CSDDD now require of banks on transition plans? Nothing: Omnibus I deleted Article 22, which had required a 1.5°C-compatible transition plan, and kept downstream financial services outside due diligence. Banks still disclose their transition plan under CSRD and ESRS E1 if they have one, and they must hold a prudential plan under CRD6. The three must be consistent, which is in practice the hard part.
7. What is the cost of a transition plan, and who pays? In the Meridian case, about EUR 22m a year after tax, 13 bp of return on CET1, of which two thirds is the operating cost of the risk and data programme. Shareholders pay the subsidies, the programme and the income forgone; desks pay the internal carbon fee, which is a transfer; clients pay only where pricing changes. The climate capital add-on is an opportunity cost that becomes real only if capital binds.
8. What does a supervisor look for when reviewing a bank’s plan? Evidence of use: a limit, a price or an origination rule that changed because of the plan, and minutes that show challenge. Consistency between the plan, the RAS, the ICAAP, the CSRD statement and public commitments. Governance: who owns each target, how deviations are escalated, how pay is linked. And the basics that the ECB has already enforced, starting with a timely materiality assessment.
EU law (stable identifiers)
EBA, ECB and international bodies
Commentary used to verify dates and status
Academic and reference texts